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PLATO

CHARMIDES ALCIBIADES I AND II
HIPPARCHUS THE LOVERS
THEAGES MINOS EPINOMIS

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WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

CHARMIDES ALCIBIADES I AND II
HIPPARCHUS THE LOVERS
THEAGES MINOS EPINOMIS

BY

W. R. M. LAMB, M.A.

SOMETIME FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

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PREFACE

THE Greek text in this volume is based on the recension of Schanz, except in the cases of the *Minos* and the *Epinomis*, where it follows in the main the text of C. F. Hermann. Emendations accepted from modern scholars are noted as they occur.

The special introductions are intended merely to prepare the reader for the general character and purpose of each dialogue.

W. R. M. LAMB.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

PLATO was born in 427 B.C. of Athenian parents who could provide him with the best education of the day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life. He came to manhood in the dismal close of the Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other sophists, and his early bent seems to have been towards poetry. But his intelligence was too progressive to rest in the agnostic position on which the sophistic culture was based. A century before, Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible, because the objects of sense are continually changing; yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by developing some hints let fall by its oracular author about the truth contained in names. From this influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates, whose character and gifts have left a singular impress on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost wholly due to Plato's applications and extensions of

his master's thought; since, fortunately for us, the pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but brought his artistic genius into play, and composed the memorials of philosophic talk which we know as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew similar sketches of his teaching: the suggestion came from the "mimes" of the Syracusan Sophron, —realistic studies of conversation between ordinary types of character. As Plato became more engrossed in the Socratic speculations, this artistic impulse was strengthened by the desire of recording each definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion and advance.

When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was over sixty, and had long been notorious in Athens for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the *Phaedo* he tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific explanations of the universe, and found them full of puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anaxagoras,—that the cause of everything is "mind." This was more promising: but it led nowhere after all, since it failed to rise above the conception of physical energy; this "mind" showed no intelligent aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the plan of making *definitions* of "beautiful," "good," "large," and so on, as qualities observed in the several classes of beautiful, good and large material things, and then employing these propositions, if they

appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science out of a recognized theory of " ideas " or " forms," which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated when we say " this man is good," and which postulates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects of sense. His " hypothetical " method, familiar to mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance in the *Republic*.

The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate scene of the *Phaedo* were accustomed to the theory of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and the soul. For some years before the master's death (399 B.C.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was often a spell-bound hearer of the " satyr." But ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which varied according to their age and the extent of their acquaintance with him. Aristophanes' burlesque in the *Clouds* (423 B.C.) had left a common impression not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet the young men who had any frequent speech with him in his later years, while they felt there was something uncanny about him, found an irresistible attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent eloquence on the principles of their actions and careers. He kept no school, and took no fees ; he distrusted the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom he was carelessly confounded ; moreover, he professed

to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues, such as the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, and *Lysis*, show the manner in which he performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect, the law of definite individual knowledge, above all reason of state or tie of party; and it is not surprising that his city, in the effort of recovering her political strength, decided to hush such an inconvenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate, but he continued his work undeterred.

Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have professed no positive doctrine, there were one or two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue, he said, is knowledge; for each man's good is his happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it awakened and exercised by "dialectic," or a systematic course of question and answer. He also believed his mission to be divinely ordained, and asserted that his own actions were guided at times by the prohibitions of a "spiritual sign." He was capable, as we find in the *Symposium*, of standing in rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and once for as long as twenty-four hours.

It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance

on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and mystical suggestions must have led his favourite pupils a good way towards a new system of metaphysics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings with the material world, and that the mind has prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic life.

After the death of Socrates in 399, Plato spent some twelve years in study and travel. For the first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara, where Eucleides, his fellow-student and friend, was forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have composed some of the six Dialogues already mentioned as recording Socrates' activity in Athens. Towards and probably beyond the end of this period, in order to present the Socratic method in bolder conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the *Protagoras*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*. These works show a much greater command of dramatic and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The last of them may well be later than 387, the year in which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the Academy ; where the memory of his master was to be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the

Socratic discussions among the elect of the new generation. The rivalry of this private college with the professional school of Isocrates is discernible in the subject and tone of the *Gorgias*. Plato carried on the direction of the Academy till his death, at eighty-one, in 346; save that half-way through this period (367) he accepted the invitation of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato's talk: now it was a wayward youth who refused the yoke of a systematic training. What that training was like we see in the *Republic*, where true political wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned, with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.

The *Meno* and *Gorgias* set forth the doctrine that knowledge of right is latent in our minds: dialectic, not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived, must be long and difficult: but he felt a mystical rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture the immutable "forms" as existing in a world of their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence it springs—that knowledge is somehow possible, had come to the front of his mind when he began to know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the *Cratylus* and *Symposium*, display the strength of the conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the

feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute beauty. The *Phaedo* turns the logical theory upon the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of death.

With increasing confidence in himself as the successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the *Republic*, to show the master meeting his own unsatisfied queries on education and politics. We read now of a " form " of good to which all thought and action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will explain not merely why justice is better than injustice, but the meaning and aim of everything. In order that man may be fully understood, we are to view him " writ large " in the organization of an ideal state. The scheme of description opens out into many subsidiary topics, including three great proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of private property, the community of women and children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But the central subject is the preparation of the philosopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for dialectic; so that, once possessed of the supreme truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men. As in the *Phaedo*, the spell of mythical revelation is

brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The *Phaedrus* takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us allegorically into the realm of "ideas," and thence to point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philosopher's duty of investigating the mutual relations of the "forms" to which his study of particular things has led him.

A closer interest in logical method, appearing through his delight in imaginative construction, is one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato's teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues, the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, he puts off the aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as categories of thought which require co-ordination. The discussion of knowledge in the former makes it evident that the Academy was now the meeting-place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had learnt from other schools of thought; while the arguments are conducted with a critical caution very different from the brilliant and often hasty zeal of Socrates. The *Parmenides* corrects an actual or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle, now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with the theory as he understood it. The forms are viewed in the light of the necessities of thought: knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice which will raise our minds to the vision of all parti-

culars in their rightly distinguished and connected classes.

Plato is here at work on his own great problem :— If what we know is a single permanent law under which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the link between the one and the many? The *Sophist* contains some of his ripest thought on this increasingly urgent question : his confident advance beyond Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form, which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of a lecture. We observe an attention to physical science, the association of soul, motion, and existence, and the comparative study of being and not-being. The *Politicus* returns to the topic of state-government, and carries on the process of acquiring perfect notions of reality by the classification of things. Perhaps we should see in the absolute "mean" which is posited as the standard of all arts, business, and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The *Philebus*, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge, dwells further on the correct division and classification required if our reason, as it surely must, is to apprehend truth. The method is becoming more thorough and more complex, and Plato's hope of bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is gaining a clearer insight into the problem of unity and plurality.

The magnificent myth of the *Timaeus*, related by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the universe, so as to show how the One manifests

itself as the Many. We have here the latest reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the *Laws*, he addresses himself to the final duty of the philosopher as announced in the *Republic*: a long habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather than disqualify him for the practical regulation of public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once more on soul, as the energy of the world and the vehicle of our sovereign reason.

Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates' teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle; whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may be able to detect in the *Timaeus* a tendency to view numbers as the real principles of things; and we may conjecture a late-found interest in the physical complexion of the world. As a true artist, with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life, Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, throughout: but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science we must regard him rather as a great inventor of

sciences than as what we should now call a scientist. This is giving him a splendid name, which few men have earned. Some of his inventions may be unrealizable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly futile. There are flaws in his arguments: to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy.

W. R. M. Lamb.

[Note.—*Each of the Dialogues is a self-contained whole. The order in which they have been mentioned in this Introduction is that which agrees best in the main with modern views of Plato's mental progress, though the succession in some instances is uncertain.*]

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CHARMIDES

INTRODUCTION TO THE *CHARMIDES*

THE subject of this dialogue is the virtue whose various aspects we may approach in English with the words "temperance," "sobriety," "moderation," or "discretion," but for which our language, after centuries of analysis and definition have narrowed the application of ethical terms, has now no constant equivalent. The first of these words, "temperance," has been used throughout the present translation; but it is necessary to note that the intellectual element in the Greek virtue of "temperance" is not only recognizable from the beginning of the conversation, but increasingly prominent as the argument proceeds. The Greeks always tended to regard a moral quality as a state of the reasoning mind; and Socrates' particular treatment of "temperance" in this discussion implies that he and his circle were even inclined to identify it with a kind of practical wisdom or prudence.[1] An attentive reader will find no difficulty in perceiving the salient features of "temperance"—a distinct understanding of it as a whole is just what the speakers themselves are seeking—at each turn of the conversation.

[1] *σωφροσύνη*, indeed, though it came to mean something like our "temperance," originally meant "soundness of mind," "wholeness or health of the faculty of thought (*φρονεῖν*)."

The handsome youth Charmides, whom Socrates meets in a wrestling-school at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (432 B.C.), traces his descent through his father Glaucon to Dropides, a friend and kinsman of Solon; his mother was a sister of Pyrilampes, who was noted for his stature and beauty. Critias, son of Glaucon's brother Callaeschrus, and thus first cousin to Charmides, is a man of mature age, for he appears as his cousin's guardian: he became famous, or rather infamous, later on as one of the Thirty Tyrants; and together with Charmides he fell fighting for despotism against democracy in 404 B.C. But of these grim and dismal doings, which filled Plato (then a youth of twenty-three) with a horror of Athenian politics as conceived and conducted at that time, there is no hint in this brilliant scene of healthful training and ingenuous debate. Plato's own mother, Perictione, was Charmides' sister, and he seems to record here with unmixed pride the goodly connexions of his family, from the standpoint of that earlier time of his childhood. He chooses his uncle Charmides as offering a likely instance, in the flower of his youth, of a healthy, well-conditioned mind in a handsome, well-developed body.

As soon as Socrates catches sight of the youth, he is fired with admiration of his grace. But the serious interest of Socrates is fixed, as ever, on the mind of this attractive person, and he proceeds at once to question him on the state of his "soul" and the nature of that "temperance" which is necessary for the well-being of the whole human organism. Two suggestions of Charmides — that temperance is a quiet or sedate kind of conduct,

and that it is a feeling of modesty—are in turn disproved by Socrates ; a third definition, supported by and apparently derived from Critias—that it is doing one's own business—leads Socrates to insist, in his habitual way, on the importance of *knowing* what one is doing, with the result that Critias gives a fourth definition—self-knowledge (164-5). Socrates tries to find out what exactly is the thing known by means of temperance, and so procured by it, as health is by medicine and buildings by architecture. Critias replies that temperance is distinguished from all other kinds of knowledge by being the science of all the sciences, including itself (166). But Socrates shows the difficulty of conceiving of any function or faculty as applied to itself ; it seems to require some separate object (168-9). He doubts, therefore, if there can be such cognition of cognition ; and even supposing this is possible, how about cognition of non-cognition, which was a part of the suggested nature of temperance (169) ? But altogether this view of the matter is too aridly intellectual, and of no practical value, for it fails to include a knowledge of what will be beneficial or useful (172-3). We find that what we really require is a knowledge of good and evil (174), and it does not appear that temperance is anything like this at all. In the end, we are not only left without a satisfactory answer to our question, but have rashly hazarded some improbable statements by the way.

Such is the bare outline of this interesting, if inconclusive, discussion. Plato's main object in composing the dialogue was to exhibit and recommend the process of attaining, or endeavouring to

attain, a clear notion of an ordinary moral quality; and as the difficulties accumulate, he takes the opportunity of enforcing his master's tenet that all human virtue and well-being must be based on knowledge. Our curiosity is first started in one direction, and then whetted and turned in another. The seemingly profitless search is so conducted that we are drawn, as audience of the little drama, to partake in a clarifying exercise of the mind, and we come away eager to analyse and refine our moral ideals. The need of understanding and co-ordinating the fundamental conceptions and conventions of society is the dominant theme of Plato's earlier writings: the scene and subject of each conversation are in effect quite casual, and the efforts of the speakers have no relation to what they may have said yesterday or may say to-morrow.

Thus the suggestion (161 c), that temperance is "doing one's own business," is treated here as a puzzling riddle, and is lightly dismissed with some unfair play with the scope of the word "doing": whereas this very suggestion is seriously advanced in the *Republic* (433, 496, 550) as a definition of justice. In the same way "self-knowledge" (another definition of temperance) is here pronounced to be impossible, and even if possible, useless (166): but elsewhere we often find Plato insisting, with earnest eloquence, on the necessity and high value of self-knowledge. In the *Charmides*, however, Socrates does not stay to develop that familiar theme: for the moment he is only concerned to point out a difficulty involved in the suggestion as applied to temperance. Where he does come to an expectant pause, and hints at the

right direction for further progress in the search, is in the demand for a cognition of good and evil (174), although this happens to be outside the supposed limits of temperance. The train of reasoning here is briefly this: granted that knowledge must be a main constituent of the virtue of temperance, such knowledge cannot merely act or revolve upon itself; it must have relation to some external sphere, and what we require is a knowledge of good and evil in the ends or aims of our conduct, superior to any particular knowledge or science pursued in our ordinary practical life. This division of sciences into the theoretical and the practical is resumed in the *Gorgias*. It is only just mentioned here, and so far "the good" is nothing more august or important than the Socratic conception of "the useful."

We may perhaps regret that in disposing of Charmides' first suggestion Socrates commits the logical blunder of arguing that, because temperance and quickness are both honourable, therefore quickness is temperate (159 D). No doubt Charmides' failure to protest at this point was brought out in discussion at the Academy. Plato would perhaps excuse himself by saying that when he wrote the *Charmides* he was more intent on intellectual drama than on logical accuracy. He has certainly displayed remarkable skill in bringing out the two characters of Charmides and Critias in the natural course of the conversation; and it is worth observing, besides, how the vividness of his portraiture serves to emphasize, by contrast, the impersonal, dispassionate nature of reason and truth (166 C, 175 D).

ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗΣ· ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΣ

St. II p. 153 Ἥκομεν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἑσπέρας ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, οἷον δὲ διὰ χρόνου ἀφιγμένος ἁσμένως ἦα ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς. καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαίστραν τὴν καταντικρὺ τοῦ τῆς Βασίλης ἱεροῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαβον πάνυ πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν καὶ ἀγνῶτας ἐμοί, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους γνωρίμους. καί με ὡς
B εἶδον εἰσιόντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου, εὐθὺς πόρρωθεν ἠσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν· Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ἅτε καὶ μανικὸς ὤν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρός με, καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ δ' ὅς, πῶς ἐσώθης ἐκ τῆς μάχης; ὀλίγον δὲ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι μάχη ἐγεγόνει ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ, ἣν ἄρτι ἦσαν οἱ τῇδε πεπυσμένοι.

[1] A Corinthian colony in Chalcidice which was a tributary ally of Athens, and revolted from her in 433 B.C. In the next year an Athenian force met and fought a Peloponnesian force at Potidaea, and then laid siege to the city. Thus began the Peloponnesian War.

CHARMIDES

[OR ON TEMPERANCE: TENTATIVE]

CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, CHAEREPHON, CRITIAS, CHARMIDES

We arrived yesterday evening from the army at Potidaea,[1] and I sought with delight, after an absence of some time, my wonted conversations. Accordingly I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas,[2] opposite the Queen's shrine,[3] and there I came upon quite a number of people, some of whom were unknown to me, but most of whom I knew. And as soon as they saw me appear thus unexpectedly, they hailed me from a distance on every side; but Chaerephon, like the mad creature that he is, jumped up from their midst and ran to me, and grasping me by the hand—

Socrates, he said, how did you survive the battle? (Shortly before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea, of which the people here had only just had news.)

[2] A professional trainer.

[3] There was a shrine of Basile, or the Queen (of whom nothing is known), some way to the south of the Acropolis. *Cf.* Frazer, *Pausanias*, ii. p. 203.

153 Καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος, Οὕτωσί, ἔφην, ὡς σὺ ὁρᾷς.

Καὶ μὴν ἤγγελταί γε δεῦρο, ἔφη, ἥ τε μάχη πάνυ C ἰσχυρὰ γεγονέναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων τεθνάναι.

Καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ ἀπήγγελται.

Παρεγένου μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ;

Παρεγενόμην.

Δεῦρο δή, ἔφη, καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διήγησαι· οὐ γάρ τί πω πάντα σαφῶς πεπύσμεθα. καὶ ἅμα με καθίζει ἄγων παρὰ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχρου. παρακαθεζόμενος οὖν ἠσπαζόμην τόν τε Κριτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ διηγούμην αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, ὅ τι μέ τις ἀνέροιτο· ἠρώτων δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλο.

D Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἄδην εἴχομεν, αὖθις ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτων τὰ τῇδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχοι τὰ νῦν, περί τε τῶν νέων, εἴ τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφέροντες ἢ σοφίᾳ ἢ κάλλει ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν. καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀποβλέψας πρὸς 154 τὴν θύραν, ἰδών τινας νεανίσκους εἰσιόντας καὶ λοιδορουμένους ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἄλλον ὄχλον ὄπισθεν ἑπόμενον, Περὶ μὲν τῶν καλῶν, ἔφη, Ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτίκα μοι δοκεῖς εἴσεσθαι· οὗτοι γὰρ τυγχάνουσιν οἱ εἰσιόντες πρόδρομοί τε καὶ ἐρασταὶ ὄντες τοῦ δοκοῦντος καλλίστου εἶναι τά γε δὴ νῦν· φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγγὺς ἤδη που εἶναι προσιών.

Ἔστι δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς τε καὶ τοῦ;

Οἶσθά που σύ γε, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὔπω ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦν πρίν σε ἀπιέναι, Χαρμίδην τὸν τοῦ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ B ἡμετέρου θείου υἱόν, ἐμὸν δὲ ἀνεψιόν.

Οἶδα μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ γάρ τι φαῦλος

In the state in which you see me, I replied.

It has been reported here, you know, said he, that the battle was very severe, and that many of our acquaintance have lost their lives in it.

Then the report, I replied, is pretty near the truth.

You were present, he asked, at the fighting?

I was present.

Then sit down here, he said, and give us a full account; for as yet we have had no clear report of it all. And with that he led me to a seat by Critias, son of Callaeschrus. So I sat down there and greeted Critias and the rest, and gave them all the news from the battlefield, in answer to their various questions; each had his inquiry to make.

When we had had enough of such matters, I in my turn began to inquire about affairs at home, how philosophy was doing at present, and whether any of the rising young men had distinguished themselves for wisdom or beauty or both. Then Critias, looking towards the door, for he saw some young fellows who were coming in with some railing at each other, and a crowd of people following on behind them, said—Concerning the beauties, Socrates, I expect you will get your knowledge at once: for these who are coming in are in fact forerunners and lovers of the person who is held, for the moment at least, to be the greatest beauty; and he himself, I imagine, must by now be nearly upon us.

Who is he, I asked, and whose son?

You must know, he replied, but he was not yet grown up when you went away,—Charmides, son of our uncle Glaucon, and my cousin.

I do know, to be sure, I said; for he was not to

154 οὐδὲ τότε ἦν ἔτι παῖς ὤν, νῦν δ' οἶμαί που εὖ μάλα ἂν ἤδη μειράκιον εἴη.

Αὐτίκα, ἔφη, εἴσει καὶ ἡλίκος καὶ οἷος γέγονε. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὁ Χαρμίδης εἰσέρχεται.

Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐδὲν σταθμητόν· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλούς· σχεδὸν γάρ τί μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καλοὶ φαίνονται· ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τότε ἐκεῖνος ἐμοὶ
C θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐρᾶν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν αὐτοῦ· οὕτως ἐκπεπληγμένοι τε καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ἦσαν, ἡνίκ' εἰσήει· πολλοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄπισθεν εἵποντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἧττον θαυμαστὸν ἦν· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος' ἔβλεπεν αὐτῶν, οὐδ' ὅστις σμικρότατος ἦν, ἀλλὰ
D πάντες ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα ἐθεῶντο αὐτόν. καὶ ὁ Χαιρεφῶν καλέσας με, Τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;

Ὑπερφυῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφη, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδῦναι, δόξει σοι ἀπρόσωπος εἶναι· οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν.

Συνέφασαν οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα τῷ Χαιρεφῶντι· κἀγώ, Ἡράκλεις, ἔφην, ὡς ἄμαχον λέγετε τὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ ἔτι αὐτῷ ἓν δὴ μόνον τυγχάνει προσὸν σμικρόν τι.

Τί; ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας.

E Εἰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς. πρέπει δέ που, ὦ Κριτία, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς γε ὑμετέρας ὄντα οἰκίας.

[1] A *white* or uncoloured line was proverbially useless for

be despised even then, when he was still a child, and now, I suppose, he will be quite a youth by this time.

You will know this moment, he said, both how much and to what purpose he has grown. And just as he spoke these words, Charmides entered.

Now I, my good friend, am no measurer: I am a mere "white line"[1] in measuring beautiful people, for almost everyone who has just grown up appears beautiful to me. Nay and this time, moreover, the young man appeared to me a marvel of stature and beauty; and all the rest, to my thinking, were in love with him, such was their astonishment and confusion when he came in, and a number of other lovers were following in his train. On the part of men like us it was not so surprising; but when I came to observe the boys I noticed that none of them, not even the smallest, had eyes for anything else, but that they all gazed at him as if he were a statue. Then Chaerephon called me and said—How does the youth strike you, Socrates? Has he not a fine face?

Immensely so, I replied.

Yet if he would consent to strip, he said, you would think he had no face, he has such perfect beauty of form.

And these words of Chaerephon were repeated by the rest. Then,—By Heracles! I said, what an irresistible person you make him out to be, if he has but one more thing—a little thing—besides.

What? said Critias.

If in his soul, I replied, he is of good grain. And I should think, Critias, he ought to be, since he is of your house.

[1] marking off measurements on *white* stone or marble: *cf.* Soph. fr. 306.

154 Ἀλλ', ἔφη, πάνυ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ ταῦτα.

Τί οὖν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἴδους; πάντως γάρ που τηλικοῦτος ὢν ἤδη ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι.

Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἐπεί τοι καὶ ἔστι
155 φιλόσοφός τε καί, ὡς δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ, πάνυ ποιητικός.

Τοῦτο μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Κριτία, πόρρωθεν ὑμῖν τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχει ἀπὸ τῆς Σόλωνος συγγενείας. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεῦρο; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν που εἰ ἔτι ἐτύγχανε[1] νεώτερος ὤν, αἰσχρὸν ἂν ἦν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμῖν ἐναντίον γε σοῦ, ἐπιτρόπου τε ἅμα καὶ ἀνεψιοῦ ὄντος.

Ἀλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, καὶ καλοῦμεν αὐτόν.
Β καὶ ἅμα πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον, Παῖ, ἔφη, κάλει Χαρμίδην, εἰπὼν ὅτι βούλομαι αὐτὸν ἰατρῷ συστῆσαι περὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἧς πρώην πρός με ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀσθενοῖ. πρὸς οὖν ἐμὲ ὁ Κριτίας, Ἐναγχός τοι ἔφη βαρύνεσθαί τι τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔωθεν ἀνιστάμενος· ἀλλὰ τί σε κωλύει προσποιήσασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαί τι κεφαλῆς φάρμακον;

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μόνον ἐλθέτω.

Ἀλλ' ἥξει, ἔφη.

Ὃ οὖν καὶ ἐγένετο. ἦκε γάρ, καὶ ἐποίησε γέ-
C λωτα πολύν· ἔκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν τῶν καθημένων συγχωρῶν τὸν πλησίον ἐώθει[2] σπουδῇ, ἵνα παρ' αὐτῷ καθέζοιτο, ἕως τῶν ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ καθημένων τὸν μὲν ἀνεστήσαμεν, τὸν δὲ πλάγιον κατεβάλομεν. ὁ δ' ἐλθὼν μεταξὺ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Κριτίου ἐκαθέ-

[1] εἰ ἔτι ἐτύγχανε Goldbacher: ἔτι τυγχάνει, εἰ ἐτύγχανε MSS.
[2] ἐώθει W. Dindorf: ὤθει MSS.

Ah, he said, he is right fair and good in that way also.

Why then, I said, let us strip that very part of him and view it first, instead of his form ; for anyhow, at that age, I am sure he is quite ready to have a discussion.

Very much so, said Critias ; for, I may say, he is in fact a philosopher, and also—as others besides himself consider—quite a poet.

That, my dear Critias, I said, is a gift which your family has had a long while back, through your kinship with Solon. But why not call the young man here and show him to me ? For surely, even if he were younger still, there could be no discredit in our having a talk with him before you, who are at once his guardian and his cousin.

You are quite right, he said, and we will call him. Thereupon he said to his attendant,—Boy, call Charmides ; tell him I want him to see a doctor about the ailment with which he told me he was troubled yesterday. Then, turning to me,—You know, he has spoken lately of having a headache, said Critias, on getting up in the morning : now why should you not represent to him that you know a cure for headache ?

Why not ? I said : only he must come.

Oh, he will be here, he said.

And so it was ; for he came, and caused much laughter, because each of us who were seated made room for him by pushing hard at his neighbour so as to have him sitting beside himself, until at either end of the seat one had to stand up, and we tumbled the other off sideways ; and he came and sat down between me and Critias. But here, my

155 ζετο. ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε, ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καί μου ἡ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἐξεκέκοπτο, ἣν εἶχον ἐγὼ ὡς πάνυ ῥᾳδίως αὐτῷ διαλεξόμενος· ἐπειδὴ δέ, φράσαντος τοῦ Κριτίου ὅτι ἐγὼ εἴην ὁ τὸ φάρμακον D ἐπιστάμενος, ἐνέβλεψέ τέ μοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον καὶ ἀνήγετο ὡς ἐρωτήσων, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ ἅπαντες περιέρρεον ἡμᾶς κύκλῳ κομιδῇ, τότε δή, ὦ γεννάδα, εἶδόν τε τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἐφλεγόμην καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν καὶ ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὃς εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλῳ ὑποτιθέμενος, "εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν·" αὐτὸς γάρ E μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου θρέμματος ἑαλωκέναι. ὅμως δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρωτήσαντος, εἰ ἐπισταίμην τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον, μόγις πως ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι ἐπισταίμην.

Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐστίν;

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι αὐτὸ μὲν εἴη φύλλον τι, ἐπῳδὴ δέ τις ἐπὶ τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἴη, ἣν εἰ μέν τις ἐπᾴδοι ἅμα καὶ χρῷτο αὐτῷ, παντάπασιν ὑγιᾶ ποιοῖ τὸ φάρμακον· ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἴη τοῦ φύλλου.

156 Καὶ ὅς, Ἀπογράψομαι τοίνυν, ἔφη, παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ἐπῳδήν.

Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐάν με πείθῃς ἢ κἂν μή;

Γελάσας οὖν, Ἐάν σε πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ τοὔνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς;

Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, ἔφη· οὐ γάρ τι σοῦ ὀλίγος λόγος

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[1] A poet classed with Mimnermus and Archilochus by Plutarch; *cf.* Bergk, *Poet. Lyr.*[4] p. 960.

friend, I began to feel perplexed, and my former confidence in looking forward to a quite easy time in talking with him had been knocked out of me. And when, on Critias telling him that it was I who knew the cure, he gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, and was just about to plunge into a question, and when all the people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side—then, ah then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess myself no longer; and I thought none was so wise in love-matters as Cydias,[1] who in speaking of a beautiful boy recommends someone to "beware of coming as a fawn before the lion, and being seized as his portion of flesh"; for I too felt I had fallen a prey to some such creature. However, when he had asked me if I knew the cure for headache, I somehow contrived to answer that I knew.

Then what is it? he asked.

So I told him that the thing itself was a certain leaf, but there was a charm to go with the remedy; and if one uttered the charm at the moment of its application, the remedy made one perfectly well; but without the charm there was no efficacy in the leaf.

Then I will take down the charm, said he, from you in writing.

Do you prefer, I asked, to get my consent first, or to do without it?

This made him laugh, and he said: To get your consent, Socrates.

Very well, I said; and are you certain of my name?

Unless I am at fault, he replied; for there is no

156 ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἡλικιώταις, μέμνημαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ παῖς ὢν Κριτίᾳ τῷδε συνόντα σε.

Καλῶς γε σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν· μᾶλλον γάρ σοι
B παρρησιάσομαι περὶ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, οἷα τυγχάνει οὖσα· ἄρτι δ' ἠπόρουν, τίνι τρόπῳ σοι ἐνδειξαίμην τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς. ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, τοιαύτη οἵα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που, ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν,
C εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἕξειν· καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἴεσθαι ἄν ποτε θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι. ἐκ δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσι θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι· ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως λέγουσί τε καὶ ἔχει;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἀποδέχῃ τὸν λόγον;

Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

D Κἀγὼ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἐπαινέσαντος ἀνεθάρρησά τε, καί μοι κατὰ σμικρὸν πάλιν ἡ θρασύτης συνηγείρετο, καὶ ἀνεζωπυρούμην· καὶ εἶπον· Τοιοῦτον τοίνυν ἐστίν, ὦ Χαρμίδη, καὶ τὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐπῳδῆς. ἔμαθον δ' αὐτὴν ἐγὼ ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς παρά τινος τῶν Θρᾳκῶν τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος ἰατρῶν, οἳ λέγονται καὶ ἀπαθανατίζειν. ἔλεγε δὲ ὁ Θρᾷξ οὗτος, ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν [ἰατροὶ][1] οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ

[1] *ἰατροὶ* secl. Cobet.

little talk of you among the set of our age, and I remember as a mere child the sight of you in company with Critias here.

That is a good thing, I said: for I shall speak more freely to you about the charm, and its real nature; just now I was at a loss for the way to apprise you of its power. For it is of such a nature, Charmides, that it cannot cure the head alone; I daresay you have yourself sometimes heard good doctors say, you know, when a patient comes to them with a pain in his eyes, that it is not possible for them to attempt a cure of his eyes alone, but that it is necessary to treat his head too at the same time, if he is to have his eyes in good order; and so again, that to expect ever to treat the head by itself, apart from the body as a whole, is utter folly. And on this principle they apply their regimen to the whole body, and attempt to treat and heal the part along with the whole; or have you not observed that this is what they say, and is done in fact?

Certainly I have, he said.

And you consider it well said, and accept the principle?

Most assuredly, he said.

Then I, on hearing his approval, regained my courage; and little by little I began to muster up my confidence again, and my spirit began to rekindle. So I said,—Such, then, Charmides, is the nature of this charm. I learnt it on campaign over there, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis,[1] who are said even to make one immortal. This Thracian said that the Greeks were right in

[1] A legendary hero of the Thracian race of the Getae; *cf.* Herodotus, iv. 94-6.

156 ἔλεγον, καλῶς λέγοιεν· ἀλλὰ Ζάλμοξις, ἔφη, λέγει
E ὁ ἡμέτερος βασιλεύς, θεὸς ὤν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄνευ κεφαλῆς οὐ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἰᾶσθαι οὐδὲ κεφαλὴν ἄνευ σώματος, οὕτως οὐδὲ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἴη τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ὅτι τοῦ ὅλου[1] ἀμελοῖεν οὗ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὗ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον εἴη τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν. πάντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς
157 ὡρμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα· δεῖν οὖν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλει καὶ τὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος καλῶς ἔχειν. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη, ὦ μακάριε, ἐπῳδαῖς τισιν· τὰς δ' ἐπῳδὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥᾴδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι πορίζειν.
B διδάσκων οὖν με τό τε φάρμακον καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδάς, ὅπως, ἔφη, τῷ φαρμάκῳ τούτῳ μηδείς σε πείσει τὴν αὐτοῦ κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, ὃς ἂν μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παράσχῃ τῇ ἐπῳδῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ἔφη, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἁμάρτημα περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι χωρὶς ἑκατέρου [σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγιείας][2] ἰατροί τινες ἐπιχειροῦσιν εἶναι· καί μοι πάνυ σφόδρα ἐνετέλλετο μήτε πλούσιον οὕτω μηδένα εἶναι μήτε γενναῖον μήτε καλόν, ὃς

[1] τοῦ ὅλου Burnet: τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν mss.: τοῦ ἄλλου ἀμελοῖεν Stobaeus.

[2] σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγιείας om. Laur. lxxxv. 6.

advising as I told you just now: "but Zalmoxis," he said, "our king, who is a god, says that as you ought not to attempt to cure eyes without head, or head without body, so you should not treat body without soul"; and this was the reason why most maladies evaded the physicians of Greece — that they neglected *the whole*, on which they ought to spend their pains, for if this were out of order it was impossible for *the part* to be in order. For all that was good and evil, he said, in the body and in man altogether was sprung from the soul, and flowed along from thence as it did from the head into the eyes. Wherefore that part was to be treated first and foremost, if all was to be well with the head and the rest of the body. And the treatment of the soul, so he said, my wonderful friend, is by means of certain charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we may easily secure health to the head, and to the rest of the body also. Now in teaching me the remedy and the charms he remarked,—"Let nobody persuade you to treat his head with this remedy, unless he has first submitted his soul for you to treat with the charm. For at present," he said, "the cure of mankind is beset with the error of certain doctors who attempt to practise the one method without the other." And he most particularly enjoined on me not to let anyone, however wealthy or noble or handsome, induce me to disobey

157 C ἐμὲ πείσει ἄλλως ποιεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν—ὁμώμοκα γὰρ αὐτῷ, καί μοι ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι—πείσομαι οὖν, καὶ σοί, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ξένου ἐντολὰς τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παρασχεῖν ἐπᾴσαι ταῖς τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς ἐπῳδαῖς, προσοίσω τὸ φάρμακον τῇ κεφαλῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὅ τι ποιοῖμέν σοι, ὦ φίλε Χαρμίδη.

Ἀκούσας οὖν μου ὁ Κριτίας ταῦτ' εἰπόντος, Ἕρμαιον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη ἡ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀσθένεια τῷ νεανίσκῳ, εἰ ἀναγκασθήσεται D καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν διὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν βελτίων γενέσθαι. λέγω μέντοι σοι, ὅτι Χαρμίδης τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν οὐ μόνον τῇ ἰδέᾳ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, οὗ σὺ φῂς τὴν ἐπῳδὴν ἔχειν· φῂς δὲ σωφροσύνης· ἦ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι πάνυ πολὺ δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος εἶναι τῶν νυνί, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, εἰς ὅσον ἡλικίας ἥκει, οὐδενὸς χείρων ὤν.

Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δίκαιον, ὦ Χαρμίδη, διαφέρειν σε τῶν ἄλλων πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις· οὐ E γὰρ οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐνθάδε ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἔχειν ἐπιδεῖξαι, οἵαι δύο οἰκίαι συνελθοῦσαι εἰς ταὐτὸν τῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων καλλίω ἂν καὶ ἀμείνω γεννήσειαν ἢ ἐξ ὧν σὺ γέγονας. ἥ τε γὰρ πατρῴα ὑμῖν οἰκία, ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπ' Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν ποιητῶν ἐγκεκωμιασμένη παραδέδοται ἡμῖν, ὡς διαφέρουσα κάλλει τε καὶ ἀρετῇ 158 καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ· καὶ αὖ ἡ πρὸς μητρὸς ὡσαύτως· Πυριλάμπους γὰρ τοῦ σοῦ θεί-

him. So I, since I have given him my oath, and must obey him, will do as he bids ; and if you agree to submit your soul first to the effect of the Thracian charms, according to the stranger's injunctions, I will apply the remedy to your head : otherwise we shall be at a loss what to do with you, my dear Charmides.

Then Critias, when he heard me say this, remarked,—This affection of the head, Socrates, will turn out to be a stroke of luck for the young man, if he is to be compelled on account of his head to improve his understanding also. However, let me tell you, Charmides is considered to excel his comrades not only in appearance, but also in that very thing which you say is produced by your charm : temperance you say it is, do you not ?

Certainly, I replied.

Then be assured, he said, that he is considered to be far and away the most temperate person now alive, while in every other respect, for a youth of his age, he is second to none.

Why, yes, I said, and it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel the rest in all these respects ; for I do not suppose there is anyone else here who could readily point to a case of any two Athenian houses uniting together which would be likely to produce handsomer or nobler offspring than those from which you are sprung. For your father's house, which comes from Critias, son of Dropides, has been celebrated by Anacreon and Solon and many other poets, so that it is famed by tradition among us as pre-eminent in beauty and virtue and all else that is accounted happiness ; and then, your mother's house is famous in the same way, for of Pyrilampes,

158 ου οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ λέγεται καλλίων καὶ
μείζων ἀνὴρ δόξαι εἶναι, ὁσάκις ἐκεῖνος ἢ παρὰ
μέγαν βασιλέα ἢ παρ' ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ
πρεσβεύων ἀφίκετο, σύμπασα δὲ αὖτη ἡ οἰκία οὐδ-
→ ἐν τῆς ἑτέρας ὑποδεεστέρα. ἐκ δὴ τοιούτων γεγο-
νότα εἰκός σε εἰς πάντα πρῶτον εἶναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν
B ὁρώμενα τῆς ἰδέας, ὦ φίλε παῖ Γλαύκωνος, δοκεῖς
μοι οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑποβεβηκέναι[1]·
εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα
κατὰ τὸν τοῦδε λόγον ἱκανῶς πέφυκας, μακάριόν σε,
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Χαρμίδη, ἡ μήτηρ ἔτικτεν. ἔχει
δ' οὖν οὕτως. εἰ μέν σοι ἤδη πάρεστιν, ὡς λέγει
Κριτίας ὅδε, σωφροσύνη, καὶ εἶ σώφρων ἱκανῶς,
οὐδὲν ἔτι σοι ἔδει οὔτε τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος οὔτε
τῶν Ἀβάριδος τοῦ Ὑπερβορέου ἐπῳδῶν, ἀλλ' αὐτό
C σοι ἂν ἤδη δοτέον εἴη τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον·
εἰ δ' ἔτι τούτων ἐπιδεὴς εἶναι δοκεῖς, ἐπαστέον
πρὸ τῆς τοῦ φαρμάκου δόσεως. αὐτὸς οὖν μοι
εἰπέ, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς τῷδε καὶ φῂς ἱκανῶς ἤδη
καὶ σωφροσύνης μετέχειν ἢ ἐνδεὴς εἶναι;

Ἀνερυθριάσας οὖν ὁ Χαρμίδης πρῶτον μὲν ἔτι
καλλίων ἐφάνη· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυντηλὸν αὐτοῦ τῇ
ἡλικίᾳ ἔπρεψεν· ἔπειτα καὶ οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ἀπεκρίνατο·
εἶπε γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὔθ'
ὁμολογεῖν οὔτε ἐξάρνῳ εἶναι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐὰν
D μὲν γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, μὴ φῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ἅμα μὲν
ἄτοπον αὐτὸν καθ' ἑαυτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἅμα δὲ
καὶ Κριτίαν τόνδε ψευδῆ ἐπιδείξω καὶ ἄλλους
πολλούς, οἷς δοκῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ὡς ὁ τούτου

[1] ὑποβεβηκέναι Madvig : ὑπερβεβληκέναι MSS.

[1] A fabulous hero of the far north, to whom oracles and charms were ascribed by the Greeks; *cf.* Herodotus, iv. 36.

your uncle, it is said that no one in all the continent was considered to be his superior in beauty or stature, whenever he came as envoy to the great king or anyone else in Asia, and his house as a whole is no whit inferior to the other. Sprung from such people, it is to be supposed that you would be first in all things. And indeed, as regards your visible form, dear son of Glaucon, I consider that nowhere have you fallen behind any of your ancestors. But if your nature is really rich in temperance and those other things, as our friend here says, blessed is the son, dear Charmides, I exclaimed, that your mother has borne in you! However, the case stands thus: if you already possess temperance, as Critias here declares, and you are sufficiently temperate, then you never had any need of the charms of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean,[1] and might well be given at once the remedy for the head; but if you prove to be still lacking that virtue, we must apply the charm before the remedy. So tell me yourself whether you agree with our friend, and can say that you are already sufficiently provided with temperance, or are deficient in it?

At this Charmides blushed and, for one thing, looked more beautiful then ever, for his modesty became his years; and then, too, he answered most ingenuously, saying it was no easy matter at the moment either to admit or to deny the words of the question. For if, he went on, I say I am not temperate, not only is it a strange thing to say against oneself, but I shall at the same time be taxing with untruth both Critias and many others who consider me to be temperate, as he gives out; while

158 λόγος· ἐὰν δ' αὖ φῶ καὶ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπαινῶ, ἴσως ἐπαχθὲς φανεῖται· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τί σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι μοι εἰκότα φαίνῃ λέγειν, ὦ Χαρμίδη. καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἂν εἶναι σκεπτέον, εἴτε κέκτησαι εἴτε μὴ ὃ πυνθάνομαι, ἵνα
E μήτε σὺ ἀναγκάζῃ λέγειν ἃ μὴ βούλει, μήτ' αὖ ἐγὼ ἀσκέπτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν τρέπωμαι. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, ἐθέλω σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν.

Ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη, φίλον· ὥστε τούτου γε ἕνεκα, ὅπῃ αὐτὸς οἴει βέλτιον[1] σκέψασθαι, ταύτῃ σκόπει.

Τῇδε τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, δοκεῖ μοι βελτίστη εἶναι ἡ σκέψις περὶ αὐτοῦ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἴ σοι
159 πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνοῦσαν αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἴσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἄν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη, ὅ τί ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη· ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

Ἔγωγε, ἔφη, οἶμαι.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε, ἔφην, ὃ οἴει, ἐπειδήπερ ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασαι, κἂν εἴποις δήπου αὐτὸ ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται.

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

Ἵνα τοίνυν τοπάσωμεν εἴτε σοι ἔνεστιν εἴτε μή, εἰπέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί φῂς εἶναι σωφροσύνην κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν.

B Καὶ ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει τε καὶ οὐ πάνυ ἤθελεν ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἔπειτα μέντοι εἶπεν ὅτι οἱ δοκοῦ σωφροσύνη εἶναι τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, ἔν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς βαδίζειν καὶ δια-

[1] βέλτιον Heindorf: βελτίω mss.

if, on the other hand, I say I am, and praise myself, it will probably be found distasteful; so that I cannot see what answer I am to give you.

Then I said: Your answer is a natural one, in my opinion, Charmides; and I think, I went on, that we must join in inquiring whether you possess the thing I am asking after, or not, in order that neither you may be forced to say what you do not wish, nor I on my part may recklessly try my hand at medicine. So if it is agreeable to you, I am ready to inquire with you; but, if it is not, to let it alone.

Why, nothing, he said, could be more agreeable to me: so far as that goes, therefore, inquire in whatever way you think we had better proceed.

Then this is the way, I said, in which I consider that our inquiry into this matter had best be conducted. Now, it is clear that, if you have temperance with you, you can hold an opinion about it. For being in you, I presume it must, in that case, afford some perception from which you can form some opinion of what temperance is, and what kind of thing it is: do you not think so?

I do, he replied.

And since you understand the Greek tongue, I said, you can tell me, I suppose, your view of this particular thought of yours?

I daresay, he said.

Then in order that we may make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me, I said, what you say of temperance according to your opinion.

He at first hung back, and was not at all willing to answer: but presently he said that, to his mind, temperance was doing everything orderly and quietly—walking in the streets, talking, and doing

159 λέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως ποιεῖν· καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, συλλήβδην ἡσυχιότης τις εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτᾷς.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὖ λέγεις; φασί γέ τοι, ὦ Χαρμίδη, τοὺς ἡσυχίους σώφρονας εἶναι· ἴδωμεν δὴ εἴ τι λέγουσιν. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, οὐ τῶν καλῶν C μέντοι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστί;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Πότερον οὖν κάλλιστον ἐν γραμματιστοῦ τὰ ὅμοια γράμματα γράφειν ταχὺ ἢ ἡσυχῇ;

Ταχύ.

Τί δ' ἀναγιγνώσκειν; ταχέως ἢ βραδέως;

Ταχέως.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ κιθαριζειν ταχέως καὶ τὸ παλαίειν ὀξέως πολὺ κάλλιον τοῦ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως;

Ναί.

Τί δὲ πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν; οὐχ ὡσαύτως;

Πάνυ γε.

Θεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄλλεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος D ἅπαντα ἔργα, οὐ τὰ μὲν ὀξέως καὶ ταχὺ γιγνόμενα τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστί, τὰ δὲ [βραδέα][1] μόγις τε καὶ ἡσύχια τοῦ αἰσχροῦ;

Φαίνεται.

Φαίνεται ἄρα ἡμῖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, κατά γε τὸ σῶμα οὐ τὸ ἡσύχιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τάχιστον καὶ ὀξύτατον κάλλιστον ὄν. ἦ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἡ δέ γε σωφροσύνη καλόν τι ἦν;

Ναί.

[1] βραδέα secl. Heindorf.

everything else of that kind ; and in a word, he said, I think the thing about which you ask may be called quietness.

Well, I said, are you right there ? They do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate : so let us see if there is anything in what they say. Tell me, is not temperance, however, among the honourable things ?

To be sure, he said.

Well, which is most honourable at the writing-master's, to write the same sort of letters quickly or quietly ?

Quickly.

And in reading, to do it quickly or slowly ?

Quickly.

And so, in the same way, to play the lyre quickly, or to wrestle nimbly, is far more honourable than to do it quietly and slowly ?

Yes.

And what of boxing, alone or combined with wrestling ? Is it not the same there too ?

To be sure.

And in running and leaping and all activities of the body, are not nimble and quick movements accounted honourable, while sluggish and quiet ones are deemed disgraceful ?

Apparently.

So we find, I said, that in the body, at least, it is not quietness, but the greatest quickness and nimbleness that is most honourable, do we not ?

Certainly.

And temperance was an honourable thing ?

Yes.

159 Οὐ τοίνυν κατά γε τὸ σῶμα ἡ ἡσυχιότης ἂν ἀλλ' ἡ ταχυτὴς σωφρονέστερον εἴη, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη.

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

E Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐμαθία κάλλιον ἢ δυσμαθία; Εὐμάθία.

Ἔστι δέ γ', ἔφην, ἡ μὲν εὐμαθία ταχέως μανθάνειν, ἡ δὲ δυσμαθία ἡσυχῇ καὶ βραδέως;

Ναί.

Διδάσκειν δὲ ἄλλον οὐ ταχέως κάλλιον καὶ σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως;

Ναί.

Τί δέ; ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι καὶ μεμνῆσθαι ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως κάλλιον ἢ σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως;

Σφόδρ', ἔφη, καὶ ταχέως.

160 Ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοια οὐχὶ ὀξύτης τίς ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἡσυχία;

Ἀληθῆ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ συνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἐν γραμματιστοῦ καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι πανταχοῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἡσυχαίτατα ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστά ἐστι κάλλιστα;

Ναί.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ζητήσεσι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ βουλεύεσθαι οὐχ ὁ ἡσυχιώτατος,[1] ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, καὶ μόγις βουλευόμενός τε καὶ ἀνευρίσκων ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ ἄξιος εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστα τοῦτο δρῶν.

B Ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν πάντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ τοῦ

[1] ἡσυχιώτατος Cobet: ἡσυχώτατος MSS.

Then in the body, at least, it is not quietness but quickness that will be the more temperate thing, since temperance is honourable.

So it seems, he said.

Well now, I went on; in learning, is facility the more honourable, or difficulty?

Facility.

And facility in learning, I said, is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?

Yes.

And is it not more honourable to teach another quickly and forcibly, rather than quietly and slowly?

Yes.

Well now, is it more honourable to be reminded and to remember quietly and slowly, or forcibly and quickly?

Forcibly, he replied, and quickly.

And is not readiness of mind a sort of nimbleness of the soul, not a quietness?

True.

And to apprehend what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the lyre-master's or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly, is most honourable?

Yes.

Well, and in the searchings of the soul, and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, or he who deliberates and discovers with difficulty, that is held worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly.

That is so, he said.

Then in all, I said, Charmides, that concerns either our soul or our body, actions of quickness and

160 τάχους τε καὶ τῆς ὀξύτητος καλλίω φαίνεται ἢ τὰ τῆς βραδυτῆτός τε καὶ ἡσυχιότητος;

Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἡσυχιότης τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, οὐδ' ἡσύχιος ὁ σώφρων βίος, ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν αὐτὸν δεῖ εἶναι σώφρονα ὄντα. C δυοῖν γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἕτερα, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ αἱ ἡσύχιοι πράξεις ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλλίους ἐφάνησαν ἢ αἱ ταχεῖαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραί. εἰ δ' οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ἐλάττους αἱ ἡσύχιοι τῶν σφοδρῶν τε καὶ ταχειῶν πράξεων τυγχάνουσι καλλίους οὖσαι, οὐδὲ ταύτῃ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη μᾶλλόν τι τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχέως, οὔτε ἐν βαδισμῷ οὔτε ἐν λέξει οὔτε ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδὲ ὁ ἡσύχιος βίος [κόσμιος][1] τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου σωφρονέστερος ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ D ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι ἡμῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη ὑπετέθη, καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον τὰ ταχέα τῶν ἡσυχίων πέφανται.

Ὀρθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρηκέναι.

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, μᾶλλον προσέχων τὸν νοῦν καὶ εἰς σεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψας,[2] ἐννοήσας ὁποῖόν τινά σε ποιεῖ ἡ σωφροσύνη παροῦσα καὶ ποία τις οὖσα τοιοῦτον ἀπεργάζοιτο ἄν, πάντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενος εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως, τί σοι φαίνεται εἶναι.

E Καὶ ὃς ἐπισχὼν καὶ πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος, Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδὼς ἡ σωφροσύνη.

[1] κόσμιος secl. Heindorf.

[2] ἐμβλέψας Burnet: ἀπεμβλέψας, ἀποβλέψας mss.

nimbleness are found to be more honourable than those of slowness and quietness ?

It looks like it, he said.

So temperance cannot be a sort of quietness, nor can the temperate life be quiet, by this argument at least ; since, being temperate, it must be honourable. For we have these two alternatives : either in no cases, or I should think in very few, can we find that the quiet actions in life are more honourable than the quick and vigorous ones ; or at all events, my friend, if of the more honourable actions there are absolutely as many quiet ones as forcible and quick, not even so will temperance be acting quietly any more than acting forcibly and quickly, either in walking or in talking or in any other sphere ; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet ; since in our argument we assumed that temperance is an honourable thing, and have found that quick things are just as honourable as quiet things.

Your statement, he said, Socrates, seems to me to be correct.

Once more then, I went on, Charmides, attend more closely and look into yourself ; reflect on the quality that is given you by the presence of temperance, and what quality it must have to work this effect on you. Take stock of all this and tell me, like a good, brave fellow, what it appears to you to be.

He paused a little, and after a quite manly effort of self-examination : Well, I think, he said, that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that temperance is the same as modesty.

160 Εἶτα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ καλὸν ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις τὴν σωφροσύνην εἶναι;

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οἱ σώφρονες;

Ναί.

Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν, ὃ μὴ ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.

161 Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· Ὁμήρῳ οὐ πιστεύεις καλῶς λέγειν, λέγοντι ὅτι

αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰδὼς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.

Φαίνεται.

Σωφροσύνη δέ γε ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ οἷς ἂν παρῇ, κακοὺς δὲ μή.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

Οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη αἰδώς, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν
B ἀγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὄν, αἰδὼς δὲ [μὴ][1] οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ κακόν.

Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι· τόδε δὲ σκέψαι τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην ὃ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. σκόπει οὖν τοῦτο εἰ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ λέγων.

Καὶ ἐγώ, Ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην, Κριτίου τοῦδε ἀκήκοας
C αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν σοφῶν.

[1] μὴ secl. Ast.

Well now, I asked, did you not admit a moment ago that temperance is honourable?

Certainly I did, he said.

And temperate men are also good?

Yes.

Well, can that be good which does not produce good men?

No, indeed.

And we conclude that it is not only honourable, but good also.

I think so.

Well then, I said, are you not convinced that Homer [1] is right in saying—

Modesty, no good mate for a needy man?

I am, he said.

Then it would seem that modesty is not good, and good.

Apparently.

But temperance is good, if its presence makes men good, and not bad.

It certainly seems to me to be as you say.

So temperance cannot be modesty, if it is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than evil.

Why, I think, he said, Socrates, that is correctly stated; but there is another view of temperance on which I would like to have your opinion. I remembered just now what I once heard someone say, that temperance might be doing one's own business. I ask you, then, do you think he is right in saying this?

You rascal, I said, you have heard it from Critias here, or some other of our wise men!

[1] *Od.* xvii. 347.

161 Ἔοικεν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοῦ γε.

Ἀλλὰ τί διαφέρει, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁ Χαρμίδης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτου ἤκουσα;

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ὅστις αὐτὸ εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀληθὲς λέγεται ἢ οὔ.

Νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ εὑρήσομεν αὐτὸ ὅπῃ γε ἔχει, θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν· αἰνίγματι γάρ τινι ἔοικεν.

Ὅτι δὴ τί γε; ἔφη.

Ὅτι οὐ δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾗ τὰ ῥήματα ἐφθέγξατο,
D ταύτῃ καὶ ἐνόει ὁ λέγων σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. ἢ σὺ οὐδὲν ἡγῇ πράττειν τὸν γραμματιστήν, ὅταν γράφῃ ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκῃ;

Ἔγωγε, ἡγοῦμαι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι τὸ αὑτοῦ ὄνομα μόνον γράφειν ὁ γραμματιστὴς καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ἢ ὑμᾶς τοὺς παῖδας διδάσκειν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἧττον τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐγράφετε ἢ τὰ ὑμέτερα καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων ὀνόματα;

Οὐδὲν ἧττον.

Ἦ οὖν ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐσωφρονεῖτε
E τοῦτο δρῶντες;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Καὶ μὴν οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερά γε αὐτῶν ἐπράττετε, εἴπερ τὸ γράφειν πράττειν τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀναγιγνώσκειν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστιν.

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἰᾶσθαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τὸ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἠτινιοῦν τέχνῃ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τέχνης ἔργων ἀπεργάζεσθαι πράττειν δήπου τί ἐστιν.

Seemingly, said Critias, from some other; for indeed he did not from me.

But what does it matter, Socrates, said Charmides, from whom I heard it?

Not at all, I replied; for in any case we have not to consider who said it, but whether it is a true saying or no.

Now you speak rightly, he said.

Yes, on my word, I said: but I shall be surprised if we can find out how it stands; for it looks like a kind of riddle.

Why so? he asked.

Because, I replied, presumably the speaker of the words "temperance is doing one's own business" did not mean them quite as he spoke them. Or do you consider that the scribe does nothing when he writes or reads?

I rather consider that he does something, he replied.

And does the scribe, in your opinion, write and read his own name only, and teach you boys to do the same with yours? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends'?

Just as much.

Well, were you meddlesome or intemperate in doing this?

Not at all.

And you know you were not doing your own business, if writing and reading are doing something.

Why, so they are.

And indeed medical work, my good friend, and building and weaving and producing anything whatever that is the work of any art, I presume is doing something.

161 Πάνυ γε.

Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγ-
162 γίδα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὖ ἂν οἰκοῖτο.

Πῶς δ' οὔκ; ἔφη.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτά τε καὶ οὕτω τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη.

Οὐ φαίνεται.

Ἠινίττετο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὁ λέγων τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἶναι· οὐ γάρ που οὕτω γε ἦν εὐήθης· ἢ τινος ἠλιθίου
B ἤκουσας τουτὶ λέγοντος, ὦ Χαρμίδη;

Ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη, ἐπεί τοι καὶ πάνυ ἐδόκει σοφὸς εἶναι.

Παντὸς τοίνυν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αἴνιγμα αὐτὸ προὔβαλεν, ὡς ὂν χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν γνῶναι ὅ τί ποτε ἔστιν.

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν ἂν εἴη ποτὲ τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

Οὐκ οἶδα μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲν κωλύει μηδὲ τὸν λέγοντα μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὅ τι ἐνόει.

Certainly.

Well then, I went on, do you think a state would be well conducted under a law which enjoined that everyone should weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and scraper,[1] and everything else on the same principle of not touching the affairs of others but performing and doing his own for himself?

I think not, he replied.

But still, I said, a state whose conduct is temperate will be well conducted.

Of course, he said.

Then doing one's own business in that sense and in that way will not be temperance.

Apparently not.

So that person was riddling, it seems, just as I said a moment ago, when he said that doing one's own business is temperance. For I take it he was not such a fool as all that: or was it some idiot that you heard saying this, Charmides?

Far from it, he replied, for indeed he seemed to be very wise.

Then it is perfectly certain, in my opinion, that he propounded it as a riddle, in view of the difficulty of understanding what "doing one's own business" can mean.

I daresay, he said.

Well, what can it mean, this "doing one's own business"? Can you tell me?

I do not know, upon my word, he replied: but I daresay it may be that not even he who said it knew

[1] The flask contained oil for anointing the body before exercise, and the scraper was for scraping it afterwards, or at the bath.

162 καὶ ἅμα ταῦτα λέγων ὑπεγέλα τε καὶ εἰς τὸν Κριτίαν ἀπέβλεπεν.

C Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δῆλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρός τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων, μόγις δ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν κατέχων τότε οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὃ ἐγὼ ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ Κριτίου ἀκηκοέναι τὸν Χαρμίδην ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης. ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαρμίδης βουλόμενος μὴ αὐτὸς ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀλλ'

D ἐκεῖνον τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, καὶ ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξεληλεγμένος εἴη· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλά μοι ἔδοξεν ὀργισθῆναι αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ποιητὴς ὑποκριτῇ κακῶς διατιθέντι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα· ὥστ' ἐμβλέψας αὐτῷ εἶπεν, Οὕτως οἴει, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἰ σὺ μὴ οἶσθα ὅ τί ποτ' ἐνόει ὃς ἔφη σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐκεῖνον εἰδέναι;

Ἀλλ', ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην ἐγώ, Κριτία, τοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀγνοεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα· σὲ δέ

E που εἰκὸς εἰδέναι καὶ ἡλικίας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ οὖν συγχωρεῖς τοῦτ' εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὅπερ οὑτοσὶ λέγει, καὶ παραδέχῃ τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίμην, εἴτ' ἀληθὲς εἴτε μὴ τὸ λεχθέν.

Ἀλλὰ πάνυ συγχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι.

Καλῶς γε σὺ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν. καί μοι λέγε, ἢ καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἠρώτων ἐγὼ συγχωρεῖς, τοὺς δημιουργοὺς πάντας ποιεῖν τι;

Ἔγωγε.

Ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ποιεῖν ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων;

in the least what he meant. And as he said this he gave a sly laugh and glanced at Critias.

Now Critias for some time had been plainly burning with anxiety to distinguish himself in the eyes of Charmides and the company, and having with difficulty restrained himself heretofore, he now could do so no longer; for I believe that what I had supposed was perfectly true—that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And so Charmides, wishing him to make answer instead of himself, sought to stir him up in particular, and pointed out that he himself had been refuted; but Critias rebelled against it, and seemed to me to have got angry with him, as a poet does with an actor who mishandles his verses on the stage: so he looked hard at him and said: Do you really suppose, Charmides, that if you do not know what can have been the meaning of the man who said that temperance was doing one's own business, he did not know either?

Why, my excellent Critias, I said, no wonder if our friend, at his age, cannot understand; but you, I should think, may be expected to know, in view of your years and your studies. So if you concede that temperance is what he says, and you accept the statement, for my part I would greatly prefer to have you as partner in the inquiry as to whether this saying is true or not.

Well, I quite concede it, he said, and accept it.

That is good, then, I said. Now tell me, do you also concede what I was asking just now—that all craftsmen make something?

I do.

And do you consider that they make their own things only, or those of others also?

163 Καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.

Σωφρονοῦσιν οὖν οὐ τὰ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ποιοῦντες.

Τί γὰρ κωλύει; ἔφη.

Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ ἐκεῖνον κωλύει, ὃς ὑποθέμενος σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν ἔπειτα οὐδέν φησι κωλύειν καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας σωφρονεῖν.

Ἐγὼ γάρ που, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦθ' ὡμολόγηκα, ὡς οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες σωφρονοῦσιν, ἢ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ὡμολόγησα;

Εἰπέ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ ταὐτὸν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν;

B Οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη· οὐδέ γε τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν. ἔμαθον γὰρ παρ' Ἡσιόδου, ὃς ἔφη, ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν εἶναι ὄνειδος. οἴει οὖν αὐτόν, εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα ἐκάλει καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν, οἷα νῦν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, οὐδενὶ ἂν ὄνειδος φάναι εἶναι σκυτοτομοῦντι ἢ ταριχοπωλοῦντι ἢ ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθημένῳ; οὐκ οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ

C ἐκεῖνος, οἶμαι, ποίησιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο ἐνόμιζε, καὶ ποίημα μὲν γίγνεσθαι ὄνειδος ἐνίοτε, ὅταν μὴ μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ γίγνηται, ἔργον δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ὄνειδος· τὰ γὰρ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα ἔργα ἐκάλει, καὶ ἐργασίας τε καὶ πράξεις τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις. φάναι δέ γε χρὴ καὶ οἰκεῖα μόνα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτόν, τὰ δὲ βλαβερὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια· ὥστε καὶ Ἡσίοδον χρὴ οἴεσθαι καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις φρόνιμος, τὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα τοῦτον σώφρονα καλεῖν.

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[1] The Greek word *ποιεῖν* ("make") can also mean the same as *πράττειν* ("do").

Those of others also.

And are they temperate in not making their own things only?

Yes: what reason is there against it? he said.

None for me, I replied; but there may be for him who, after assuming that temperance is doing one's own business, proceeds to say there is no reason against those also who do others' business being temperate.

And have I, pray, he said, admitted that those who do others' business are temperate? Or was my admission of those who *make*[1] things?

Tell me, I said, do you not call making and doing the same?

No indeed, he replied, nor working and making the same either: this I learnt from Hesiod,[2] who said, "Work is no reproach." Now, do you suppose that if he had given the names of working and doing to such works as you were mentioning just now, he would have said there was no reproach in shoe-making or pickle-selling or serving the stews? It is not to be thought, Socrates; he rather held, I conceive, that making was different from doing and working, and that while a thing made might be a reproach if it had no connexion with the honourable, work could never be a reproach. For things honourably and usefully made he called works, and such makings he called workings and doings; and we must suppose that it was only such things as these that he called our proper concerns, but all that was harmful, the concerns of others. So that we must conclude that Hesiod, and anyone else of good sense, calls him temperate who does his own business.

[2] *Works and Days*, 309.

163 D Ὦ Κριτία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου σου σχεδὸν ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖά τε καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοίης, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις πράξεις· καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιροῦντος. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων δίδωμι ὅπῃ ἂν βούλῃ ἕκαστον· δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν φέρῃς τοὔνομα ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς. νῦν οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σαφέστερον E ὅρισαι· ἆρα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν ἢ ποίησιν ἢ ὅπως σὺ βούλει ὀνομάζειν, ταύτην λέγεις σὺ σωφροσύνην εἶναι;

Ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

Οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖ ὁ τὰ κακὰ πράττων, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰ ἀγαθά;

Σοὶ δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὐχ οὕτω δοκεῖ;

Ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μὴ γάρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὃ σὺ λέγεις νῦν.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἔγωγε, ἔφη, τὸν μὴ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντα οὔ φημι σωφρονεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ μὴ κακὰ σωφρονεῖν· τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν σωφροσύνην εἶναι σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι.

164 Καὶ οὐδέν γέ σε ἴσως κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν· τόδε γε μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θαυμάζω, εἰ σωφρονοῦντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγῇ σὺ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι σωφρονοῦσιν.

Ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη.

Οὐκ ὀλίγον πρότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ αὖ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοῦντας σωφρονεῖν;

Ἐλέγετο γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ λέγε εἰ δοκεῖ τίς σοι ἰατρός, ὑγιᾶ

[1] "Names" here includes any substantive words such as πράξεις.

Ah, Critias, I said, you had hardly begun, when I grasped the purport of your speech—that you called one's proper and one's own things good, and that the makings of the good you called doings; for in fact I have heard Prodicus drawing innumerable distinctions between names.[1] Well, I will allow you any application of a name that you please; only make clear to what thing it is that you attach such-and-such a name. So begin now over again, and define more plainly. Do you say that this doing or making, or whatever is the term you prefer, of good things, is temperance?

I do, he replied.

Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?

And do not you, my excellent friend, he said, think so?

Leave that aside, I said; for we have not to consider yet what I think, but what you say now.

Well, all the same, I say, he replied, that he who does evil instead of good is not temperate, whereas he who does good instead of evil is temperate: for I give you "the doing of good things is temperance" as my plain definition.

And there is no reason, I daresay, why your statement should not be right; but still I wonder, I went on, whether you judge that temperate men are ignorant of their temperance.

No, I do not, he said.

A little while ago, I said, were you not saying that there was no reason why craftsmen should not be temperate in making others' things as well?

Yes, I was, he said, but what of it?

Nothing; only tell me whether you think that a

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B τινὰ ποιῶν, ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἰᾶτο;

Ἔμοιγε.

Οὐκοῦν τὰ δέοντα πράττει ὅ γε ταῦτα πράττων;

Ναί.

Ὁ τὰ δέοντα πράττων οὐ σωφρονεῖ;

Σωφρονεῖ μὲν οὖν.

Ἡ οὖν καὶ γιγνώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἰατρῷ ὅταν τε ὠφελίμως ἰᾶται καὶ ὅταν μή; καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ὅταν τε μέλλῃ ὀνήσεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου οὗ ἂν πράττῃ, καὶ ὅταν μή;

Ἴσως οὔ.

Ἐνίοτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὠφελίμως πράξας ἢ C βλαβερῶς ὁ ἰατρὸς οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν· καίτοι ὠφελίμως πράξας, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, σωφρόνως ἔπραξεν· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;

Ἔγωγε.

Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνίοτε ὠφελίμως πράξας πράττει μὲν σωφρόνως καὶ σωφρονεῖ, ἀγνοεῖ δ' ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ;

Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ἀλλ' εἴ τι σὺ οἴει ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ὡμολογημένων εἰς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι D συμβαίνειν, ἐκείνων ἄν τι ἔγωγε μᾶλλον ἀναθείμην, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθείην ὅτι μὴ οὐχὶ ὀρθῶς φάναι εἰρηκέναι, μᾶλλον ἤ ποτε συγχωρήσαιμ' ἂν ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἄνθρωπον σωφρονεῖν. σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔγωγε αὐτὸ τοῦτό φημι εἶναι σωφροσύνην, τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, καὶ συμφέρομαι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀναθέντι τὸ τοιοῦτον γράμμα. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακεῖσθαι, ὡς δὴ πρόσρησις οὖσα τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν εἰσιόντων ἀντὶ τοῦ

doctor, in making someone healthy, makes a helpful result both for himself and for the person whom he cures.

I do.

And he who does this does his duty ?

Yes.

Is not he who does his duty temperate ?

Indeed he is.

Well, and must the doctor know when his medicine will be helpful, and when not ? And must every craftsman know when he is likely to be benefited by the work he does, and when not ?

Probably not.

Then sometimes, I went on, the doctor may have done what is helpful or harmful without knowing the effect of his own action ; and yet, in doing what was helpful, by your statement, he has done temperately. Or did you not state that ?

I did.

Then it would seem that in doing what is helpful he may sometimes do temperately and be temperate, but be ignorant of his own temperance ?

But that, he said, Socrates, could never be : if you think this in any way a necessary inference from my previous admissions, I would rather withdraw some of them, and not be ashamed to say my statements were wrong, than concede at any time that a man who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I would almost say that this very thing, self-knowledge, is temperance, and I am at one with him who put up the inscription of those words at Delphi. For the purpose of that inscription on the temple, as it seems to me, is to serve as the god's salutation to those who

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E χαῖρε, ὡς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἀλλὰ σωφρονεῖν. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ὁ θεὸς προσαγορεύει τοὺς εἰσιόντας εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν διαφέρον τι ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὡς διανοούμενος ἀνέθηκεν ὁ ἀναθείς, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ· καὶ λέγει πρὸς τὸν ἀεὶ εἰσιόντα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ σωφρόνει, φησίν. αἰνιγματωδέστερον δὲ δή, ὡς μάντις, λέγει· τὸ γὰρ γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ σωφρόνει ἔστι μὲν ταὐτόν, ὡς τὰ
165 γράμματά φησι καὶ ἐγώ, τάχα δ' ἄν τις οἰηθείη ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ δή μοι δοκοῦσι παθεῖν καὶ οἱ τὰ ὕστερον γράμματα ἀναθέντες, τό τε μηδὲν ἄγαν καὶ τὸ ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συμβουλὴν ᾠήθησαν εἶναι τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν εἰσιόντων [ἕνεκεν][1] ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσρησιν· εἶθ' ἵνα δὴ καὶ σφεῖς μηδὲν ἧττον συμβουλὰς χρησίμους ἀναθεῖεν, ταῦτα γράψαντες ἀνέθεσαν. οὗ δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα πάντα, τόδ' ἐστί· τὰ μὲν ἔμπροσθέν σοι πάντα ἀφίημι·
B ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι σὺ ἔλεγες περὶ αὐτῶν ὀρθότερον, ἴσως δ' ἐγώ, σαφὲς δ' οὐδὲν πάνυ ἦν ὧν ἐλέγομεν· νῦν δ' ἐθέλω τούτου σοι διδόναι λόγον, εἰ μὴ ὁμολογεῖς σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν.

Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι, περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ, προσφέρῃ πρός με, καὶ ἐὰν δὴ βούλωμαι, ὁμολογήσοντός σοι[2]· τὸ δ'

[1] ἕνεκεν secl. Cobet.

[2] ὁμολογήσοντός σοι Heusde: ὁμολογήσαντός σου MSS.

[1] Throughout this passage there is allusion to the *thought* or *wisdom* implied in *σωφρονεῖν*, and here Critias seeks to identify *φρόνει* ("think well," "be wise") with *γνῶθι* ("know," "understand") in the inscription *γνῶθι σαυτόν* at Delphi.

enter it, instead of "Hail!"—this is a wrong form of greeting, and they should rather exhort one another with the words, "Be temperate!" And thus the god addresses those who are entering his temple in a mode which differs from that of men; such was the intention of the dedicator of the inscription in putting it up, I believe; and that he says to each man who enters, in reality, "Be temperate!" But he says it in a rather riddling fashion, as a prophet would; for "Know thyself!" and "Be temperate!" are the same, as the inscription [1] and I declare, though one is likely enough to think them different—an error into which I consider the dedicators of the later inscriptions fell when they put up "Nothing overmuch" [2] and "A pledge, and thereupon perdition." [3] For they supposed that "Know thyself!" was a piece of advice, and not the god's salutation of those who were entering; and so, in order that their dedications too might equally give pieces of useful advice, they wrote these words and dedicated them. Now my object in saying all this, Socrates, is to abandon to you all the previous argument—for, though perhaps it was you who were more in the right, or perhaps it was I, yet nothing at all certain emerged from our statements—and to proceed instead to satisfy you of this truth, if you do not admit it, that temperance is knowing oneself.

Why, Critias, I said, you treat me as though I professed to know the things on which I ask questions, and needed only the will to agree with you. But the

[2] Μηδὲν ἄγαν appears first in Theognis, 335.

[3] Ἐγγύα πάρα δ' ἄτη, an old saying on the rashness of giving a pledge, is quoted in a fragment of Cratinus, the elder rival of Aristophanes. *Cf.* Proverbs xi. 15—"He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it."

165 οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ γὰρ μετὰ σοῦ ἀεὶ τὸ προτιθέμενον διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι· σκεψάμενος
C οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν εἴτε ὁμολογῶ εἴτε μή. ἀλλ' ἐπίσχες ἕως ἂν σκέψωμαι.

Σκόπει δή, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σκοπῶ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ γιγνώσκειν γέ τί ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ τινός· ἦ οὔ;

Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ἑαυτοῦ γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρική, ἔφην, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ;

Πάνυ γε.

Εἰ τοίνυν με, ἔφην, ἔροιο σύ, ἰατρικὴ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τί ἡμῖν χρησίμη ἐστὶ καὶ τί ἀπεργά-
D ζεται, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι οὐ σμικρὰν ὠφέλειαν· τὴν γὰρ ὑγίειαν καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, εἰ ἀποδέχῃ τοῦτο.

Ἀποδέχομαι.

Καὶ εἰ τοίνυν με ἔροιο τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν, τί φημι ἔργον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι οἰκήσεις· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. χρὴ οὖν καὶ σὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐπειδὴ φῂς αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἐρωτηθέντα, ὦ Κριτία, σωφρο-
E σύνη, ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ, τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνόματος; ἴθι οὖν, εἰπέ.

Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία αὕτη πέφυκε ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, οὐδέ γε αἱ ἄλλαι ἄλλαις· σὺ δ' ὡς ὁμοίων οὐσῶν ποιῇ τὴν ζήτησιν. ἐπεὶ λέγε μοι, ἔφη, τῆς λογιστικῆς τέχνης ἢ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς τί ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἔργον οἷον οἰκία οἰκοδομικῆς ἢ ἱμάτιον ὑφαντικῆς

fact of the matter is rather that I join you in th inquiry, each time that a proposition is made, because I myself do not know ; I wish therefore to consider first, before I tell you whether I agree or not. Now, give me a moment to consider.

Consider then, he said.

Yes, and I am considering, I said. For if temperance is knowing anything, obviously it must be a kind of science, and a science of something, must it not ?

It is, he replied, and of self.

And medicine, I said, is a science of health ?

Certainly.

Then if you should ask me, I said, wherein medicine, as a science of health is useful to us, and what it produces, I should say it is of very great benefit, since it produces health ; an excellent result, if you allow so much.

I allow it.

And so, if you should ask me what result I take to be produced by building, as the builder's science, I should say houses ; and it would be the same with the other arts. Now it is for you, in your turn, to find an answer to a question regarding temperance—since you say it is a science of self, Critias—and to tell me what excellent result it produces for us, as science of self, and what it does that is worthy of its name. Come now, tell me.

But, Socrates, he said, you are not inquiring rightly. For in its nature it is not like the other sciences, any more than any of them is like any other ; whereas you are making your inquiry as though they were alike. For tell me, he said, what result is there of the arts of reckoning and geometry, in the way that a house is of building, or a coat of

165 ἢ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἔργα, ἃ πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχοι πολλῶν
166 τεχνῶν δεῖξαι; ἔχεις οὖν μοι καὶ σὺ τούτων τοιοῦτόν τι ἔργον δεῖξαι; ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξεις.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τόδε σοι ἔχω δεῖξαι, τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν ἄλλο αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιστήμης· οἷον ἡ λογιστικὴ ἐστί που τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ, πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἦ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἑτέρου ὄντος τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αὐτῆς τῆς λογιστικῆς;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

B Καὶ μὴν αὖ ἡ στατικὴ τοῦ βαρυτέρου καὶ κουφοτέρου σταθμοῦ ἐστιν [στατική][1]· ἕτερον δέ ἐστι τὸ βαρύ τε καὶ κοῦφον τῆς στατικῆς αὐτῆς. συγχωρεῖς;

Ἔγωγε.

Λέγε δή, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕτερον ὂν αὐτῆς τῆς σωφροσύνης;

Τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἥκεις ἐρευνῶν, ὅτῳ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη· σὺ δὲ ὁμοιότητά τινα ζητεῖς αὐτῆς
C ταῖς ἄλλαις. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἄλλου εἰσὶν ἐπιστῆμαι, ἑαυτῶν δ' οὔ, ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς. καὶ ταῦτά σε πολλοῦ δεῖ λελῆθέναι, ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα ποιεῖν,

[1] στατική secl. Heindorf.

weaving, or other products of the sort that one might point to in various arts? Well, can you, for your part, point to any such product in those two cases? You cannot.

To this I replied: What you say is true; but I can point out to you what is the peculiar subject of each of these sciences, distinct in each case from the science itself. Thus reckoning, I suppose, is concerned with the even and the odd in their numerical relations to themselves and to one another, is it not?

Certainly, he said.

And you grant that the odd and the even are different from the actual art of reckoning?

Of course.

And once more, weighing is concerned with the heavier and the lighter weight; but the heavy and the light are different from the actual art of weighing: you agree?

I do.

Then tell me, what is that of which temperance is the science, differing from temperance itself?

There you are, Socrates, he said: you push your investigation up to the real question at issue—in what temperance differs from all the other sciences—but you then proceed to seek some resemblance between it and them; whereas there is no such thing, for while all the rest of the sciences have something other than themselves as their subject, this one alone is a science of the other sciences and of its own self. And of this you are far from being unconscious, since in fact, as I believe, you are doing the very thing you denied you were doing just now: for you are attempt-

166 τοῦτο ποιεῖς· ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ἐάσας περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστίν.

Οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἐλέγχειν ἢ οὗπερ D ἕνεκα κἂν ἐμαυτὸν διερευνῴμην τί λέγω, φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή. καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων· ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἴει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει;

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε, ἀποκρινόμενος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται, ἔα χαίρειν, E εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστὶν εἴτε Σωκράτης ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος· ἀλλ' αὐτῷ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν τῷ λόγῳ σκόπει[1] ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐκβήσεται ἐλεγχόμενος.

Ἀλλά, ἔφη, ποιήσω οὕτω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι μέτρια λέγειν.

Λέγε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης πῶς λέγεις;

Λέγω τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι μόνη τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αὐτή τε αὑτῆς ἐστι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμης;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

167 Ὁ ἄρα σώφρων μόνος αὐτός τε ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται

[1] σκόπει Heindorf: σκόπεῖν, σκοπεῖν MSS.

ing to refute me, without troubling to follow the subject of our discussion.

How can you think, I said, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which would impel me to investigate the meaning of my own words—from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is what I am doing, I tell you. I am examining the argument mainly for my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth about everything there is should be discovered?

Yes indeed, he replied, I do, Socrates.

Then take heart, I said, my admirable friend, and answer the question put to you as you deem the case to be, without caring a jot whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted: give the argument itself your attention, and observe what will become of it under the test of refutation.

Well, he said, I will do so; for I think there is a good deal in what you say.

Then tell me, I said, what you mean in regard to temperance.

Why, I mean, he said, that it alone of all the sciences is the science both of itself and of the other sciences.

So then, I said, it will be the science of the lack of science also, besides being the science of science?[1]

Certainly, he replied.

Then only the temperate person will know himself,

[1] Science or exact knowledge must be able to measure not only the field of knowledge, but also that of its negation, ignorance.

167 καὶ οἷός τε ἔσται ἐξετάσαι τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδὼς καὶ τί μή, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὡσαύτως δυνατὸς ἔσται ἐπισκοπεῖν, τί τις οἶδε καὶ οἴεται, εἴπερ οἶδε, καὶ τί αὖ[1] οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδε δ' οὔ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδείς· καὶ ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο τὸ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδε καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν. ἆρα ταὐτά ἐστιν ἃ λέγεις;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, Β ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκεψώμεθα, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο εἶναι ἢ οὔ, τὸ ἃ οἶδε καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι ὅτι οἶδε καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν· ἔπειτα εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν, τίς ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν ὠφελία εἰδόσιν αὐτό.

Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, σκοπεῖν.

Ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σκέψαι, ἐάν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορώτερος φανῇς ἐμοῦ· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορῶ· ἢ δὲ ἀπορῶ, φράσω σοι;

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, μία τις ἐπιστήμη, ἢ C οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ἢ ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἰδὲ δὴ ὡς ἄτοπον ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγειν· ἐν ἄλλοις γάρ που τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐὰν σκοπῇς, δόξει σοι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

[1] αὖ Bekker: αὐτὸς MSS.

[1] It was the custom at banquets to dedicate a third and

and be able to discern what he really knows and does not know, and have the power of judging what other people likewise know and think they know, in cases where they do know, and again, what they think they know, without knowing it ; everyone else will be unable. And so this is being temperate, or temperance, and knowing oneself—that one should know what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you mean ?

It is, he replied.

Once more then, I said, as our third offering to the Saviour,[1] let us consider afresh, in the first place, whether such a thing as this is possible or not—to know that one knows, and does not know, what one knows and what one does not know ; and secondly, if this is perfectly possible, what benefit we get by knowing it.

We must indeed consider, he said.

Come then, I said, Critias, consider if you can show yourself any more resourceful than I am ; for I am at a loss. Shall I explain to you in what way ?

By all means, he replied.

Well, I said, what all this comes to, if your last statement was correct, is merely that there is one science which is precisely a science of itself and of the other sciences, and moreover is a science of the lack of science at the same time.

Certainly.

Then mark what a strange statement it is that we are attempting to make, my friend : for if you will consider it as applied to other cases, you will surely see—so I believe—its impossibility.

[1] final wine-offering or toast to Zeus the Saviour. *Cf.* Pindar, *Isthm.* v. *init.*

167 Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῦ;

Ἕν τοῖσδε. ἐννόει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ὄψις τις εἶναι, ἣ ὧν μὲν αἱ ἄλλαι ὄψεις εἰσίν, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων ὄψις, ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων ὄψις ἐστί,
D καὶ μὴ ὄψεων ὡσαύτως, καὶ χρῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ὄψις οὖσα, αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὄψεις· δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι τοιαύτη;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Τί δὲ ἀκοήν, ἣ φωνῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀκούει, αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῶν ἀκούει καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν;

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Συλλήβδην δὴ σκόπει περὶ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἴσθησις καὶ ἑαυτῆς, ὧν δὲ δὴ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται, μηδενὸς αἰσθανομένη;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

E Ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμία δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι, ἥτις ἡδονῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Οὐδὲ μὴν βούλησις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἣ ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὐδὲν βούλεται, αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις βούλεται.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ἔρωτα δὲ φαίης ἄν τινα εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὃς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔρως καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός, αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων;

Οὔκ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε.

Φόβον δὲ ἤδη τινὰ κατανενόηκας, ὃς ἑαυτὸν μὲν
168 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους φόβους φοβεῖται, τῶν δεινῶν δ' οὐδὲ ἓν φοβεῖται;

How so? In what cases?

In the following: ask yourself if you think there is a sort of vision which is not the vision of things that we see in the ordinary way, but a vision of itself and of the other sorts of vision, and of the lack of vision likewise; which, while being vision, sees no colour, but only itself and the other sorts of vision. Do you think there is any such?

Upon my word, I do not.

And what do you say to a sort of hearing which hears not a single sound, but hears itself and the other sorts of hearing and lack of hearing?

I reject that also.

Then take all the senses together as a whole, and consider if you think there is any sense of the senses and of itself, but insensible of any of the things of which the other senses are sensible.

I do not.

Now, do you think there is any desire which is the desire, not of any pleasure, but of itself and of the other desires?

No, indeed.

Nor, again, is there a wish, I imagine, that wishes no good, but wishes itself and the other wishes.

Quite so; there is not.

And would you say there is any love of such a sort that it is actually a love of no beauty, but of itself and of the other loves?

Not I, he replied.

And have you ever observed any fear which fears itself and the other fears, but has no fear of a single dreadful thing?

Οὐ κατανενόηκα, ἔφη.

Δόξαν δὲ δοξῶν δόξαν καὶ αὐτῆς, ὧν δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι δοξάζουσι μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἔοικε, φαμέν τινα εἶναι τοιαύτην, ἥτις μαθήματος μὲν οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη;

Φαμὲν γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἔστι; μηδὲν γάρ πω διισχυριζώμεθα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἔτι σκοπῶμεν.

B Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

Φέρε δή· ἔστι μὲν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἔχει τινὰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι· ἦ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε.

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεῖζόν φαμεν τοιαύτην τινὰ ἔχειν δύναμιν, ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον;

Ἔχει γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν ἐλάττονός τινος, εἴπερ ἔσται μεῖζον.

Ἀνάγκη.

Εἰ οὖν τι εὕροιμεν μεῖζον, ὃ τῶν μὲν μειζόνων ἐστὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ὧν δὲ τἆλλα μείζω ἐστὶ
C μηδενὸς μεῖζον, πάντως ἄν που ἐκεῖνό γ' αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, εἴπερ ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον εἴη, καὶ ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι· ἦ οὔ;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴ τι διπλάσιόν ἐστι τῶν τε ἄλλων

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[1] At this point Socrates adduces the relation of greater to smaller (*τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον*) to suggest a difficulty in conceiving a science to be a science of itself: in so doing he draws a

No, I have not, he replied.

Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but without any opinion such as the other opinions have?

By no means.

But it is apparently a science of this kind that we are assuming—one that is a science of no branch of study, but a science of itself and of the other sciences.

So we are.

And it is a strange thing, if it really exists? For we should not affirm as yet that it does not exist, but should still consider whether it does exist.

You are right.

Well now, this science is a science of something, that is, it has a certain faculty whereby it can be a science of something, has it not?

Certainly.

For, you know, we say the greater has a certain faculty whereby it can be greater than something?[1]

Quite so.

That is, than something smaller, if it is to be greater.

Necessarily.

So if we could find a greater which is greater than other greater things, and than itself, but not greater than the things beside which the others are greater, I take it there can be no doubt that it would be in the situation of being, if greater than itself, at the same time smaller than itself, would it not?

Most inevitably, Socrates, he said.

Or again, if there is a double of other doubles and

[1] false analogy between two quite different uses of the genitive in Greek, represented in English by the comparative "than" and the objective "of."

168 διπλασίων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡμίσεος δήπου ὄντος ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διπλάσιον ἂν εἴη· οὐ γάρ ἐστί που ἄλλου διπλάσιον ἢ ἡμίσεος.

Ἀληθῆ.

Πλέον δὲ αὑτοῦ ὂν οὐ καὶ ἔλαττον ἔσται, καὶ βαρύτερον ὂν κουφότερον, καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὂν
D νεώτερον, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως, ὅ τί περ ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἔχῃ, οὐ καὶ ἐκείνην ἕξει τὴν οὐσίαν, πρὸς ἣν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· οἷον ἡ ἀκοή, φαμέν, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἦν ἀκοὴ ἢ φωνῆς· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἀκούσεται, φωνὴν ἐχούσης ἑαυτῆς ἀκούσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἀκούσειεν.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ ἡ ὄψις γέ που, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴπερ ὄψεται αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, χρῶμά τι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν· ἄχρων γὰρ
E ὄψις οὐδὲν [ἂν][1] μή ποτε ἴδῃ.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὅτι ὅσα διειληλύθαμεν, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀδύνατα παντάπασι φαίνεται ἡμῖν, τὰ δ' ἀπιστεῖται σφόδρα μή ποτ' ἄν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὰ σχεῖν; μεγέθη μὲν γὰρ καὶ πλήθη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον· ἢ οὐχί;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἀκοὴ δ' αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ἔτι γε κίνησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν, καὶ θερμότης καίειν, καὶ πάντα αὖ
169 τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἀπιστίαν ‹ἂν›[2] παράσχοι, ἴσως δέ τισιν οὔ. μεγάλου δή τινος, ὦ φίλε,

[1] ἂν secl. Stallbaum. [2] ἂν add. Heindorf.

of itself, both it and the others must of course be halves, if it is to be their double ; for, you know, a double cannot be " of " anything else than its half.

True.

And what is more than itself will also be less, and the heavier will be lighter, and the older younger, and so on with everything else : whatever has its own faculty applied to itself will have also the natural quality to which its faculty was applicable, will it not ? For instance, hearing is, as we say, just a hearing of sound, is it not ?

Yes.

So if it is to hear itself, it will hear a sound of its own ; for it would not hear otherwise.

Most inevitably.

And sight, I suppose, my excellent friend, if it is to see itself, must needs have a colour ; for sight can never see what is colourless.

No more it can.

Then do you perceive, Critias, in the various cases we have propounded, how some of them strike us as absolutely impossible, while others raise serious doubts as to the faculty of the thing being ever applicable to itself ? For with magnitudes, numbers, and the like it is absolutely impossible, is it not ?

Certainly.

But again, with hearing and sight, or in the further cases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself, and all other actions of the sort, the fact must appear incredible to some, but perhaps not to others. So what we want, my friend, is some great man who

169 ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, ὅστις τοῦτο κατὰ πάντων ἱκανῶς διαιρήσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἔχειν [πλὴν ἐπιστήμης],[1] ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὔ· καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὖ ἅτινα αὐτὰ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ ἔχει, ἆρ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἣν δὴ ἡμεῖς σωφροσύνην φαμὲν εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαυτῷ ἱκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα διελέσθαι· διὸ καὶ οὔτ' εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι
B τοῦτο γενέσθαι, ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχω διισχυρίσασθαι, οὔτ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἔστι, σωφροσύνη ἀποδέχομαι αὐτὸ εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωμαι, εἴτε τι ἂν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ τοιοῦτον ὄν, εἴτε μή. τὴν γὰρ οὖν δὴ σωφροσύνην ὠφέλιμόν τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν μαντεύομαι εἶναι· σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ Καλλαίσχρου— τίθεσαι γὰρ σωφροσύνην τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης—πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἔνδειξαι, ὅτι δυνατὸν [ἀποδεῖξαί σε][2] ὃ
C νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἔπειτα πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ ὅτι καὶ ὠφέλιμον· κἀμὲ τάχ' ἂν ἀποπληρώσαις, ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγεις περὶ σωφροσύνης, ὃ ἔστιν.

Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα καὶ ἰδών με ἀποροῦντα, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς χασμωμένους καταντικρὺ ὁρῶντες ταὐτὸν τοῦτο συμπάσχουσι, κἀκεῖνος ἔδοξέ μοι ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀποροῦντος ἀναγκασθῆναι καὶ αὐτὸς ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ ἀπορίας. ἅτε οὖν εὐδοκιμῶν ἑκάστοτε, ᾐσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας, καὶ οὔτε συγχωρῆσαί μοι ἤθελεν ἀδύνατος εἶναι διελέσθαι
D ἃ προὐκαλούμην αὐτόν, ἔλεγέ τε οὐδὲν σαφές, ἐπικαλύπτων τὴν ἀπορίαν. κἀγὼ ἡμῖν ἵνα ὁ λόγος προΐοι, εἶπον· Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κριτία, νῦν μὲν

[1] πλὴν ἐπιστήμης secl. Schleiermacher.
[2] ἀποδεῖξαί σε secl. Heindorf.

will determine to our satisfaction in every respect whether there is nothing in nature so constituted as to have its own faculty applicable to itself, and not only some other object, or whether there are some such, and others not such; and whether, again, if there are things that have such relation to themselves, they include a science which we assert to be temperance. For my part, I distrust my own competence to determine these questions, and hence I am neither able to affirm whether it is possible that there should be a science of science, nor willing, let it be ever so true, to acknowledge this to be temperance until I have made out whether such a thing as this would benefit us or not. For, you see, I have a presentiment that temperance is something beneficial and good; and you, therefore, son of Callaeschrus—since you lay it down that temperance is this very science of science, and moreover of the lack of science—shall first indicate the possibility, as I put it just now, and then the benefit added to the possibility, of such a thing; and perhaps you will then satisfy me that your definition of temperance is correct.

Now when Critias heard this and saw me in a difficulty, he seemed to me—just as the sight of someone yawning opposite causes people to be affected in the same way—to be compelled by the sense of my difficulty to be caught in a difficulty himself. And so, since he usually contrived to distinguish himself, he was too ashamed to bring himself to admit to me before the company that he was unable to determine the questions with which I challenged him, but made a very indistinct reply in order to conceal his difficulty. Then I, to forward the discussion, remarked: Well, if you prefer, Critias, let

169 τοῦτο συγχωρήσωμεν, δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης· αὖθις δὲ ἐπισκεψόμεθα εἴτε οὕτως ἔχει εἴτε μή. ἴθι δὴ οὖν, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατὸν τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον οἷόν τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι ἅ τέ τις οἶδε καὶ ἃ μή; τοῦτο γὰρ δήπου ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· ἢ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ συμβαίνει γέ που, ὦ
E Σώκρατες. εἰ γάρ τις ἔχει ἐπιστήμην ἣ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει, τοιοῦτος ἂν αὐτὸς εἴη οἷόνπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔχει. ὥσπερ ὅταν τάχος τις ἔχῃ, ταχύς, καὶ ὅταν κάλλος, καλός, καὶ ὅταν γνῶσιν, γιγνώσκων· ὅταν δὲ δὴ γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς τις ἔχῃ, γιγνώσκων που αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε ἔσται.

Οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὐχ ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γιγνῶσκόν τις ἔχῃ, αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνώσεται, ἀλλ' ἔχοντι τοῦτο τίς ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδε καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν;

170 Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταὐτόν ἐστι τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ.

Ἴσως, ἔφην, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω ἀεὶ ὅμοιος εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ αὖ μανθάνω ὡς ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἃ οἶδεν εἰδέναι καὶ ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι.

Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη;

Ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπιστήμη που ἐπιστήμης οὖσα ἆρα πλεῖόν τι οἷα τ' ἔσται διαιρεῖν, ἢ ὅτι τούτων τόδε μὲν ἐπιστήμη, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἐπιστήμη;

Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον.

B Ταὐτὸν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη ὑγιεινοῦ, καὶ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη δικαίου;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν, οἶμαι, ἰατρική, τὸ δὲ πολιτική, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμη.

us concede for the moment that there may possibly be a science of science : some other time we shall consider whether such is the fact or not. Come then ; suppose it is perfectly possible : how is one helped thereby to know what one knows and does not know ? For this, you are aware, we said [1] was the meaning of self-knowledge and temperance, did we not ?

Certainly, he said ; and it must surely follow, Socrates ; for if a man has a science which knows itself, he will be similar himself to that which he has. For instance, he who has swiftness will be swift, he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know ; and when he has knowledge that is of itself, he will then, surely, be in the position of knowing himself.

I do not dispute, I said, that when a man has that which knows itself he will know himself ; but having that, how is he bound to know what he knows and what he does not know ?

Because, Socrates, the two things are the same.

I daresay, I said ; but I am afraid I am still my old self : I still do not see how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same as the other.

How do you mean ? he asked.

In this way, I replied : will a science of science, if such exists, be able to do more than determine that one of two things is science, and the other is not science ?

No, only that.

Now, is science or lack of science of health the same as science or lack of science of justice ?

By no means.

For the one, I suppose, is medicine, and the other politics, while the thing in question is merely science.

[1] 167 A.

170 Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὴ προσεπίστηταί τις τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμην μόνον γιγνώσκῃ ἅτε τούτου μόνον ἔχων ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι μέν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, εἰκότως ἂν γιγνώσκοι καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

C Ὅ τι δὲ γιγνώσκει, ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ πῶς εἴσεται; γιγνώσκει γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ' ἁρμονικὸν μουσικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ' οἰκοδομικὸν οἰκοδομικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, καὶ οὕτω πάντα· ἢ οὔ;

Φαίνεται.

Σωφροσύνη δέ, εἴπερ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς εἴσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινὸν γιγνώσκει ἢ ὅτι τὸ οἰκοδομικόν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐκ ἄρα εἴσεται ὃ οἶδεν ὅ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οἶδε μόνον.

Ἔοικεν.

D Οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖν τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδε καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι οἶδε καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδε μόνον.

Κινδυνεύει.

Οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄρα οἷός τε ἐσται οὗτος ἐξετάσαι φάσκοντά τι ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ἐπίσταται ὃ φησιν ἐπίστασθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταται· ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὡς ἔοικε, γνώσεται, ὅτι ἔχει τινὰ ἐπιστήμην, ὅτου δέ γε, ἡ σωφροσύνη οὐ ποιήσει αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν.

Yes, to be sure.

And if a man has no added knowledge of health and justice, but knows only science, as having science of that alone, he will probably know that he has a certain piece of scientific knowledge about himself and about other people, will he not?

Yes.

But how will this science help him to know what he knows? For of course he knows health by means of medicine, not temperance, and harmony by means of music, not temperance, and building by means of the builder's art, not temperance; and so it will be in every case, will it not?

Apparently.

And how will temperance, supposing it is only a science of sciences, help him to know that he knows health, or that he knows building?

By no means.

Then he who is ignorant of all this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.

So it seems.

Then being temperate, or temperance, will not be this knowledge of what one knows or does not know, but, it would seem, merely knowing that one knows or does not know.

It looks like it.

Then such a person will also be unable to examine another man's claim to some knowledge, and make out whether he knows or does not know what he says he knows: he will merely know, it would seem, that he has a certain knowledge; but of what it is, temperance will not cause him to know.

170 Οὐ *φαίνεται.*

E Οὔτε ἄρα *τὸν προσποιούμενον ἰατρὸν εἶναι, ὄντα δὲ μή, καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα οἷός τε ἔσται διακρίνειν, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ μή. σκεψώμεθα δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε· εἰ μέλλει ὁ σώφρων ἢ ὁστισοῦν ἄλλος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μή, ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε ποιήσει· περὶ μὲν ἰατρικῆς δήπου αὐτῷ οὐ διαλέξεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπαΐει, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες· ἢ οὔ;*

Ναί, *οὕτως.*

Περὶ δέ γε *ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ μόνῃ ἀπέδομεν.*

Ναί.

Οὐδὲ περὶ *ἰατρικῆς ἄρα οἶδεν ὁ ἰατρικός, ἐπει-*
171 *δήπερ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τυγχάνει.*

Ἀληθῆ.

Ὅτι μὲν δὴ *ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, γνώσεται ὁ σώφρων τὸν ἰατρόν· δέον δὲ*[1] *πεῖραν λαβεῖν ἥτις ἐστίν, ἄλλο τι σκέψεται ὧντινων; ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ὥρισται ἑκάστη ἐπιστήμη μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς, τῷ τινῶν εἶναι;*

Τούτῳ μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ ἡ *ἰατρικὴ δὴ ἑτέρα εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ὡρίσθη τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη.*

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν *ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν τὸν βου-*
B *λόμενον ἰατρικὴν σκοπεῖν, ἐν οἷς ποτ' ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς ἔξω, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν;*

Οὐ δῆτα.

[1] *δέον δὲ* Goldbacher: *δεῖ δή, δὲ δὴ* MSS.

Apparently not.

So he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is none, from the man who really is one, nor any other man who has knowledge from him who has none. But let us consider it another way: if the temperate man or anybody else would discriminate between the true doctor and the false, he will go to work thus, will he not? He will surely not talk to him about medicine; for, as we were saying, the doctor understands nothing else but health and disease. Is not that so?

Yes, it is.

But about science he knows nothing, for that, you know, we assigned to temperance alone.

Yes.

So the medical man knows nothing about medicine either, since medicine is, of course, a science.

True.

Then the temperate man will know, indeed, that the doctor has a certain science; but when he has to put its nature to the proof, must he not consider what its subjects are? Is not each science marked out, not merely as a science, but as a particular one, by the particular subjects it has?

It is, to be sure

And medicine is marked out as different from the other sciences by being a science of health and disease.

Yes.

And so anyone who wishes to inquire into medicine must make those things, whatever they may be, with which it is concerned, the matter of his inquiry; not those foreign things, I presume, with which it is not?

No, indeed.

171 Ἐν τοῖς ὑγιεινοῖς ἄρα καὶ νοσώδεσιν ἐπισκέψεται τὸν ἰατρόν, ᾗ ἰατρικός ἐστιν, ὁ ὀρθῶς σκοπούμενος.

Ἔοικεν.

Οὐκοῦν ἐν τοῖς οὕτως ἢ λεγομένοις ἢ πραττομένοις τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεται, σκοπούμενος, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα, εἰ ὀρθῶς πράττεται;

Ἀνάγκη.

Ἦ οὖν ἄνευ ἰατρικῆς δύναιτ' ἄν τις τούτων ποτέροις ἐπακολουθῆσαι;

Οὐ δῆτα.

C Οὐδέ γε ἄλλος οὐδείς, ὡς ἔοικε, πλὴν ἰατρός, οὔτε δὴ ὁ σώφρων· ἰατρὸς γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον, εἰ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη μόνον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, οὔτε ἰατρὸν διακρῖναι οἷά τε ἔσται ἐπιστάμενον τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, προσποιούμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπισταμένων καὶ ὁτιοῦν, πλήν γε τὸν αὐτοῦ ὁμότεχνον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί.

Φαίνεται, ἔφη.

D Τίς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ὠφελία ἡμῖν ἔτι ἂν εἴη ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τοιαύτης οὔσης; εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπετιθέμεθα, ᾔδει ὁ σώφρων ἃ τε ᾔδει καὶ ἃ μὴ ᾔδει, τὰ μὲν ὅτι οἶδε, τὰ δ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδε, καὶ ἄλλον ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπονθότα ἐπισκέψασθαι οἷός τε ἦν, μεγαλωστὶ ἂν ἡμῖν, φαμέν, ὠφέλιμον ἦν σώφροσιν εἶναι· ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν αὐτοί τε [καὶ][1] οἱ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ὑφ'

[1] καὶ del. Heindorf.

Then he who conducts his inquiry aright will consider the doctor, as a medical man, in connexion with cases of health and disease.

So it seems.

And will inquire whether, in what is said or done in such cases, his words are truly spoken, and his acts rightly done?

He must.

Well now, could anyone follow up either of these points without the medical art?

No, indeed.

Nobody at all, it would seem, but a doctor; and so not the temperate man either: for he would have to be a doctor, in addition to his temperance.

That is so.

Then inevitably, if temperance is only a science of science and of lack of science, it will be equally unable to distinguish a doctor who knows the business of his art from one who does not know but pretends or thinks he does, and any other person who has knowledge of anything at all: one will only distinguish one's fellow-artist, as craftsmen usually can.

Apparently, he said.

Then what benefit, I asked, Critias, can we still look for from temperance, if it is like that? For if, as we began by assuming, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know, and that he knows the one and does not know the other, and if he were able to observe this same condition in another man, it would be vastly to our benefit, we agree, to be temperate; since we should pass all our lives, both we who had temperance and all the rest

171 E ἡμῶν ἤρχοντο. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἃ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐξευρίσκοντες τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἐκείνοις ἂν παρεδίδομεν, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπετρέπομεν, ὧν ἤρχομεν, ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἢ ὅ τι πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἔμελλον πράξειν· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἄν, οὗ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον· καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης οἰκία τε οἰκουμένη ἔμελλε καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι, πόλις τε πολιτευομένη, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν οὗ
172 σωφροσύνη ἄρχοι· ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης, ἐν πάσῃ πράξει ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δὲ εὐ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ἐλέγομεν περὶ σωφροσύνης, λέγοντες ὅσον ἀγαθὸν εἴη τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδέ τις καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως.

Νῦν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τοιαύτη οὖσα πέφανται.

Ὁρῶ, ἔφη.

B Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἣν νῦν εὑρίσκομεν σωφροσύνην οὖσαν, τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ὅτι ὁ ταύτην ἔχων, ὅ τι ἂν ἄλλο μανθάνῃ, ῥᾷόν τε μαθήσεται καὶ ἐναργέστερα πάντα αὐτῷ φανεῖται, ἅτε πρὸς ἑκάστῳ ᾧ ἂν μανθάνῃ προσκαθορῶντι τὴν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δὴ κάλλιον ἐξετάσει περὶ ὧν ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς μάθῃ, οἱ δὲ ἄνευ τούτου ἐξετάζοντες ἀσθενέστερον καὶ φαυλότερον τοῦτο δράσουσιν; ἆρ', ὦ φίλε, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστὶν ἃ ἀπολαυσόμεθα

who were governed by us, without error. For neither should we ourselves attempt to do what we did not know, instead of finding out those who knew and placing the matter in their hands, nor should we permit others under our governance to do anything but what they were likely to do aright; and they would do that when they had knowledge of it; and so it would be that a house which was ordered, or a state which was administered, as temperance bade, and everything else that was ruled by temperance, could not but be well ordered; for with error abolished, and rightness leading, in their every action men would be bound to do honourably and well under such conditions, and those who did well would be happy. Did we not so speak of temperance, I said, Critias, when we remarked how great a boon it was to know what one knows and what one does not know?

To be sure we did, he replied.

Whereas now, I went on, you see that nowhere can any such science be found.

I see, he said.

Then may we say, I asked, that there is this good point in the knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, which we now find to be what temperance is, that he who has it will not only learn more easily whatever he learns, but will perceive everything more plainly, since besides the particular things that he learns he will behold the science; and hence he will probe more surely the state of other men respecting the things which he has learnt himself, while those who probe without such knowledge will do it more feebly and poorly? Are these, my friend, the kind of advantages that we shall gain from temperance?

C τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἡμεῖς δὲ μεῖζόν τι βλέπομεν καὶ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸ μεῖζόν τι εἶναι ἢ ὅσον ἐστίν;

Τάχα δ' ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχοι.

Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἴσως δέ γε ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἐζητήσαμεν. τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι μοι ἄτοπ' ἄττα καταφαίνεται περὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἴδωμεν γάρ, εἰ βούλει, συγχωρήσαντες καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι [εἰδέναι],[1] καὶ ὅ γε ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδε καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, μὴ ἀποστερήσωμεν,

D ἀλλὰ δῶμεν· καὶ πάντα ταῦτα δόντες ἔτι βέλτιον σκεψώμεθα, εἰ ἄρα τι καὶ ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει τοιοῦτον ὄν. ἃ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς μέγα ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη, ἡγουμένη διοικήσεως καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ὦ Κριτία, καλῶς ὡμολογηκέναι.

Πῶς δή; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥᾳδίως ὡμολογήσαμεν μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἰ ἕκαστοι ἡμῶν, ἃ μὲν ἴσασι, πράττοιεν ταῦτα, ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταιντο, ἄλλοις παραδιδοῖεν τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις.

E Οὐκ οὖν, ἔφη, καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;

Οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ἄτοπα λέγεις ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἔφην, καὶ ἐμοί τοι δοκεῖ οὕτω· κἀνταῦθα[2] καὶ ἄρτι ἀποβλέψας ἄτοπά γ' ἔφην μοι προφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι φοβοίμην μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοποῖμεν. ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδέν μοι δῆλον

173 εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅ τι ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται.

[1] εἰδέναι secl. Heusde.

But are we really looking at something greater, and requiring it to be something greater than it really is?

Probably, he replied, that is so.

I daresay, I said; and I daresay also our inquiry has been worthless. And this I conclude, because I observe certain strange facts about temperance, if it is anything like that. For suppose, if you please, we concede that there may possibly be a science of science, and let us grant, and not withdraw, our original proposition that temperance is the knowledge of what one knows and does not know; granting all this, let us still more thoroughly inquire whether on these terms it will be of any profit to us. For our suggestion just now, that temperance of that sort, as our guide in ordering house or state, must be a great boon, was not, to my thinking, Critias, a proper admission.

How so? he asked.

Because, I replied, we too lightly admitted that it would be a great boon to mankind if each of us should do what he knows, but should place what he did not know in the hands of others who had the knowledge.

Well, was that, he asked, not a proper admission?

Not to my mind, I answered.

In very truth, your words are strange! he said, Socrates.

Yes, by the Dog, I said, and they strike me too in the same way; and it was in view of this, just now, that I spoke of strange results that I noticed, and said I feared we were not inquiring rightly. For in truth, let temperance be ever so much what we say it is, I see nothing to show what good effect it has on us.

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[1] οὕτω· κἀνταῦθα Hermann: οὕτως εἰ ἐνταῦθα, οὕτως, οὕτωσὶ ἐνταῦθα MSS.

173 Πῶς δή; ἦ δ' ὅς. λέγε, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰδῶμεν ὅ τι λέγεις.

Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ληρεῖν με· ὅμως τό γε προφαινόμενον ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ παριέναι, εἴ τίς γε αὐτοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν κήδεται.

Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἄκουε δή, ἔφην, τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ, εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος ἐλήλυθεν. εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα ἡμῶν ἄρχοι ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὖσα οἵαν νῦν ὁριζόμεθα, B ἄλλο τι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας πάντ' ἂν[1] πράττοιτο, καὶ οὔτε τις κυβερνήτης φάσκων εἶναι, ὢν δὲ οὔ, ἐξαπατᾷ ἂν ἡμᾶς, οὔτε ἰατρὸς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς, προσποιούμενός τι εἰδέναι ὃ μὴ οἶδε, λανθάνοι ἄν· ἐκ δὴ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄλλο ἂν ἡμῖν τι συμβαίνοι ἢ[2] ὑγιέσι τε τὰ σώματα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν, καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ τὰ σκεύη καὶ τὴν ἀμπε- C χόνην καὶ ὑπόδεσιν πᾶσαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα τεχνικῶς ἡμῖν εἰργασμένα εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς χρῆσθαι; εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε, καὶ τὴν μαντικὴν εἶναι συγχωρήσωμεν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, αὐτῆς ἐπιστατοῦσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἀλαζόνας ἀποτρέπειν, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάντεις καθιστάναι ἡμῖν προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων. κατεσκευασμένον δὴ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστημόνως D ἂν πράττοι καὶ ζῴη, ἕπομαι· ἡ γὰρ σωφροσύνη φυλάττουσα οὐκ ἂν ἐῴη παρεμπίπτουσαν τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην συνεργὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι· ὅτι δ' ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ

[1] πάντ' ἂν Burnet: πάντα Stobaeus, ἂν mss.
[2] ἢ add. Heindorf.

How so? he asked: tell us, in order that we on our side may know what you mean.

I expect, I said, I am talking nonsense: but still one is bound to consider what occurs to one, and not idly ignore it, if one has even a little concern for oneself.

And you are quite right, he said.

Hear then, I said, my dream, whether it has come through horn or through ivory.[1] Suppose that temperance were such as we now define her, and that she had entire control of us: must it not be that every act would be done according to the sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he was not would deceive us, nor would a doctor, nor a general, nor anyone else pretending to know something he did not know, go undetected; and would not these conditions result in our having greater bodily health than we have now, safety in perils of the sea and war, and skilful workmanship in all our utensils, our clothes, our shoes, nay, everything about us, and various things besides, because we should be employing genuine craftsmen? And if you liked, we might concede that prophecy, as the knowledge of what is to be, and temperance directing her, will deter the charlatans, and establish the true prophets as our prognosticators. Thus equipped, the human race would indeed act and live according to knowledge, I grant you (for temperance, on the watch, would not suffer ignorance to foist herself in and take a hand in our labours), but that by acting according to knowledge we should do well and be happy—this is a

[1] *Cf.* Homer, *Od.* xix. 562 foll. Dreams are there described as issuing from two gates: dreams that come true are from the gate of horn; deceitful dreams are from the gate of ivory.

173 εὐδαιμονοῖμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔπω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὦ φίλε Κριτία.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ ῥᾳδίως εὑρήσεις ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν, ἐὰν τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμάσῃς.

Σμικρὸν τοίνυν με, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι προσδίδαξον. τίνος ἐπιστημόνως λέγεις; ἢ σκυτῶν τομῆς;

E Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Ἀλλὰ χαλκοῦ ἐργασίας;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλὰ ἐρίων ἢ ξύλων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα. οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦνται παρὰ σοῦ εὐδαίμονες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περί τινων ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα[1] σὺ[2] δοκεῖς μοι ἀφορίζεσθαι τὸν εὐδαίμονα. καὶ ἴσως λέγεις ὃν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸν εἰδότα
174 τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι πάντα, τὸν μάντιν. τοῦτον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγεις;

Καὶ τοῦτον ἔγωγε, ἔφη, καὶ ἄλλον.

Τίνα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἆρα μὴ τὸν τοιόνδε, εἴ τις πρὸς τοῖς μέλλουσι καὶ τὰ γεγονότα πάντα εἰδείη καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα, καὶ μηδὲν ἀγνοοῖ; θῶμεν γάρ τινα εἶναι αὐτόν. οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, τούτου γ' ἔτι ἂν εἴποις οὐδένα ἐπιστημονέστερον ζῶντα εἶναι.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Τόδε δὴ ἔτι προσποθῶ, τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονα; ἢ ἅπασαι ὁμοίως;

[1] ζῶντα Schleiermacher; ζώντων MSS.
[2] σὺ Bekker: εὖ MSS.

point which as yet we are unable to make out, my dear Critias.

But still, he replied, you will have some difficulty in finding any other fulfilment of welfare if you reject the rule of knowledge.

Then inform me further, I said, on one more little matter. Of what is this knowledge? Do you mean of shoe-making?

Good heavens, not I!

Well, of working in brass?

By no means.

Well, in wool, or in wood, or in something else of that sort?

No, indeed.

Then we no longer hold, I said, to the statement that he who lives according to knowledge is happy; for these workers, though they live according to knowledge, are not acknowledged by you to be happy: you rather delimit the happy man, it seems to me, as one who lives according to knowledge *about certain things*. And I daresay you are referring to my instance of a moment ago, the man who knows all that is to come, the prophet. Do you refer to him or to someone else?

Yes, I refer to him, he said, and someone else too.

Whom? I asked. Is it the sort of person who might know, besides what is to be, both everything that has been and now is, and might be ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose such a man exists: you are not going to tell me, I am sure, of anyone alive who is yet more knowing than he.

No, indeed.

Then there is still one more thing I would fain know: which of the sciences is it that makes him happy? Or does he owe it to all of them alike?

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B Οὐδαμῶς ὁμοίως, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ ποία μάλιστα; ἦ τί οἶδε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι; ἆρά γε ἦ τὸ πεπτευτικόν;

Ποῖον, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεπτευτικόν;

Ἀλλ' ἦ τὸ λογιστικόν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλ' ἦ τὸ ὑγιεινόν;

Μᾶλλον, ἔφη.

Ἐκείνη δ' ἦν λέγω μάλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἦ τί;

Ἥι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν.

Ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλῳ, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ

C συμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν. ἐπεί, ὦ Κριτία, εἰ θέλεις ἐξελεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἧττόν τι ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἡ δὲ σκυτικὴ ὑποδεδέσθαι, ἡ δὲ ὑφαντικὴ ἠμφιέσθαι, ἡ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ;

Οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε Κριτία, τὸ εὖ γε τούτων ἕκαστα

D γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὠφελίμως ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσται ταύτης ἀπούσης.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Οὐχ αὕτη δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἀλλ' ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστημῶν γε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ· ὥστε εἰ αὕτη

By no means to all alike, he replied.

But to which sort most? One that gives him knowledge of what thing, present, past or future? Is it that by which he knows draught-playing?

Draught-playing indeed! he replied.

Well, reckoning?

By no means.

Well, health?

More likely, he said.

And that science to which I refer as the most likely, I went on, gives him knowledge of what?

Of good, he replied, and of evil.

Vile creature! I said, you have all this time been dragging me round and round, while concealing the fact that the life according to knowledge does not make us do well and be happy, not even if it be knowledge of all the other knowledges together, but only if it is of this single one concerning good and evil. For, Critias, if you choose to take away this science from the whole number of them, will medicine any the less give us health, or shoemaking give us shoes, or weaving provide clothes, or will the pilot's art any the less prevent the loss of life at sea, or the general's in war?

None the less, he replied.

But, my dear Critias, to have any of these things well and beneficially done will be out of our reach if that science is lacking.

That is true.

And that science, it seems, is not temperance, but one whose business is to benefit us; for it is not a science of sciences and lack of sciences, but of good

174 ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη [ἡ ὠφελίμη][1] ἡμῖν.

Τί δ', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν αὕτη ὠφελοῖ; εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ σωφρο-
E σύνη, ἐπιστατεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, καὶ ταύτης δήπου ἂν ἄρχουσα τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης ὠφελοῖ ἂν ἡμᾶς.

Ἦ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ἰατρική; καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν αὕτη ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ οὐχ αἱ ἄλλαι τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἑκάστη; ἢ οὐ πάλαι διεμαρτυρόμεθα, ὅτι ἐπιστήμης μόνον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός· οὐχ οὕτως;

Φαίνεταί γε.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός.

Οὐ δῆτα.

175 Ἄλλης γὰρ ἦν τέχνης ὑγίεια· ἢ οὔ;

Ἄλλης.

Οὐδ' ἄρα ὠφελείας, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὖ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνῃ νῦν δή· ἢ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε.

Πῶς οὖν ὠφέλιμος ἔσται ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας οὖσα δημιουργός;

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικέ γε.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὡς ἐγὼ πάλαι εἰκότως ἐδεδοίκη καὶ δικαίως ἐμαυτὸν ἠτιώμην ὅτι οὐδὲν χρηστὸν περὶ σωφροσύνης σκοπῶ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὅ γε κάλλιστον πάντων ὁμολογεῖται εἶναι, τοῦτο
B ἡμῖν ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζητεῖν. νῦν δέ—πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα, καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὑρεῖν ἐφ' ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων ὁ

[1] ἡ ὠφελίμη secl. Madvig.

and evil: so that if this is beneficial, temperance must be something else to us.

But why, he asked, should not *it* be beneficial? For if temperance is above all a science of the sciences, and presides too over the other sciences, surely she will govern this science of the good, and so benefit us.

And give us health also? I asked: will she, and not medicine, do this? And will the several works of the other arts be hers, and not the particular works of each art? Have we not constantly protested that she is only knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Is not that so?

Apparently it is.

Then she will not be a producer of health?

No, indeed.

For health, we said, belongs to another art, did we not?

We did.

Nor of benefit, my good friend; for this work, again, we assigned to another art just now, did we not?

Certainly.

Then how will temperance be beneficial, if it produces no benefit?

By no means, Socrates, as it seems.

So do you see, Critias, how all the time I had good reason for my fear, and fair ground for the reproach I made against myself, that my inquiry regarding temperance was worthless?[1] For I cannot think that what is admitted to be the noblest thing in the world would have appeared to us useless if I had been of any use for making a good search. But now, you see, we are worsted every way, and cannot discover what

[1] *Cf.* 172 c.

175 νομοθέτης τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔθετο, τὴν σωφροσύνην. καίτοι πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐ συμβαίνονθ' ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι· καὶ ταύτῃ αὖ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ C τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γιγνώσκειν συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμων ὢν τε οἶδεν, ὅτι οἶδε, καὶ ὢν μὴ οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδε. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδ' ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἅ τις μὴ οἶδε μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἁμῶς γέ πως· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε, φησὶν αὐτὰ εἰδέναι ἡ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία. καίτοι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτως ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν D τυχοῦσα ἡ ζήτησις καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον εὑρεῖν δύναται τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον κατεγέλασεν αὐτῆς, ὥστε ὃ ἡμεῖς πάλαι συνομολογοῦντες καὶ συμπλάττοντες ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν πάνυ ὑβριστικῶς ἀνωφελὲς ὂν ἀπέφαινε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐμὸν καὶ ἧττον ἀγανακτῶ· ὑπὲρ δὲ σοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, πάνυ ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ σὺ τοιοῦτος ὢν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πρὸς E τούτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν σωφρονέστατος, μηδὲν ὀνήσῃ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σωφροσύνης μηδέ τί σ' ὠφελήσει ἐν τῷ βίῳ παροῦσα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀγανακτῶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, ἣν παρὰ τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς ἔμαθον, εἰ μηδενὸς ἀξίου πράγματος οὖσαν αὐτὴν μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐμάνθανον. ταῦτ' οὖν πάνυ μὲν [οὖν][1] οὐκ οἴομαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ φαῦλον

[1] οὖν secl. Winckelmann.

[1] *Cf.* 156 D.

thing it can possibly be to which the lawgiver gave this name, temperance. And yet we have conceded many points which were not deducible from our argument. For you know we conceded that there was a science of science, when the argument was against it and would not agree ; and we further conceded that this science could know the works also of the other sciences, when the argument was against this too, in order to make out that the temperate man had a knowledge of what he knew and did not know, so as to know that he knew the one and did not know the other. And we made this concession in a really magnificent manner, without considering the impossibility of a man knowing, in some sort of way, things that he does not know at all ; for our admission says that he knows that he does not know them ; and yet, in my opinion, there can be nothing more irrational than this. Nevertheless, although it has found us so simple-minded and tractable, the inquiry remains quite incapable of discovering the truth, but has utterly flouted it by most impudently showing us the inutility of that which we had been ever so long assuming, by our joint admissions and fictions, to be the meaning of temperance. Now, so far as I am concerned, I am not particularly distressed : but for your sake, I said, Charmides, I am seriously distressed to think that you, with your goodly form and most temperate soul besides, are to have no profit or advantage from the presence of that temperance in all your life. And I am still more distressed about the charm which I learnt from the Thracian,[1] that I should have spent so much pains on a lesson which has had such a worthless effect. Now I really do not think that this can be the case, but

175 εἶναι ζητητήν· ἐπεὶ τήν γε σωφροσύνην μέγα τι
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ εἴπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό, μακάριον
176 εἶναί σε. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἔχεις τε καὶ μηδὲν δέῃ τῆς
ἐπῳδῆς· εἰ γὰρ ἔχεις, μᾶλλον ἂν ἔγωγέ σοι συμβου-
λεύσαιμι ἐμὲ μὲν λῆρον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον
λόγῳ ὁτιοῦν ζητεῖν, σεαυτὸν δέ, ὅσῳπερ σωφρονέ-
στερος εἶ, τοσούτῳ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερον.

Καὶ ὁ Χαρμίδης, Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε,
ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω.
πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰδείην ὅ γε μηδ' ὑμεῖς οἵοί τέ ἐστε
B ἐξευρεῖν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ὡς φῂς σύ; ἐγὼ μέντοι
οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι, καὶ ἐμαυτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
πάνυ οἶμαι δεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, καὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν
οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπᾴδεσθαι ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅσαι ἡμέραι, ἕως
ἂν φῇς σὺ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν.

Εἶεν· ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ὦ Χαρμίδη, ‹ἦν›[1]
δρᾷς τοῦτο ἔμοιγ' ἔσται τοῦτο τεκμήριον ὅτι
σωφρονεῖς, ἢν ἐπᾴδειν παρέχῃς Σωκράτει καὶ μὴ
ἀπολείπῃ τούτου μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν.

Ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος, ἔφη, καὶ μὴ ἀπολειψομένου·
C δεινὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιοίην, εἰ μὴ πειθοίμην σοὶ τῷ
ἐπιτρόπῳ καὶ μὴ ποιοίην ἃ κελεύεις.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, κελεύω ἔγωγε.

Ποιήσω τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας
ἀρξάμενος.

Οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί βουλεύεσθον ποιεῖν;

Οὐδέν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύμεθα.

Βιάσῃ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδ' ἀνάκρισίν μοι
δώσεις;

[1] ἦν add. Goldbacher.

rather that I am a poor hand at inquiring; for temperance I hold to be a great good, and you to be highly blessed, if you actually have it. See now whether you have it, and are in no need of the charm; for if it is yours, I should rather advise you to regard me as a babbler who is unable to argue out any subject of inquiry whatsoever, and yourself as advancing in happiness as you advance in temperance.

Then Charmides said: Why, upon my word, Socrates, I do not know at all whether I have it or have it not. For how can I know, when even you two are unable to discover what this thing is?—so you say, but of this you do not at all convince me—and I quite believe, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and for my part I have no objection to being charmed by you every day of my life, until you say I have had enough of the treatment.

Very well, said Critias: now, Charmides, if you do this, it will be a proof to me of your temperance—if you submit to be charmed by Socrates and do not forsake him through thick and thin.

Count on me to follow, he said, and not forsake him; for it would ill become me to disobey you, my guardian, and refuse to do your bidding.

Well now, he said, I bid you.

Then I will do as you bid, he replied, and will start this very day.

There, there, I said, what are you two plotting to do?

Nothing, replied Charmides; we have made our plot.

So you will use force, I said, before even allowing me to make my affidavit?

176 Ὡς βιασομένου, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ ὅδε γε ἐπιτάττει· πρὸς ταῦτα σὺ αὖ βουλεύου ὅ τι ποιήσεις.

D Ἀλλ' οὐδεμία, ἔφην ἐγώ, λείπεται βουλή· σοὶ γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦντι πράττειν ὁτιοῦν καὶ βιαζομένῳ οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἔσται ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπων.

Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, μηδὲ σὺ ἐναντιοῦ.

Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντιώσομαι.

You must expect me to use force, he replied, since he gives me the command : take counsel, therefore, on your side, as to what you will do.

But that leaves no room, I said, for counsel ; for if once you set about doing anything and use force, no man alive will be able to withstand you.

Then do not you, he said, withstand me.

Then I will not withstand you, I replied.

ALCIBIADES I

INTRODUCTION TO *ALCIBIADES I*

THE *First Alcibiades* gives us a clear and useful, if rather inelegant, illustration of the ordinary teaching of Socrates. He accosts his young friend at a critical moment of opening manhood, and makes him admit, by willing replies to a series of carefully designed questions, that he is ignorant of the most important things which ought to be known by one about to enter upon a public career. In the first part (103–114) we are shown that Alcibiades is going to advise the state on questions of peace and war, and must therefore know what is just and what unjust: but he could only have acquired this knowledge from the multitude, whose perpetual quarrels seem to show that they lack it; and if he says that it is rather on the expedient and inexpedient that he proposes to advise them, we want to know in turn what these are. In the second part (115–127) we find that the just is the honourable, good and expedient; and Alcibiades is further humiliated by a sly use of the double meaning of "doing well"—acting aright, and prospering. Other Athenian statesmen, including even Pericles (who is supposed to be still alive), are just as ignorant as Alcibiades, and he may be at no disadvantage in competition with them: but his real competitors in the race for power and glory are persons like the kings of Sparta and Persia, whose

training, wealth, and authority are described at some length and in lively detail. For such a contest it is necessary that Alcibiades should avail himself of all the help that Socrates can give him. They must join equally in the inquiry—What is the goodness required in a statesman? It seems to have something to do with friendship and harmony among the people; and yet justice surely consists in everyone doing his own work, and this does not make for harmony. Alcibiades is sorely puzzled, but fortunately he is not too old to learn. The third and last section (128–135) deals with the Delphic maxim *Know thyself*, and what it may be supposed to mean. To know oneself is to know one's mind, and is true prudence or "temperance," which, with justice, is a necessary condition of happiness.

The imaginary time of the conversation is about 432 B.C., when Alcibiades was eighteen years old. He is now losing the extraordinary physical beauty of his boyhood, and is turning his mind to the political power whose attainment is the obvious aim of an able and ambitious man. It is at this moment that Socrates, an admirer who has held aloof from him till now, exposes by skilful questioning his false conceit of knowledge and his desperate need of knowing, in the first place, his own mind. The method of interrogation, and the language used by both speakers, are quite of a piece with those in other early dialogues of Plato. The somewhat lengthy speech of Socrates about the royal families of Persia and Sparta (121–124), though it has some pleasant touches of Socratic humour, is perhaps a little out of character in a scene where so much emphasis is laid on the point that all the positive statements come from Alcibiades and

none from Socrates; and the identification of soul with man (130 c) is a crude and unsatisfactory suggestion compared with the later theories of the *Gorgias* (464 A) and other dialogues. But on the whole there seems to be no sufficient reason for doubting, with some eminent scholars, the authenticity of this dialogue, if it be remembered that the work is probably one of Plato's earliest sketches, composed in the years immediately following the death of Socrates (399 B.C.); that from the third century A.D. it has been regarded and studied as an exemplary piece of Academic teaching; and that it is natural to suppose that the series of Plato's compositions would begin with some immature and relatively inartistic essays in dialogue-writing. When he came to conceive the *Symposium*, Plato was able to draw far fuller and finer portraits of both Socrates and Alcibiades, and to vivify their friendly converse by many a masterly stroke of dramatic art.

ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ· ΜΑΙΕΥΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ

St. II p. 103

ΣΩ. Ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν, ὅτι πρῶτος ἐραστής σου γενόμενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυμένων μόνος οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι, καὶ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι δι' ὄχλου ἐγένοντό σοι διαλεγόμενοι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσεῖπον. τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλά τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ
B οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα· εὔελπις δέ εἰμι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό. σχεδὸν οὖν κατανενόηκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ σκοπούμενος ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἐραστὰς ἔσχες· πολλῶν γὰρ γενομένων καὶ μεγαλοφρόνων οὐδεὶς ὃς οὐχ ὑπερβληθεὶς τῷ φρονήματι ὑπὸ σοῦ πέφευγεν, τὸν δὲ λόγον,
104 ᾧ ὑπερπεφρόνηκας, ἐθέλω διελθεῖν. οὐδενὸς φῂς ἀνθρώπων ἐνδεὴς εἶναι εἰς οὐδέν· τὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά σοι μεγάλα εἶναι, ὥστε μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀρξάμενα τελευτῶντα εἰς τὴν ψυχήν.

[1] Socrates refers to the "spiritual sign" which occasionally warned him against an intended action: *cf. Apol.* 31 C D, 40 A B.

ALCIBIADES I

[OR ON THE NATURE OF MAN: "OBSTETRIC"]

CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES

SOC. Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition,[1] of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, so I have come to you, as you see; and I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future. Now I have been observing you all this time, and have formed a pretty good notion of your behaviour to your lovers: for although they were many and high-spirited, everyone of them has found your spirit too strong for him and has run away. Let me explain the reason of your spirit being too much for them. You say you have no need of any man in any matter; for your resources are so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that you lack nothing.

104 οἴει γὰρ δὴ εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παντὶ δῆλον ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐ ψεύδῃ· ἔπειτα νεανικωτάτου γένους ἐν τῇ σεαυτοῦ πόλει, οὔσῃ μεγίστῃ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων, καὶ B ἐνταῦθα πρὸς πατρός τέ σοι φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς πλείστους εἶναι καὶ ἀρίστους, οἳ εἴ τι δέοι ὑπηρετοῖεν ἄν σοι, τούτων δὲ τοὺς πρὸς μητρὸς οὐδὲν χείρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους· συμπάντων δὲ ὧν εἶπον μείζω οἴει σοι δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε σοί τε καὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ· ὃς οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει δύναται πράττειν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, ἀλλ' ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ C μεγάλοις γένεσιν. προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν πλουσίων· δοκεῖς δέ μοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἥκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν. κατὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα σύ τε μεγαλαυχούμενος κεκράτηκας τῶν ἐραστῶν ἐκεῖνοί τε ὑποδεέστεροι ὄντες ἐκρατήθησαν, καί σε ταῦτ' οὐ λέληθεν· ὅθεν δὴ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι θαυμάζεις, τί διανοούμενός ποτε οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι τοῦ ἔρωτος, καὶ ἥντιν' ἔχων ἐλπίδα ὑπομένω τῶν ἄλλων πεφευγότων.

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ ἴσως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι D σμικρόν με ἔφθης. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι ἐν νῷ εἶχον πρότερός σοι προσελθὼν αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἐρέσθαι, τί ποτε βούλει καὶ εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων ἐνοχλεῖς με, ἀεὶ ὅπου ἂν ὦ ἐπιμελέστατα παρών· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θαυμάζω, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἥδιστ' ἂν πυθοίμην.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούσῃ μὲν ἄρα μου, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, προθύμως, εἴπερ, ὡς φῄς, ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι τί δια-

You think, in the first place, that you are foremost in beauty and stature—and you are not mistaken in this, as is plain for all to see—and in the second place, that you are of the most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece, and that there you have, through your father, very many of the best people as your friends and kinsmen, who would assist you in case of need, and other connexions also, through your mother, who are not a whit inferior to these, nor fewer. And you reckon upon a stronger power than all those that I have mentioned, in Pericles, son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian of you and your brother when he died, and who is able to do whatever he likes not only in this city but all over Greece and among many great nations of the barbarians. And I will add besides the wealth of your house: but on this, I observe, you presume least of all. Well, you puff yourself up on all these advantages, and have overcome your lovers, while they in their inferiority have yielded to your might, and all this has not escaped you; so I am very sure that you wonder what on earth I mean by not getting rid of my passion, and what can be my hope in remaining when the rest have fled.

ALC. Perhaps also, Socrates, you are not aware that you have only just anticipated me. For I, in fact, had the intention of coming and asking you first that very same question—what is your aim and expectation in bothering me by making a particular point of always turning up wherever I may be. For I really do wonder what can be your object, and should be very glad if you would tell me.

SOC. Then you will listen to me, presumably, with keen attention if, as you say, you long to know what

104 νοοῦμαι, καὶ ὡς ἀκουσομένῳ καὶ περιμενοῦντι λέγω.

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

Ε ΣΩ. Ὅρα δή· οὐ γάρ τοι εἴη ἂν θαυμαστὸν εἰ, ὥσπερ μόγις ἠρξάμην, οὕτω καὶ μόγις παυσαίμην.

ΑΛΚ. Ὦ γαθὲ λέγε· ἀκούσομαι γάρ.

ΣΩ. Λεκτέον ἂν εἴη. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄνδρα οὐχ ἧττονα ἐραστῶν προσφέρεσθαι ἐραστῇ, ὅμως δὲ τολμητέον φράσαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰ μέν σε ἑώρων ἃ νῦν δὴ διῆλθον ἀγαπῶντά τε καὶ οἰόμενον δεῖν ἐν τούτοις καταβιῶναι, πάλαι ἂν ἀπηλλάγμην τοῦ ἔρωτος,
105 ὥς γε δὴ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω· νῦν δὲ ἕτερα αὖ κατηγορήσω διανοήματα σὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν σέ, ᾧ καὶ γνώσῃ, ὅτι προσέχων γέ σοι τὸν νοῦν διατετέλεκα. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι, εἴ τίς σοι εἶπoι θεῶν· ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, πότερον βούλει ζῆν ἔχων ἃ νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ αὐτίκα τεθνάναι, εἰ μή σοι ἐξέσται μείζω κτήσασθαι; δοκεῖς ἄν μοι ἑλέσθαι τεθνάναι· ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐπὶ τίνι δή ποτε ἐλπίδι ζῇς, ἐγὼ φράσω. ἡγῇ, ἐὰν θᾶττον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παρέλθῃς—τοῦτο δὲ
Β ἔσεσθαι μάλα ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν—παρελθὼν οὖν ἐνδείξεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις, ὅτι ἄξιος εἶ τιμᾶσθαι ὡς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων, καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδειξάμενος μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐὰν δ' ἐνθάδε μέγιστος ᾖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν Ἕλλησιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅσοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν ἠπείρῳ. καὶ εἰ αὖ σοι εἶποι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος θεὸς ὅτι αὐτοῦ σε δεῖ δυναστεύειν ἐν τῇ

I mean, and I have in you a listener who will stay to hear me out.

ALC. Why, to be sure : only speak.

SOC. Look to it, then ; for it would be no wonder if I should make as much difficulty about stopping as I have made about starting.

ALC. My good sir, speak ; for I will listen.

SOC. Speak I must, I suppose. Now, although it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who does not yield to lovers, I must make bold nevertheless to put my meaning into words. For if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love, so at least I persuade myself : but as it is, I shall propound to your face quite another set of your thoughts, whereby you will understand that I have had you continually before my mind. For I believe, if some god should ask you : " Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things ? " I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly—which you expect to occur in a very few days—you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honour than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed, and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state ; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to

105 C Εὐρώπῃ, διαβῆναι δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἐξέσται
σοι οὐδ' ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ πράγμασιν, οὐκ ἂν αὖ
μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις μόνοις ζῆν, εἰ
μὴ ἐμπλήσεις τοῦ σοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς σῆς
δυνάμεως πάντας, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀνθρώπους· καὶ
οἶμαί σε πλὴν Κύρου καὶ Ξέρξου ἡγεῖσθαι οὐδένα
ἄξιον λόγου γεγονέναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχεις ταύτην
τὴν ἐλπίδα, εὖ οἶδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάζω. ἴσως ἂν οὖν
εἴποις, ἅτε εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω· τί δὴ οὖν, ὦ
D Σώκρατες, τοῦτό ἐστί σοι πρὸς λόγον [ὃν ἔφησθα
ἐρεῖν, δι' ὃ ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀπαλλάττῃ][1]; ἐγὼ δὲ σοί γε
ἐρῶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ Κλεινίου καὶ Δεινομάχης. τούτων
γάρ σοι ἁπάντων τῶν διανοημάτων τέλος ἐπιτε-
θῆναι ἄνευ ἐμοῦ ἀδύνατον· τοσαύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν
οἶμαι ἔχειν εἰς τὰ σὰ πράγματα καὶ εἰς σέ· διὸ δὴ
καὶ πάλαι οἶμαί με τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἐᾶν διαλέγεσθαί
σοι, ὃν ἐγὼ περιέμενον ὁπηνίκα ἐάσει. ὥσπερ γὰρ
E σὺ ἐλπίδας ἔχεις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι αὐτῇ
παντὸς ἄξιος εἶ, ἐνδειξάμενος δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ
παραυτίκα δυνήσεσθαι, οὕτω κἀγὼ παρὰ σοὶ ἐλ-
πίζω μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐνδειξάμενος ὅτι παντὸς
ἄξιός εἰμί σοι, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπίτροπος οὔτε συγγενὴς
οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς παραδοῦναι τὴν δύναμιν
ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖς πλὴν ἐμοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι.
νεωτέρῳ μὲν οὖν ὄντι σοι καὶ πρὶν τοσαύτης
ἐλπίδος γέμειν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ εἶα ὁ θεὸς
διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ μάτην διαλεγοίμην· νῦν δὲ
106 ἐφῆκε· νῦν γὰρ ἄν μου ἀκούσαις.

ΑΛΚ. Πολύ γέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν ἀτοπώτε-
ρος αὖ φαίνῃ, ἐπειδὴ ἤρξω λέγειν, ἢ ὅτε σιγῶν

[1] ὃν . . . ἀπαλλάττῃ secl. Burnet.

hold sway here in Europe, but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either—if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power ; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account. So then that this is your hope, I know well enough ; I am not merely guessing. And I daresay you will reply, since you know that what I say is true : " Well, Socrates, and what has that to do with your point ? " I am going to tell you, dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Without me it is impossible for all those designs of yours to be crowned with achievement ; so great is the power I conceive myself to have over your affairs and over you, and it is for this very reason, I believe, that the god has so long prevented me from talking with you, while I was waiting to see when he would allow me. For as you have hopes of proving yourself in public to be invaluable to the state and, having proved it, of winning forthwith unlimited power, so do I hope to win supreme power over you by proving that I am invaluable to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is competent to transmit to you the power that you long for except me, with the god's help, however. In your younger days, to be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking with you, in order that I might not waste my words : but now he has set me on ; for now you will listen to me.

ALC. You seem to me far more extraordinary, Socrates, now that you have begun to speak, than before, when you followed me about in silence ;

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εἶπου· καίτοι σφόδρα γε ἦσθ' ἰδεῖν καὶ τότε τοιοῦτος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ταῦτα διανοοῦμαι ἢ μή, ὡς ἔοικε, διέγνωκας, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φῶ, οὐδέν μοι ἔσται πλέον πρὸς τὸ πείθειν σε. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτα διανενόημαι, πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ σοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο; ἔχεις λέγειν;

B ΣΩ. Ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς εἴ τινα ἔχω εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν, οἷους δὴ ἀκούειν εἴθισαι; οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμόν· ἀλλ' ἐνδείξασθαι μέν σοι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οἷός τ' ἂν εἴην ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, ἐὰν ἓν μόνον μοι ἐθελήσῃς βραχὺ ὑπηρετῆσαι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' εἴ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπόν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπηρέτημα, ἐθέλω.

ΣΩ. Ἦ[1] χαλεπὸν δοκεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ χαλεπόν.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δή.

ΑΛΚ. Ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡς διανοουμένου σου ταῦτα ἐρωτῶ,

C ἃ φημί σε διανοεῖσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅ τι ἐρεῖς.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή· διανοῇ γάρ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, παριέναι συμβουλεύσων Ἀθηναίοις ἐντὸς οὐ πολλοῦ χρόνου· εἰ οὖν μέλλοντός σου ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα λαβόμενος ἐροίμην· ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τίνος Ἀθηναῖοι διανοοῦνται βουλεύεσθαι, ἀνίστασαι συμβουλεύσων; ἆρ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὧν σὺ ἐπίστασαι βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι; τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;

D ΑΛΚ. Εἴποιμ' ἂν δήπου, περὶ ὧν οἶδα βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι.

[1] ἦ Buttmann: εἰ MSS.

though even then you looked strange enough. Well, as to my intending all this or not, you have apparently made your decision, and any denial of mine will not avail me to persuade you. Very good : but supposing I have intended ever so much what you say, how are you the sole means through which I can hope to attain it ? Can you tell me ?

SOC. Are you asking whether I can make a long speech, such as you are used to hearing ? No, my gift is not of that sort. But I fancy I could prove to you that the case is so, if you will consent to do me just one little service.

ALC. Why, if you mean a service that is not troublesome, I consent.

SOC. Do you consider it troublesome to answer questions put to you ?

ALC. No, I do not.

SOC. Then answer.

ALC. Ask.

SOC. Well, you have the intentions which I say you have, I suppose ?

ALC. Be it so, if you like, in order that I may know what you will say next.

SOC. Now then : you intend, as I say, to come forward as adviser to the Athenians in no great space of time ; well, suppose I were to take hold of you as you were about to ascend the platform, and were to ask you : " Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that you should stand up to advise them ? Is it something about which you have better knowledge than they ? " What would be your reply ?

ALC. I should say, I suppose, it was something about which I knew better than they.

106 ΣΩ. Περὶ ὧν ἄρ' εἰδὼς τυγχάνεις, ἀγαθὸς σύμβουλος εἶ.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μόνον οἶσθα, ἃ παρ' ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρες;

ΑΛΚ. Ποῖα γὰρ ἄλλα;

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἄν ποτε ἔμαθές τι ἢ ἐξηῦρες μήτε μανθάνειν ἐθέλων μήτε αὐτὸς ζητεῖν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἠθέλησας ἂν ζητῆσαι ἢ μαθεῖν ἃ ἐπίστασθαι ᾤου;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Ε ΣΩ. Ἆρα νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, ἦν χρόνος ὅτε οὐχ ἡγοῦ εἰδέναι;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν ἃ γε μεμάθηκας, σχεδόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα· εἰ δέ τι ἐμὲ λέληθεν, εἰπέ. ἔμαθες γὰρ δὴ σύ γε κατὰ μνήμην τὴν ἐμὴν γράμματα καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐλεῖν γε ἤθελες μαθεῖν· ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐπίστασαι, εἰ μή πού τι μανθάνων ἐμὲ λέληθας· οἶμαι δέ γε, οὔτε νύκτωρ οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐξιὼν ἔνδοθεν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' οὐ πεφοίτηκα εἰς ἄλλων ἢ τούτων.

107 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν, ὅταν περὶ γραμμάτων Ἀθηναῖοι βουλεύωνται, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, τότε ἀναστὴσῃ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσων;

ΑΛΚ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὅταν περὶ κρουμάτων ἐν λύρᾳ;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ παλαισμάτων γε εἰώθασι βουλεύεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ μέντοι.

SOC. Then you are a good adviser on things about which you actually know.

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. And you know only the things you have learnt from others or discovered yourself?

ALC. What could I know besides?

SOC. And can it be that you would ever have learnt or discovered anything without being willing either to learn it or to inquire into it yourself?

ALC. No.

SOC. Well then, would you have been willing to inquire into or learn what you thought you knew?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. So there was a time when you did not think that you knew what you now actually know.

ALC. There must have been.

SOC. Well, but I know pretty nearly the things that you have learnt: tell me if anything has escaped me. You learnt, if I recollect, writing and harping and wrestling; as for fluting, you refused to learn it. These are the things that you know, unless perhaps there is something you have been learning unobserved by me; and this you were not, I believe, if you so much as stepped out of doors either by night or by day.

ALC. No, I have taken no other lessons than those.

SOC. Then tell me, will it be when the Athenians are taking advice how they are to do their writing correctly that you are to stand up and advise them?

ALC. Upon my word, not I.

SOC. Well, about strokes on the lyre?

ALC. Not at all.

SOC. Nor in fact are they accustomed to deliberate on throws in wrestling either at the Assembly.

ALC. No, to be sure.

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ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος βουλεύωνται; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε περὶ οἰκοδομίας.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Β ΣΩ. Οἰκοδόμος γὰρ ταῦτά γε σοῦ βέλτιον συμβουλεύσει.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ὅταν περὶ μαντικῆς βουλεύωνται;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Μάντις γὰρ αὖ ταῦτα ἄμεινον ἢ σύ.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐάν τέ γε σμικρὸς ἢ μέγας ᾖ, ἐάν τε καλὸς ἢ αἰσχρός, ἔτι τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννής.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Εἰδότος γάρ, οἶμαι, περὶ ἑκάστου ἡ συμβουλή, καὶ οὐ πλουτοῦντος.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐάν τε πένης ἐάν τε πλούσιος ᾖ ὁ παραινῶν, οὐδὲν διοίσει Ἀθηναίοις, ὅταν περὶ τῶν C ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλεύωνται, πῶς ἂν ὑγιαίνοιεν, ἀλλὰ ζητοῦσιν ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον.

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκότως γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος σκοπῶνται, τότε σὺ ἀνιστάμενος ὡς συμβουλεύσων ὀρθῶς ἀναστήσῃ;

ΑΛΚ. Ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τῶν περὶ ναυπηγίας λέγεις, ὁποίας τινὰς χρὴ αὐτοὺς τὰς ναῦς ναυπηγεῖσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ναυπηγεῖν γάρ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. τοῦτ' αἴτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.

SOC. Then what will be the subject of the advice? For I presume it will not be about building.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. For a builder will give better advice than you in that matter.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Nor yet will it be about divination?

ALC. No.

SOC. For there again a diviner will serve better than you.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Whether he be short or tall, handsome or ugly, nay, noble or ignoble.

ALC. Of course.

SOC. For on each subject the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches.

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate for the health of the citizens; all that they require of their counsellor is that he be a physician.

ALC. Naturally.

SOC. Then what will they have under consideration if you are to be right in standing up, when you do so, as their counsellor?

ALC. Their own affairs, Socrates.

SOC. Do you mean with regard to shipbuilding, and the question as to what sort of ships they ought to get built?

ALC. No, I do not, Socrates.

SOC. Because, I imagine, you do not understand shipbuilding. Is that, and that alone, the reason?

ALC. That is just the reason.

107 D ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ περὶ ποίων τῶν ἑαυτῶν λέγεις πραγμάτων ὅταν βουλεύωνται;

ΑΛΚ. Ὅταν περὶ πολέμου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ περὶ εἰρήνης ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα λέγεις, ὅταν βουλεύωνται, πρὸς τίνας χρὴ εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τίσι πολεμεῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρὴ δ' οὐχ οἷς βέλτιον;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Καὶ τότε ὁπότε βέλτιον;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἄμεινον;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν βουλεύοιντο Ἀθηναῖοι, τίσι χρὴ προσπαλαίειν καὶ τίσιν ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον, σὺ ἄμεινον ἂν συμβουλεύοις ἢ ὁ παιδοτρίβης;

ΑΛΚ. Ὁ παιδοτρίβης δήπου.

ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, πρὸς τί <ἂν>[1] βλέπων ὁ παιδοτρίβης συμβουλεύσειεν οἷς δεῖ προσπαλαίειν καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὅντινα τρόπον; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα τούτοις δεῖ προσπαλαίειν, οἷς βέλτιον, ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

108 ΣΩ. Ἆρα καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα ἄμεινον;

ΑΛΚ. Τοσαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόθ' ὅτ' ἄμεινον;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ᾄδοντα δεῖ κιθαρίζειν ποτὲ πρὸς τὴν ᾠδὴν καὶ βαίνειν;

[1] ἂν add. Burnet.

SOC. Well, on what sort of affairs of their own do you mean that they will be deliberating?

ALC. On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state's affairs.

SOC. Do you mean that they will be deliberating with whom they ought to make peace, and on whom they ought to make war, and in what manner?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And on whom it is better to do so, ought they not?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And at such time as it is better?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And for so long as they had better?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm's length, and in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser?

ALC. The wrestling-master, I presume.

SOC. And can you tell me what the wrestling-master would have in view when he advised as to the persons with whom they ought or ought not to wrestle close, and when and in what manner? What I mean is something like this: ought they not to wrestle close with those with whom it is better to do so?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And so far as is better, too?

ALC. So far.

SOC. And at such time also as is better?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. But again, when one sings, one has sometimes to accompany the song with harping and stepping?

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ΑΛΚ. Δεῖ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόθ' ὁπότε βέλτιον;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα βέλτιον;

ΑΛΚ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ βέλτιον μὲν ὠνόμαζες ἐπ'
B ἀμφοτέροις, τῷ τε κιθαρίζειν πρὸς τὴν ᾠδὴν καὶ τῷ προσπαλαίειν, τί καλεῖς τὸ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν καλῶ γυμναστικόν; σὺ δ' ἐκεῖνο τί καλεῖς;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐμὲ μιμεῖσθαι. ἐγὼ γάρ που ἀπεκρινάμην τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἔχον, ὀρθῶς δὲ δήπου ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον· ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ τέχνη οὐ γυμναστικὴ ἦν;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

C ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δ' εἶπον τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν βέλτιον γυμναστικόν.

ΑΛΚ. Εἶπες γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ—πρέποι γὰρ ἄν που καὶ σοὶ τὸ καλῶς διαλέγεσθαι—εἰπὲ πρῶτον, τίς ἡ τέχνη ἧς τὸ κιθαρίζειν καὶ τὸ ᾄδειν καὶ τὸ ἐμβαίνειν ὀρθῶς; συνάπασα τίς καλεῖται; οὔπω δύνασαι εἰπεῖν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὧδε πειρῶ· τίνες αἱ θεαὶ ὧν ἡ τέχνη;

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[1] Socrates means by "better" or "the better way" the general method of attaining excellence in any art.

[2] Socrates here repeats *καλῶς* (which means "handsomely"

ALC. Yes, one has.

SOC. And at such time as is better?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And so far as is better?

ALC. I agree.

SOC. Well now, since you applied the term "better" to the two cases of harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the "better" in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic? What do you call the other?

ALC. I do not understand.

SOC. Well, try to copy me: for my answer gave you, I think, what is correct in every instance; and that is correct, I presume, which proceeds by rule of the art, is it not?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And was not the art here gymnastic?

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. And I said that the better[1] in the case of wrestling was gymnastic.

ALC. You did.

SOC. And I was quite fair?

ALC. I think so.

SOC. Come then, in your turn—for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue *fairly*[2]—tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly? What is it called as a whole? You cannot yet tell me?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Well, try another way: who are the goddesses that foster the art?

as well as "correctly") in allusion to Alcibiades' good looks. *Cf.* 113 B.

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ΑΛΚ. Τὰς Μούσας, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

D ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε. ὅρα δή· τίνα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐπωνυμίαν ἡ τέχνη ἔχει;

ΑΛΚ. Μουσικήν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω γάρ. τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτην ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον ἐστιν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγώ σοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τὴν γυμναστικήν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τί φῂς; πῶς γίγνεσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Μουσικῶς μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην ἄγειν, τοῦτο τὸ

E βέλτιον τί ὀνομάζεις; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ [ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ][1] ἔλεγες τὸ ἄμεινον, ὅτι μουσικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον· πειρῶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τὸ βέλτιον.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' οὐ πάνυ ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε, εἰ μέν τίς σε λέγοντα καὶ συμβουλεύοντα περὶ σιτίων, ὅτι βέλτιον τόδε τοῦδε καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον, ἔπειτα ἐρωτήσειε, τί τὸ ἄμεινον λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη; περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινότερον, καίτοι οὐ προσποιῇ γε ἰατρὸς εἶναι· περὶ δὲ οὗ προσποιῇ

109 ἐπιστήμων εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύσεις ἀνιστάμενος ὡς εἰδώς, τούτου δέ, ὡς ἔοικας, πέρι ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ; ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φαίνεται;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

[1] ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ secl. Schanz.

ALC. The Muses, you mean, Socrates?

SOC. I do. Now, just think, and say by what name the art is called after them.

ALC. Music,[1] I suppose you mean.

SOC. Yes, I do. And what is that which proceeds correctly by its rule? As in the other case I was correct in mentioning to you gymnastic as that which goes by the art, so I ask you, accordingly, what you say in this case. What manner of proceeding is required?

ALC. A musical one, I suppose.

SOC. You are right. Come then, what is it that you term "better," in respect of what is better in waging war and being at peace? Just as in our other instances you said that the "better" implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the "better" in this case.

ALC. But I am quite unable.

SOC. But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the "better," Alcibiades?—in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful?

ALC. Very.

[1] "Music" with the Greeks included poetry and dancing as well as our "music."

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ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν, πρὸς τί τείνει τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἄγειν ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν οἷς δεῖ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' οἶσθα, ἐπειδὰν πόλεμον ποιώμεθα, ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῦντες ἀλλήλοις πάθημα ἐρχόμεθα εἰς τὸ
B πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὅ τι αὐτὸ ὀνομάζοντες ἐρχόμεθα;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἐξαπατώμενοί τι ἢ βιαζόμενοι ἢ ἀποστερούμενοι.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε· πῶς ἕκαστα τούτων πάσχοντες; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, τί διαφέρει τὸ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε.

ΑΛΚ. Ἢ τὸ ὧδε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δικαίως ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως;

ΣΩ. Αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε διαφέρει ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; Ἀθηναίοις σὺ πρὸς ποτέρους συμβουλεύσεις πολεμεῖν, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἢ τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας;

C ΑΛΚ. Δεινὸν τοῦτό γε ἐρωτᾷς· εἰ γὰρ καὶ διανοεῖται τις ὡς δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας πολεμεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ νόμιμον τοῦθ', ὡς ἔοικεν.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα· οὐδέ γε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ σὺ [τὸ δίκαιον][1] τοὺς λόγους ποιήσῃ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρώτων βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς μή,

[1] *τὸ δίκαιον* secl. Nürnberger.

SOC. Then consider and do your best to tell me the connexion of " better " in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed.

ALC. Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it.

SOC. But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, and what name we give it when we do so ?

ALC. I do : we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation.

SOC. Enough : how do we suffer each of these things ? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another.

ALC. Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way ?

SOC. Precisely.

ALC. Why, there you have all the difference in the world.

SOC. Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war—those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just ?

ALC. That is a hard question : for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so.

SOC. For that would not be lawful, I suppose ?

ALC. No, indeed ; nor is it considered honourable either.

SOC. So you too will appeal to these things in making your speeches ?

ALC. Necessarily.

SOC. Then must not that " better " about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not, and

109 καὶ ὁπότε καὶ μή, τὸ δικαιότερον τυγχάνει ὄν; ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεταί γε.

D ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη; πότερον σαυτὸν λέληθας ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο, ἢ ἐμὲ ἔλαθες μανθάνων καὶ φοιτῶν εἰς διδασκάλου, ὅς σε ἐδίδασκε διαγιγνώσκειν τὸ δικαιότερόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτερον; καὶ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος; φράσον καὶ ἐμοί, ἵνα αὐτῷ φοιτητὴν προξενήσῃς καὶ ἐμέ.

ΑΛΚ. Σκώπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Φίλιον τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σόν, ὃν ἐγὼ E ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐπιορκήσαιμι· ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔχεις, εἰπὲ τίς ἐστιν.

ΑΛΚ. Τί δ', εἰ μὴ ἔχω; οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἄλλως εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων;

ΣΩ. Ναί, εἴ γε εὕροις.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν εὑρεῖν με ἡγῇ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε, εἰ ζητήσαις.

ΑΛΚ. Εἶτα ζητῆσαι οὐκ ἂν οἴει με;

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε, εἰ οἰηθείης γε μὴ εἰδέναι.

ΑΛΚ. Εἶτα οὐκ ἦν ὅτ' εἶχον οὕτως;

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τοῦτον τὸν 110 χρόνον, ὅτε οὐκ ᾤου εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα; φέρε, πέρυσιν ἐζήτεις τε καὶ οὐκ ᾤου εἰδέναι; ἢ ᾤου; καὶ τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα μὴ μάτην οἱ διάλογοι γίγνωνται.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' ᾤμην εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ ἔτος καὶ τέταρτον καὶ πέμπτον οὐχ οὕτως;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

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[1] *Cf.* above, 106 E.

when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster?

ALC. Apparently it is.

SOC. How now, friend Alcibiades? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked[1] your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust? And who is he? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil.

ALC. You are joking, Socrates.

SOC. No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name I would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.

ALC. But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way?

SOC. Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it.

ALC. But do you not think I might discover it?

SOC. Yes, quite so, if you inquired.

ALC. And do you not think I might inquire?

SOC. I do, if you thought you did not know.

ALC. And was there not a time when I held that view?

SOC. Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile.

ALC. Well, I thought I knew.

SOC. And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind?

ALC. I was.

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ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρὸ τούτου παῖς ἦσθα. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν τοίνυν εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ὤου εἰδέναι.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς εὖ οἶσθα;

B ΣΩ. Πολλάκις σοῦ ἐν διδασκάλων ἤκουον παιδὸς ὄντος καὶ ἄλλοθι, καὶ ὁπότε ἀστραγαλίζοις ἢ ἄλλην τινα παιδιὰν παίζοις, οὐχ ὡς ἀποροῦντος περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ μάλα μέγα καὶ θαρραλέως λέγοντος περὶ ὅτου τύχοις τῶν παίδων, ὡς πονηρός τε καὶ ἄδικος εἴη καὶ ὡς ἀδικοῖ· ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἔμελλον ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁπότε τίς με ἀδικοῖ;

ΣΩ. Σὺ δ' εἰ τύχοις ἀγνοῶν εἴτε ἀδικοῖο εἴτε μὴ τότε, λέγεις, τί σε χρὴ ποιεῖν;

C ΑΛΚ. Μὰ Δί' ἀλλ' οὐκ ἠγνόουν ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἐγίγνωσκον ὅτι ἠδικούμην.

ΣΩ. Ὤιου ἄρα ἐπίστασθαι καὶ παῖς ὤν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε· καὶ ἠπιστάμην γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξευρών; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν ᾧ γε ὤου εἰδέναι.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ἡγοῦ; σκόπει· οὐ γὰρ εὑρήσεις τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.

ΑΛΚ. Μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔκουν ἔχω γ' εἰπεῖν.

D ΣΩ. Εὑρὼν μὲν ἄρα οὐκ οἶσθα αὐτά.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ πάνυ φαίνομαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄρτι γε οὐδὲ μαθὼν ἔφησθα εἰδέ-

SOC. But, you see, before that time you were a child, were you not?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. So I know well enough that then you thought you knew.

ALC. How do you know it so well?

SOC. Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher's or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account?

ALC. But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me?

SOC. Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask —"What are you to do?"

ALC. Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant: no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged.

SOC. So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust.

ALC. I did; and I knew too.

SOC. At what sort of time did you discover it? For surely it was not while you thought you knew.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Then when did you think you were ignorant? Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time.

ALC. Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say.

SOC. So you do not know it by discovery.

ALC. Not at all, apparently.

SOC. But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either; and if you neither discovered

110 *ναι· εἰ δὲ μήθ' ηὗρες μήτε ἔμαθες, πῶς οἶσθα καὶ πόθεν;*

ΑΛΚ. *Ἀλλ' ἴσως τοῦτό σοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρινάμην, τὸ φάναι εἰδέναι αὐτὸς ἐξευρών.*

ΣΩ. *Τὸ δὲ πῶς εἶχεν;*

ΑΛΚ. *Ἔμαθον, οἶμαι, καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.*

ΣΩ. *Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἥκομεν λόγον. παρὰ τοῦ; φράζε κἀμοί.*

E ΑΛΚ. *Παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν.*

ΣΩ. *Οὐκ εἰς σπουδαίους γε διδασκάλους καταφεύγεις εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέρων.*

ΑΛΚ. *Τί δέ; οὐχ ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι οὗτοι;*

ΣΩ. *Οὔκουν τὰ πεττευτικά γε καὶ τὰ μή· καίτοι φαυλότερα αὐτὰ οἶμαι τῶν δικαίων εἶναι. τί δέ; σὺ οὐχ οὕτως οἴει;*

ΑΛΚ. *Ναί.*

ΣΩ. *Εἶτα τὰ μὲν φαυλότερα οὐχ οἷοί τε διδάσκειν, τὰ δὲ σπουδαιότερα;*

ΑΛΚ. *Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἄλλα γοῦν πολλὰ οἷοί τ' εἰσὶ διδάσκειν σπουδαιότερα τοῦ πεττεύειν.*

ΣΩ. *Ποῖα ταῦτα;*

111 ΑΛΚ. *Οἷον καὶ τὸ ἑλληνίζειν παρὰ τούτων ἔγωγε ἔμαθον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν ἐμαυτοῦ διδάσκαλον, ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀναφέρω, οὓς σὺ φῂς οὐ σπουδαίους εἶναι διδασκάλους.*

ΣΩ. *Ἀλλ', ὦ γενναῖε, τούτου μὲν ἀγαθοὶ διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοί, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινοῖντ' ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκαλίαν.*

ΑΛΚ. *Τί δή;*

ΣΩ. *Ὅτι ἔχουσι περὶ αὐτὰ ἃ χρὴ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς διδασκάλους ἔχειν.*

nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence ?

ALC. Well, perhaps that answer I gave you was not correct, that I knew it by my own discovery.

SOC. Then how was it done ?

ALC. I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.

SOC. Back we come to the same argument. From whom ? Please tell me.

ALC. From the many.

SOC. They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many !

ALC. Why, are they not competent to teach ?

SOC. Not how to play, or not to play, draughts ; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. What ? Do you not think so ?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then if they are unable to teach the slighter, can they teach the more serious matter ?

ALC. I think so : at any rate, there are many other things that they are able to teach, more serious than draughts.

SOC. What sort of things ?

ALC. For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers.

SOC. Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects.

ALC. And why ?

SOC. Because in those subjects they have the equipment proper to good teachers.

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ΑΛΚ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὁτιοῦν αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναι; ἢ οὔ;

B ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς εἰδότας ὁμολογεῖν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ μὴ διαφέρεσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐν οἷς δ' ἂν διαφέρωνται, ταῦτα φήσεις εἰδέναι αὐτούς;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν διδάσκαλοι πῶς ἂν εἶεν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοι διαφέρεσθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ποιόν ἐστι λίθος ἢ ξύλον; καὶ ἐάν τινα ἐρωτᾷς, ἆρ'

C οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμολογοῦσι, καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ὁρμῶσιν, ὅταν βούλωνται λαβεῖν λίθον ἢ ξύλον; ὡσαύτως καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτα· σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω τὸ ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις· ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς μὲν ταῦθ', ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀλλήλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἰδίᾳ, καὶ δημοσίᾳ αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν αἱ μὲν ταῦθ' αἱ δ' ἄλλα φάσκουσαι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ γάρ.

D ΣΩ. Εἰκότως ἂν ἄρα τούτων γε καὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶεν ἀγαθοί.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν βουλοίμεθα ποιῆσαί τινα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰδέναι, ὀρθῶς ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν εἰς διδασκαλίαν τούτων τῶν πολλῶν;

ALC. What do you mean by that?

SOC. You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. But if they differ upon anything, will you say that they know it?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Then how can they be teachers of it?

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute?

ALC. They do.

SOC. Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by "the many" that you speak of?

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ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ βουληθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν ἢ ποῖοι ἵπποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν δρομικοί τε καὶ μή, ἆρ' ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦτο ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἱκανὸν δέ σοι τεκμήριον, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστανται
E οὐδὲ κρήγυοι διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τούτων, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ βουληθείημεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὁποῖοι ὑγιεινοὶ ἢ νοσώδεις, ἆρα ἱκανοὶ ἂν ἡμῖν ἦσαν διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοί;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἦν δ' ἄν σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι μοχθηροί εἰσι τούτων διδάσκαλοι, εἰ ἑώρας αὐτοὺς διαφερομένους;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων
112 ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσί σοι ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις;

ΑΛΚ. Ἥκιστα νὴ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν διαφέρεσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὔκουν οἶομαί γε πώποτέ σε ἰδεῖν οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι σφόδρα οὕτω διαφερομένους ἀνθρώπους περὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ μή, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μάχεσθαί τε καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι ἀλλήλους.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἔγωγε
B οἶδ' ὅτι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἑώρακας, ἀκήκοας γοῦν ἄλλων

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. And you have ample proof that they do not know this, and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?

ALC. I have.

SOC. And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it?

ALC. I should.

SOC. Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other about just and unjust men or things?

ALC. Far from it, on my word, Socrates.

SOC. In fact, they differ most especially on these points?

ALC. Very much so.

SOC. And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people,

112 τε πολλῶν καὶ Ὁμήρου. καὶ Ὀδυσσείας γὰρ καὶ Ἰλιάδος ἀκήκοας.

ΑΛΚ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ διαφορᾶς δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αἱ μάχαι γε καὶ οἱ θάνατοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν τοῖς τε Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρωσὶν ἐγένοντο, καὶ τοῖς μνηστῆρσι τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης καὶ τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ.

C ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Τανάγρᾳ Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἀποθανοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ [Κλεινίας][1] ἐτελεύτησεν, οὐδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς ἄλλου ἡ διαφορὰ ἢ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου τοὺς θανάτους καὶ τὰς μάχας πεποίηκεν. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

1 ΣΩ. Τούτους οὖν φῶμεν ἐπίστασθαι, περὶ ὧν D οὕτω σφόδρα διαφέρονται, ὥστε ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἀλλήλοις τὰ ἔσχατα σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐργάζονται;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ φαίνεταί γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς τοιούτους διδασκάλους ἀναφέρεις, οὓς ὁμολογεῖς αὐτὸς μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν εἰκός σε εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, περὶ ὧν οὕτω πλανᾷ καὶ οὔτε μαθὼν φαίνῃ παρ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐξευρών;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐκ μὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις οὐκ εἰκός.

[1] Κλεινίας om. Proclus.

especially Homer. For you have heard[1] the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*?

ALC. I certainly have, of course, Socrates.

SOC. And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus.

ALC. That is true.

SOC. And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra,[2] and later at Coronea,[3] among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not?

ALC. That is true.

SOC. Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other?

ALC. Apparently not.

SOC. And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge?

ALC. It seems I do.

SOC. Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself?

ALC. By what you say, it is not likely.

[1] *i.e.* at the recitations of rhapsodes; *cf.* the *Ion* of Plato.
[2] 457 B.C. [3] 447 B.C.

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ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς αὖ τοῦθ' ὡς οὐ καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη;

ΑΛΚ. Τὸ ποῖον;

E ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἐμὲ φῂς ταῦτα λέγειν.

ΑΛΚ. Τί δέ; οὐ σὺ λέγεις, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων;

ΣΩ. Οὐ μέντοι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ;

ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Ὧδε εἴσῃ. ἐάν σε ἔρωμαι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ δύο, πότερα πλείω ἐστί, φήσεις ὅτι τὰ δύο;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πόσῳ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἑνί.

ΣΩ. Πότερος οὖν ἡμῶν ὁ λέγων, ὅτι τὰ δύο τοῦ ἑνὸς ἑνὶ πλείω;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἠρώτων, σὺ δὲ ἀπεκρίνου;

1 ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

113 ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ τούτων μῶν ἐγὼ φαίνομαι λέγων ὁ ἐρωτῶν, ἢ σὺ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔρωμαι,[1] ποῖα γράμματα Σωκράτους, σὺ δὲ εἴπῃς, πότερος ὁ λέγων;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, ἑνὶ λόγῳ εἰπέ· ὅταν ἐρώτησίς τε καὶ ἀπόκρισις γίγνηται, πότερος ὁ λέγων, ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;

ΑΛΚ. Ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[1] ἔρωμαι Olympiodorus: ἐρῶ καὶ MSS.

SOC. There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak?

ALC. In what?

SOC. In stating that I say so.

ALC. Why, do you not say that I do not know about the just and unjust?

SOC. Not at all.

ALC. Well, do *I* say it?

SOC. Yes.

ALC. How, pray?

SOC. I will show you, in the following way. If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer "two"?

ALC. Yes, I shall.

SOC. How much greater?

ALC. By one.

SOC. Then which of us says that two are one more than one?

ALC. I.

SOC. And I was asking, and you were answering?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things?

ALC. I.

SOC. And what if I ask what are the letters in "Socrates," and you tell me? Which will be the speaker?

ALC. I.

SOC. Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker—the questioner, or the answerer?

ALC. The answerer, I should say, Socrates.

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B ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄρτι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου ἐγὼ μὲν ἦ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὰ λεχθέντα πότερος ἡμῶν εἴρηκεν;

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνομαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέχθη περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου οὐκ ἐπίσταιτο, οἴοιτο δέ, καὶ μέλλοι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἐλθὼν συμβουλεύσειν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν οἶδεν; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν;

C ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἄρα συμβαίνει, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη· σοῦ τάδε κινδυνεύεις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι, οὐδ' ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἀλλὰ σύ, ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιᾷ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις. μανικὸν γὰρ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιχείρημα ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, διδάσκειν ἃ οὐκ οἶσθα, ἀμελήσας μανθάνειν.

D ΑΛΚ. Οἶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, πότερα δικαιότερα ἢ ἀδικώτερα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγοῦνται δῆλα εἶναι· ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει πράξασιν. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτά, οἶμαι, ἐστὶ τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐλυσιτέλησεν ἀδικήσασι μεγάλα ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἑτέροις γε, οἶμαι, δίκαια ἐργασαμένοις οὐ συνήνεγκεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἕτερα μὲν τὰ δίκαια

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[1] *Hippolytus*, 352—σοῦ τάδ', οὐκ ἐμοῦ κλύεις.

SOC. And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And you the answerer?

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. Well then, which of us has spoken what has been said?

ALC. Apparently, Socrates, from what has been admitted, it was I.

SOC. And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about; is not that so?

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. Then, to quote Euripides,[1] the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have "heard it from yourself, not me," and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.

ALC. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.

SOC. What then? Granting that the just and the

113 E τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὔ τί που
αὖ σὺ οἴει ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἃ συμφέρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
καὶ δι' ὅ τι;

ΑΛΚ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰ μή με αὖ
ἐρήσῃ παρ' ὅτου ἔμαθον ἢ ὅπως αὐτὸς ἠῦρον.

ΣΩ. Οἷον τοῦτο ποιεῖς· εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις,
τυγχάνει δὲ δυνατὸν ὂν ἀποδεῖξαι δι' οὗπερ καὶ τὸ
πρότερον λόγου, οἴει δὴ καινὰ ἄττα δεῖν ἀκούειν
ἀποδείξεις τε ἑτέρας, ὡς τῶν προτέρων οἷον
σκευαρίων κατατετριμμένων, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν σὺ
αὐτὰ ἀμπίσχοιο, εἰ μή τίς σοι τεκμήριον καθαρὸν
114 καὶ ἄχραντον οἴσει. ἐγὼ δὲ χαίρειν ἐάσας τὰς σὰς
προδρομὰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐρήσομαι, πόθεν
μαθὼν αὖ τὰ συμφέροντα ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὅστις
ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ πάντ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερον
ἐρωτῶ μιᾷ ἐρωτήσει· ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς εἰς ταὐ-
τὸν ἥξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις ἀποδεῖξαι οὔθ' ὡς ἐξευρὼν
οἶσθα τὰ συμφέροντα οὔθ' ὡς μαθών. ἐπειδὴ δὲ
τρυφᾷς καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἡδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσαιο
λόγου, τοῦτον μὲν ἐῶ χαίρειν, εἴτε οἶσθα εἴτε μὴ
Β τὰ Ἀθηναίοις συμφέροντα· πότερον δὲ ταὐτά ἐστι
δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα ἢ ἕτερα, τί οὐκ ἀπ-
έδειξας; εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ
σέ, εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελθε.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴην, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, πρὸς σὲ διελθεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ γαθέ, ἐμὲ ἐκκλησίαν νόμισον καὶ
δῆμον· καὶ ἐκεῖ τοί σε δεήσει ἕνα ἕκαστον πείθειν.
ἦ γάρ;

expedient are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so?

ALC. Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates,—unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself?

SOC. What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know what is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.

ALC. But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you.

SOC. Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not?

114

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνα τε οἷόν τε εἶναι κατὰ
C μόνας πείθειν καὶ συμπόλλους περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῇ,
ὥσπερ ὁ γραμματιστὴς ἕνα τέ που πείθει περὶ
γραμμάτων καὶ πολλούς;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕνα τε
καὶ πολλοὺς πείσει;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ' ἔσται ὁ εἰδώς, ὁ ἀριθμητικός;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ἅπερ καὶ πολλοὺς οἷός τε
πείθειν εἶ, ταῦτα καὶ ἕνα;

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι ἃ οἶσθα.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν
D τῷ δήμῳ ῥήτορος ὁ ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε συνουσίᾳ, ὅτι ὁ
μὲν ἀθρόους πείθει τὰ αὐτά, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἕνα;

ΑΛΚ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι νῦν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλούς
τε καὶ ἕνα πείθειν, ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐμμελέτησον καὶ ἐπι-
χείρησον ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς τὸ δίκαιον ἐνίοτε οὐ συμ-
φέρει.

ΑΛΚ. Ὑβριστὴς εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Νῦν γοῦν ὑφ' ὕβρεως μέλλω σε πείθειν
τἀναντία οἷς σὺ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις.

ΑΛΚ. Λέγε δή.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου μόνον τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

E ΑΛΚ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς λέγε.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And the same man may well persuade one person singly, and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters ?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number ?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And this will be the man who knows—the arithmetician ?

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. And you too can persuade a single man about things of which you can persuade many ?

ALC. Presumably.

SOC. And these are clearly things that you know.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And the only difference between the orator speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time ?

ALC. It looks like it.

SOC. Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpractised hand on me, and endeavour to show that the just is sometimes not expedient.

ALC. You are insolent, Socrates !

SOC. This time, at any rate, I am going to have the insolence to persuade you of the opposite of that which you decline to prove to me.

ALC. Speak, then.

SOC. Just answer my questions.

ALC. No, you yourself must be the speaker.

114 ΣΩ. Τί δ'; οὐχ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλει πεισθῆναι;

ΑΛΚ. Πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγοις ὅτι ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, μάλιστ' ἂν εἷης πεπεισμένος;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δή· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς σοῦ ἀκούσῃς, ὅτι τὰ δίκαια συμφέροντά ἐστιν, ἄλλῳ γε λέγοντι μὴ πιστεύσῃς.

ΑΛΚ. Οὕτοι, ἀλλ' ἀποκριτέον· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἴομαι βλαβήσεσθαι.

115 ΣΩ. Μαντικὸς γὰρ εἶ. καί μοι λέγε· τῶν δικαίων φῂς ἔνια μὲν συμφέρειν, ἔνια δ' οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὰ μὲν καλὰ αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δ' οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχρὰ μέν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καλά;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ τὰ καλά; πότερον πάντα ἀγαθά, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Οἴομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνια τῶν καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἀγαθά;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

Β ΣΩ. Ἆρα λέγεις τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμῳ βοηθήσαντες ἑταίρῳ ἢ οἰκείῳ τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον, οἱ δ' οὐ βοηθήσαντες, δέον, ὑγιεῖς ἀπῆλθον;

soc. What? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded?

ALC. By all means, to be sure.

soc. And you would best be persuaded if you should say "the case is so"?

ALC. I agree.

soc. Then answer; and if you do not hear your own self say that the just is expedient, put no trust in the words of anyone again.

ALC. I will not: but I may as well answer; for I do not think I shall come to any harm.

soc. You are quite a prophet! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And again, some noble, and some not?

ALC. What do you mean by that question?

soc. I would ask whether anyone ever seemed to you to be doing what was base and yet just.

ALC. Never.

soc. Well, are all just things noble?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And what of noble things, in their turn? Are they all good, or some only, while others are not?

ALC. In my opinion, Socrates, some noble things are evil.

soc. And some base things are good?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound?

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ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι οὓς ἔδει· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὴν δέ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ ἕλκη· ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

C ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἡ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ θάνατος;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτόν γέ ἐστι καλὸν καὶ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς φίλοις βοηθεῖν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα τοίνυν εἰ, ἢ γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνταῦθα· κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὡμολόγεις καλὸν εἶναι τὴν βοήθειαν· τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ σκόπει, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἀγαθον ἢ κακόν; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· πότερ' ἂν δέξαιό σοι εἶναι, ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀγαθά.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα, καὶ ἥκιστα τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιο ἂν στέρεσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν λέγεις περὶ ἀνδρείας; ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ δέξαιο στέρεσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐδὲ ζῆν ἂν ἐγὼ δεξαίμην δειλὸς ὤν.

ΣΩ. Ἔσχατον ἄρα κακῶν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ δειλία.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάναι, ὡς ἔοικεν.

ΑΛΚ. Φημί.

ALC. Precisely.

SOC. And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavour to save those whom it was one's duty to save; and this is courage, is it not?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And is not the courage one thing, and the death another?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one's friends is noble and evil?

ALC. Apparently not.

SOC. Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage: now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way: which would you choose to have, good things or evil?

ALC. Good.

SOC. And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived?

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. Then what do you say of courage? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it?

ALC. I would give up life itself if I had to be a coward.

SOC. Then you regard cowardice as the uttermost evil.

ALC. I do.

SOC. On a par with death, it seems.

ALC. Yes.

115 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζωὴ καὶ ἀνδρεία;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Καὶ τὰ μὲν μάλιστ' ἂν εἶναι βούλοιό σοι, τὰ δὲ ἥκιστα;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄριστα ἡγῇ, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρα σὺ ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι κἀν τοῖς κακίστοις θάνατον.[1]

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις, ᾗ μὲν καλόν, κατ' ἀγαθοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας, καλὸν αὐτὸ προσεῖπας;

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνομαί γε.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ δὲ κακοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κακόν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὧδε δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἑκάστην τῶν πράξεων· εἴπερ ᾗ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν
116 καλεῖς, καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴν κλητέον.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθόν, καλόν· ᾗ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχρόν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δέ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μέν, κακὴν δέ.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν καλῶν, καθ' ὅσον καλόν,

[1] πάνυ γε . . . θάνατον Stobaeus: om. mss., Proclus.

SOC. And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst?

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.

ALC. I do.

SOC. Then the rescue of one's friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces.

ALC. I believe that is so.

SOC. And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then in saying that the rescue of one's friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.

ALC. I believe what you say is true, Socrates.

SOC. So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is

116 κακόν, οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καθ' ὅσον αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν.

B ΑΛΚ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὧδε σκέψαι. ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὐδαίμονες δι' ἀγαθῶν κτῆσιν;

ΑΛΚ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Κτῶνται δὲ ταῦτα τῷ εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ εὖ ἄρα πράττειν ἀγαθόν;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καλὸν ἡ εὐπραγία;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

C ΣΩ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν πάλιν αὖ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἂν ἄρα εὕρωμεν καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὑρήσομεν ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὰ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρει ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Συμφέρει.

ΣΩ. Μνημονεύεις οὖν περὶ τῶν δικαίων πῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;

ΑΛΚ. Οἶμαί γε τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καλὰ πράττειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθά;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

D ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρειν;

evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And are not those who do well happy?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And they acquire these by doing well and nobly?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. So doing well is good?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And welfare is noble?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.

ALC. We must.

SOC. Well then, are good things expedient or not?

ALC. Expedient.

SOC. And do you remember what our admissions were about just things?

ALC. I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things.

SOC. And that those who do noble things must do good things?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And that good things are expedient?

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ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δίκαια ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, συμφέροντά ἐστιν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ταῦτα οὐ σὺ ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνομαι, ὡς ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τις ἀνίσταται συμβουλεύσων εἴτε Ἀθηναίοις εἴτε Πεπαρηθίοις, οἰόμενος γιγνώσκειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, φήσει δ' εἶναι τὰ δίκαια κακὰ ἐνίοτε, ἄλλο τι ἢ καταγελᾷης ἂν αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδήπερ τυγχάνεις καὶ σὺ λέγων ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστι
Ε δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε οὐδ' ὅ τι λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι. τοτὲ μὲν γάρ μοι ἕτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλα.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα τοῦτο, ὦ φίλε, ἀγνοεῖς τὸ πάθημα τί ἐστιν;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οἴει ἂν οὖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη σε, δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς ἢ τρεῖς ἔχεις, καὶ δύο χεῖρας ἢ τέτταρας, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερ' ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλα, ἢ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτά;

117 ΑΛΚ. Δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγε ἤδη περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, οἶμαι μέντοι τὰ αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτι οἶσθα; τοῦτ' αἴτιον;

ΑΛΚ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Περὶ ὧν ἄρα ἄκων τἀναντία ἀποκρίνῃ, δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τούτων οὐκ οἶσθα.

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.

ALC. So it seems.

SOC. Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?

ALC. I seem to be, apparently.

SOC. So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians,[1] imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?

ALC. But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.

SOC. And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?

ALC. I am, quite.

SOC. Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?

ALC. I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.

SOC. And the reason would be, because you know?

ALC. I think so.

SOC. Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant.

ALC. Very likely.

SOC. And you say you are bewildered in answering

[1] Peparethus is a small island off the coast of Thessaly.

117 καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ μὴ ἀποκρινόμενος φῇς πλανᾶσθαι; εἶτα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει· ἐπειδάν τίς τι μὴ εἰδῇ, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τούτου πλανᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἶσθα ὁντινα τρόπον ἀναβήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν;

ΑΛΚ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ πλανᾶταί σου ἡ δόξα περὶ ταῦτα;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' αἴτιον οἶσθα ἢ ἐγὼ φράσω;

ΑΛΚ. Φράσον.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ φίλε, οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅρα καὶ σὺ κοινῇ. ἆ μὴ ἐπίστασαι, γιγνώσκεις δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι, πλανᾷ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ὥσπερ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας οἶσθα δήπου ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αὐτὸς περὶ ταῦτα δοξάζεις, ὅπως χρὴ σκευάζειν, καὶ πλανᾷ, ἢ τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπεις;

ΑΛΚ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ ἐν νηῒ πλέοις, ἆρα δοξάζοις ἂν πότερον χρὴ τὸν οἴακα εἴσω ἄγειν ἢ ἔξω, καὶ ἄτε

[1] The "tiller" was the handle of an oar at the side of the stern, and was moved towards or away from the centre of the ship.

about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things?

ALC. I agree.

SOC. Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing?

ALC. Yes, of course.

SOC. Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven?

ALC. On my word, not I.

SOC. Is that too a kind of question about which your judgement is bewildered?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Do you know the reason, or shall I state it?

ALC. State it.

SOC. It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it.

ALC. Here again, how do you mean?

SOC. Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish?

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows?

ALC. I do the latter.

SOC. And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards,[1] and in your ignorance bewilder

117 οὐκ εἰδὼς πλανῷο ἄν, ἢ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοις;

ΑΛΚ. Τῷ κυβερνήτῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ ἃ μὴ οἶσθα πλανᾷ, ἅπερ εἰδῇς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ πράξει διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιάν ἐστι, τὴν τοῦ μὴ εἰδότα οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς αὖ λέγεις τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Τότε που ἐπιχειροῦμεν πράττειν, ὅταν οἰώμεθα εἰδέναι ὅ τι πράττομεν;

Ε ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γέ πού τινες μὴ οἴωνται εἰδέναι, ἄλλοις παραδιδόασιν;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μὴ εἰδότων ἀναμάρτητοι ζῶσι διὰ τὸ ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίνες οὖν οἱ ἁμαρτάνοντες; οὐ γάρ που οἵ γε εἰδότες.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὔθ' οἱ εἰδότες οὔθ' οἱ τῶν μὴ
118 εἰδότων εἰδότες ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν, ἢ ἄλλοι λείπονται ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, οἰόμενοι δ' εἰδέναι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ οὗτοι.

ΣΩ. Αὕτη ἄρα ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν ᾖ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα, τότε κακουργοτάτη καὶ αἰσχίστη;

ΑΛΚ. Πολύ γε.

yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet?

ALC. I would leave it to him.

SOC. So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know?

ALC. It seems I am not.

SOC. Then do you note that mistakes in action also are due to this ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not?

ALC. Here again, how do you mean?

SOC. We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others?

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. And so that kind of ignorant person makes no mistakes in life, because they entrust such matters to others?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Who then are those who make mistakes? For, I take it, they cannot be those who know.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?

ALC. Yes, only those.

SOC. Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base?

ALC. By far.

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ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἔχεις μείζω εἰπεῖν δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ταῦτα σὺ φῂς πλανᾶσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ πλανᾷ, ἆρ' οὐ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν
B ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἀγνοεῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐκ εἰδὼς οἴει αὐτὰ εἰδέναι;

ΑΛΚ. Κινδυνεύω.

ΣΩ. Βαβαὶ ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, οἷον πάθος πέπονθας· ὃ ἐγὼ ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ, ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνῳ ἐσμέν, ῥητέον. ἀμαθίᾳ γὰρ συνοικεῖς, ὦ βέλτιστε, τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, ὡς ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ καὶ σὺ σαυτοῦ· διὸ καὶ ἄττεις ἄρα πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὶν παιδευθῆναι. πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο οὐ σὺ μόνος,
C ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, πλὴν ὀλίγων γε καὶ ἴσως τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου Περικλέους.

ΑΛΚ. Λέγεταί γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέναι, καὶ Πυθοκλείδῃ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ· καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλικοῦτος ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἤδη τινὰ εἶδες σοφὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀδυνατοῦντα ποιῆσαι ἄλλον σοφὸν ἅπερ αὐτός; ὥσπερ ὅς σε ἐδίδαξε γράμματα, αὐτός τε ἦν σοφὸς καὶ σὲ ἐποίησε τῶν τε ἄλλων ὅντινα ἐβούλετο· ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

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[1] A musician of Ceos (who was perhaps also a Pythagorean philosopher) who taught in Athens.

[2] An Ionian philosopher who lived in Athens *c.* 480–430 B.C.

[3] An Athenian musician and sophist.

SOC. Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?

ALC. I am afraid so.

SOC. Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city's affairs, except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.

ALC. Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides [1] and Anaxagoras [2]; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon [3] for that very purpose.

SOC. Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not?

ALC. Yes.

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D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ὁ παρ' ἐκείνου μαθὼν ἄλλον οἷός τε ἔσῃ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδοτρίβης ὡσαύτως;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν γὰρ δήπου τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐπισταμένων ὁτιοῦν ὅτι ἐπίστανται, ἐπειδὰν καὶ ἄλλον οἷοί τε ὦσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, Περικλῆς τίνα ἐποίησε σοφόν, ἀπὸ τῶν υἱέων ἀρξάμενος;

E ΑΛΚ. Τί δ', εἰ τὼ Περικλέους υἱέε ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἀδελφόν.

ΑΛΚ. Τί δ' ἂν αὖ Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν Κλεινίας μὲν μαίνεται, τὼ δὲ Περικλέους υἱέε ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην, σοὶ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀναθῶμεν, δι' ὅ τι σε οὕτως ἔχοντα περιορᾷ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγώ, οἶμαι, αἴτιος οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

119 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἰπέ, ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου, ὧν ἑκάτερος Ζήνωνι ἑκατὸν μνᾶς τελέσας σοφός τε καὶ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν.

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[1] A friend of Zeno: *cf. Parmen.* 126.

[2] An Athenian general.

[3] Of Elea, in S. Italy; a disciple of Parmenides who criticized the Pythagorean teaching.

SOC. And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And the same holds of the harper and the trainer?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one's knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.

ALC. I agree.

SOC. Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with?

ALC. But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates?

SOC. Well, Cleinias, your brother.

ALC. But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman?

SOC. Well, if Cleinias is mad and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason are we to assign, in your case, for his allowing you to be in your present condition?

ALC. I believe I am myself to blame for not attending to him.

SOC. But tell me of any other Athenian or foreigner, slave or freeman, who is accounted to have become wiser through converse with Pericles; as I can tell you that Pythodorus [1] son of Isolochus, and Callias,[2] son of Calliades, became through that of Zeno [3]; each of them has paid Zeno a hundred minae,[4] and has become both wise and distinguished.

[4] About £1500-£2000, or the total expenses of three years at an English University (1964).

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τί οὖν διανοῇ περὶ σαυτοῦ; πότερον ἐᾶν ὡς νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιεῖσθαι;

B ΑΛΚ. Κοινὴ βουλή, ὦ Σώκρατες. καίτοι ἐννοῶ σου εἰπόντος καὶ συγχωρῶ. δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων ἀπαίδευτοι εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα τί δὴ τοῦτο;

ΑΛΚ. Εἰ μέν που ἦσαν πεπαιδευμένοι, ἔδει ἂν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα αὐτοῖς ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι μαθόντα καὶ ἀσκήσαντα ἰέναι ὡς ἐπ' ἀθλητάς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ οὗτοι ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντες ἐληλύθασιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, τί δεῖ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μανθάνοντα πράγματ'

C ἔχειν; ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι τούτων τῇ γε φύσει πάνυ πολὺ περιέσομαι.

ΣΩ. Βαβαί, οἷον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοῦτ' εἴρηκας· ὡς ἀνάξιον τῆς ἰδέας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν σοι ὑπαρχόντων.

ΑΛΚ. Τί μάλιστα καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἀγανακτῶ ὑπέρ τε σοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἔρωτος.

ΑΛΚ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἠξίωσας τὸν ἀγῶνά σοι εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπους.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τίνας μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄξιον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἄνδρα οἰόμενον μεγαλόφρονα εἶναι.

D ΑΛΚ. Πῶς λέγεις; οὐ πρὸς τούτους μοι ὁ ἀγών;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ τριήρη διενοοῦ κυβερνᾶν μέλλουσαν ναυμαχεῖν, ἤρκει ἄν σοι τῶν συνναυτῶν

ALC. Well, upon my word, I cannot.

SOC. Very good: then what is your intention regarding yourself? Will you remain as you are, or take some trouble?

ALC. We must put our heads together, Socrates. And indeed, as soon as you speak, I take the point and agree. For the men who manage the city's affairs, apart from a few, do strike me as uneducated.

SOC. Then what does that mean?

ALC. That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practise and have the trouble of learning? For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them.

SOC. Ho, ho, my good sir, what a thing to say! How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages!

ALC. What is your meaning now, Socrates? What is the connexion?

SOC. I am grieved for you, and for my love.

ALC. Why, pray?

SOC. That you should expect your contest to be with the men we have here.

ALC. Well, but with whom is it to be?

SOC. Is that a worthy question to be asked by a man who considers himself high-spirited?

ALC. How do you mean? Is not my contest with these men?

SOC. Well, suppose you were intending to steer a warship into action, would you be content to be the best hand among the crew at steering or, while

119 βελτίστῳ εἶναι τὰ κυβερνητικά, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν ᾧου ἂν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ἀπέβλεπες δ' ἂν εἰς τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνταγωνιστάς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς νῦν εἰς τοὺς συναγωνιστάς; ὧν δήπου περιγενέσθαι σε δεῖ τοσοῦτον, ὥστε μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
E καταφρονηθέντας συναγωνίζεσθαί σοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε καλόν τι ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι διανοῇ καὶ ἄξιον σαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διανοοῦμαί γε.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ σοι ἄρα ἄξιον ἀγαπᾶν, εἰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν βελτίων εἶ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἡγεμόνας ἀποβλέπειν, εἴ ποτε[1] ἐκείνων βελτίων γένοιο, σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσκοῦντα πρὸς ἐκείνους.

120 ΑΛΚ. Λέγεις δὲ τίνας τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθα ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις τε καὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ πολεμοῦσαν ἑκάστοτε;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἡγεμὼν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς Περσῶν τὸν ἀγῶνα ἡγούμενός σοι εἶναι ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡγοῖο;

ΑΛΚ. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, ὦ 'γαθέ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Μειδίαν σε δεῖ τὸν
B ὀρτυγοκόπον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους οἳ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἔτι τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη, φαῖεν ἂν αἱ γυναῖκες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπ' ἀμουσίας καὶ οὔπω ἀποβεβληκότες, ἔτι δὲ βαρβαρίζοντες ἐληλύθασι κολακεύ-

[1] εἴ ποτε Burnet: ὁπότε MSS.

regarding this skill as a necessary qualification, would you keep your eye on your actual opponents in the fight, and not, as now, on your fellow-fighters? These, I conceive, you ought so far to surpass that they would not feel fit to be your opponents, but only to be your despised fellow-fighters against the enemy, if you mean really to make your mark with some noble action that will be worthy both of yourself and of the city.

ALC. Why, I do mean to.

SOC. So you think it quite fitting for you to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers, but neglect to keep your eye on the enemy's leaders with a view to showing yourself better than they are, or to plan and practise against them!

ALC. Of whom are you speaking now, Socrates?

SOC. Do you not know that our city makes war occasionally on the Spartans and on the Great King?

ALC. That is true.

SOC. And if you are minded to be the head of our state, you would be right in thinking that your contest is with the kings of Sparta and of Persia?

ALC. That sounds like the truth.

SOC. No, my good friend; you ought rather to keep your eye on Meidias the quail-filliper[1] and others of his sort—who undertake to manage the city's affairs, while they still have the slavish hair[2] (as the women would say) showing in their minds through their lack of culture, and have not yet got rid of it; who, moreover, have come with their out-

[1] Meidias is mentioned by Aristophanes (*Av.* 1297) for his skill in the game of filliping quails which were specially trained not to flinch.

[2] Slaves in Athens were largely natives of western Asia, and had thick, close hair, very different from the wavy locks of the Greeks.

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σοντες τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρξοντες—πρὸς τούτους σε δεῖ, οὔσπερ λέγω, βλέποντα σαυτοῦ δὴ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ μήτε μανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται, μέλλοντα τοσοῦτον ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, μήτε ἀσκεῖν C ὅσα δεῖται ἀσκήσεως, καὶ πᾶσαν παρασκευὴν παρεσκευασμένον οὕτως ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς μέν μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἶμαι μέντοι τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγοὺς καὶ τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ ἄριστε, τὴν οἴησιν ταύτην σκόπει οἵαν ἔχεις.

ΑΛΚ. Τοῦ *πέρι*;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν ποτέρως ἂν οἴει σαυτοῦ μᾶλλον D ἐπιμεληθῆναι, φοβούμενός τε καὶ οἰόμενος δεινοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι, ἢ μή;

ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰ δεινοὺς οἰοίμην.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οἴει τι βλαβήσεσθαι ἐπιμεληθεὶς σαυτοῦ;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὀνήσεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν τοῦτο τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔχει ἡ οἴησις αὕτη.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι καὶ ψευδής ἐστιν, ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων σκέψαι.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰκὸς ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι φύσεις ἐν E γενναίοις γένεσιν ἢ μή;

ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς γενναίοις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς εὖ φύντας, ἐὰν καὶ εὖ τραφῶσιν, οὕτω τελέους γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν;

landish speech to flatter the state, not to rule it—to these, I tell you, should your eyes be turned; and then you can disregard yourself, and need neither learn what is to be learnt for the great contest in which you are to be engaged, nor practise what requires practice, and so ensure that you are perfectly prepared before entering upon a political career.

ALC. Why, Socrates, I believe you are right; though I think neither the Spartan generals nor the Persian king are at all different from other people.

SOC. But, my excellent friend, consider what this notion of yours means.

ALC. In regard to what?

SOC. First of all, do you think you would take more pains over yourself if you feared them and thought them terrible, or if you did not?

ALC. Clearly, if I thought them terrible.

SOC. And do you think you will come to any harm by taking pains over yourself?

ALC. By no means; rather that I shall get much benefit.

SOC. And on this single count that notion[1] of yours is so much to the bad.

ALC. True.

SOC. Then, in the second place, observe the probability that it is false.

ALC. How so?

SOC. Is it probable that noble races should produce better natures, or not?

ALC. Clearly, noble races would.

SOC. And will not the well-born, provided they are well brought up, probably be perfected in virtue?

[1] *i.e.* about the Spartan generals and the Persian king, 120 c.

120 ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκεψώμεθα δή, τοῖς ἐκείνων τὰ ἡμέτερα ἀντιτιθέντες, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι φαυλοτέρων γενῶν εἶναι οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Περσῶν βασιλεῖς. ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὡς οἱ μὲν Ἡρακλέους, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιμένους ἔκγονοι, τὸ δ' Ἡρακλέους τε γένος καὶ τὸ Ἀχαιμένους εἰς Περσέα τὸν Διὸς ἀναφέρεται;

121 ΑΛΚ. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς Εὐρυσάκη, τὸ δ' Εὐρυσάκους εἰς Δία.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ γενναῖε Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰς Δαίδαλον, ὁ δὲ Δαίδαλος εἰς Ἥφαιστον τὸν Διός. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τούτων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀρξάμενα βασιλεῖς εἰσὶν ἐκ βασιλέων μέχρι Διός, οἱ μὲν Ἄργους τε καὶ Λακεδαίμονος, οἱ δὲ τῆς Περσίδος τὸ ἀεί, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν· ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοί τε ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ πατέρες. εἰ
B δὲ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους δέοι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα Εὐρυσάκους ἐπιδεῖξαι Σαλαμῖνα ἢ τὴν Αἰακοῦ τοῦ ἔτι προτέρου Αἴγιναν Ἀρταξέρξῃ τῷ Ξέρξου, πόσον ἂν οἴει γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν; ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ τοῦ τε γένους ὄγκῳ ἐλαττώμεθα τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῦσιν ὡς μεγάλα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ὧν αἱ γυναῖκες δημοσίᾳ φυλάττονται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν μὴ λάθῃ ἐξ ἄλλου γενόμενος ὁ
C βασιλεὺς ἢ ἐξ Ἡρακλειδῶν; ὁ δὲ Περσῶν τοσοῦτον ὑπερβάλλει, ὥστε οὐδεὶς ὑποψίαν ἔχει ὡς ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν βασιλεὺς γένοιτο ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ· διὸ οὐ φρουρεῖται ἡ βασιλέως γυνὴ ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου.

[1] Socrates' father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor, and Daedalus was the legendary inventor of sculpture.

[2] *i.e.*, the kings of Sparta and Persia.

ALC. That must be so.

SOC. Then let us consider, by comparing our lot with theirs, whether the Spartan and Persian kings appear to be of inferior birth. Do we not know that the former are descendants of Hercules and the latter of Achaemenes, and that the line of Hercules and the line of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

ALC. Yes, and mine, Socrates, to Eurysaces, and that of Eurysaces to Zeus!

SOC. Yes, and mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus,[1] and Daedalus to Hephaestus, son of Zeus! But take the lines of those people,[2] going back from them: you have a succession of kings reaching to Zeus—on the one hand, kings of Argos and Sparta; on the other, of Persia, which they have always ruled, and frequently Asia also, as at present; whereas we are private persons ourselves, and so were our fathers. And then, suppose that you had to make what show you could of your ancestors, and of Salamis as the native land of Eurysaces, or of Aegina as the home of the yet earlier Aeacus, to impress Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, how you must expect to be laughed at! Why, I am afraid we are quite outdone by those persons in pride of birth and upbringing altogether. Or have you not observed how great are the advantages of the Spartan kings, and how their wives are kept under statutory ward of the ephors, in order that every possible precaution may be taken against the king being born of any but the Heracleidae? And the Persian king is so pre-eminent that no one has a suspicion that an heir could have been born of anybody but the king; and hence the king's wife has nothing to guard her except fear. When

121 ἐπειδὰν δὲ γένηται ὁ παῖς ὁ πρεσβύτατος, οὗπερ ἡ ἀρχή, πρῶτον μὲν ἑορτάζουσι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ βασιλέως, ὧν ἂν ἄρχῃ, εἶτα εἰς τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ βασιλέως γενέθλια πᾶσα θύει καὶ ἑορτάζει ἡ Ἀσία· ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ D κωμῳδοποιοῦ, οὐδ' οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα τι αἰσθάνονται, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη. μετὰ τοῦτο τρέφεται ὁ παῖς, οὐχ ὑπὸ γυναικὸς τροφοῦ ὀλίγου ἀξίας, ἀλλ' ὑπ' εὐνούχων οἳ ἂν δοκῶσι τῶν περὶ βασιλέα ἄριστοι εἶναι· οἷς τά τε ἄλλα προστέτακται ἐπιμέλεσθαι τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ὅπως κάλλιστος ἔσται μηχανᾶσθαι, ἀναπλάττοντας τὰ μέλη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ κατορθοῦντας· καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες ἐν μεγάλῃ E τιμῇ εἰσιν. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἑπτέτεις γένωνται οἱ παῖδες, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους φοιτῶσι, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θήρας ἄρχονται ἰέναι· δὶς ἑπτὰ δὲ γενόμενον[1] ἐτῶν τὸν παῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν οὓς ἐκεῖνοι βασιλείους παιδαγωγοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ἐξειλεγμένοι Περσῶν οἱ ἄριστοι δόξαντες ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τέτταρες, ὅ τε σοφώτατος καὶ ὁ δικαιότατος καὶ ὁ σωφρονέστατος 122 καὶ ὁ ἀνδρειότατος. ὧν ὁ μὲν μαγείαν τε διδάσκει τὴν Ζωροάστρου τοῦ Ὡρομάζου· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῶν θεραπεία· διδάσκει δὲ καὶ τὰ βασιλικά· ὁ δὲ δικαιότατος ἀληθεύειν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου· ὁ δὲ σωφρονέστατος μηδ' ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἄρχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα ἐλεύθερος εἶναι ἐθίζηται καὶ ὄντως βασιλεύς, ἄρχων πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ

[1] *γενόμενον* Buttmann: *γενομένων* MSS.

[1] The saying, which became proverbial, is thought to have occurred in one of the (now lost) plays of Plato, the Athenian comic poet, who lived *c.* 460–389 B.C.

the eldest son, the heir to the throne, is born, first of all the king's subjects who are in his palace have a feast, and then for ever after on that date the whole of Asia celebrates the king's birthday with sacrifice and feasting: but when we are born, as the comic poet[1] says, "even the neighbours barely notice it," Alcibiades. After that comes the nurture of the child, not at the hands of a woman-nurse of little worth, but of the most highly approved eunuchs in the king's service, who are charged with the whole tendance of the new-born child, and especially with the business of making him as handsome as possible by moulding his limbs into a correct shape; and while doing this they are in high honour. When the boys are seven years old they are given horses and have riding lessons, and they begin to follow the chase. And when the boy reaches fourteen years he is taken over by the royal tutors, as they call them there: these are four men chosen as the most highly esteemed among the Persians of mature age, namely, the wisest one, the justest one, the most temperate one, and the bravest one. The first of these teaches him the magian lore of Zoroaster,[2] son of Horomazes; and that is the worship of the gods: he teaches him also what pertains to a king. The justest teaches him to be truthful all his life long; the most temperate, not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, in order that he may be accustomed to be a free man and a veritable king, who is the master first of all that is in him, not the slave; while the bravest trains him

[2] Zoroaster was the reputed founder of the Persian religion, of which the ministers were the Magi or hereditary priests.

122 δουλεύων· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρειότατος ἄφοβον καὶ ἀδεᾶ παρασκευάζων, ὡς ὅταν δείσῃ δοῦλον ὄντα. σοὶ
B δ', ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, Περικλῆς ἐπέστησε παιδαγωγὸν τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸν ἀχρειότατον ὑπὸ γήρως, Ζώπυρον τὸν Θρᾷκα. διῆλθον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἄν σοι τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, εἰ μὴ πολὺ ἔργον ἦν· καὶ ἅμα ταῦθ' ἱκανὰ δηλῶσαι καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα. τῆς δὲ σῆς γενέσεως, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας, ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ μέλει, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ἐραστής σου τυγχάνει ὤν. εἰ
C δ' αὖ ἐθέλοις εἰς πλούτους ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ ἐσθῆτας ἱματίων θ' ἕλξεις καὶ μύρων ἀλοιφὰς καὶ θεραπόντων πλήθους ἀκολουθίας τήν τε ἄλλην ἁβρότητα τὴν Περσῶν, αἰσχυνθείης ἂν ἐπὶ σεαυτῷ, αἰσθανόμενος ὅσον αὐτῶν ἐλλείπεις.

Εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθελήσεις εἰς σωφροσύνην τε καὶ κοσμιότητα ἀποβλέψαι καὶ εὐχέρειαν καὶ εὐκολίαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερίαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν καὶ φιλονικίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίας τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων, παῖδα ἂν ἡγήσαιο
D σαυτὸν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. εἰ δ' αὖ τι καὶ πλούτῳ προσέχεις καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οἴει τὶ εἶναι, μηδὲ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄρρητον ἔστω, ἐάν πως αἴσθῃ οὗ εἶ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλεις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων πλούτους ἰδεῖν, γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ τἀνθάδε τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐλλείπει. γῆν μὲν γὰρ ὅσην ἔχουσι τῆς θ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ Μεσσήνης, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἀμφισβητήσειε τῶν τῇδε πλήθει οὐδὲ ἀρετῇ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀνδραπόδων κτήσει τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν εἱλωτικῶν, οὐδὲ μὴν ἵππων γε, οὐδ'

to be fearless and undaunted, telling him that to be daunted is to be enslaved. But you, Alcibiades, had a tutor set over you by Pericles from amongst his servants, who was so old as to be the most useless of them, Zopyrus the Thracian. I might describe to you at length the nurture and education of your competitors, were it not too much of a task; and besides, what I have said suffices to show the rest that follows thereon. But about your birth, Alcibiades, or nurture or education, or about those of any other Athenian, one may say that nobody cares, unless it be some lover whom you chance to have. And again, if you chose to glance at the wealth, the luxury, the robes with sweeping trains, the anointings with myrrh, the attendant troops of menials, and all the other refinements of the Persians, you would be ashamed at your own case, on perceiving its inferiority to theirs.

Should you choose, again, to look at the temperance and orderliness, the forbearance and placidity, the magnanimity and discipline, the courage and endurance, and the toil-loving, success-loving, honour-loving spirit of the Spartans, you would count yourself but a child in all these things. If again you regard wealth, and think yourself something in that way, I must not keep silence on this point either, if you are to realize where you stand. For in this respect you have only to look at the wealth of the Spartans, and you will perceive that our riches here are far inferior to theirs. Think of all the land that they have both in their own and in the Messenian country: not one of our estates could compete with theirs in extent and excellence, nor again in ownership of slaves, and especially of those of the helot class, nor yet of horses, nor of all the flocks and herds

122 E ὅσα ἄλλα βοσκήματα κατὰ Μεσσήνην νέμεται· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἐῶ χαίρειν, χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν ὅσον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἰδίᾳ· πολλὰς γὰρ ἤδη γενεὰς εἰσέρχεται μὲν αὐτόσε ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐξέρχεται δὲ οὐδαμόσε, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον,
123 ὃν ἡ ἀλώπηξ πρὸς τὸν λέοντα εἶπε, καὶ τοῦ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα νομίσματος εἰσιόντος μὲν τὰ ἴχνη τὰ ἐκεῖσε τετραμμένα δῆλα, ἐξιόντος δὲ οὐδαμῇ ἄν τις ἴδοι· ὥστε εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ οἱ ἐκεῖ πλουσιώτατοι εἰσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὁ βασιλεύς· ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων μέγισται λήψεις καὶ πλεῖσταί εἰσι τοῖς
B βασιλεῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλικὸς φόρος οὐκ ὀλίγος γίγνεται, ὃν τελοῦσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς πρὸς Ἑλληνικοὺς μὲν πλούτους μεγάλα, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Περσικοὺς καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνων βασιλέως οὐδέν· ἐπεί ποτ' ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων παρὰ βασιλέα, ὃς ἔφη παρελθεῖν χώραν πάνυ πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθήν, ἐγγὺς ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, ἣν καλεῖν τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ζώνην τῆς βασιλέως γυναικός· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἣν αὖ καλεῖσθαι
C καλύπτραν, καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐξηρημένους τὸν τῆς γυναικός, καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχειν ἑκάστους τῶν τόπων ἀπὸ ἑκάστου τῶν κόσμων· ὥστε οἶμαι ἐγώ, εἴ τις εἴποι τῇ βασιλέως μητρί, Ξέρξου δὲ γυναικί, Ἀμήστριδι, ὅτι ἐν νῷ ἔχει σοῦ τῷ υἱεῖ ἀντιτάττεσθαι ὁ Δεινομάχης υἱός, ἢ ἔστι κόσμος ἴσως ἄξιος μνῶν πεντήκοντα, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, τῷ δ' υἱεῖ

that graze in Messene. However, I pass over all these things: but there is more gold and silver privately held in Lacedaemon than in the whole of Greece; for during many generations treasure has been passing in to them from every part of Greece, and often from the barbarians also, but not passing out to anyone; and just as in the fable of Aesop, where the fox remarked to the lion on the direction of the footmarks, the traces of the money going into Lacedaemon are clear enough, but nowhere are any to be seen of it coming out; so that one can be pretty sure that those people are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that among themselves the richest is the king; for the largest and most numerous receipts of the kind are those of the kings, and besides there is the levy of the royal tribute in no slight amount, which the Spartans pay to their kings. Now, the Spartan fortunes, though great compared with the wealth of other Greeks, are nought beside that of the Persians and their king. For I myself was once told by a trustworthy person, who had been up to their court, that he traversed a very large tract of excellent land, nearly a day's journey, which the inhabitants called the girdle of the king's wife, and another which was similarly called her veil; and many other fine and fertile regions reserved for the adornment of the consort; and each of these regions was named after some part of her apparel. So I imagine, if someone should say to the king's mother Amestris, who was wife of Xerxes, "The son of Deinomache[1] intends to challenge your son; the mother's dresses are worth perhaps fifty minae at the outside, while the son has under three hundred

[1] The mother of Alcibiades.

123 αὐτῆς γῆς πλέθρα Ἐρχίασιν οὐδὲ τριακόσια,
θαυμάσαι ἂν ὅτῳ ποτὲ πιστεύων ἐν νῷ ἔχει οὗτος
D ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τῷ Ἀρτοξέρξῃ διαγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ
οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ πι-
στεύων οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπιχειρεῖ πλὴν ἐπιμελείᾳ τε
καὶ σοφίᾳ· ταῦτα γὰρ μόνα ἄξια λόγου ἐν Ἕλλησιν.
ἐπεὶ εἴ γε πύθοιτο, ὅτι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης οὗτος νῦν
ἐπιχειρεῖ πρῶτον μὲν ἔτη οὐδέπω γεγονὼς σφόδρα
εἴκοσιν, ἔπειτα παντάπασιν ἀπαίδευτος, πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις, τοῦ ἐραστοῦ αὐτῷ λέγοντος ὅτι χρὴ πρῶτον
μαθόντα καὶ ἐπιμεληθέντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀσκήσαντα
E οὕτως ἰέναι διαγωνιούμενον βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ἐθέλει,
ἀλλά φησιν ἐξαρκεῖν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν
θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ἐρέσθαι· τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν ὅτῳ
πιστεύει τὸ μειράκιον; εἰ οὖν λέγοιμεν ὅτι κάλλει
τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ φύσει τῆς
ψυχῆς, ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, μαίνεσθαι
πρὸς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀποβλέψασα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
οἶμαι δὲ κἂν Λαμπιδώ, τὴν Λεωτυχίδου μὲν θυγα-
124 τέρα, Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ γυναῖκα, Ἄγιδος δὲ μητέρα,
οἳ πάντες βασιλεῖς γεγόνασι, θαυμάσαι ἂν καὶ
ταύτην εἰς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντα ἀπο-
βλέψασαν, εἰ σὺ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτῆς διαγωνί-
ζεσθαι οὕτω κακῶς ἠγμένος. καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν
δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ αἱ τῶν πολεμίων γυναῖκες βέλτιον
περὶ ἡμῶν διανοοῦνται, οἵους χρὴ ὄντας σφίσιν
ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ἡμεῖς περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλ', ὦ
μακάριε, πειθόμενος ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς
B γράμματι, γνῶθι σαυτόν, ὅτι οὗτοι εἰσὶν ἀντίπαλοι,
ἀλλ' οὐχ οὓς σὺ οἴει· ὧν ἄλλῳ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ
περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μή περ ἐπιμελείᾳ τε ἂν καὶ

acres at Erchiae,[1]" she would wonder to what on earth this Alcibiades could be trusting, that he proposed to contend against Artaxerxes; and I expect she would remark—"The only possible things that the man can be trusting to for his enterprise are industry and wisdom; for these are the only things of any account among the Greeks." Whereas if she were informed that this Alcibiades who is actually making such an attempt is, in the first place, as yet barely twenty years old, and secondly, altogether uneducated; and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practise, before he enters on a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, "On what, then, can the youngster rely?" And if we told her, "On beauty, stature, birth, wealth, and mental gifts," she would conclude we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages of her own people in all these respects. And I imagine that even Lampido, daughter of Leotychides and wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who have all been kings, would wonder in the same way, when she compared her people's resources, at your intention of having a contest with her son despite your bad upbringing. And yet, does it not strike you as disgraceful that our enemies' wives should have a better idea of the qualities that we need for an attempt against them than we have ourselves? Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, *Know thyself*; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save

[1] In Attica, about fifteen miles east of Athens.

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τέχνῃ. ὧν σὺ εἰ ἀπολειφθήσῃ, καὶ τοῦ ὀνομαστὸς γενέσθαι ἀπολειφθήσῃ ἐν Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροις, οὗ μοι δοκεῖς ἐρᾶν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλου.

ΑΛΚ. Τίνα οὖν χρὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖσθαι; ἔχεις ἐξηγήσασθαι; παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικας ἀληθῆ εἰρηκότι.

ΣΩ. Ναί· ἀλλὰ γὰρ κοινὴ βουλή, ᾧτινι τρόπῳ C ἂν ὅτι βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα· ἐγὼ γάρ τοι οὐ περὶ μὲν σοῦ λέγω ὡς χρὴ παιδευθῆναι, περὶ ἐμοῦ δὲ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ σου διαφέρω πλήν γε ἑνί.

ΑΛΚ. Τίνι;

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ σοφώτερος ἢ Περικλῆς ὁ σός.

ΑΛΚ. Τίς οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Θεός, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὅσπερ σοί με οὐκ εἴα πρὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας διαλεχθῆναι· ᾧ καὶ πιστεύων λέγω, ὅτι ἡ ἐπιφάνεια δι' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου σοι ἔσται ἢ δι' ἐμοῦ.

D ΑΛΚ. Παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως· λέγω μέντοι ἀληθῆ, ὅτι ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, μᾶλλον μὲν πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀτὰρ νώ γε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα.

ΑΛΚ. Ὅτι μὲν ἐγώ, οὐ ψεύδῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ὅτι γ' ἐγώ.

ΑΛΚ. Τί οὖν ἂν ποιοῖμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀπορρητέον οὐδὲ μαλακιστέον, ὦ ἑταῖρε.

ΑΛΚ. Οὕτοι δὴ πρέπει γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλὰ σκεπτέον κοινῇ. καί μοι λέγε·

[1] *Cf.* above, 119 B.

only pains and skill. If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamoured than anyone else ever was of anything.

ALC. Well then, what are the pains that I must take, Socrates? Can you enlighten me? For I must say your words are remarkably like the truth.

SOC. Yes, I can: but we must put our heads together,[1] you know, as to the way in which we can improve ourselves to the utmost. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point.

ALC. What is that?

SOC. My guardian is better and wiser than your one, Pericles.

ALC. Who is he, Socrates?

SOC. God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you attain to eminence.

ALC. You are jesting, Socrates.

SOC. Perhaps; I am right, however, in saying that we need to take pains—all men rather badly, but we two very badly indeed.

ALC. As to me, you are not wrong.

SOC. Nor, I fear, as to myself either.

ALC. Then what can we do?

SOC. There must be no crying off or skulking, my good friend.

ALC. No, for that would indeed be unseemly, Socrates.

SOC. It would; so let us consider in common.

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E φαμὲν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἄριστοι βούλεσθαι γενέσθαι. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ἀρετήν;

ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἥνπερ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοί.

ΣΩ. Οἱ τί ἀγαθοί;

ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον ὅτι οἱ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα.

ΣΩ. Ποῖα; ἆρα τὰ ἱππικά;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἱππικοὺς γὰρ ἂν ἦμεν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὰ ναυτικὰ λέγεις;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Παρὰ τοὺς ναυτικοὺς γὰρ ἂν ἦμεν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποῖα; ἃ τίνες πράττουσιν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἅπερ Ἀθηναίων οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί.

125 ΣΩ. Καλοὺς δὲ κἀγαθοὺς λέγεις τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς ἄφρονας;

ΑΛΚ. Τοὺς φρονίμους.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ ἕκαστος φρόνιμος, τοῦτο ἀγαθός;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἄφρων, πονηρός;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ὁ σκυτοτόμος φρόνιμος εἰς ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίαν;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸς ἄρα εἰς αὐτά;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀγαθός.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; εἰς ἱματίων ἐργασίαν οὐκ ἄφρων ὁ σκυτοτόμος;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

Now tell me: we say, do we not, that we wish to be as good as possible?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. In what excellence?

ALC. Clearly that which is the aim of good men.

SOC. Good in what?

ALC. Clearly, good in the management of affairs.

SOC. What sort of affairs? Horsemanship?

ALC. No, no.

SOC. Because we should apply to horsemen?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Well, seamanship, do you mean?

ALC. No.

SOC. Because we should apply to seamen?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Well, what sort of thing? The business of what men?

ALC. Of Athenian gentlemen.

SOC. Do you mean by "gentlemen" the intelligent or the unintelligent?

ALC. The intelligent.

SOC. And everyone is good in that wherein he is intelligent?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And bad wherein he is unintelligent?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. Then is the shoemaker intelligent in the making of foot-gear?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. So he is good in that article?

ALC. Good.

SOC. Well now, is not the shoemaker unintelligent in the making of clothes?

ALC. Yes.

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B ΣΩ. Κακὸς ἄρα εἰς τοῦτο;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ κακός τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν λέγεις τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ κακούς;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίνας ποτὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς λέγεις;

ΑΛΚ. Τοὺς δυναμένους ἔγωγε ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου ἵππων γε;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα καμνόντων;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ πλεόντων;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔ φημι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ θεριζόντων;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔ.

C ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ποιούντων ἤ τι ποιούντων;

ΑΛΚ. Ποιούντων λέγω.

ΣΩ. Τί; πειρῶ καὶ ἐμοὶ δηλῶσαι.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκοῦν τῶν καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν ἀνθρώποις χρωμένων;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα κελευστῶν χρωμένων ἐρέταις;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Κυβερνητικὴ γὰρ αὖτη γε ἀρετή;

SOC. So he is bad in that?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then, on this showing, the same man is both bad and good.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. Well, can you say that good men are also bad?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. But whoever do you mean by the good?

ALC. I mean those who are able to rule in the city.

SOC. Not, I presume, over horses?

ALC. No, no.

SOC. But over men?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. When they are sick?

ALC. No.

SOC. Or at sea?

ALC. I say, no.

SOC. Or harvesting?

ALC. No.

SOC. Doing nothing, or doing something?

ALC. Doing something, I say.

SOC. Doing what? Try and let me know.

ALC. Well, men who do business with each other and make use of one another, as is our way of life in our cities.

SOC. Then you speak of ruling over men who make use of men?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Over boatswains who make use of rowers?

ALC. No, no.

SOC. Because that is the pilot's distinction?

125 ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν αὐλητῶν,
D ἀνθρώποις ἡγουμένων ᾠδῆς καὶ χρωμένων χορευταῖς;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Χοροδιδασκαλικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γ' αὖ;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ποτε λέγεις χρωμένων ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώποις οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἄρχειν;

ΑΛΚ. Κοινωνούντων ἔγωγε λέγω πολιτείας καὶ συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τούτων ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ τέχνη; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ σε ἐροίμην πάλιν τὰ νῦν δή, κοινωνούντων ναυτιλίας ἐπίστασθαι ἄρχειν τίς ποιεῖ τέχνη;

ΑΛΚ. Κυβερνητική.

E ΣΩ. Κοινωνούντων δὲ ᾠδῆς, ὡς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τίς ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἄρχειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἥνπερ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἡ χοροδιδασκαλία.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπιστήμην;

ΑΛΚ. Εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μῶν ἀβουλία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν κυβερνητῶν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὐβουλία;

126 ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, εἴς γε τὸ σῴζεσθαι πλέοντας.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. τί δέ; ἣν σὺ λέγεις εὐβουλίαν, εἰς τί ἐστιν;

ΑΛΚ. Εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν καὶ σῴζεσθαι.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Well, do you mean ruling over men who are flute-players, and who lead the singing and make use of dancers?

ALC. No, no.

SOC. Because, again, that is the chorus-teacher's function?

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. But whatever do you mean by being able to rule over men who make use of men?

ALC. I mean ruling over men in the city who share in it as fellow-citizens, and do business with each other.

SOC. Well, what art is this? Suppose I should ask you over again, as I did just now, what art makes men know how to rule over fellow-sailors?

ALC. The pilot's.

SOC. And what knowledge—to repeat what was said a moment ago—makes them rule over their fellow-singers?

ALC. That which you just mentioned, the chorus-teacher's.

SOC. Well now, what do you call the knowledge of one's fellow-citizens?

ALC. Good counsel, I should say, Socrates.

SOC. Well, and is the pilot's knowledge evil counsel?

ALC. No, no.

SOC. Rather good counsel?

ALC. So I should think, for the preservation of his passengers.

SOC. Quite right. And now, for what is the good counsel of which you speak?

ALC. For the better management and preservation of the city.

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ΣΩ. Ἄμεινον δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σῴζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σύ με ἔροιο· ἄμεινον διοικεῖται σῶμα καὶ σῴζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου; εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι ὑγιείας μὲν παραγιγνομένης, νόσου δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. οὐ καὶ σὺ οἴει οὕτως;

B ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ με αὖ ἔροιο· τίνος δὲ παραγιγνομένου ἄμεινον ὄμματα; ὡσαύτως εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι ὄψεως μὲν παραγιγνομένης, τυφλότητος δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. καὶ ὦτα δὲ κωφότητος μὲν ἀπογιγνομένης, ἀκοῆς δὲ ἐγγιγνομένης βελτίω τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται.

ΑΛΚ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; πόλις τίνος παραγιγνομένου καὶ ἀπογιγνομένου βελτίων τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται καὶ διοικεῖται;

C ΑΛΚ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν φιλία μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὸ μισεῖν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν ἀπογίγνηται.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν φιλίαν λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν ἢ διχόνοιαν;

ΑΛΚ. Ὁμόνοιαν.

ΣΩ. Διὰ τίνα οὖν τέχνην ὁμονοοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις περὶ ἀριθμούς;

ΑΛΚ. Διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται; οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτήν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἕκαστος;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

SOC. And what is it that becomes present or absent when we get this better management and preservation? If, for example, you should ask me, "What is it that becomes present or absent when the body is better managed and preserved?"—I should reply, "Health becomes present, and disease absent." Do not you think so too?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And if, again, you asked me, "What becomes present in a better condition of the eyes?"—I should answer in just the same way, "Sight becomes present, and blindness absent." So, in the case of the ears, deafness is caused to be absent, and hearing to be present, when they are improved and getting better treatment.

ALC. Correct.

SOC. Well then, what is it that becomes present or absent when a state is improved and has better treatment and management?

ALC. To my mind, Socrates, friendship with one another will be there, while hatred and faction will be absent.

SOC. Now, by friendship do you mean agreement or disagreement?

ALC. Agreement.

SOC. And what art is it that causes states to agree about numbers?

ALC. Arithmetic.

SOC. And what of individuals? Is it not the same art?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And it makes each single person agree with himself?

ALC. Yes.

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ΣΩ. Διὰ τίνα δὲ τέχνην ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ
D ὁμονοεῖ περὶ σπιθαμῆς καὶ πήχεος, ὁπότερον μεῖζον; οὐ διὰ τὴν μετρητικήν;

ΑΛΚ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀλλήλοις καὶ αἱ πόλεις;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ σταθμοῦ; οὐχ ὡσαύτως;

ΑΛΚ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν, τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τοῦ, καὶ τίς αὐτὴν τέχνη παρασκευάζει; καὶ ἆρα ἥπερ πόλει, αὕτη καὶ ἰδιώτῃ, αὐτῷ τε πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον;

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκός γέ τοι.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἔστι; μὴ κάμῃς ἀποκρινόμενος,
E ἀλλὰ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι φιλίαν τε λέγειν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν, ἥνπερ πατήρ τε υἱὸν φιλῶν ὁμονοεῖ καὶ μήτηρ, καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ καὶ γυνὴ ἀνδρί.

ΣΩ. Οἴει ἄν οὖν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἄνδρα γυναικὶ περὶ ταλασιουργίας δύνασθαι ὁμονοεῖν, τὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον τῇ ἐπισταμένῃ;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε δεῖ οὐδέν· γυναικεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε μάθημα.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

127 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; γυνὴ ἀνδρὶ περὶ ὁπλιτικῆς δύναιτ' ἂν ὁμονοεῖν μὴ μαθοῦσα;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀνδρεῖον γὰρ τοῦτο γε ἴσως αὖ φαίης ἂν εἶναι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

SOC. And what art makes each of us agree with himself as to which is the longer, a span or a cubit? Is it not mensuration?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And it makes both individuals and states agree with each other?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And what about the balance? Is it not the same here too?

ALC. It is.

SOC. Then what is that agreement of which you speak, and about what? And what art secures it? And is it the same in an individual as in a state, when one agrees with oneself and with another?

ALC. Most likely.

SOC. Well, what is it? Do not flag in your answers, but do your best to tell me.

ALC. I suppose I mean the friendship and agreement that you find when a father and mother love their son, and between brother and brother, and husband and wife.

SOC. Then do you suppose, Alcibiades, that a husband can possibly agree with his wife about woolwork, when he does not understand it, and she does?

ALC. Oh, no.

SOC. Nor has he any need, since that is a woman's accomplishment.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Or again, could a woman agree with a man about soldiering, when she has not learnt it?

ALC. Oh, no.

SOC. Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man's affair.

ALC. I would.

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ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ μὲν γυναικεῖα, τὰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖα μαθήματα κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἔν γε τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁμόνοια γυναιξὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας.

ΑΛΚ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα φιλία, εἴπερ ἡ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἦι ἄρα αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ αὑτῶν πράττουσιν, οὐ φιλοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

B ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα οἱ ἄνδρες ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ᾗ τὰ αὑτῶν.

ΑΛΚ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' εὖ[1] ἄρα ταύτῃ οἰκοῦνται αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;

ΑΛΚ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, φιλίας μὴ παρούσης, ἧς φαμὲν γιγνομένης εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἄλλως δὲ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς φιλία ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτῶν ἑκάτεροι πράττουσιν.

C ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι γε· νῦν δὲ πῶς αὖ λέγεις; ὁμονοίας μὴ ἐγγιγνομένης φιλία ἐγγίγνεται; ἢ οἷόν θ' ὁμόνοιαν ἐγγίγνεσθαι ὧν οἱ μὲν ἴσασι περὶ τούτων, οἱ δ' οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Δίκαια δὲ πράττουσιν ἢ ἄδικα, ὅταν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;

ΑΛΚ. Δίκαια· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[1] εὖ Olympiodorus: αὖ mss.

SOC. Then, by your account, there are some accomplishments belonging to women, and some to men?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. So in these, at any rate, there is no agreement between men and women.

ALC. No.

SOC. And hence no friendship either, if, as we said, friendship is agreement.

ALC. Apparently not.

SOC. So women are not loved by men, in so far as they do their own work.

ALC. It seems not.

SOC. Nor are men by women, in so far as they do theirs.

ALC. No.

SOC. And states, therefore, are not well ordered in so far as each person does his own business? [1]

ALC. I think they are, Socrates.

SOC. How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship, which we say must be there if states are well ordered, as otherwise they are not?

ALC. But it seems to me that friendship arises among them just on that account—that each of the two parties does its own business.

SOC. It was not so a moment since: but now, what do you mean this time? Does friendship arise where there is no agreement? And is it possible that agreement should arise where some know about the business, but others do not?

ALC. Impossible.

SOC. And are they doing what is just or unjust, when each man does his own business?

ALC. What is just, of course.

[1] *Cf. Charm.* 161 E, *Rep.* i. 332 ff.

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ΣΩ. Τὰ δίκαια οὖν πραττόντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν πολιτῶν φιλία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται πρὸς ἀλλήλους;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη αὖ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τίνα οὖν ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν φιλίαν ἢ ὁμόνοιαν, περὶ ἧς δεῖ ἡμᾶς σοφούς τε εἶναι καὶ εὐβούλους, ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ὦμεν; οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι μαθεῖν οὔθ' ἥτις οὔτ' ἐν οἷστισι· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς φαίνεται ἐνοῦσα, τοτὲ δ' οὔ, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶδα ὅ τι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λελῆθέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἴσχιστα ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ θαρρεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἤσθου πεπονθὼς πεντηκονταετής, χαλεπὸν ἂν ἦν σοι ἐπιμεληθῆναι σαυτοῦ· νῦν δὲ ἣν ἔχεις ἡλικίαν, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ δεῖ αὐτὸ αἰσθέσθαι.

ΑΛΚ. Τί οὖν τὸν αἰσθανόμενον χρὴ ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη· καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιῇς, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, εἴ τι δεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ πιστεύειν, σύ τε κἀγὼ βέλτιον σχήσομεν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔσται ταῦτα ἕνεκά γε τοῦ ἐμὲ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τί ἐστι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι —μὴ πολλάκις λάθωμεν οὐχ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι, οἰόμενοι δέ—καὶ πότε ἄρα αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπος; ἆρα ὅταν τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐπιμελῆται, τότε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ποδῶν ἄνθρωπος πότε ἐπιμελεῖται; ἆρ' ὅταν ἐκείνων ἐπιμελῆται ἃ ἔστι τῶν ποδῶν;

SOC. And when the citizens do what is just in the city, does not friendship arise among them?

ALC. Again I think that must be so, Socrates.

SOC. Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.

ALC. Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a very disgraceful condition.

SOC. But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.

ALC. Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates?

SOC. Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven's favour—if we are to put any trust in *my* divination—you and I shall both be in better case.

ALC. That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.

SOC. Come then, what is "taking pains over oneself"—for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things?

ALC. I at least believe so.

SOC. Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet?

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ΑΛΚ. Οὐ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Καλεῖς δέ τι χειρός; οἷον δακτύλιον ἔστιν ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἢ δακτύλου;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποδὸς ὑπόδημα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

‹ΣΩ. Καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος ὁμοίως;

B ΑΛΚ. Ναί.›[1]

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ὅταν ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελώμεθα, τότε ποδῶν ἐπιμελούμεθα;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ πάνυ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη; ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι ὁτουοῦν πράγματος;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ὅταν τίς τι βέλτιον ποιῇ, τότε ὀρθὴν λέγεις ἐπιμέλειαν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη ὑποδήματα βελτίω ποιεῖ;

ΑΛΚ. Σκυτική.

ΣΩ. Σκυτικῇ ἄρα ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελούμεθα;

C ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ποδὸς σκυτικῇ; ἢ ἐκείνῃ ᾗ πόδας βελτίους ποιοῦμεν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐκείνῃ.

ΣΩ. Βελτίους δὲ πόδας οὐχ ᾗπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Αὕτη δ' οὐ γυμναστική;

ΑΛΚ. Μάλιστα.

[1] καὶ ἱμάτια . . . ναί Stobaeus: om. mss.

ALC. I do not understand.

SOC. Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet?

ALC. I do not quite understand, Socrates.

SOC. Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then what art makes shoes better?

ALC. Shoe-making.

SOC. So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And over our foot too by shoe-making? Or by that art whereby we make feet better?

ALC. By that art.

SOC. And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better?

ALC. I think so.

SOC. And is not that gymnastic?

ALC. Certainly.

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ΣΩ. Γυμναστικῇ μὲν ἄρα ποδὸς ἐπιμελούμεθα, σκυτικῇ δὲ τῶν τοῦ ποδός;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν χειρῶν, δακτυλιογλυφίᾳ δὲ τῶν τῆς χειρός;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν σώματος, ὑφαντικῇ δὲ
D καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τῶν τοῦ σώματος;

ΑΛΚ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλῃ μὲν ἄρα τέχνῃ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιμελούμεθα, ἄλλῃ δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ, σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾗ τις ἂν αὐτοῦ τε ἐπιμελοῖτο καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ποίᾳ ποτ' ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθείημεν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

E ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε ὡμολόγηται, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἂν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ ὁτιοῦν βέλτιον ποιοῖμεν, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἔγνωμεν ἄν ποτε, τίς τέχνη ὑπόδημα βέλτιον ποιεῖ, μὴ εἰδότες ὑπόδημα;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε τίς τέχνη δακτυλίους βελτίους ποιεῖ, ἀγνοοῦντες δακτύλιον.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ.

SOC. So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot?

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving and the rest over what belongs to the body?

ALC. Absolutely so.

SOC. Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.

ALC. Not at all.

SOC. For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one's belongings would not be the same.

ALC. Apparently not.

SOC. Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves?

ALC. I cannot say.

SOC. Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?

ALC. That is true.

SOC. Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe?

ALC. Impossible.

SOC. Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring.

ALC. True.

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ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ αὐτόν, ἆρ' ἄν ποτε γνοῖμεν ἀγνοοῦντες τί ποτ' ἐσμὲν αὐτοί;

129 ΑΛΚ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν δὴ ῥᾴδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν, καί τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών, ἢ χαλεπόν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις μὲν ἔδοξε παντὸς εἶναι, πολλάκις δὲ παγχάλεπον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἴτε ῥᾴδιον εἴτε μή ἐστιν, ὅμως γε ἡμῖν ὧδ' ἔχει· γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχ' ἂν γνοίημεν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ οὐκ ἄν ποτε.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

B ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τίν' ἂν τρόπον εὑρεθείη αὐτὸ ταὐτό; οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν τάχ' εὕροιμεν τί ποτ' ἐσμὲν αὐτοί, τούτου δὲ ἔτι ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἀδύνατοί που.

ΑΛΚ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε οὖν πρὸς Διός. τῷ διαλέγει σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐγὼ σοί;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Σωκράτης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ διαλεγόμενος;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ὁ ἀκούων;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λόγῳ διαλέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης;

C ΑΛΚ. Τί μήν;

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[1] This seems to be a sudden adumbration of the Platonic "idea" or form which remains constant, and so "the same,"

soc. Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves?

ALC. Impossible.

soc. Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody?

ALC. I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard.

soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can.

ALC. That is so.

soc. Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself[1] be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.

ALC. Rightly spoken.

soc. Steady, then, in Heaven's name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And I in turn to you?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then the talker is Socrates?

ALC. To be sure.

soc. And the hearer, Alcibiades?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And Socrates uses speech in talking?

ALC. Of course.

behind the shifting objects of sense related to it through its influence or impress. *Cf.* below, 130 D.

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ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταὐτόν που καλεῖς.

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ χρώμενος καὶ ᾧ χρῆται οὐκ ἄλλο;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὥσπερ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεῖ καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τέμνων καὶ χρώμενος, ἄλλο δὲ οἷς τέμνων χρῆται;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως καὶ οἷς ὁ κιθαριστὴς κιθαρίζει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κιθαριστὴς ἄλλο ἂν εἴη;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀρτίως ἠρώτων, εἰ ὁ χρώμενος
D καὶ ᾧ χρῆται ἀεὶ δοκεῖ ἕτερον εἶναι.

ΑΛΚ. Δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν φῶμεν τὸν σκυτοτόμον; τέμνειν ὀργάνοις μόνον ἢ καὶ χερσίν;

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ χερσίν.

ΣΩ. Χρῆται ἄρα καὶ ταύταις;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμενος σκυτοτομεῖ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ χρώμενον καὶ οἷς χρῆται ἕτερα ὁμολογοῦμεν;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἕτερον ἄρα σκυτοτόμος καὶ κιθαριστὴς
E χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν οἷς ἐργάζονται;

SOC. And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not?

ALC. How do you mean?

SOC. For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Well then, that is what I was asking just now — whether the user and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.

ALC. They are.

SOC. Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well?

ALC. With his hands as well.

SOC. So he uses these also?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from the hands and eyes that they use for their work?

129 ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ παντὶ τῷ σώματι χρῆται ἄνθρωπος;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἕτερον δ' ἦν τό τε χρώμενον καὶ ᾧ χρῆται;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἕτερον ἄρα ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτ' οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἔχεις μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τὸ τῷ σώματι χρώμενον.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

130 ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλο τι χρῆται αὐτῷ ἢ ψυχή;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσα;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τόδε γε οἶμαι οὐδένα ἂν ἄλλως οἰηθῆναι.

ΑΛΚ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Μὴ οὐ τριῶν ἕν γέ τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

ΑΛΚ. Τίνων;

ΣΩ. Ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ συναμφότερον, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο.

ΑΛΚ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον ὡμολογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι;

B ΑΛΚ. Ὡμολογήσαμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν σῶμα αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἄρχει;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄρχεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ εἴπομεν.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. And man uses his whole body too?

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. And we said that the user and what he uses are different?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. So man is different from his own body?

ALC. It seems so.

SOC. Then whatever is man?

ALC. I cannot say.

SOC. Oh, but you can—that he is the user of the body.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And the user of it must be the soul?

ALC. It must.

SOC. And ruler?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Now, here is a remark from which no one, I think, can dissent.

ALC. What is it?

SOC. That man must be one of three things.

ALC. What things?

SOC. Soul, body, or both together as one whole.

ALC. Very well.

SOC. But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man?

ALC. We have.

SOC. And does the body rule itself?

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Because we have said that it is ruled.

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ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν δὴ τοῦτό γε εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἆρα τὸ συναμφότερον τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει, καὶ ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος;

ΑΛΚ. Ἴσως δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Πάντων γε ἥκιστα· μὴ γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἑτέρου οὐδεμία που μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφότερον ἄρχειν.

ΑΛΚ. Ὀρθῶς.

C ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται, οἶμαι, ἢ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ εἴπερ τί ἐστι, μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχήν.

ΑΛΚ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναί σοι, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;

ΑΛΚ. Μὰ Δί', ἀλλὰ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως, ἐξαρκεῖ ἡμῖν· ἀκριβῶς μὲν γὰρ τότε εἰσόμεθα,

D ὅταν εὕρωμεν ὃ νῦν δὴ παρήλθομεν διὰ τὸ πολλῆς εἶναι σκέψεως.

ΑΛΚ. Τί τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Ὃ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἐρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέον εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα ὅ τι ἐστί. καὶ ἴσως ἐξαρκέσει· οὐ γάρ που κυριώτερόν γε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχήν.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὕτω νομίζειν, ἐμὲ καὶ

[1] *Cf.* 129 B.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then that cannot be what we are seeking.

ALC. It seems not.

SOC. Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man?

ALC. Perhaps it is.

SOC. The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.

ALC. You are right.

SOC. But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.

ALC. Precisely so.

SOC. Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?

ALC. No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.

SOC. And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.

ALC. What is that?

SOC. The point suggested in that remark a moment ago,[1] that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. And it is proper to take the view that you

130 σὲ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ε ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἦν ὃ καὶ ὀλίγῳ ἔμπροσθεν εἴπομεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαλέγεται λόγῳ χρώμενος, οὐ πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὁ ἐπιτάττων γνῶναι ἑαυτόν.

131 ΑΛΚ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματός τι γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν ἔγνωκεν.

ΑΛΚ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν ἰατρῶν ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκει, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, οὐδὲ τῶν παιδοτριβῶν, καθ' ὅσον παιδοτρίβης.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτῶν οὗτοί γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτῶν κατά γε τὰς τέχνας ἃς ἔχουσι· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ

Β σώματος γιγνώσκουσιν, οἷς τοῦτο θεραπεύεται.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν, οὐδεὶς τούτων σώφρων κατὰ τὴν τέχνην.

ΑΛΚ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ βάναυσοι αὗται αἱ τέχναι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ μαθήματα.

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with *Alcibiades*—that is, with his soul.

ALC. I believe so.

SOC. Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.

ALC. So it seems.

SOC. And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.

ALC. That is so.

SOC. Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer.

ALC. It seems not.

SOC. And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended.

ALC. That is true.

SOC. So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art.

ALC. None, I agree.

SOC. And that is why these arts are held to be sordid, and no acquirements for a good man.

ALC. Quite so.

131 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πάλιν ὅστις αὖ σῶμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλ' οὐχ αὑτὸν θεραπεύει;

ΑΛΚ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅστις δέ γε τὰ χρήματα, οὔθ' ἑαυτὸν οὔτε C τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἄρα ἔτι πράττει ὁ χρηματιστής.

ΑΛΚ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις γέγονεν ἐραστὴς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου σώματος, οὐκ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἠράσθη, ἀλλά τινος τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὅστις δέ σου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρᾷ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη φαίνεται ἐκ τοῦ λόγου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματός σου ἐρῶν, ἐπειδὴ λήγει ἀνθοῦν, ἀπιὼν οἴχεται;

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

D ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν οὐκ ἄπεισιν, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἴῃ;

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ οὐκ ἀπιὼν ἀλλὰ παραμένων λήγοντος τοῦ σώματος, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεληλυθότων.

ΑΛΚ. Εὖ γε ποιῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ μὴ ἀπέλθοις.

ΣΩ. Προθυμοῦ τοίνυν ὅτι κάλλιστος εἶναι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ προθυμήσομαι.

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὕτω γέ σοι ἔχει· οὔτ' ἐγένεθ', ὡς E ἔοικεν, Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου ἐραστὴς οὔτ' ἔστιν

SOC. Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself?

ALC. It looks rather like it.

SOC. But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?

ALC. I agree.

SOC. So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business.

ALC. Correct.

SOC. And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades' body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?

ALC. That is true.

SOC. Your lover is rather he who loves your soul?

ALC. He must be, apparently, by our argument.

SOC. And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over?

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better?

ALC. So it seems.

SOC. And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body's prime is over, and the rest have departed.

ALC. Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go.

SOC. Then you must endeavour to be as handsome as you can.

ALC. Well, I shall endeavour.

SOC. You see how you stand: Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover

131 ἀλλ' ἢ εἷς μόνος, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔφησθα σμικρὸν φθῆναί με προσελθόντα σοι, ἐπεὶ πρότερος ἄν μοι προσελθεῖν, βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι, δι' ὅ τι μόνος οὐκ ἀπέρχομαι;

ΑΛΚ. Ἦν γὰρ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον, ὅτι μόνος ἐραστὴς ἦν σός, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι τῶν σῶν· τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει ὥρας,
132 σὺ δ' ἄρχῃ ἀνθεῖν. καὶ νῦν γε ἂν μὴ διαφθαρῇς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ αἰσχίων γένῃ, οὐ μή σε ἀπολίπω. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ δημεραστὴς ἡμῖν γενόμενος διαφθαρῇς· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ ἀγαθοὶ αὐτὸ πεπόνθασιν Ἀθηναίων. εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος δῆμος Ἐρεχθέως· ἀλλ' ἀποδύντα χρὴ αὐτὸν θεάσασθαι· εὐλαβοῦ οὖν τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἣν ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΑΛΚ. Τίνα;

Β ΣΩ. Γύμνασαι πρῶτον, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ μάθε ἃ δεῖ μαθόντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, πρότερον δὲ μή, ἵν' ἀλεξιφάρμακα ἔχων ἴῃς καὶ μηδὲν πάθῃς δεινόν.

ΑΛΚ. Εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ὅντιν' ἂν[1] τρόπον ἐπιμεληθεῖμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται· ὃ γὰρ ἐσμέν, ἐπιεικῶς ὡμολόγηται· ἐφοβούμεθα δὲ μὴ τούτου σφαλέντες λάθωμεν ἑτέρου τινὸς ἐπιμελόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡμῶν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

[1] ὅντιν' ἂν Bekker: ὄντινα mss.

[1] Quoted from Homer, *Il.* ii. 547.

except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

ALC. True.

SOC. And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you?

ALC. Yes, that was so.

SOC. Then the reason was that I was the only lover of *you*, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is passing its prime, while *you* are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is "the people of great-hearted Erechtheus"[1]; but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.

ALC. What is it?

SOC. Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm.

ALC. Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves.

SOC. Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves.

ALC. That is so.

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C ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον.

ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέροις παραδοτέον.

ΑΛΚ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν ἂν τρόπον γνοίημεν αὐτὸ[1] ἐναργέστατα; ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γνόντες, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα. ἆρα πρὸς θεῶν εὖ λέγοντος οὗ νῦν δὴ ἐμνήσθημεν τοῦ Δελφικοῦ γράμματος οὐ συνιεμεν;

ΑΛΚ. Τὸ ποῖόν τι διανοούμενος λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

D ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι φράσω, ὅ γε ὑποπτεύω λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλαχοῦ εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Σκόπει καὶ σύ. εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὄμματι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβουλεῦον εἶπεν ἰδὲ σαυτόν, πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβομεν τί παραινεῖν; ἆρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, εἰς ὃ βλέπων ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἔμελλεν αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν;

ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἐννοῶμεν δή, εἰς τί βλέποντες τῶν ὄντων
E ἐκεῖνό τε ὁρῶμεν ἅμα ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ᾧ ὁρῶμεν ἔνεστί ‹τι›[2] τῶν τοιούτων;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

[1] αὐτὸ Schleiermacher: αὐτὰ mss.

SOC. And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that.

ALC. Clearly.

SOC. While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers.

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven's name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?

ALC. With what intent do you say that, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which that inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight.

ALC. What do you mean by that?

SOC. Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice—"See thyself,"—how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at something in looking at which it would see itself?

ALC. Clearly.

SOC. Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves.

ALC. Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.

SOC. Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?

ALC. To be sure.

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[2] τι add. F. A. Wolf.

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ΣΩ. Ἐννενόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ
133 καταντικρὺ ὄψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλοῦμεν, εἴδωλον ὄν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾧ ὁρᾷ, οὕτως ἂν αὐτὸν ἴδοι.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βλέποι ἤ τι τῶν ὄντων, πλὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον, οὐκ ὄψεται ἑαυτόν.

B ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα εἰ μέλλει ἰδεῖν ἑαυτόν, εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῷ βλεπτέον, καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐγγιγνομένη· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτό που ὄψις;

ΑΛΚ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνώσεσθαι αὑτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλεπτέον, καὶ μάλιστ' εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή, σοφία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον ὄν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

C ΣΩ. Ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅ τι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς

[1] The Greek *κόρη* and the Latin *pupilla* both meant "little

SOC. And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another's eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil,[1] for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?

ALC. That is true.

SOC. Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this,[2] it will not see itself.

ALC. That is true.

SOC. Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight.

ALC. That is so.

SOC. And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?

ALC. I agree, Socrates.

SOC. And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?

ALC. We cannot.

SOC. Then this part of her resembles God, and

[1] girl" or "doll," and were used to indicate the dark centre of the eye in which a tiny image can be seen reflected.

[2] *i.e.* it must look at the pupil of a man's eye, or at what is comparable to that "perfect part" in other things.

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τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, [θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν],[1] οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη μάλιστα.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ὡμολογοῦμεν σωφροσύνην εἶναι;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μὴ γιγνώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μηδὲ σώφρονες ὄντες δυναίμεθ' ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακά τε καὶ ἀγαθά;

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

D ΣΩ. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἴσως σοι φαίνεται μὴ γιγνώσκοντα Ἀλκιβιάδην τὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου γιγνώσκειν ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐστίν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀδύνατον μέντοι νὴ Δία.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ ἡμέτερα ὅτι ἡμέτερα, εἰ μηδ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' ἄρα μηδὲ[2] τὰ ἡμέτερα, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ τι ὀρθῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἄρτι εἶναί τινας, οἳ ἑαυτοὺς μὲν οὐ γιγνώσκουσι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτῶν, ἄλλους δὲ τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν. ἔοικε γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι κατιδεῖν ἑνός τε καὶ

E μιᾶς τέχνης, αὐτόν, τὰ αὑτοῦ, τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.

ΑΛΚ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅστις δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που ἂν ἀγνοοῖ κατὰ ταὐτά.

ΑΛΚ. Τί μήν;

[1] *θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν* om. Olympiodorus.
[2] *μηδὲ* Stobaeus: om. mss.

[1] Above, 131 B.

whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. And self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance.[1]

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. So if we have no knowledge of ourselves and no temperance, shall we be able to know our own belongings, good or evil?

ALC. How can that be, Socrates?

SOC. For I expect it seems impossible to you that without knowing Alcibiades you should know that the belongings of Alcibiades are in fact his.

ALC. Impossible indeed, upon my word.

SOC. Nor could we know that our belongings are ours if we did not even know ourselves?

ALC. How could we?

SOC. And so, if we did not so much as know our belongings, we could not know the belongings of our belongings either?

ALC. Apparently not.

SOC. Then we were not quite correct in admitting just now that there are people who, without knowing themselves, know their belongings, while others know their belongings' belongings. For it seems to be the function of one man and one art to discern all three—himself, his belongings, and the belongings of his belongings.

ALC. It looks like it.

SOC. And anyone who is ignorant of his belongings will be similarly ignorant, I suppose, of the belongings of others.

ALC. Quite so.

133 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἀγνοήσει.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν γένοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ πολιτικός.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οἰκονομικός γε.

134 ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ εἴσεται ὅ τι πράττει.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐξαμαρτάνων δὲ οὐ κακῶς πράξει ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Κακῶς δὲ πράττων οὐκ ἄθλιος;

ΑΛΚ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' οἷς οὗτος πράττει;

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ οὗτοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε, ἐὰν μή τις σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐχ οἷόν τε.

B ΣΩ. Οἱ ἄρα κακοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄθλιοι.

ΑΛΚ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ὁ πλουτήσας ἀθλιότητος ἀπαλλάττεται, ἀλλ' ὁ σωφρονήσας.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται αἱ πόλεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαιμονήσειν, οὐδὲ πλήθους οὐδὲ μεγέθους ἄνευ ἀρετῆς.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ μέντοι.

SOC. And if ignorant of others' affairs, he will be ignorant also of the affairs of states.

ALC. He must be.

SOC. Then such a man can never be a statesman.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. No, nor an economist either.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Nor will he know what he is doing.

ALC. No, I agree.

SOC. And will not he who does not know make mistakes?

ALC. To be sure.

SOC. And when he makes mistakes, will he not do ill both in private and in public?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And doing ill he will be wretched?

ALC. Yes, very.

SOC. And what of those for whom he is doing so?

ALC. They will be wretched also.

SOC. Then it is impossible to be happy if one is not temperate and good.

ALC. Impossible.

SOC. So it is the bad men who are wretched.

ALC. Yes, very.

SOC. And hence it is not he who has made himself rich that is relieved of wretchedness, but he who has made himself temperate.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. So it is not walls or warships or arsenals that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor numbers, nor size, without virtue.

ALC. No, indeed.

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ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ μέλλεις τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράξειν ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς, ἀρετῆς σοι μεταδοτέον τοῖς πολίταις.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

C ΣΩ. Δύναιτο δ' ἄν τις μεταδιδόναι ὃ μὴ ἔχοι;

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Αὐτῷ ἄρα σοὶ πρῶτον κτητέον ἀρετήν, καὶ ἄλλῳ ὃς μέλλει μὴ ἰδίᾳ μόνον αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἄρξειν καὶ ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πόλεως καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοι οὐδ' ἀρχὴν παρασκευαστέον σαυτῷ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ, οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

D ΣΩ. Δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε.

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὁρῶντες πράξετε.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνταῦθά γε βλέποντες ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα ἀγαθὰ κατόψεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ πράξετε;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἐθέλω ἐγγυήσασθαι ἢ μὴν εὐδαιμονήσειν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀσφαλὴς γὰρ εἶ ἐγγυητής.

ΣΩ. Ἀδίκως δὲ πράττοντες, εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα, ὅμοια τούτοις πράξετε ἀγνοοῦντες ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

SOC. And if you are to manage the city's affairs properly and honourably, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

ALC. Of course.

SOC. But could one possibly impart a thing that one had not?

ALC. How, indeed?

SOC. Then you or anyone else who is to be governor and curator, not merely of himself and his belongings in private, but of the state and its affairs, must first acquire virtue himself.

ALC. That is true.

SOC. Hence it is not licence or authority for doing what one pleases that you have to secure to yourself or the state, but justice and temperance.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God.

ALC. Naturally.

SOC. And, as we were saying in what went before, you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. Well, and looking thereon you will behold and know both yourselves and your good.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And so you will act aright and well?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Well now, if you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy.

ALC. And I can rely on your warranty.

SOC. But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves.

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ΑΛΚ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ὧι γὰρ ἄν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐξουσία μὲν ᾗ ποιεῖν ὃ βούλεται, νοῦν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ, τί τὸ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν, ἰδιώτῃ ἢ καὶ πόλει; οἷον νοσοῦντι ἐξουσίας οὔσης δρᾶν ὃ βούλεται, νοῦν ἰατρικὸν μὴ
135 ἔχοντι, τυραννοῦντι δὲ ὡς μηδὲ ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον; ἆρ' οὐχ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, διαφθαρῆναι τὸ σῶμα;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν νηΐ, εἴ τῳ ἐξουσία εἴη ποιεῖν ὃ δοκεῖ, νοῦ τε καὶ ἀρετῆς κυβερνητικῆς ἐστερημένῳ, καθορᾷς ἃ ἂν συμβαίη αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς συνναύταις;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἀπόλοιντο πάντες ἄν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως ἐν πόλει τε καὶ πάσαις ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἐξουσίαις ἀπολειπομέναις ἀρετῆς ἕπεται
Β τὸ κακῶς πράττειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τυραννίδα χρή, ὦ ἄριστε Ἀλκιβιάδη, παρασκευάζεσθαι οὔθ' αὑτῷ οὔτε τῇ πόλει, εἰ μέλλετε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀρετήν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἄρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε ἄμεινον καὶ κάλλιον;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ κάλλιον πρεπωδέστερον;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

C ΣΩ. Πρέπει ἄρα τῷ κακῷ δουλεύειν· ἄμεινον γάρ.

ALC. That is probable.

SOC. For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, is at liberty to do what he pleases, but is lacking in mind, what is the probable result to him personally, or to the state as well? For instance, if he is sick and at liberty to do what he pleases—without a medical mind, but with a despot's power which prevents anyone from even reproving him—what will be the result? Will not his health, in all likelihood, be shattered?

ALC. That is true.

SOC. Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation, do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow-sailors?

ALC. I do: they must all perish.

SOC. And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure?

ALC. It must.

SOC. Then it is not despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if you would be happy, but virtue.

ALC. That is true.

SOC. And before getting virtue, to be governed by a superior is better than to govern, for a man as well as a child.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. And the better is also nobler?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And the nobler more becoming?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. Then it becomes a bad man to be a slave, since it is better.

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ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δουλοπρεπὲς ἄρα ἡ κακία.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἡ ἀρετή.

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φεύγειν χρή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν δουλοπρέπειαν;

ΑΛΚ. Μάλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνῃ δὲ νῦν πῶς ἔχεις; ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Δοκῶ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν, πῶς ἀποφεύξῃ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ σὲ νῦν; ἵνα μὴ ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ καλῷ ἀνδρί.

D ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

ΑΛΚ. Λέγω δή. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις μέντοι τόδε λέγω, ὅτι κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοὐμόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγήσω σε ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσῃ.

E ΣΩ. Ὦ γενναῖε, πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν διοίσει, εἰ παρὰ σοὶ ἐννεοττεύσας ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον ὑπὸ τούτου πάλιν θεραπεύσεται.

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[1] *παιδαγωγεῖν* is used here simply in the sense of "following about as personal attendant."

[2] It was commonly believed that aged storks were fed by

ALC. Yes.

SOC. So vice is a thing that becomes a slave.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. And virtue becomes a free man.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And we should shun, my good friend, all slavishness?

ALC. Most certainly, Socrates.

SOC. And do you now perceive how you stand? Are you on the side of the free, or not?

ALC. I think I perceive only too clearly.

SOC. Then do you know how you may escape from the condition in which you now find yourself? Let us not give it a name, where a handsome person is concerned!

ALC. I do.

SOC. How?

ALC. If it be your wish, Socrates.

SOC. That is not well said, Alcibiades.

ALC. Well, what should I say?

SOC. If it be God's will.

ALC. Then I say it. And yet I say this besides, that we are like to make a change in our parts, Socrates, so that I shall have yours and you mine. For from this day onward it must be the case that I am your attendant, and you have me always in attendance on you.[1]

SOC. Ah, generous friend! So my love will be just like a stork; for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be cherished in return by its nestling.[2]

younger storks which they had previously hatched and reared.

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ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄρξομαί γε ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμέλεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην ἄν σε καὶ διατελέσαι· ὀρρωδῶ δέ, οὔ τι τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ῥώμην, μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ.

ALC. Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over justice.

SOC. I should like to think you will continue to do so; yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you.

ALCIBIADES II

INTRODUCTION TO *ALCIBIADES II*

This dialogue was included among the genuine works of Plato, about the beginning of our era, by Thrasyllus, the scholar and friend of Augustus; but there can be no doubt that it is one of the many imitations of Plato's writings which were composed in the third and second centuries B.C. Its subject—the importance of knowing what one ought to pray for—is Socratic enough; yet the reader who comes to it from an authentic work of Plato, though it be merely an immature study like the *First Alcibiades*, is soon aware of grievous defects in argumentative force and connexion, and must especially remark an utter absence of the play of humour with which Plato habitually and artfully relieves the onset of his master's questioning. The language also, while it shows that the author had a considerable knowledge of Plato, is in many points unplatonic. Its numerous lapses in structure and diction are well exhibited in Stallbaum's introduction and notes: as a few examples we may notice here the Greek phrases which correspond to "manifestation" (140 B), "and so, on the same lines, with the rest" (145 D), and "I shall be only too happy to accept" (151 B). Yet it is worth while to keep this work, provided that its secondary character is recognized, alongside the writings of Plato; for although its fitful light is

merely borrowed from Plato's and Xenophon's lively memorials of Socrates, it helps us to fix by contrast our conception of the matter and manner of those genuine representations.

The dialogue opens with the question whether Alcibiades, who is on his way to a temple, realizes the danger of prayer, when one may be unwittingly praying for quite the wrong thing, like a madman. But madness is only one of the several kinds of imprudence or unwisdom, which is the general cause of such mistakes, and of all misguided ambitions. In particular, and above all, " ignorance of the best " is the cause of human error. We find that all arts and accomplishments are useless or worse, unless they are accompanied by knowledge of their right and beneficial use ; and, so far, only the few possess such helpful knowledge. Alcibiades begins to understand the perplexity of prayer, and Socrates illustrates with a story the reverent caution of the Spartans in the matter. Alcibiades then asks him to clear away the mist from his soul, and crowns him with a garland.

ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΕΥΧΗΣ· ΜΑΙΕΥΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ

St. II p. 138

ΣΩ. Ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἆρά γε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσευξόμενος πορεύῃ;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φαίνῃ γέ τοι ἐσκυθρωπακέναι τε καὶ εἰς γῆν βλέπειν, ὥς τι συννοούμενος.

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ τί ἄν τις συννοοῖτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τὴν μεγίστην, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, σύννοιαν, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τοὺς θεούς, ἃ τυγχάνομεν εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἐνίοτε τούτων τὰ μὲν διδόναι, τὰ δ' οὔ, καὶ ἔστιν οἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἔστι δὲ οἷς οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσει τις[1] αὐτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δ' ἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τύχωσιν ἐν ταύτῃ ὄντες τῇ ἕξει, ἐν ᾗ διδόασιν αὐτοὶ ἄ τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνει; ὥσπερ τὸν Οἰδίπουν αὐτίκα φασὶν εὔξασθαι χαλκῷ διελέσθαι τὰ πατρῷα τοὺς

[1] λήσει τις Bekker: λήσεται mss.

ALCIBIADES II

[OR ON PRAYER: "OBSTETRIC"]

CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES

SOC. Alcibiades, are you on your way to offer a prayer to the god?

ALC. I am, certainly, Socrates.

SOC. You seem, let me say, to have a gloomy look, and to keep your eyes on the ground, as though you were pondering something.

ALC. And what might one ponder, Socrates?

SOC. The greatest of questions, Alcibiades, as I believe. For tell me, in Heaven's name, do you not think that the gods sometimes grant in part, but in part refuse, what we ask of them in our private and public prayers, and gratify some people, but not others?

ALC. I do, certainly.

SOC. Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus, they say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it

138 υἱεῖς· ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τῶν παρόντων αὐτῷ κακῶν ἀποτροπὴν τινα εὔξασθαι, ἕτερα πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι κατηρᾶτο· τοιγαροῦν ταῦτά τε ἐξετελέσθη, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ἃ τί δεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα λέγειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἴρηκας· ἐπεὶ τίς ἄν σοι δοκεῖ τολμῆσαι ὑγιαίνων τοιαῦτ' εὔξασθαι;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἆρα ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

D ΣΩ. Ἄφρονες δὲ καὶ φρόνιμοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι εἶναί τινές σοι;

ΑΛΚ. Εἶναι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τίνες ποτ' εἰσὶν οὗτοι. ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσί τινες, ὡμολόγηται, ἄφρονές τε καὶ φρόνιμοι, καὶ μαινόμενοι ἕτεροι.

ΑΛΚ. Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὲ ὑγιαίνοντές εἰσί τινες;

ΑΛΚ. Εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσθενοῦντες ἕτεροι;

139 ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινές εἰσιν, οἳ μηδέτερα τούτων πεπόνθασιν;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ μὴ νοσεῖν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail.

ALC. But you have instanced a madman, Socrates: why, do you suppose that anyone could bring himself, while he was in a sound state, to utter such a prayer?

SOC. Do you regard madness as the opposite of wisdom?

ALC. Certainly I do.

SOC. And there are some men whom you regard as unwise, and others as wise?

ALC. Why, yes.

SOC. Come then, let us consider who these people are. We have admitted that some are unwise, some wise, and others mad.

ALC. Yes, we have.

SOC. And again, there are some in sound health?

ALC. There are.

SOC. And others also who are in ill-health?

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. And they are not the same?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. And are there any others besides, who are found to be in neither state?

ALC. No, to be sure.

SOC. For a human being must needs be either sick or not sick.

ALC. I agree.

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ΣΩ. Τί δέ; περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἆρά γε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχεις σὺ γνώμην[1];

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα, ἢ ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ
B τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων πεπονθέναι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ὁμολογήσας ὑπεναντίον εἶναι μανίαν φρονήσει;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα εἶναι;

ΑΛΚ. Ὡμολόγησα γάρ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἑνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐδαμῶς.

C ΣΩ. Ἀφροσύνη ἄρα καὶ μανία κινδυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Πάντας οὖν ἂν φάντες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἂν φαίημεν· αὐτίκα τῶν σῶν ἡλικιωτῶν εἴ τινες τυγχάνουσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες, ὥσπερ εἰσί, καὶ τῶν ἔτι πρεσβυτέρων· ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀλίγους μὲν εἶναι τοὺς φρονίμους, ἄφρονας δὲ δὴ τοὺς πολλούς, οὓς δὴ σὺ μαινομένους καλεῖς;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οἴει ἂν οὖν χαίροντας ἡμᾶς εἶναι μετὰ τοσού-

SOC. Well then, do you hold the same view about wisdom and unwisdom?

ALC. How do you mean?

SOC. Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?

ALC. No, there is not.

SOC. So he must needs be in one or the other of these two conditions.

ALC. I agree.

SOC. And you remember that you admitted that madness is the opposite of wisdom?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And further, that there is no third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?

ALC. Yes, I admitted that.

SOC. Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing?

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Then it looks as though unwisdom and madness were the same.

ALC. Yes, apparently.

SOC. So we shall be right, Alcibiades, in saying that all unwise persons are mad; for example, such of your contemporaries as happen to be unwise—some such there are—and of your elders, even: for tell me, in Heaven's name, do you not think that in our city the wise people are but few, whereas the majority are unwise, and these you call mad?

ALC. I do.

SOC. Well, do you suppose we could safely live

[1] σὺ γνώμην Burnet: ἔχει συγγνώμην, ἔχεις γνώμην MSS.

139 D των μαινομένων πολιτευομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν παιομένους καὶ βαλλομένους, καὶ ἅπερ εἰώθασιν οἱ μαινόμενοι διαπράττεσθαι, πάλαι δὴ δίκην δεδωκέναι; ἀλλ' ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ποτ' ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες; κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ᾠήθην.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ τῇδέ πῃ ἀθρητέον.

ΑΛΚ. Πῇ ποτε λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δή σοί γε ἐρῶ. ὑπολαμβάνομέν τινας εἶναι νοσοῦντας· ἦ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

E ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν νοσοῦντα ποδαγρᾶν ἢ πυρέττειν ἢ ὀφθαλμιᾶν, ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι καὶ μηδὲν τούτων πεπονθὼς ἑτέραν νόσον νοσεῖν; πολλαὶ γὰρ δήπου γέ εἰσι, καὶ οὐχ αὗται μόναι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

ΣΩ. Ὀφθαλμία οὖν σοι δοκεῖ πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶσα νόσος ὀφθαλμία;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα ἔμοιγε· ἀπορῶ μέντοι πῶς λέγω.

140 ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἔμοιγε προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν, σύν τε δύο σκεπτομένω τυχὸν εὑρήσομεν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ προσέχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς δύναμιν τὴν ἐμήν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήθη ἡμῖν ὀφθαλμία μὲν πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι, νόσος μέντοι οὐκ εἶναι πᾶσα ὀφθαλμία;

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[1] *Cf.* Homer, *Il.* x. 224 *σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν ὅππως κέρδος ἔῃ*, "if two go along together, then one marks before the other how advantage may be had."

with so many madmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different?

ALC. Well, it must be, Socrates. For it looks as though it were not as I thought.

SOC. And I think so too. But there is another way of regarding it.

ALC. I wonder what way you mean.

SOC. Well, I will tell you. We conceive there are some who are sick, do we not?

ALC. We do, to be sure.

SOC. And do you believe that a sick man must necessarily have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Do you not think that, although he may be afflicted in none of these ways, he may be suffering from some other disease? For surely there are many of them: these are not the only ones.

ALC. I agree.

SOC. And is every ophthalmia, in your opinion, a disease?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And is every disease also ophthalmia?

ALC. No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning.

SOC. Well, if you will attend to me, "two together"[1] will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek.

ALC. Nay, but I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.

SOC. Then we have admitted that while every ophthalmia is a disease, every disease, on the other hand, is not ophthalmia?

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ΑΛΚ. Ὡμολογήθη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμολογηθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ πυρέττοντες πάντες νοσοῦσιν, οὐ μέντοι οἱ νοσοῦντες πάντες πυρέττουσιν οὐδὲ ποδαγρῶσιν
B οὐδέ γε ὀφθαλμιῶσιν, οἶμαι· ἀλλὰ νόσος μὲν πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, διαφέρειν δέ φασιν οὓς δὴ καλοῦμεν ἰατροὺς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν[1] αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαι οὔτε ὅμοιαι οὔτε ὁμοίως διαπράττονται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν ἑκάστη· νόσοι μέντοι πᾶσαί εἰσιν. ὥσπερ δημιουργούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνομεν· ἢ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς σκυτοτόμους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους παμπληθεῖς, οὓς τί δεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα λέγειν; ἔχουσι δ' οὖν διειληφότες
C δημιουργίας μέρη, καὶ πάντες οὗτοί εἰσι δημιουργοί, οὐ μέντοι εἰσὶ τέκτονές γε οὐδὲ σκυτοτόμοι οὐδ' ἀνδριαντοποιοί, οἱ σύμπαντες εἰσι δημιουργοί.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὕτως μὲν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην διειληφότες εἰσί, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖστον αὐτῆς μέρος ἔχοντας μαινομένους καλοῦμεν, τοὺς δ' ὀλίγον ἔλαττον ἠλιθίους τε καὶ ἐμβροντήτους· οἱ δὲ ἐν εὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμασι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐήθεις, ἕτεροι δὲ
D ἀκάκους καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἐνεούς· εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ ἀναζητῶν ὀνόματα. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἀφροσύνη ἐστί, διαφέρει δέ, ὥσπερ τέχνη

[1] *ἀπεργασία* here seems to be used for "effect produced" instead of its usual meaning, "fully effecting," "completion."

ALC. We have.

SOC. And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout or ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors—in its manifestation.[1] For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have their several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. In the same way, then, have men divided unwisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call "mad," and those who have a little less, "dolts" and "idiots"; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes "romantic,"[2] sometimes "simple-minded,"[3] or again "innocent," "inexperienced," or "obtuse"; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are unwisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one

[2] *μεγαλόψυχος* has here declined from "high-souled" or "magnanimous" to something like "Quixotic."

[3] *εὐήθης*, even in Plato's time, varied between "good-hearted" and "silly."

140 τέχνης ἡμῖν κατεφαίνετο καὶ νόσος νόσου· ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπ' ἐκείνου πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. ἦν γὰρ δήπου καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, σκεπτέον εἶναι τοὺς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ φρονίμους, τίνες ποτ' εἰσίν. ὡμολόγητο γὰρ εἶναί τινας· ἢ γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί, ὡμολόγηται.

Ε ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τούτους φρονίμους ὑπολαμβάνεις, οἳ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἅττα δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄφρονας δὲ ποτέρους; ἆρά γε τοὺς μηδέτερα τούτων εἰδότας;

ΑΛΚ. Τούτους.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε μὴ εἰδότες μηδέτερα τούτων λήσουσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες ἅττα μὴ δεῖ;

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι ἔλεγον, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ
141 τὸν Οἰδίπουν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων· εὑρήσεις δ' ἔτι καὶ τῶν νῦν πολλοὺς οὐκ ὀργῇ κεχρημένους, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, οὐδ' οἰομένους κακά σφισιν εὔχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀγαθά. ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἠὔχετο, οὐδ' ᾤετο· ἕτεροι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἳ τἀναντία τούτων πεπόνθασιν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαί σε πρῶτον, εἴ σοι ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος, ἐρωτήσειε, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι τύραννον γενέσθαι τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἡγήσαιο καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, προσθείη καὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων· εἰ δέ σε
Β ὁρῴη ἔτι ἔλαττον δοκοῦντα ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ καὶ πάσης Εὐρώπης ὑποσταίη σοι, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον ὑπο-

art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you ?

ALC. That is my view.

SOC. Then let us turn at this point and retrace our steps. For we said, you know, at the beginning that we must consider who the unwise can be, and who the wise : for we had admitted that there are such persons, had we not ?

ALC. Yes, we have admitted it.

SOC. Then you conceive those to be wise who know what one ought to do and say ?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And which are the unwise ? Those who know neither of these things ?

ALC. The same.

SOC. And those who know neither of these things will say and do unawares what one ought not ?

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was Oedipus ; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was : they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add " and of all the Greeks also " ; and if he saw you were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely

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σταίη, ‹ἀλλ'›[1] αὐθημερόν σου βουλομένου ὡς πάντας αἰσθήσεσθαι, ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου τύραννός ἐστιν· αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἄν σε ἀπιέναι περιχαρῆ γενόμενον, ὡς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν κεκυρηκότα.

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν ἄλλοι ὁντινοῦν, εἴπερ τοιαῦτα συμβαίη αὐτῷ.

C ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀντί γε τῆς σῆς ψυχῆς οὐδ' ἂν τὴν πάντων Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων χώραν τε καὶ τυραννίδα βουληθείης σοι γενέσθαι.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μηθέν γέ τι μέλλων αὐτοῖς χρήσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ μέλλοις κακῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς χρῆσθαι; οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς οὔτε τὰ διδόμενα εἰκῇ δέχεσθαί γε οὔτε αὐτὸν εὔχεσθαι γενέσθαι, εἴ γέ τις βλάπτεσθαι μέλλοι διὰ ταῦτα ἢ τὸ παράπαν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλαγῆναι. πολλοὺς δ' ἂν D ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν, ὅσοι τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ σπουδάσαντες τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς παραγενέσθαι, ὡς ἀγαθόν τι πράξαντες, διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπιβουλευθέντες τὸν βίον ἀφῃρέθησαν. οἶμαι δέ σε οὐκ ἀνήκοον εἶναι ἔνιά γε χθιζά τε καὶ πρωϊζὰ γεγενημένα, ὅτε Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Μακεδόνων τύραννον τὰ παιδικά, ἐρασθέντα τῆς τυραννίδος οὐθὲν ἧττον ἥπερ ἐκεῖνος τῶν παιδικῶν, ἀπέκτεινε τὸν E ἐραστὴν ὡς τύραννός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ ἐσόμενος· κατασχὼν δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἡμέρας τὴν τυραννίδα πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐπιβουλευθεὶς ὑφ' ἑτέρων τινῶν

[1] ἀλλ' add. Dobree.

[1] Quoted from Homer, *Il.* ii. 303.

promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods.

ALC. So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck!

SOC. But still you would not wish to sacrifice your life even for the territory and sovereignty of all the Greeks and barbarians together.

ALC. I should think not. How could I, without a prospect of making any use of them?

SOC. And what if you had a prospect of making an evil and injurious use of them? Not in this case either?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one's own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one's life altogether. Yet we could tell of many ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavoured to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And I expect you are not unacquainted with certain events "of a day or two ago,"[1] when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain[2] by his favourite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover with the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others

[2] This assassination occurred in 399 B.C., the year of Socrates' death.

141 ἐτελεύτησεν. ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων πολιτῶν —ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλων ἀκηκόαμεν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρόντες οἴδαμεν—ὅσοι στρατηγίας ἐπιθυμήσαν-
142 τες ἤδη καὶ τυχόντες αὐτῆς οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν φυγάδες τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν· οἱ δὲ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες αὐτῶν πράττειν διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων ἐλθόντες καὶ φόβων οὐ μόνον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατῆλθον, ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν πολιορκούμενοι πολιορκίαν οὐδὲν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων διετέλεσαν, ὥστε ἐνίους αὐτῶν εὔχεσθαι
B ἀστρατηγήτους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐστρατηγηκέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι φέροντες εἰς ὠφέλειαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τοὐναντίον. εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ περὶ τέκνων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εὐξαμένους τινὰς ἤδη γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένων εἰς συμφοράς τε καὶ λύπας τὰς μεγίστας καταστάντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν διὰ τέλους ὄντων τῶν τέκνων ὅλον τὸν βίον λυπούμενοι διήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ χρηστῶν μὲν γενομένων, συμφοραῖς
C δὲ χρησαμένων ὥστε στερηθῆναι, καὶ τούτους οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλάττονας δυστυχίας καθεστηκότας ἥπερ ἐκείνους, καὶ βουλομένους ἂν ἀγένητα μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' ὅμως τούτων τε καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν ὁμοιοτρόπων τούτοις οὕτω σφόδρα καταδήλων ὄντων, σπάνιον εὑρεῖν ὅστις ἂν ἢ διδομένων ἀπόσχοιτο ἢ μέλλων δι' εὐχῆς τεύξεσθαι παύσαιτο ἂν εὐχόμενος· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὔτε ἂν τυραννίδος διδομένης ἀπόσχοιντο ἂν οὔτε στρατη-
D γίας οὐδ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἃ παρόντα βλάπτει

in his turn, and perished. You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command and have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven that they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in vexation; while others, though they had good ones, were bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a great deal more of a similar kind, before men's eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship or any of the various other things which bring with them harm

142 μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλὰ κἂν εὔξαιντο ἂν γενέσθαι, εἴ τῳ μὴ παρόντα τυγχάνει· ὀλίγον δὲ ἐπισχόντες ἐνίοτε παλινῳδοῦσιν, ἀνευχόμενοι ἅττ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξωνται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἀπορῶ, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάτην θεοὺς ἄνθρωποι αἰτιῶνται, ἐξ ἐκείνων φάμενοι κακά σφισιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν εἴτε ἀτασθαλίαισιν εἴτε ἀφροσύναις χρὴ
E εἰπεῖν, ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσι. κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φρόνιμός τις εἶναι ἐκεῖνος ὁ ποιητής, ὃς δοκεῖ μοι φίλοις ἀνοήτοις τισὶ χρησάμενος, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ πράττοντας καὶ εὐχομένους ἅπερ οὐ βέλτιον ἦν, ἐκείνοις δὲ ἐδόκει, κοινῇ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν εὐχὴν ποιήσασθαι· λέγει δέ πως ὧδί·

143 Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά, φησί, καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις
ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δειλὰ[1] καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν

κελεύει. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς λέγειν ὁ ποιητής· σὺ δ' εἴ τι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα, μὴ σιώπα.

ΑΛΚ. Χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὰ καλῶς εἰρημένα· ἐκεῖνο δ' οὖν ἐννοῶ, ὅσων κακῶν αἰτία ἡ ἄγνοια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁπότε, ὡς ἔοικε, λελήθαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διὰ ταύτην καὶ
B πράττοντες καὶ τό γ' ἔσχατον εὐχόμενοι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ κάκιστα. ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν οἴοιτο ἱκανὸς εἶναι, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εὔξασθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ κάκιστα. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατάρᾳ τινὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐχῇ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη.

[1] δειλὰ Buttmann: δεινὰ MSS.

rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when "they themselves by their own presumption"—or unwisdom, shall we say?—"have gotten them more than destined sorrows."[1] It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these:

King Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not;
But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert.[2]

So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of an answer to his words, do not be silent.

ALC. It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe—how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing, but—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer!

[1] *Cf.* Homer, *Od.* i. 32. [2] *Cf. Anth. Pal.* x. 108.

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ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ὦ βέλτιστε, φαίη ἄν τις ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ σοφώτερος ὢν τυγχάνοι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς λέγειν, οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγοντας ἄγνοιαν, C εἴ γε μὴ προσθείημεν τὴν ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις κακόν.

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔστι γὰρ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα ὅτῳ δὴ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι ἄμεινον ἀγνοεῖν ἢ γιγνώσκειν;

ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· σοὶ δ' οὔ;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνό σου καταγνώσομαι, ἐθέλειν ἄν σε πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα διαπεπρᾶχθαι, ἅπερ Ὀρέστην φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ εἰ D δή τινες ἄλλοι ἐκείνοις τυγχάνουσι ταὐτὰ διαπεπραγμένοι.

ΑΛΚ. Εὐφήμει πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὔτοι τὸν λέγοντα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις σοι ταῦτα πεπρᾶχθαι, εὐφημεῖν δεῖ σε κελεύειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολύ, εἴ τις τὰ ἐναντία λέγοι· ἐπειδὴ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ σφόδρα δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστ' οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκῇ· δοκεῖς δ' ἂν τὸν Ὀρέστην, εἰ ἐτύγχανε φρόνιμος ὢν καὶ εἰδὼς ὅ τι βέλτιστον ἦν αὐτῷ πράττειν, τολμῆσαι ἄν τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

E ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε ἄλλον οἶμαι οὐδένα.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν ἄρ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἄγνοια καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

SOC. But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance, unless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil.

ALC. How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for anybody, in any condition whatsoever, to be ignorant than cognisant?

SOC. I believe so; and do not you?

ALC. No, indeed, upon my word.

SOC. But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon, and any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs.

ALC. No unlucky words, in Heaven's name, Socrates!

SOC. Why, it is not the person who says, Alcibiades, that you would not like to be guilty of such an act, whom you should bid avoid unlucky words, but much rather him who might say the contrary; since the act seems to you so very dreadful as to be unfit even for such casual mention. But do you think that Orestes, if he had had all his wits about him and had known what was best for him to do, would have brought himself to commit any act of the sort?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Nor would anyone else, I imagine.

ALC. No.

SOC. Then it seems that ignorance of what is best, and to be ignorant of the best, is a bad thing.

ALC. I agree.

143 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν;

ΑΛΚ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα· εἴ σοι αὐτίκα μάλα παρασταίη, οἰηθέντι βέλτιον εἶναι, Περικλέα τὸν σεαυτοῦ ἐπίτροπόν τε καὶ φίλον, ἐγχειρίδιον λαβόντα, ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας,
144 εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔνδον ἐστί, βουλόμενον ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα· οἱ δὲ φαῖεν ἔνδον εἶναι— καὶ οὐ λέγω ἐθέλειν ἄν σε τούτων τι πράττειν· ἀλλ' εἰ, οἶμαι, δόξει σοι, ὅπερ οὐθὲν κωλύει δήπου τῷ γε ἀγνοοῦντι τὸ βέλτιστον παραστῆναι ποτὲ δόξαν, ὥστε οἰηθῆναι καὶ τὸ κάκιστόν ποτε βέλτιστον εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν παρελθὼν εἶσω καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν
B ἐκεῖνον ἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἂν ἄλλον εἶναί τινα, ἆρ' ἔτι ἂν αὐτὸν τολμήσαις ἀποκτεῖναι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὸν ἐντυχόντα, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὃν ἠβούλου. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ πολλάκις ἐγχειροῖς, αἰεὶ δὲ ἀγνοοῖς τὸν Περικλέα, ὁπότε μέλλοις τοῦτο πράττειν, οὔποτε ἂν ἐπίθοιο αὐτῷ.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὸν Ὀρέστην δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε τῇ μητρὶ ἐπιθέσθαι, εἴ γε ὡσαύτως ἠγνόησεν;

C ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ δήπου οὐδ' ἐκεῖνος τὴν προστυχοῦ-

SOC. And not only for the person himself, but for everyone else?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?

ALC. No, upon my word, I should think not.

SOC. For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him.

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?

ALC. I do not think he would.

SOC. For presumably he, too, had no intention

144 σαν γυναῖκα οὐδὲ τὴν ὁτουοῦν μητέρα διενοεῖτο ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὑτὸς αὑτοῦ.

ΑΛΚ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀγνοεῖν ἄρα τά γε τοιαῦτα βέλτιον τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις καὶ τοιαύτας δόξας ἔχουσιν.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτι ἡ ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοια καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὐ κακόν, ὥσπερ ἄρτι σοι ἐδόκει;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔοικεν.

D ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄτοπον ἂν ἴσως σοι δόξειεν εἶναι.

ΑΛΚ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, κινδυνεύει τό γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό.[1] σκόπει δὲ ὧδε. ἆρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν ἤτοι πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦθ' ὃ ἂν
E προχειροτέρως μέλλωμεν ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ ῥήτορες αὐτίκα ἤτοι εἰδότες συμβουλεύειν ἢ οἰηθέντες εἰδέναι συμβουλεύουσιν ἡμῖν ἑκάστοτε, οἱ μὲν περὶ πολέμου τε καὶ εἰρήνης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδομίας ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς·
145 ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, ὅσα δή ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων συμβουλῆς ἅπαντα γίγνεται.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα τοίνυν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις.

ΑΛΚ. Ἄν δυνηθῶ.

of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else's mother, but only his own.

ALC. That is so.

SOC. Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.

ALC. It seems to be.

SOC. Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.

ALC. What may that be, Socrates?

SOC. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?

ALC. I think so.

SOC. Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbours; and in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.

ALC. That is true.

SOC. Then observe the consequence.

ALC. If I am able.

[1] αὐτό Schneider, αὐτά MSS.

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ΣΩ. Καλεῖς γὰρ δήπου φρονίμους τε καὶ ἄφρονας;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δ' ὀλίγους φρονίμους;

ΑΛΚ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρός τι ἀποβλέπων ἀμφοτέρους;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

B ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τὸν τοιοῦτον συμβουλεύειν εἰδότα, χωρὶς τοῦ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ ὅτε βέλτιον, φρόνιμον καλεῖς;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε, οἶμαι, ὅστις τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτὸ οἶδε χωρὶς τοῦ ὁπότε βέλτιον καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον βέλτιον. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ εἴ τίς τινα ἀποκτιννύναι οἶδεν οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ φυγάδα ποιεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, χωρὶς τοῦ ὁπότε βέλτιον καὶ ὅντινα βέλτιον;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ μέντοι.

C ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὕτη δ' ἦν ἡ αὐτὴ δήπου ἥπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου· ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Φρόνιμον δέ γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρῶντα σύμβουλον καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον[1] τἀναντία τούτων. ἦ πῶς δοκεῖ;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἴ τις ἱππεύειν ἢ τοξεύειν οἶδεν, ἢ αὖ πυκτεύειν ἢ παλαίειν ἤ τι τῆς ἄλλης ἀγωνίας

[1] τοιοῦτον J. G. Schneider: ποιοῦντα MSS.

SOC. Why, surely you call men either wise or unwise?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And the many unwise, and the few wise?

ALC. Precisely.

SOC. And in either case you name them in reference to something?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Nor, I conceive, a man who knows what war is in itself, without knowing when or for how long a time it is better to make war?

ALC. Agreed.

SOC. Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave?

ALC. No, to be sure.

SOC. Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best,—and this is surely the same as knowledge of the beneficial, is it not?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And we shall call him wise, and a competent adviser both of the city and of his own self; but a man not so qualified we shall call the opposite of these. How do you think?

ALC. I agree.

SOC. And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any

145 D ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ὅσα τέχνῃ οἴδαμεν, τί καλεῖς ὃς ἂν εἰδῇ τὸ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην βέλτιον γιγνόμενον; ἆρ' οὐ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἱππικόν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δέ γε, οἶμαι, κατὰ τὴν πυκτικὴν πυκτικόν, τὸν δὲ κατ' αὐλητικὴν αὐλητικόν, καὶ τἆλλα δήπου ἀνὰ λόγον τούτοις· ἢ ἄλλως πως;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν περὶ τούτων τι ἐπιστήμονα ὄντα ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα φρόνιμον E εἶναι, ἢ πολλοῦ φήσομεν ἐνδεῖν;

ΑΛΚ. Πολλοῦ μέντοι νὴ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ποίαν οὖν οἴει πολιτείαν εἶναι τοξοτῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀθλητῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν, ἀναμεμιγμένων δ' ἐν τοιούτοις οὓς[1] ἄρτι εἰρήκαμεν τῶν τε αὐτὸ τὸ πολεμεῖν εἰδότων καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποκτιννύναι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν ῥητορικῶν πολιτικὸν φύσημα φυσώντων, ἁπάντων δὲ τούτων ὄντων ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁπότε βέλτιον ἐνὶ ἑκάστῳ τούτων 146 χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τίνα;

ΑΛΚ. Φαύλην τινὰ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φαίης γε ἄν, οἶμαι, ὁπόταν ὁρᾷς ἕνα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν φιλοτιμούμενόν τε καὶ νέμοντα τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς πολιτείας

τούτῳ μέρος,
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνῃ κράτιστος ὤν·

λέγω δὲ τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην βέλτιστον

[1] οὓς Dobree: οἷς mss.

other sport, or do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And the rules of boxing, I suppose, make a good boxer, and those of flute-playing a good flute-player, and so, on the same lines,[1] I presume, with the rest; or is there any difference?

ALC. No, it is as you say.

SOC. Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man, or shall we say he comes far short of it?

ALC. Far short of it, I declare.

SOC. Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better to employ their respective arts?

ALC. A paltry one, I should call it, Socrates.

SOC. Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to that

Wherein himself is found most excellent,[2]

I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular

[1] *ἀνὰ λόγον* occurs, with the genitive, in *Tim.* 29 c; the normal Platonic phrase for our passage is *ὡσαύτως*.

[2] *Cf. Gorg.* 484 E (Eurip. *Antiope*, fr.).

146 γιγνόμενον· τοῦ δὲ τῇ πόλει τε καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ βελτίστου ὄντος τὰ πολλὰ διημαρτηκότα, ἅτε οἶμαι, ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα. οὕτως δὲ
B τούτων ἐχόντων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιμεν φάντες πολλῆς ταραχῆς τε καὶ ἀνομίας μεστὴν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν;

ΑΛΚ. Ὀρθῶς μέντοι νὴ Δία.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐδόκει οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν προχείρως μέλλωμεν ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐδόκει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κἂν μὲν πράττῃ ἅ τις οἶδεν ἢ δοκεῖ εἰδέναι, παρέπηται δὲ τὸ ὠφελίμως, καὶ λυσι-
C τελούντως ἡμᾶς ἔξειν καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γ', οἶμαι, τἀναντία τούτων, οὔτε τῇ πόλει οὔτ' αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὡσαύτως σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἄλλως πως;

ΑΛΚ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἔφησθα καλεῖν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δ' ὀλίγους φρονίμους;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φαμεν πάλιν τοὺς πολλοὺς διημαρτηκέναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ὡς τὰ πολλά γε, οἶμαι, ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότας.

D ΑΛΚ. Φαμὲν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Λυσιτελεῖ ἄρα τοῖς πολλοῖς μήτ' εἰδέναι μηδὲν μήτ' οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι, εἴπερ γε μᾶλλον προθυμήσονται πράττειν μὲν ταῦτα, ἅττ' ἂν εἰδῶσιν

art—while he is generally off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances, should we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness?

ALC. We should, upon my word.

SOC. And we took it to be necessary that we should first think we know, or really know, anything that we intend either to do or to say with facility?

ALC. We did.

SOC. And if a man does what he knows or thinks he knows, and is assisted by knowing how to make it beneficial, we shall find him profitable both to the city and to himself?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. But if, I suppose, he does the contrary, he will not be so either to the city or to himself?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Well then, do you still take the same view now as before, or do you think differently?

ALC. No, I take the same view.

SOC. And you said you called the many unwise, and the few wise?

ALC. I did.

SOC. So now we repeat our statement that the many have missed getting the best because in most cases, I conceive, they have put their trust in opinion apart from intelligence.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then it is an advantage to the many neither to know nor to think they know anything, if they are going to be specially eager to do what they know or

146 ἢ οἰηθῶσιν εἰδέναι, πράττοντες δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τὰ πλείω μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτε ἔφην κινδυνεύειν τό γε
E τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντ' αὐτό, ἆρ' οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι ὀρθῶς ἐφαινόμην λέγων;

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ εἰ μὴ τότε, ἀλλὰ νῦν μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μέλλουσαν ὀρθῶς βιώσεσθαι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀντέχεσθαι, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἀσθενοῦντα ἰατροῦ ἢ τινος κυβερνήτου τὸν ἀσφαλῶς μέλλοντα πλεῖν. ἄνευ
147 γὰρ ταύτης,[1] ὅσῳπερ ἂν λαμπρότερον[2] ἐπουρίσῃ τὸ τῆς τύχης[3] ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ σώματος ῥώμην ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοσούτῳ μείζω ἁμαρτήματα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν καλουμένην πολυμαθίαν τε καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένος, ὀρφανὸς δὲ ὢν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἑκάστης τῶν ἄλλων, ἆρ' οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι δικαίως πολλῷ χειμῶνι χρήσεται, ἄτ', οἶμαι, ἄνευ κυβερνήτου διατελῶν ἐν πελάγει, χρόνον οὐ μακρὸν βίου
B θέων; ὥστε συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὃ λέγει κατηγορῶν πού τινος, ὡς ἄρα πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δέ, φησίν, ἠπίστατο πάντα.

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ τί δή ποτε συμβαίνει τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ,

[1] ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης transp. Lennep: ante ἢ περὶ χρημάτων MSS.
[2] λαμπρότερον Lennep: μὴ πρότερον MSS.
[3] τύχης Stallbaum: ψυχῆς MSS.

think they know, but are likely on the whole, in doing it, to be injured rather than benefited.

ALC. That is very true.

SOC. So you see that when I said it looked as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, where it did not include the science of the best, in a few cases helped, but in most harmed the owner, I was evidently right in very truth, was I not?

ALC. Though I did not then, I think so now, Socrates.

SOC. Hence the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge, exactly as a sick man does to a doctor, or as he who would voyage safely does to a pilot. For without this, the more briskly it is wafted by fortune either to the acquisition of wealth or to bodily strength or aught else of the sort, the greater will be the mistakes in which these things, it would seem, must needs involve it. And he who has acquired the so-called mastery of learning and arts, but is destitute of this knowledge and impelled by this or that one among those others, is sure to meet with much rough weather, as he truly deserves; since, I imagine, he must continue without a pilot on the high seas, and has only the brief span of his life in which to run his course. So that his case aptly fits the saying of the poet, in which he complains of somebody or other that

> Full many crafts he knew: but still
> He knew them all so very ill.[1]

ALC. Why, how on earth is the poet's saying

[1] Quoted from the mock-epic *Margites*, of which only this and five other lines have survived. The hero, Margites, became the proverbial type of a blundering idiot, and the poem was generally attributed to Homer.

ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν δοκεῖ πρὸς λόγον εἰρηκέναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε πρὸς λόγον· ἀλλ' αἰνίττεται, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ ποιηταὶ σχεδόν τι πάντες. ἔστι τε γὰρ φύσει ποιητικὴ ἡ σύμπασα C αἰνιγματώδης καὶ οὐ τοῦ προστυχόντος ἀνδρὸς γνωρίσαι· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τῷ φύσει τοιαύτη εἶναι, ὅταν λάβηται ἀνδρὸς φθονεροῦ τε καὶ μὴ βουλομένου ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἀλλ' ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν, ὑπερφυῶς δὴ τὸ χρῆμα ὡς δύσγνωστον φαίνεται, ὅ τί ποτε νοοῦσιν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου Ὁμηρόν γε τὸν θειότατόν τε καὶ σοφώτατον ποιητὴν ἀγνοεῖν δοκεῖς, ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπίστασθαι κακῶς· ἐκεῖνος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λέγων τὸν Μαργίτην πολλὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, κακῶς δέ, D φησί, πάντα ἠπίστατο[1]· ἀλλ' αἰνίττεται, οἶμαι, παράγων τὸ κακῶς μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἠπίστατο ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι· γίγνεται οὖν συντεθὲν ἔξω μὲν τοῦ μέτρου, ἔστι δ' ὅ γε βούλεται, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακὸν δὲ ἦν ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῷ πάντα ταῦτα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι εἴπερ ἦν αὐτῷ κακὸν τὸ πολλὰ εἰδέναι, φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐτύγχανεν, εἴπερ γε πιστεύειν δεῖ τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις.

E ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἦ χαλεπῶς γ' ἂν ἄλλοις τισὶ πιστεύσαιμι λόγοις, εἴπερ μηδὲ τούτοις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΑΛΚ. Πάλιν αὖ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ φέρε πρὸς Διός—ὁρᾷς γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅση τε καὶ οἵα· ταύτης δὴ καὶ σύ μοι

[1] ἠπίστατο Bekker: ἐπίστασθαι MSS.

[1] This trick of twisting the words of a quotation into an

apposite, Socrates? For to my mind it has nothing to do with the point.

SOC. It is very much to the point: but he, good sir, like almost every other poet, speaks in riddles. For poetry as a whole is by nature inclined to riddling, and it is not every man who can apprehend it. And furthermore, besides having this natural tendency, when it gets hold of a grudging person who wishes not to show forth to us his own wisdom but to conceal it as much as possible, we find it an extraordinarily difficult matter to make out whatever this or that one of them may mean. For surely you do not suppose that Homer, divinest and wisest of poets, did not know it was impossible to know ill; for it is he who says of Margites that he knew many things, but knew them all ill: but it is a riddle, I think, in which he has made "ill" stand for "evil," and "knew" for "to know." So if we put it together, letting the metre go, indeed, but grasping his meaning, we get this: "Full many crafts he knew, but it was evil for him to know them all."[1] Then clearly, if it was evil for him to know many things, he was in fact a paltry fellow, assuming we are to believe what we have previously argued.

ALC. But I think we may, Socrates: at least, if I cannot believe those arguments of ours, I shall find it hard to trust any others.

SOC. And you are right in so thinking.

ALC. Then again, I think not.

SOC. But come now, in Heaven's name—for I suppose you see how great and strange is our perplexity, in which you, as it seems to me, have your

unnatural meaning is quite characteristic of Socrates. *Cf.* *Protag.* 343-7.

147 δοκεῖς κεκοινωνηκέναι· μεταβαλλόμενός γέ τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν παύῃ, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ἂν μάλιστά σοι δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεδυκέναι αὖ καὶ
148 οὐκέτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν—εἰ οὖν σοί γ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεός, πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος, ἐρωτήσειε, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι ἐκείνων τι γενέσθαι ὧνπερ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλέγετο, εἴτε αὐτῷ σοι ἐπιτρέψειεν εὔξασθαι, τί ποτ' ἂν οἴει ἢ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνου διδομένων λαμβάνων ἢ αὐτὸς εὐξάμενος γενέσθαι τοῦ καιροῦ τυχεῖν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐθὲν ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ μάργον
B τί μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολλῆς φυλακῆς, ὅπως μὴ λήσει τις αὐτὸν εὐχόμενος μὲν κακά, δοκῶν δὲ τἀγαθά, ἔπειτ' ὀλίγον ἐπισχών, ὅπερ καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, παλινῳδῇ, ἀνευχόμενος ἅττ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξηται.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχὶ εἰδώς τι πλέον ἡμῶν ὁ ποιητής, οὗ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπεμνήσθην, τὰ δειλὰ[1] καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν ἐκέλευεν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ
C Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὸν ποιητὴν ἐζηλωκότες, εἴτε καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἐπεσκεμμένοι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἑκάστοτε παραπλησίαν εὐχὴν εὔχονται, τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι κελεύοντες αὖ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς· πλείω[2] δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐκείνων εὐξαμένων ἀκούσειεν. τοιγαροῦν εἰς τὸ παρῆκον τοῦ

[1] δειλὰ Buttmann: δεινὰ, δῆλα MSS.
[2] πλείω Burnet: πλέον, πλείων MSS.

share; for you change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and cease to hold the same view—well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask, before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance—by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account?

ALC. Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, offhand. Why, I take it to be a fatuous request,[1] when it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one's good, and then after a little while, as you were saying,[2] one change one's tune and retract all one's former prayers.

SOC. And did not the poet whom I quoted at the beginning of our discussion[3] know more than we, when he bade us pray for the averting of what is grievous, even though we pray for it?

ALC. I think so.

SOC. Then it is their admiration of this poet, Alcibiades, or perhaps the result of their own study, that causes the Spartans to offer a similar prayer whether the occasion be private or public—that the gods will give them for their own benefit the beautiful as well as the good: more than this no one can ever hear them pray for. The consequence is that to the

[1] *i.e.*, that I should answer offhand. The pun in *μάργον*, alluding to the "fatuous" Margites, cannot be rendered in English.

[2] 142 D. [3] 143 A.

148 χρόνου οὐδένων ἧττον εὐτυχεῖς εἰσὶν ἄνθρωποι· εἰ δ' ἄρα καὶ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς ὥστε μὴ πάντα εὐτυχεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων εὐχήν· ἐπὶ D τοῖς θεοῖς δ' ἐστίν ὥστε, οἶμαι, καὶ διδόναι ἅττ' ἄν τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνῃ καὶ τἀναντία τούτων.

Βούλομαι δέ σοι καὶ ἕτερόν τι διηγήσασθαι, ὅ ποτε ἤκουσα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινῶν, ὡς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις διαφορᾶς γενομένης συνέβαινεν ἀεὶ τῇ πόλει ἡμῶν ὥστε καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, ὁπότε μάχη γένοιτο, δυστυχεῖν καὶ μηδέποτε δύνασθαι κρατῆσαι· τοὺς οὖν Ἀθηναίους ἀγανακτοῦντας τῷ πράγματι καὶ ἀπορουμένους, τίνι χρὴ μηχανῇ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀποτροπὴν E εὑρεῖν, βουλευομένοις αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν κράτιστον εἶναι πέμψαντας πρὸς Ἄμμωνα ἐκεῖνον ἐπερωτᾶν· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις τάδε, καὶ ἀνθ' ὅτου Λακεδαιμονίοις οἱ θεοὶ μᾶλλον νίκην διδόασιν ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἳ πλείστας, φάναι, μὲν θυσίας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄγομεν, ἀναθήμασί τε κεκοσμήκαμεν τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῶν ὡς οὐδένες ἄλλοι, πομπάς τε πολυτελεστάτας καὶ σεμνοτάτας ἐδωρούμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀν' ἕκαστον ἔτος, καὶ ἐτελοῦμεν χρήματα 149 ὅσα οὐδ' οἱ ἄλλοι σύμπαντες Ἕλληνες· Λακεδαιμονίοις δέ, φάναι, οὐδεπώποτ' ἐμέλησεν οὐδὲν τούτων, ἀλλ' οὕτως ὀλιγώρως διάκεινται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ὥστε καὶ ἀνάπηρα θύουσιν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὐκ ὀλίγῳ ἐνδεεστέρως τιμῶσιν ἢπερ ἡμεῖς, χρήματα οὐδὲν ἐλάττω κεκτημένοι τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως. ἐπεὶ δὴ εἰρηκέναι ταῦτα καὶ

[1] This seems to be the meaning of the Greek, which is certainly not Platonic. In Aristotle, *Phys.* iv. 13. 5 ὁ παρήκων χρόνος means "past time."

present time[1] they have been just as fortunate as any other people; and if it has befallen them to be not invariably fortunate, it was anyhow not owing to their prayer. It rests with the gods, I conceive, to give us either what we may pray for or the reverse.

And I would like to give you an account of something else, which I once heard from some of my seniors. A quarrel having arisen between the Athenians and the Spartans, it befell our city to be always unsuccessful in every battle by land and sea, and she could never win a victory. So the Athenians, in their annoyance at this result, and at a loss for some means of finding a deliverance from the trouble they were in, took counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon[2]; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: "for we"—such was the message—"offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than all the rest of the Greeks together. But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and indeed are so neglectful in their behaviour to the gods, that they make a practice of sacrificing defective victims, and generally are very much behind us in the honours that they pay, though the wealth they possess is quite equal to that of our city." When

[2] An Ethiopian god whose cult spread over Egypt, and through Cyrene to various parts of Greece: he had temples at Thebes and Sparta, but the famous one in the Libyan desert is probably meant here.

149 ἐπερωτῆσαι, τί χρὴ πράττοντας αὐτοὺς τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν εὑρεῖν, ἄλλο μὲν
B οὐθὲν ἀποκριθῆναι[1] τὸν προφήτην—τὸν γὰρ θεὸν οὐκ ἐᾶν δῆλον ὅτι—καλέσαντα δὲ αὐτόν, Ἀθηναίοις, φάναι, τάδε λέγει Ἄμμων· φησὶν ἂν βούλεσθαι αὑτῷ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων εὐφημίαν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σύμπαντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἱερά. τοσαῦτα εἰπεῖν, οὐκέτι περαιτέρω. τήν γ' οὖν εὐφημίαν οὐκ ἄλλην τινά μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ θεὸς ἢ τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτῶν· ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι πολὺ διαφέρουσα τῶν
C ἄλλων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οἱ μὲν χρυσόκερως βοῦς παραστησάμενοι, ἕτεροι δ' ἀναθήμασι δωρούμενοι τοὺς θεούς, εὔχονται ἅττ' ἂν τύχῃ ταῦτα, ἄν τε ἀγαθὰ ἄν τε κακά· βλασφημούντων οὖν αὐτῶν ἀκούοντες οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταυτασὶ πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι πολλῆς φυλακῆς δεῖσθαι καὶ σκέψεως, ὅ τί ποτε ῥητέον ἐστὶ καὶ μή.

Εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερα παραπλήσια τούτοις εἰρημένα. φησὶ γὰρ τοὺς Τρῶας
D ἔπαυλιν ποιουμένους

ἔρδειν ἀθανάτοισι τελήεσσας ἑκατόμβας·

τὴν δὲ κνῖσαν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου τοὺς ἀνέμους φέρειν οὐρανὸν εἴσω

ἡδεῖαν· τῆς δ' οὔ τι θεοὺς μάκαρας δατέεσθαι, οὐδ' ἐθέλειν· μάλα γ' ἰρ οφιν ἀπήχθετο Ἴλιος ἱρὴ
E καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμμελίω Πριάμοιο·

ὥστε οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἦν προὔργου θύειν τε καὶ δῶρα

[1] The use of ἀποκριθῆναι for "answered" instead of the

they had so spoken, and added the question, what they should do in order to find a deliverance from the trouble they were in, the prophet's only answer[1]—evidently it was all that the god allowed—was to call them to him and say : " Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians : I would rather have the reverent reserve[2] of the Spartans than all the ritual of the Greeks." So much he said, and not a word further. Now by " reverent reserve " I suppose the god could only mean their prayer, since in fact it differs greatly from those that are generally offered. For the Greeks in general either lead up bulls with gilded horns, or else present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for any odd thing, whether it be good or bad : so when the gods hear their irreverent speech they reject all these costly processions and sacrifices. Whereas I think we ought to be very cautious, and fully consider what is to be said and what is not.

And in Homer too you will find other tales of a similar sort. For he relates how the Trojans, in making their bivouac,

> Sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs,

and how the winds bore the sweet savour from the plain into heaven :

> But the blessed gods partook not of it, nor would have it,
> For deep was their hate against holy Ilium,
> And Priam, and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear.[3]

So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and

usual *ἀποκρίνασθαι* is evidence for placing the writer a good deal later than Plato.

[2] *εὐφημία* means " avoidance of speech that may offend "—the opposite being *βλασφημία*.

[3] The four lines directly quoted are not in our manuscripts of Homer, but have been inserted in modern texts as *Il.* viii. 548, 550-2.

149 τελεῖν μάτην, θεοῖς ἀπηχθημένους. οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ τῶν θεῶν, ὥστε ὑπὸ δώρων παράγεσθαι οἷον κακὸν τοκιστήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐήθη λόγον λέγομεν, ἀξιοῦντες Λακεδαιμονίων ταύτῃ περιεῖναι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποβλέπουσιν ἡμῶν οἱ θεοί, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, ἄν τις ὅσιος καὶ
150 δίκαιος ὢν τυγχάνῃ. πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον, οἶμαι, ἢ πρὸς τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταύτας πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας, ἃς οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰ μὲν εἰς θεούς, πολλὰ δ' εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡμαρτηκότας καὶ ἰδιώτην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ἀν' ἕκαστον ἔτος τελεῖν· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐ δωροδόκοι ὄντες, καταφρονοῦσιν ἁπάντων τούτων, ὥς φησιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ θεῶν προφήτης. κινδυνεύει γοῦν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ φρόνησις διαφερόντως τε-
B τιμῆσθαι. φρόνιμοι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι οὐκ ἄλλοι τινές εἰσιν [ἢ][1] τῶν εἰδότων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. βουλοίμην δ' ἂν καὶ πυθέσθαι ὅ τί ποτε ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοί, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄλλῃ πῃ δοκεῖ ἢ ᾗπερ σοί τε καὶ τῷ θεῷ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν εἰκὸς εἴη ἀντίψηφον ἐμὲ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ἐν πολλῇ ἀπορίᾳ φάσκων εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτὸν εὐχόμενος κακά,
C δοκῶν δὲ ἀγαθά;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλές σοί ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐξομένῳ, ἵνα μηδ' ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, βλασφημοῦντός σου ἀκούων οὐθὲν ἀποδέξηται τῆς θυσίας ταύτης, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἕτερόν τι προσαπο-

[1] ἢ del. Winckelmann.

pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base usurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and justice that may be found in any of us. Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbours. But the gods are not to be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that justice and wisdom are held in especial honour both by the gods and by men of intelligence; and wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject.

ALC. Why, Socrates, it in no wise differs from yours and the god's; for indeed it would not be fitting for me to record my vote against the god.

SOC. And you remember you professed to be in great perplexity lest you should pray unawares for evil, while supposing it to be good?

ALC. I do.

SOC. You see, then, how unsafe it is for you to approach the god with your prayers, for it may chance that when he hears your irreverent speech he will reject your sacrifice altogether, and you may perhaps be accorded some other bad thing as well.

150 λαύσῃς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν. τῇ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων εὐχῇ διὰ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν—τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ γε ὀνομάτων—οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί σε ἐθέλειν
D χρῆσθαι. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐστὶ περιμένειν, ἕως ἄν τις μάθῃ, ὡς δεῖ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διακεῖσθαι.

ΑΛΚ. Πότε οὖν παρέσται ὁ χρόνος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύσων; ἥδιστα γὰρ ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἰδεῖν τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τίς ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος ᾧ μέλει περὶ σοῦ. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι, ὥσπερ τῷ Διομήδει φησὶ τὴν Ἀθηναν Ὅμηρος ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀχλύν,

ὄφρ' εὖ γιγνώσκοι ἠμὲν θεὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα,

E οὕτω καὶ σοὶ δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρῶτον τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφελόντα, ἣ νῦν παροῦσα τυγχάνει, τὸ τηνικαῦτ' ἤδη προσφέρειν δι' ὧν μέλλεις γνώσεσθαι ἠμὲν κακὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖς δυνηθῆναι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀφαιρείτω, εἴτε βούλεται τὴν ἀχλὺν εἴτε ἄλλο τι· ὡς ἐγὼ παρεσκεύασμαι μηθὲν ἂν φυγεῖν τῶν ὑπ' ἐκείνου προσταττομένων, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος,[1] εἴ γε μέλλοιμι βελτίων γενέσθαι.

151 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνος θαυμαστὴν ὅσην περὶ σὲ προθυμίαν ἔχει.

ΑΛΚ. Εἰς τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀναβάλλεσθαι κράτιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ· ἀσφαλέστερον γάρ ἐστιν ἢ παρακινδυνεύειν τοσοῦτον κίνδυνον.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ μὴν τουτονὶ

[1] ἄνθρωπος Schanz: ἄνθρωπος, ὁ ἄνθρωπος MSS.

In my opinion, therefore, it is best to hold your peace: for I expect you will not consent to use the Spartan's prayer, you have such a *romantic* spirit—to give it the fairest of folly's names.[1] It is necessary, therefore, to bide one's time until one can learn how one should behave towards gods and men.

ALC. Well, when will that time arrive, Socrates, and who is to be my instructor? For I feel I should very much like to see who the man is.

SOC. It is he who is concerned about you. But I think, as Homer relates how Athena removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede,

> That he might well discern both god and man,[2]

so you too must first have the mist removed which now enwraps your soul, and then you will be ready to receive the means whereby you will discern both evil and good. For at present I do not think you could do so.

ALC. Let him remove the mist or whatever else he likes to call it: for I am prepared to obey every one of his commands, without shirking, whoever the man may be, so long as I am to be the better for them.

SOC. I tell you, he on his part is prodigiously anxious to help you.

ALC. Then I think it best to defer the sacrifice also till the time comes.

SOC. And you are quite right: for that is safer than running so serious a risk.

ALC. But how say you, Socrates? Look now, I

[1] *Cf.* 140 c. [2] *Il.* v. 127.

151 τὸν στέφανον, ἐπειδή μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς συμβεβουλευκέναι, σοὶ περιθήσω· τοῖς θεοῖς δὲ καὶ
B στεφάνους καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα τότε δώσομεν, ὅταν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθοῦσαν ἴδω. ἥξει δ' οὐ διὰ μακροῦ τούτων θελόντων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δέχομαι καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ἄν τι τῶν παρὰ σοῦ δοθέντων ἡδέως ἴδοιμι δεξάμενον ἐμαυτόν. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ὁ Κρέων Εὐριπίδῃ πεποίηται τὸν Τειρεσίαν ἰδὼν ἔχοντα τὰ στέφη καὶ ἀκούσας ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαρχὰς αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι διὰ τὴν τέχνην,

οἰωνὸν ἐθέμην, φησί, καλλίνικα ‹σὰ›[1] στέφη·
ἐν γὰρ κλύδωνι κείμεθ', ὥσπερ οἶσθα σύ·

C οὕτω δὲ κἀγὼ παρὰ σοῦ τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οἰωνὸν τίθεμαι. δοκῶ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐν ἐλάττονι κλύδωνι τοῦ Κρέοντος εἶναι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν καλλίνικος γενέσθαι τῶν σῶν ἐραστῶν.

[1] σὰ Eur. *Phoen.* 858: om. MSS.

will crown you with this garland, as I consider you have given me such good advice; and to the gods we shall offer both garlands and all the other customary things when I see that day has come. And come it will ere long, if they are willing.

soc. Well, I accept this gift; and anything else besides, that you may give me, I shall be only too happy to accept.[1] And as Euripides has made Creon say when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths, and hears that he has obtained them, on account of his art, as first-fruits of the spoils of war:

> As omen good I take thy victor's wreaths;
> For in the waves we labour, as thou knowest,—[2]

so do I take this opinion of yours as a good omen. For I consider I am no less wave-tossed than Creon, and would like to come off victorious over your lovers.

[1] The Greek here is literally—"I should gladly see myself to have accepted"—which seems very unplatonic.

[2] Eurip. *Phoen.* 858-9. The blind prophet Teiresias has been crowned by the Athenians for the aid he has given them in a successful war. Eteocles, the young king of Thebes, has left the city in charge of his uncle Creon while he is fighting his brother Polynices for the possession of the throne.

HIPPARCHUS

INTRODUCTION TO THE *HIPPARCHUS*

The *Hipparchus* is probably not a genuine work of Plato, who would surely have conducted the discussion with more grace and spirit and consecution. Nevertheless it is not without interest to the student of the Platonic dialogues. The subject—the meaning of the common phrase, "a lover of gain," and its general handling, are truly Socratic, and the language shows that the writer had a fairly close and accurate grasp of Platonic idiom. A series of definitions are suggested by Socrates' anonymous companion, and these are in turn exposed as conflicting with each other or the truth. After proving that gain is not made from worthless things, and that it is not the same as good, Socrates gives an account of the wise and beneficent rule of Hipparchus in Athens (527–514 B.C.), and of the cause of the conspiracy which brought about his death. This digression, although it gives its name to the whole dialogue, is connected with the conversation by but one flimsy thread—one of the maxims which Hipparchus inscribed by the roadside for the edification of the people: this maxim—"Deceive not a friend"—has a bearing, not on any subject of the debate, but only on a momentary difference between Socrates and his friend. Socrates then allows the friend to retract some of his previous statements,

and gets the reply that some gain is good, some evil. But we want to know what *gain* itself is, whether it be good or evil ; it is not the same as an acquisition, for it is only when an acquisition is good that we call it gain. It seems, after all, that gain must be something good. The same result is reached, if we consider the relation of gain to value or worth ; for the valuable is profitable, and the profitable is good. The conversation ends with a short recapitulation, showing how obscure the meaning of gain really is, and how unsafe it is to reproach anyone with being " a lover of gain."

ΙΠΠΑΡΧΟΣ Η ΦΙΛΟΚΕΡΔΗΣ

[ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ

St. II p. 225 ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ τὸ φιλοκερδές; τί ποτέ ἐστι, καὶ τίνες οἱ φιλοκερδεῖς;

ΕΤ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκοῦσιν, οἳ ἂν κερδαίνειν ἀξιῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσι γιγνώσκοντες, ὅτι οὐδενός ἐστιν ἄξια, ἢ ἀγνοοῦντες; εἰ γὰρ ἀγνοοῦντες, ἀνοήτους λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς.

ΕΤ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνοήτους λέγω, ἀλλὰ πανούργους καὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἥττους τοῦ κέρδους, γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀφ' ὧν τολμῶσι
B κερδαίνειν, ὅμως τολμᾶν φιλοκερδεῖν δι' ἀναισχυντίαν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τοιόνδε λέγεις τὸν φιλοκερδῆ, οἷον ἐὰν φυτεύων γεωργικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιον τὸ φυτόν, ἀξιοῖ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐκτραφέντος κερδαίνειν; ἆρα τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν λέγεις;

ΕΤ. Ἀπὸ παντὸς ὅ γε φιλοκερδής, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴεται δεῖν κερδαίνειν.

HIPPARCHUS OR LOVER OF GAIN

[ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, FRIEND

SOC. And what is love of gain? What can it be, and who are the lovers of gain?

FR. In my opinion, they are those who think it worth while to make gain out of things of no worth.

SOC. Is it your opinion that they know those things to be of no worth, or do not know? For if they do not know, you mean that the lovers of gain are fools.

FR. No, I do not mean they are fools, but rascals who wickedly yield to gain, because they know that the things out of which they dare to make their gain are worthless, and yet they dare to be lovers of gain from mere shamelessness.

SOC. Well now, do you mean by the lover of gain such a man, for instance, as a farmer who plants something which he knows is a worthless herb, and thinks fit to make gain out of it when he has reared it up? Is that the sort of man you mean?

FR. The lover of gain, as such, Socrates, thinks he ought to make gain from everything.

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ΣΩ. Μή μοι οὕτως εἰκῇ, ὥσπερ τι ἠδικημένος
C ὑπό τινος, ἀλλὰ προσέχων ἐμοὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀπόκριναι,
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ἠρώτων· οὐχὶ ὁμο-
λογεῖς τὸν φιλοκερδῆ ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τῆς
ἀξίας τούτου, ὅθεν κερδαίνειν ἀξιοῖ;

ET. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἐπιστήμων περὶ φυτῶν τῆς ἀξίας,
ἐν ὁποίᾳ ἄξια φυτευθῆναι καὶ ὥρᾳ καὶ χώρᾳ;
ἵνα τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τῶν σοφῶν ῥημάτων ἐμβάλωμεν,
ὧν οἱ δεξιοὶ περὶ τὰς δίκας καλλιεποῦνται.

D ET. Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι γεωργόν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν ἀξιοῦν[1] κερδαίνειν ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ
οἴεσθαι δεῖν κερδαίνειν;

ET. Τοῦτο λέγω.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν με ἐπιχείρει ἐξαπατᾶν, ἄνδρα
226 πρεσβύτερον ἤδη οὕτω νέος ὤν, ἀποκρινόμενος
ὥσπερ νῦν δή, ἃ οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἴει, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς
εἰπέ· ἆρ'[2] ἔστιν ὄντινα οἴει γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα
γιγνόμενον, καὶ γιγνώσκοντα, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιον
φυτεύει τὸ φυτόν, οἴεσθαι ἀπὸ τούτου κερδαίνειν;

ET. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἱππικὸν ἄνδρα γιγνώσκοντα, ὅτι
οὐδενὸς ἄξια σιτία τῷ ἵππῳ παρέχει, ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὸν
οἴει, ὅτι τὸν ἵππον διαφθείρει;

ET. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

B ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἴεταί γε ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαίνειν
τῶν σιτίων τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.

[1] τὸ ἀξιοῦν Etwall: τὸν ἄξιον MSS.
[2] εἰπέ· ἆρ' Boeckh: εἶπερ MSS.

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[1] The "artful phrase" here is the jingling ὥρᾳ καὶ χώρᾳ,

SOC. Please do not speak so recklessly, as though you had been wronged by someone, but give me your attention and answer just as you would if I were beginning my questions over again. Do you not admit that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of the thing from which he thinks it worth while to make gain?

FR. I do.

SOC. Then who has knowledge of the worth of plants, and of the sort of season and soil in which they are worth planting—if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases[1] which adroit pleaders use to trick out their speeches in the law courts?

FR. For my part, I should say a farmer.

SOC. And by "think it worth while to make gain" do you mean aught but "thinking one ought to make gain"?

FR. I mean that.

SOC. Then do not attempt to deceive me, who am now quite an elderly person, and you so young, by making, as you did just now, an answer that is not even your own thought; but tell me in all truth, do you suppose that any man who was taking up farming and who knew it was a worthless plant that he was planting, could think to make gain from it?

FR. Upon my word, I do not.

SOC. Or again, take a horseman who knows that he is providing worthless food for his horse; do you suppose he is unaware that he is destroying his horse?

FR. I do not.

SOC. So he does not think to make gain from that worthless food.

[1] characteristic of the rhetoric taught by Gorgias and his followers.

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ET. Οὐχί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; *κυβερνήτην μηδενὸς ἄξια ἱστία καὶ πηδάλια τῇ νηῒ παρεσκευασμένον ἀγνοεῖν οἴει, ὅτι ζημιωθήσεται καὶ κινδυνεύσει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολέσθαι καὶ τὴν ναῦν ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἃ ἂν ἄγῃ πάντα;*

ET. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἴεταί γε κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν
C *σκεύων τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.*

ET. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. *Ἀλλὰ στρατηγὸς γιγνώσκων, ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὅπλα ἔχει, οἴεται ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαίνειν καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν;*

ET. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. *Ἀλλ' αὐλητὴς αὐλοὺς οὐδενὸς ἀξίους ἔχων ἢ κιθαριστὴς λύραν ἢ τοξότης τόξον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν συλλήβδην τῶν δημιουργῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀνδρῶν μηδενὸς ἄξια ὄργανα ἢ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἡντιναοῦν ἔχων ἀπὸ τούτων οἴεται κερδαίνειν;*

D ET. Οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε.

ΣΩ. *Τίνας οὖν ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς; οὐ γάρ που τούτους γε, οὓς διεληλύθαμεν, ‹ἀλλ'›[1] οἵτινες γιγνώσκοντες τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια ἀπὸ τούτων οἴονται δεῖν κερδαίνειν; ἀλλ' οὕτω μέν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐκ ἔστ' ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς φιλοκερδής.*

ET. *Ἀλλ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν τούτους φιλοκερδεῖς εἶναι, οἳ ἑκάστοτε ὑπὸ ἀπληστίας καὶ πάνυ σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια καὶ οὐδενὸς*
E *γλίχονται ὑπερφυῶς καὶ φιλοκερδοῦσιν.*

ΣΩ. *Οὐ δήπου, ὦ βέλτιστε, γιγνώσκοντες, ὅτι*

[1] ἀλλ' add. Apelt.

FR. No.

SOC. Or again, take a navigator who has furnished his ship with worthless spars and ropes ; do you think he is unaware that he will suffer for it, and will be in danger of being lost himself, and of losing the ship and all her cargo ?

FR. I do not.

SOC. So he does not think to make gain from that worthless tackle ?

FR. No, indeed.

SOC. But does a general, who knows that his army has worthless arms, think to make gain, or think it worth while to make gain, from them ?

FR. By no means.

SOC. Or does a flute-player who has worthless flutes, or a harper with a lyre, a bowman with a bow, or anyone else at all, in short, among ordinary craftsmen or sensible men in general, with any implement or other equipment of any sort that is worthless, think to make gain from it ?

FR. To all appearance, no.

SOC. Then whoever can they be, your lovers of gain ? For I presume they are not the people whom we have successively mentioned, but people who know their worthless things, and yet think they are to make gain from them. But in that case, by what you say, remarkable sir, no man alive is a lover of gain !

FR. Well, Socrates, I should like to call those lovers of gain who from insatiable greed consumedly long for things that are even quite petty and of little or no worth, and so love gain, in each case.

SOC. Not knowing, of course, my excellent friend,

226 οὐδενὸς ἄξιά ἐστι· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ ἐξηλέγξαμεν ὅτι ἀδύνατον.

ΕΤ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ γιγνώσκοντες, δῆλον ὅτι ἀγνοοῦντες, οἰόμενοι δὲ τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πολλοῦ ἄξια εἶναι.

ΕΤ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οἵ γε φιλοκερδεῖς φιλοῦσι τὸ κέρδος;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κέρδος δὲ λέγεις ἐναντίον τῇ ζημίᾳ;

227 ΕΤ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅτῳ ἀγαθόν ἐστι ζημιοῦσθαι;

ΕΤ. Οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ κακόν;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Βλάπτονται ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄρα ἄνθρωποι.

ΕΤ. Βλάπτονται.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν ἄρα ἡ ζημία.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ζημίᾳ τὸ κέρδος.

ΕΤ. Ἐναντίον.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν ἄρα τὸ κέρδος.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦντας φιλοκερδεῖς καλεῖς.

ΕΤ. Ἔοικεν.

B ΣΩ. Οὐ μανικούς γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς. ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς πότερον φιλεῖς ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ᾖ, ἢ οὐ φιλεῖς;

ΕΤ. Ἔγωγε.

that the things are worthless; for we have already convinced ourselves by our argument that this is impossible.

FR. I agree.

SOC. And if not knowing this, clearly they are ignorant of it, but think that those worthless things are worth a great deal.

FR. Apparently.

SOC. Now, of course lovers of gain must love gain?

FR. Yes.

SOC. And by gain you mean the opposite of loss?

FR. I do.

SOC. And is it a good thing for anyone to suffer loss?

FR. For no one.

SOC. Rather an evil?

FR. Yes.

SOC. So mankind are harmed by loss.

FR. They are harmed.

SOC. Then loss is an evil.

FR. Yes.

SOC. And gain is the opposite of loss.

FR. The opposite.

SOC. So that gain is a good.

FR. Yes.

SOC. Hence it is those who love the good that you call lovers of gain.

FR. So it seems.

SOC. At least there is nothing mad, my friend, about lovers of gain, as you describe them. But tell me, do you yourself love, or not love, whatever is good?

FR. I love it.

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ΣΩ. Ἔστι δέ τι ἀγαθόν, ὃ οὐ φιλεῖς, ἀλλὰ κακόν;

ΕΤ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἴσως φιλεῖς.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ δὴ καὶ ἐμέ, εἰ οὐ καὶ ἐγώ· ὁμολογήσω γὰρ καὶ ἐγώ σοι φιλεῖν τὰ ἀγαθά. ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι ἅπαντες οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι
C τἀγαθὰ φιλεῖν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ μισεῖν;

ΕΤ. Ἔμοιγε φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ κέρδος ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πάντες αὖ φιλοκερδεῖς φαίνονται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ὃν δὲ τὸ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, οὐδεὶς ἦν φιλοκερδής. ποτέρῳ οὖν ἄν τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι;

ΕΤ. Εἴ τις, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι, ὀρθῶς λαμβάνοι τὸν φιλοκερδῆ. ὀρθῶς δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι φιλοκερδῆ, ὃς ἂν σπουδάζῃ ἐπὶ τούτοις
D καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀφ' ὧν οἱ χρηστοὶ οὐ τολμῶσι κερδαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ὦ γλυκύτατε, τὸ κερδαίνειν ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν εἶναι ὠφελεῖσθαι.

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντας καὶ ἀεί.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλονται ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἀγαθά γέ ἐστιν.

E ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἀφ' ὧν γε μέλλουσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, βλαβήσεσθαι τῶν κερδῶν.

SOC. And is there anything good that you do not love, or must it then be evil?

FR. Upon my word, nothing.

SOC. In fact, I expect you love all good things.

FR. Yes.

SOC. Well now, ask me on my side whether I do not likewise: for I shall agree with you, for my part, that I love good things. But besides you and me, do you not think that all the rest of mankind love good things, and hate evil things?

FR. It appears so to me.

SOC. And we admitted that gain is good?

FR. Yes.

SOC. On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?

FR. What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with, and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.

SOC. But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.

FR. Well, what of that?

SOC. There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.

FR. Yes.

SOC. Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.

FR. Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.

227 ΣΩ. Βλαβήσεσθαι δὲ λέγεις ζημιώσεσθαι ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΕΤ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ζημιώσεσθαι λέγω.

ΣΩ. Ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους οὖν ζημιοῦνται ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄνθρωποι;

ΕΤ. Ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ζημιοῦνται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους τοῦ πονηροῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δοκεῖ οὖν τί σοι χρηστὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα πονηρὸν εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

228 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον τὸ κέρδος τῇ ζημίᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἐναντίον εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὲ ὂν κακῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Ὡμολογήσαμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἐπιχειρεῖς με ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπίτηδες ἐναντία λέγων οἷς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν.

ΕΤ. Οὐ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον σύ με ἐξαπατᾷς καὶ οὐκ οἶδα ὅπῃ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεις.

Β ΣΩ. Εὐφήμει· οὐ μέντ' ἂν καλῶς ποιοίην, οὐ πειθόμενος ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ σοφῷ.

ΕΤ. Τίνι τούτῳ; καὶ τί μάλιστα;

ΣΩ. Πολίτῃ μὲν ἐμῷ τε καὶ σῷ, Πεισιστράτου δὲ υἱεῖ τοῦ ἐκ Φιλαϊδῶν, Ἱππάρχῳ, ὃς τῶν Πεισιστράτου παίδων ἦν πρεσβύτατος καὶ σοφώτατος, ὃς ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο, καὶ τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί, καὶ ἠνάγκασε τοὺς ῥαψῳδοὺς Παναθηναίοις ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ διιέναι, ὥσπερ
C νῦν ἔτι οἵδε ποιοῦσι· καὶ ἐπ' Ἀνακρέοντα τὸν

soc. By " suffer harm " do you mean " suffer loss," or something else ?

FR. No, I mean just " suffer loss."

soc. Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss ?

FR. From both ; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.

soc. Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked ?

FR. I do not.

soc. And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.

FR. I agree.

soc. And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good ?

FR. That was our admission.

soc. So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.

FR. No, on my honour, Socrates ; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk !

soc. Hush, hush ! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.

FR. Who is that ? And to what are you referring now ?

soc. I mean my and your fellow-citizen, Pisistratus's son Hipparchus, of Philaïdae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus's sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared

228 Τήϊον πεντηκόντορον στείλας ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν· Σιμωνίδην δὲ τὸν Κεῖον ἀεὶ περὶ αὐτὸν εἶχε, μεγάλοις μισθοῖς καὶ δώροις πείθων· ταῦτα δ' ἐποίει βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἵνα ὡς βελτίστων ὄντων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι, οὐκ οἰόμενος δεῖν οὐδενὶ σοφίας φθονεῖν, ἅτε ὢν καλός τε κἀγαθός. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτῷ οἱ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν πολιτῶν πεπαιδευμένοι ἦσαν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ
D σοφίᾳ, ἐπιβουλεύων αὖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς παιδεῦσαι ἔστησεν αὐτοῖς Ἑρμᾶς κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τῶν δήμων ἑκάστων, κἄπειτα τῆς σοφίας τῆς αὐτοῦ, ἥν τ' ἔμαθε καὶ ἣν αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρεν, ἐκλεξάμενος ἃ ἡγεῖτο σοφώτατα εἶναι, ταῦτα αὐτὸς ἐντείνας εἰς ἐλεγεῖον αὐτοῦ ποιήματα καὶ ἐπιδείγματα τῆς σοφίας ἐπέγραψεν, ἵνα πρῶτον
E μὲν τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματα τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα μὴ θαυμάζοιεν οἱ πολῖται αὐτοῦ, τό τε Γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ Μηδὲν ἄγαν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ Ἱππάρχου ῥήματα μᾶλλον σοφὰ ἡγοῖντο, ἔπειτα παριόντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκοντες καὶ γεῦμα λαμβάνοντες αὐτοῦ τῆς σοφίας φοιτῷεν ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παιδευθησόμενοι. ἐστὸν δὲ δύω τὠπιγράμματε· ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπ'
229 ἀριστερὰ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιγέγραπται λέγων ὁ Ἑρμῆς, ὅτι ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τοῦ δήμου ἕστηκεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπὶ δεξιά

μνῆμα τόδ' Ἱππάρχου· στεῖχε δίκαια φρονῶν

φησίν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ ἄλλα ἐν ἄλλοις Ἑρμαῖς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπιγεγραμμένα· ἔστι δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῇ Στειριακῇ ὁδῷ, ἐν ᾧ λέγει

[1] A town on the south-east coast of Attica.

galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom, he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own wise lore, both learnt from others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of *Know thyself* and *Nothing overmuch*, and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education. There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:

The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.

There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria [1] road, in which he says:

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B μνῆμα τόδ' Ἱππάρχου· μὴ φίλον ἐξαπάτα.

ἐγὼ οὖν σὲ ἐμοὶ ὄντα φίλον οὐ δήπου τολμῴην ἂν ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ ἐκείνῳ τοιούτῳ ὄντι ἀπιστεῖν, οὗ καὶ ἀποθανόντος τρία ἔτη ἐτυραννεύθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἱππίου, καὶ πάντων ἂν τῶν παλαιῶν ἤκουσας, ὅτι ταῦτα μόνον τὰ ἔτη τυραννὶς ἐγένετο ἐν Ἀθήναις, τὸν δ' ἄλλον χρόνον ἐγγύς τι ἔζων Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλεύοντος. λέγεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν χαριεστέρων ἀνθρώ-

C πων καὶ ὁ θάνατος αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι οὐ δι' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ᾠήθησαν, διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀτιμίαν τῆς κανηφορίας, ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν Ἁρμόδιον γεγονέναι παιδικὰ τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. μέγα δ' ἐφρόνει ἄρα καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἐπὶ τῷ παιδεῦσαι ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὸν Ἵππαρχον. ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἁρμόδιον

D τυγχάνειν ἐρῶντά τινος τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ γενναίων τῶν τότε· καὶ λέγουσι τοὔνομα αὐτοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι· τὸν οὖν νεανίσκον τοῦτον τέως μὲν θαυμάζειν τόν τε Ἁρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα ὡς σοφούς, ἔπειτα συγγενόμενον τῷ Ἱππάρχῳ καταφρονῆσαι ἐκείνων, καὶ τοὺς περιαλγήσαντας ταύτῃ τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ οὕτως ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἵππαρχον.

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[1] On this point the writer agrees with Thuc. vi. 59, who gives what is now the accepted story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.

I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens,[1] and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say that Hipparchus's death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin's sister from bearing the basket,[2] for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favourite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of *this* "disqualification" that they slew Hipparchus.[3]

[2] In the Panathenaic procession.

[3] This curious version of the fall of the Pisistratid rulers (Hippias and Hipparchus) seeks to explain the conspiracy as due to a rivalry in a sort of pre-Socratic influence over young men which arose between the citizen Aristogiton and the ruler Hipparchus.

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ET. Κινδυνεύεις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ οὐ φίλον με ἡγεῖσθαι ἤ, εἰ ἡγῇ φίλον, οὐ πείθεσθαι
E Ἱππάρχῳ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅπως οὐ σὺ ἐμὲ ἐξαπατᾷς, οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα μέντοι τρόπον, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅ τι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων, ἵνα μὴ οἴῃ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. πότερον γὰρ τοῦτό σοι ἀναθῶμαι, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι;

ET. Μή μοί γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ζημία οὐ κακόν;

ET. Μή μοί γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὡς οὐ τῇ ζημίᾳ καὶ τῷ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸ κέρδος καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἐναντίον;

230 ET. Μηδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὡς ἐναντίον ὂν τῷ κακῷ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ κερδαίνειν;

ET. Οὔτι πᾶν γε· τουτί μοι ἀνάθου.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ ἄρα σοι, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ κέρδους τὸ μέν τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δέ τι κακόν.

ET. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀνατίθεμαι τοίνυν σοὶ τοῦτο· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ κέρδος τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερον κέρδος τι κακόν· κέρδος δέ γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν· ἦ γάρ;

ET. Πῶς με ἐρωτᾷς;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω. σιτίον ἐστί τι ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν;

B ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μᾶλλόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ

FR. It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus. For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.

SOC. Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?

FR. No, thank you.

SOC. Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?

FR. No, thank you.

SOC. Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?

FR. Nor that either.

SOC. Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?

FR. No, not in every case: let me revoke this one.

SOC. You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.

FR. I do.

SOC. Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?

FR. What do you mean by this question?

SOC. I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?

FR. Yes.

SOC. And is the one sort more food than the other,

230 ἑτέρου σιτίον, ἢ ὁμοίως τοῦτό γε, σιτία, ἐστὸν ἀμφότερα καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, κατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ᾗ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποτὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, ὅσα τῶν ὄντων ταὐτὰ ὄντα τὰ μὲν πέπονθεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακά, οὐδὲν ἐκείνῃ γε διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ᾗ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; ὥσπερ C ἄνθρωπος δήπου ὁ μὲν χρηστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ πονηρός.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπός γε, οἶμαι, οὐδέτερος οὐδετέρου οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττόν ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ χρηστὸς τοῦ πονηροῦ οὔτε ὁ πονηρὸς τοῦ χρηστοῦ.

ΕΤ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ κέρδους διανοώμεθα, ὡς κέρδος γε ὁμοίως ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ τὸ χρηστόν;

ΕΤ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον κερδαίνει ὁ τὸ χρηστὸν κέρδος ἔχων ἢ τὸ πονηρόν· οὔκουν μᾶλλόν γε D κέρδος φαίνεται οὐδέτερον ὄν, ὡς ὁμολογοῦμεν.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδετέρῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ ἧττον πρόσεστιν.

ΕΤ. Οὐ γὰρ δή.

ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ τοιούτῳ πράγματι πῶς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ὁτιοῦν ἂν ποιοῖ ἢ πάσχοι, ᾧ μηδέτερον τούτων προσείη;

ΕΤ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κέρδη μὲν ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἀμφότερα καὶ κερδαλέα, τουτὶ δὴ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπι-

or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?

FR. Yes.

SOC. And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance, one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.

FR. Yes.

SOC. But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.

FR. What you say is true.

SOC. Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?

FR. Necessarily.

SOC. So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort is found to be more gain, as we agree.

FR. Yes.

SOC. For neither of them has addition of either more or less.

FR. No, indeed.

SOC. And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?

FR. Impossible.

SOC. Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it

230 σκέψασθαι, διὰ τί ποτε ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ κέρδος
E καλεῖς, τί ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὁρῶν; ὥσπερ ἂν
εἰ [ἃ][1] σύ με ἠρώτας τὰ νῦν δή, διὰ τί ποτε καὶ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν σιτίον καὶ τὸ κακὸν σιτίον ὁμοίως ἀμφότερα
σιτία καλῶ, εἶπον ἄν σοι, διότι ἀμφότερα ξηρὰ
τροφὴ σώματός ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ
εἶναι σιτίον κἂν σύ που ἡμῖν ὁμολογοῖς. ἦ γάρ;

ET. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ περὶ ποτοῦ οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν τρόπος εἴη
τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὅτι τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγρᾷ τροφῇ,
231 ἐάν τε χρηστὴ ἐάν τε πονηρὰ ᾖ, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομά
ἐστι, ποτόν· καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως. πειρῶ οὖν
καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ μιμεῖσθαι οὕτως ἀποκρινόμενον. τὸ
χρηστὸν κέρδος καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν κέρδος κέρδος φῂς
ἀμφότερον εἶναι τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρῶν, ὅτι
δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κέρδος ἐστίν; εἰ δ' αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς
ἔχεις ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει,
ἆρα κέρδος λέγεις πᾶν κτῆμα, ὃ ἄν τις κτήσηται
ἢ μηδὲν ἀναλώσας, ἢ ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον
λάβῃ;

B ET. Ἔμοιγε δοκῶ τοῦτο καλεῖν κέρδος.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα καὶ τὰ τοιάδε λέγεις, ἐάν τις ἑστιαθείς,
μηδὲν ἀναλώσας ἀλλ' εὐωχηθείς, νόσον κτήσηται;

ET. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὑγίειαν δὲ κτησάμενος ἀπὸ ἑστιάσεως
κέρδος ἂν κτήσαιτο ἢ ζημίαν;

ET. Κέρδος.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ κέρδος, τὸ ὁτιοῦν
κτῆμα κτήσασθαι.

ET. Οὐ μέντοι.

[1] ἃ del. Schleiermacher.

can be that leads you to call both of them gain: what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you—for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?

FR. I would.

SOC. And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body, whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one's expense.

FR. I believe that is what I call gain.

SOC. Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness?

FR. Upon my word, not I.

SOC. And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss?

FR. Gain.

SOC. Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition.

FR. No, indeed.

231 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖκ, ἐὰν κακόν; ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὁτιοῦν κτήσηται, οὐ κέρδος κτήσεται;

ΕΤ. Φαίνεται, ἐάν γε ἀγαθόν.

C ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δὲ κακόν, οὐ ζημίαν κτήσεται;

ΕΤ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὡς πάλιν αὖ περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτό; τὸ μὲν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται, ἡ δὲ ζημία κακόν.

ΕΤ. Ἀπορῶ ἔγωγε ὅ τι εἴπω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀδίκως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι· ἐάν τις ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον κτήσηται, φῂς κέρδος εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Οὔτι κακόν γε λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐὰν χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ μέλλω τοῦτο ἐρήσεσθαι. φέρε D γάρ, ἐάν τις χρυσίου σταθμὸν ἥμισυν ἀναλώσας διπλάσιον λάβῃ ἀργυρίου, κέρδος ἢ ζημίαν εἴληφεν;

ΕΤ. Ζημίαν δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀντὶ δωδεκαστασίου γὰρ διστάσιον αὐτῷ καθίσταται τὸ χρυσίον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν πλέον γ' εἴληφεν· ἢ οὐ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος;

ΕΤ. Οὔτι τῇ ἀξίᾳ γε ἀργύριον χρυσίου.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ κέρδει τοῦτο προσεῖναι, τὴν ἀξίαν. νῦν γοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀργύριον πλέον ὂν τοῦ χρυσίου οὐ φῂς ἄξιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ χρυσίον ἔλαττον ὂν ἄξιον φῂς εἶναι.

E ΕΤ. Σφόδρα· ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἄρα κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ἐάν τε σμικρὸν ᾖ ἐάν τε μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἀνάξιον ἀκερδές.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

SOC. Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good?

FR. Apparently one will, if it is good.

SOC. And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss?

FR. I think so.

SOC. You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil.

FR. For my part, I cannot tell what to say.

SOC. And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain?

FR. I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent.

SOC. Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me, if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss?

FR. Loss, I presume, Socrates: for one's gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver.

SOC. But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half?

FR. Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold.

SOC. So gain, it seems, must have this addition of *worth*. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth.

FR. Assuredly, for that is the case.

SOC. Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain.

FR. Yes.

231 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἄξιον λέγεις ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ κεκτῆσθαι;

ΕΤ. Ναί, κεκτῆσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἄξιον αὖ λέγεις κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ἀνωφελὲς ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον;

ΕΤ. Τὸ ὠφέλιμον δήπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

232 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἀνδρειότατε πάντων, οὐ τὸ κερδαλέον ἀγαθὸν αὖ πάλιν τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἥκει ἡμῖν ὁμολογούμενον;

ΕΤ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μνημονεύεις οὖν, ὅθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γέγονεν;

ΕΤ. Οἶμαί γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἐγώ σε ὑπομνήσω. ἠμφισβήτησάς μοι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς μὴ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλεσθαι κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν κερδῶν τἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ πονηρὰ μή.

ΕΤ. Ναίχι.

B ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκακε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Ἠνάγκακε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ πείσειεν ἄν· νῦν δ' οὖν, εἴτε πέπεισαι εἴτε ὁπωσδὴ ἔχεις, σύμφης γοῦν ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα.

ΕΤ. Ὁμολογῶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπαντα ἅπαντας· ἢ οὔ;

SOC. And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess?

FR. Yes, to possess.

SOC. And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable?

FR. The profitable, I presume.

SOC. And the profitable is good?

FR. Yes.

SOC. And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good?

FR. So it seems.

SOC. Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?

FR. I think I do.

SOC. In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked.

FR. Yes.

SOC. And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good?

FR. Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me.

SOC. Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones.

FR. Yes, I do admit it.

SOC. And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not?

ET. Ὁμολογῶ.

C ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ τούς γε πονηροὺς αὐτὸς[1] εἶπες ὅτι καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα κέρδη φιλοῦσιν.

ET. Εἶπον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον πάντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοκερδεῖς ἂν εἶεν, καὶ οἱ χρηστοὶ καὶ οἱ πονηροί.

ET. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζει, εἴ τίς τῳ ὀνειδίζει φιλοκερδεῖ εἶναι· τυγχάνει γὰρ καὶ ὁ ταῦτα ὀνειδίζων αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος ὤν.

[1] αὐτὸς Bekker: αὐτοὺς MSS.

FR. I do.

SOC. But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains.

FR. I did.

SOC. And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked.

FR. Apparently.

SOC. Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.

THE LOVERS

INTRODUCTION TO *THE LOVERS*

The conversation here related by Socrates takes place in a school, where a number of boys and young men of good birth and looks have come to take the regular courses of reading, writing, recitation, and arithmetic, and to acquire the elements of geometry and astronomy. The scene in the school is swiftly and vividly described. Socrates soon finds himself talking with two young men of opposite character and training : like Amphion and Zethus in Euripides' *Antiope* (referred to in the *Gorgias*, 485-6), they have given their time, one to the humane studies of music, literature and rational debate (all of which were embraced by the Greeks under the general term " music ") ; and the other, who has turned his back on these refinements, to athletic exercise and prowess. Their antagonism is further sharpened by the fact that they are both ardent admirers of one of a pair of boys or striplings, who have been earnestly disputing over some astronomical theory, but who now turn their attention to the debate between Socrates and the two lovers.

Socrates raises the question of philosophy, which has been suggested by the sight of the two young astronomers. The athletic lover, of course, feels nothing but contempt for it ; but his literary rival cannot commend it too highly, and describes it as

the lifelong acquisition of fresh knowledge (133 c). But if " much learning " is the meaning of philosophy, we must consider *how much* learning is good for us : we find, for instance, that a moderate or measured amount of exercise and food is best in athletics ; and it would seem that a certain moderation in learning will be best for the soul (134 D, E). The trainer and the doctor will give us the right measure of exercise and food for a good condition of body, but who will fix it for the acquirements of the soul ? This important question is left unanswered. But if we cannot tell exactly *how much*, let us see if we can say *what* the philosopher ought to learn. The youth suggests that he should learn just so much of each art or craft as will enable him, through his intelligent grasp of what is done in each, to impress people with his knowledge and cleverness (135 D). Socrates objects that, on this view, the philosopher will be like an all-round athlete who may be able to beat ordinary athletes, but must be only second-best when matched with anyone who specializes in one sort of contest. As the youth adheres to his statement, Socrates points out that a second-rate person must be useless and mischievous in any emergency, so long as a specialist is available (136 c). In fact, the philosopher must be something quite different from that (137 B).

At this point Socrates, rather abruptly, turns the talk on to the subject of right and wrong, with especial reference to the judge or governor who has to decide between them (137 D). The skill required for such decisions is the highest that we know of : it is the true state-craft, which should combine knowledge of human nature and of oneself,

"temperance" or reasoned self-control, and justice. Is the philosopher to be only second-rate, and so practically useless, in the all-important business of applying these arts or powers? Or is he, above all others, to undertake such work himself, as being his peculiar business? The youth agrees that he must; and Socrates ends by saying that philosophy is something quite different from erudition and theoretical knowledge of the arts.

The little drama of the dialogue is well conceived and conducted. From the pleasant scene of life in the fashionable school we pass to the contrast between the arrogant young votary of letters and the simple-minded sportsman, who has the amusement of seeing his disdainful rival humbled by the elucidating questions of Socrates. The easy grace of the narrative reminds one of the *Charmides* and the *Lysis*; and the search for the true content and meaning of philosophy might well be a resumption of the remark on the various learning of the sophist Hippias in the *Protagoras* (318 E). Conformably with Plato's early manner, the important question of the due *measure* in learning, as in all else, is just stated clearly, and then left for future investigation. The interesting conception of the philosopher as something like our newspaper critic, and indeed as little more than a smatterer in the arts, arose naturally from the distaste felt by the best Greek society for manual labour, and from the high value set on frequent and acute discussion of everything under the sun. The Athenians especially, as Thucydides tells us through the mouth of Pericles, believed in the utility of rational debate for the life of an enterprising people; and Socrates is hardly fair to the sophists, or to him-

self, when he classes the man who cultivates this ability as useless. But his hasty condemnation of the ordinary critical observer is explained when we reach the concluding section. "Yes," we seem to be told, "philosophy *is* a kind of criticism or discrimination, but not the petty, meddling kind that you suppose. The philosopher must be supreme in a special sphere of his own, where he will be the one authority on good and evil, right and wrong."

The sudden, impatient manner in which this glimpse of the philosopher is given, and the guise in which he is shown, are not unplatonic: yet, apart from certain details of language, this last section has a clumsy abruptness which suggests that the whole piece may be the work of a skilful imitator, who is successful enough with the dramatic narrative, but cannot rise to the higher levels of Plato's thought and art; and it is to be noted that here the important work of distinguishing the true from the false is not included in the philosopher's business. We should have expected Plato to have either concealed the gaps and loose ends with some more playfulness, or to have more ably connected and sustained his treatment of so high and intimate a theme.

ΕΡΑΣΤΑΙ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ· ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

St. I p. 132 Εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ εἶδον αὐτόθι τῶν τε νέων τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πατέρων εὐδοκίμων, καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς. ἐτυγχανέτην οὖν δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε, περὶ ὅτου δέ, οὐ σφόδρα κατήκουον· ἐφαινέσθην μέντοι ἢ περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου ἢ περὶ Οἰνοπίδου ἐρίζειν· κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν
B ἐφαινέσθην καὶ ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς ἐμιμοῦντο τοῖν χεροῖν ἐπικλίνοντε καὶ μάλ' ἐσπουδακότε. κἀγώ —καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἐραστὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου αὐτοῖν—κινήσας οὖν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἠρόμην, ὅ τί ποθ' οὕτως ἐσπουδακότε τὼ μειρακίω εἴτην, καὶ εἶπον· Ἦ που μέγα τι καὶ καλόν ἐστι, περὶ ὃ τοσαύτην σπουδὴν πεποιημένω ἐστόν;

Ὁ δ' εἶπε, Ποῖον, ἔφη, μέγα καὶ καλόν; ἀδολεσχοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὗτοί γε περὶ τῶν μετεώρων καὶ φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες.

C Καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἶπον·

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[1] The Ionian philosopher who lived in friendship with Pericles at Athens.

THE LOVERS

[OR ON PHILOSOPHY : ETHICAL]

I ENTERED the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear : it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras [1] or about Oenopides [2]; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles, and they were imitating certain inclinations [3] with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said : Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed ?

Great and fine, indeed ! he replied : why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy.

Then I, surprised at his answer, said : Young man,

[2] A philosopher of Chios, distinguished as a geometer and astronomer.

[3] *i.e.* the slopes of the contours of the earth, and of the apparent course of the sun (ecliptic).

132 Ὦ νεανία, αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν; ἢ τί οὕτως χαλεπῶς λέγεις;

Καὶ ὁ ἕτερος—πλησίον γὰρ καθήμενος ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῦ, ἀντεραστὴς ὤν—ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ τε ἐρομένου κἀκείνου ἀποκρινομένου, Οὐ πρὸς σοῦ γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖς τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι τοῦτον, εἰ αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τοῦτον, ὅτι τραχηλιζόμενος καὶ ἐμπιπλάμενος καὶ καθεύδων πάντα τὸν βίον διατετέλεκεν; ὥστε σὺ τί αὐτὸν ᾧου ἀποκρινεῖσθαι ἄλλ' ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρόν ἐστι φιλοσοφία;

D Ἦν δὲ οὗτος μὲν τοῖν ἐρασταῖν περὶ μουσικὴν διατετριφώς, ὁ δ' ἕτερος, ὃν ἐλοιδόρει, περὶ γυμναστικήν. καί μοι ἔδοξε χρῆναι τὸν μὲν ἕτερον ἀφιέναι, τὸν ἐρωτώμενον,[1] ὅτι οὐδ' αὐτὸς προσεποιεῖτο περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ ἔργων, τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον εἶναι διερωτῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ εἴ τι δυναίμην παρ' αὐτοῦ ὠφεληθείην. εἶπον οὖν ὅτι Εἰς κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐρώτημα ἠρόμην· εἰ δὲ σὺ οἴει τοῦδε κάλλιον ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, σὲ ἐρωτῶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ καὶ τοῦτον, εἰ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καλὸν εἶναι ἢ οὔ.

133 Σχεδὸν οὖν ταῦτα λεγόντων ἡμῶν ἐπακούσαντε τὼ μειρακίω ἐσιγησάτην, καὶ αὐτὼ παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ ἐγενέσθην. καὶ ὅ τι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἔπαθον, οὐκ οἶδα, αὐτὸς δ' οὖν ἐξεπλάγην· ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε ὑπὸ τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν ἐκπλήττομαι. ἐδόκει μέντοι μοι καὶ ὁ ἕτερος οὐχ

[1] ἐρωτώμενον Schleiermacher: ἐρώμενον MSS.

do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?

Then the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rival's answer, said: You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not know that he has spent the whole of his life in practising the neck-hold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful?

Now this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies,[1] whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honourable or not?

Then the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers' sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too

[1] Literally, "on music," which with the Greeks included poetry and general literature as well as music.

133 ἧττον ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίνατό γέ μοι καὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως. Ὁπότε γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν αἰσχρὸν ἡγησαίμην εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἄνθρωπον νομίσαιμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι,
B οὐδ' ἄλλον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸν ἀντεραστήν, καὶ λέγων μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ, ἵν' αὐτοῦ κατακούοι τὰ παιδικά.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Καλὸν ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν, ἐγὼ ἔφην· ἦ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι εἰδέναι πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ εἰδείη τις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅ τι ἔστιν;

Οὐκ ἔφη.

C Οἶσθ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ τι ἔστι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν ἔστιν; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Τί δ' ἄλλο γε, ἢ κατὰ τὸ Σόλωνος; Σόλων γάρ που εἶπε

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος·

καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως ἀεὶ χρῆναι ἕν γέ τι μανθάνειν τὸν μέλλοντα φιλοσοφήσειν, καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρεσβύτερον, ἵν' ὡς πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθῃ. καί μοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔδοξε τὶ εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτά πως ἐννοήσας ἠρόμην αὐτόν, εἰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν ἡγοῖτο εἶναι.

D Κἀκεῖνος, Πάνυ, ἔφη.

Ἦ γῇ δὲ δὴ καλὸν εἶναι μόνον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἢ καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, πάνυ.

was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit: Why, of course, Socrates, he said, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man, nor anyone else either who was disposed to think so. Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favourite might hear every word.

Then I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honourable?

Quite so, he said.

Well now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honourable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?

No, he said.

Then do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?

Certainly I do, said he.

Then what is it? I asked.

Why, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:

> And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;—

and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning.

To which he answered: Certainly.

And do you consider philosophy to be merely honourable, I asked, or good as well?

Good as well, he said: very much so.

133 Πότερον οὖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τι τοῦτο ἴδιον ἑνορᾷς, ἢ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἷον φιλογυμναστίαν οὐ μόνον ἡγῇ καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὔ;

Ὁ δὲ καὶ μάλα εἰρωνικῶς ἔφη δύο· Πρὸς μὲν τόνδε μοι εἰρήσθω, ὅτι οὐδέτερα· πρὸς δὲ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογῶ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν·
E ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ὀρθῶς.

Ἠρώτησα οὖν ἐγώ, Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις τὴν πολυπονίαν φιλογυμναστίαν ἡγῇ εἶναι;

Κἀκεῖνος ἔφη, Πάνυ γε, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι.

Κἀγὼ εἶπον, Ἡγῇ δὲ δὴ τοὺς φιλογυμναστοῦντας ἄλλου του ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ τούτου, ὅ τι ποιήσει αὐτοὺς εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα;

Τούτου, ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι τὸ σῶμα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν;

134 Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀπό γε ὀλίγων πόνων τὸ σῶμά τις εὖ ἔχοι;

Καί μοι ἔδοξεν ἤδη ἐνταῦθα κινητέος εἶναι ὁ φιλογυμναστής, ἵνα μοι βοηθήσῃ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς γυμναστικῆς· κἄπειτα ἠρόμην αὐτόν, Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγᾷς ἡμῖν, ὦ λῷστε, τούτου ταῦτα λέγοντος; ἢ καὶ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εὖ τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν πόνων, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων;

Ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ᾤμην τὸ λεγόμενον
B δὴ τοῦτο κἂν ὑν[1] γνῶναι, ὅτι οἱ μέτριοι πόνοι εὖ ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, πόθεν δὴ οὐχὶ ἄνδρα γε ἀγρυπνόν τε καὶ ἄσιτον καὶ ἀτριβῆ τὸν τράχηλον

[1] κἂν ὑν Hermann: καὶ νῦν MSS.

Then do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honourable, but good as well, or do you not?

Whereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer: To *him* my statement must be "neither"; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honourable and good: for I consider this the right view.

Then I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?

To which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.

Then I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?

Only that, he replied.

And does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?

Yes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?

Here I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?

For my part, Socrates, he said, I thought even a pig —as the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and

134 ἔχοντα καὶ λεπτὸν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν; καὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα εἰπόντος ἥσθη τὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἠρυθρίασε.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Τί οὖν; σὺ ἤδη συγχωρεῖς μήτε πολλοὺς μήτε ὀλίγους πόνους εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν τὰ σώματα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετρίους; ἢ διαμάχῃ δυοῖν ὄντοιν νῷν περὶ τοῦ λόγου;

C Κἀκεῖνος, Πρὸς μὲν τοῦτον, ἔφη, κἂν πάνυ ἡδέως διαγωνισαίμην, καὶ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἱκανὸς ἂν γενοίμην βοηθῆσαι τῇ ὑποθέσει, ἣν ὑπεθέμην, καὶ εἰ ταύτης ἔτι φαυλοτέραν ὑπεθέμην· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι· πρὸς μέντοι σὲ οὐδὲν δέομαι παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Τί δὲ τὰ σιτία; τὰ μέτρια ἢ τὰ πολλά; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Καὶ τὰ σιτία ὡμολόγει.

D Ἔτι δὲ κἀγὼ προσηνάγκαζον αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὠφελιμώτατα εἶναι τὰ μέτρια, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ μηδὲ τὰ ὀλίγα· καί μοι ὡμολόγει τὰ μέτρια.

Τί δέ, ἔφην, τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν; τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἢ τὰ ἄμετρα τῶν προσφερομένων;

Τὰ μέτρια, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἓν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ μαθήματα.

Ὡμολόγει.

Καὶ τούτων ἄρα τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πολλά;

Συνέφη.

unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame! And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.

Then I said to him: Well, do *you* now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point?

To which he answered: Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.

And what of food? Moderate or much? I asked.

The same applied to food, he admitted.

Then I went on and sought to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.

And now, I said, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?

Moderate things, he replied.

And are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?

He admitted they were.

So among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?

He agreed.

134 Τίνα οὖν ἐρόμενοι ἂν δικαίως ἐροίμεθα, ὁποῖοι μέτριοι πόνοι καὶ σιτία πρὸς τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν;

'Ωμολογοῦμεν μὲν τρεῖς ὄντες, ὅτι ἰατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην.

E Τίνα δ' ἂν περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς, ὁπόσον μέτριον;

Καὶ τούτου τὸν γεωργὸν ὡμολογοῦμεν.

Τίνα δὲ περὶ μαθημάτων εἰς ψυχὴν φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ σπορᾶς ἐρωτῶντες δικαίως ἂν ἐροίμεθα, ὁπόσα καὶ ὁποῖα μέτρια;

Τοὐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες· 135 κἀγὼ προσπαίζων αὐτοὺς ἠρόμην, Βούλεσθε, ἔφην, ἐπειδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐσμέν, ἐρώμεθα ταυτὶ τὰ μειράκια; ἢ ἴσως αἰσχυνόμεθα, ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστῆρας Ὅμηρος, μὴ ἀξιοῦντες[1] εἶναί τινα ἄλλον, ὅστις ἐντενεῖ τὸ τόξον;

Ἐπειδὴ οὖν μοι ἐδόκουν ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν, καὶ εἶπον, Ποῖα δὲ μάλιστ' ἄττα τοπάζομεν εἶναι τῶν μαθημάτων, ἃ δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ οὐχὶ πάντα οὐδὲ πολλά;

B Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ σοφώτερος εἶπεν ὅτι Κάλλιστα ταῦτ' εἴη τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ προσήκοντα, ἀφ' ὧν ἂν πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν· πλείστην δ' ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοίη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πλείστων γε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀξιολόγων, μαθὼν αὐτῶν ταῦτα, ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν, ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.

[1] ἀξιοῦντες Cobet: ἀξιούντων, ἀξιοῦντας MSS.

[1] *Od.* xxi. 285 foll., where the suitors of Penelope are

Then whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?

The three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer.

And whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?

In that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.

And whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?

At this point we all began to be full of perplexity; then I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? Or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer [1] said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?

Then, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things?

At this the wiser one interjected: The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.

ashamed, after they have failed to string the great bow of Odysseus, to let its owner, disguised as a beggar, try his strength on it, and perhaps succeed.

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Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ; καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τέκτονα μὲν ἂν πρίαιο
C πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν, ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα δὲ οὐδ' ἂν μυρίων δραχμῶν· ὀλίγοι γε μὴν κἂν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι γίγνοιντο. ἆρα μήτι τοιοῦτον λέγεις; καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας μου συνεχώρει καὶ αὐτὸς λέγειν τοιοῦτον.

Ἡρόμην δ' αὐτόν, εἰ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἴη δύο μόνας τέχνας οὕτω μαθεῖν τὸν αὐτόν, μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας· ὁ δέ, Μὴ οὕτως μου, ἔφη, ὑπολάβῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγοντος, ὅτι δεῖ ἑκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν
D τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἐπίστασθαι ἀκριβῶς, ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον, ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἷόν τ' εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων, καὶ αὐτὸν συμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην, ὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις τε καὶ πραττομένοις περὶ τὰς τέχνας.

Κἀγώ, ἔτι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἠμφεγνόουν τὸν λόγον ὅ τι ἐβούλετο, Ἆρ' ἐννοῶ, ἔφην, οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλό-
E σοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἰσὶν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς. τάχ' ἂν ἴσως τοιοῦτόν τι λέγοις καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς

[1] A mina (= 100 drachmae) would be about £15-£20 in our money to-day.

[2] Literally, athletes trained for the contest of the five exercises of leaping, running, disc-flinging, javelin-throwing, and wrestling.

Well now, do you mean, I asked, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five or six minae,[1] but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.

I next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied: Do not conceive me, Socrates, to be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.

Then, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher? For you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes[2] in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them. I daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who

135 ἐπιτηδεύοντας τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα· τῶν μὲν
136 πρώτων εἰς σύνεσιν περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐλλείπεσθαι, τὰ δευτερεῖα δ' ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων περιεῖναι, καὶ οὕτως γίγνεσθαι περὶ πάντα ὕπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα τὸν πεφιλοσοφηκότα· τοιοῦτόν τινά μοι δοκεῖς ἐνδείκνυσθαι.

Καλῶς γέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ. ἔστι γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι, μηδ' εἰς τὴν
B ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι, ὥστε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀπολελεῖφθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι.

Μετὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐγὼ προθυμούμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅ τι λέγοι, ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον χρησίμους ἢ ἀχρήστους εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνοι.

Χρησίμους δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν, εἴπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ χρήσιμοι, οἱ πονηροὶ ἄχρηστοι;

Ὁμολόγει.

Τί δέ; τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας χρησίμους ἡγῇ ἢ οὔ;

C Ὁ δὲ ὡμολόγει χρησίμους, καὶ πρός γε ἔφη χρησιμωτάτους εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι.

Φέρε δὴ γνῶμεν, εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ποῦ καὶ χρήσιμοι ἡμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ ὕπακροι οὗτοι; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἑκάστου γε τῶν τὰς τέχνας ἐχόντων φαυλότερός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος.

Ὁμολόγει.

Φέρε δὴ σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενή-

make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate in an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.

You are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, he said, in your conception of the philosopher's position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest, as the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.

Well, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.

Useful, I should say, Socrates, he replied.

Then if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?

He agreed that they were.

Again, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not?

He agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful.

Come now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.

He agreed.

Well now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your

136 σας ἢ τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν, περὶ ὧν σὺ σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἔχεις, πότερον ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι τὸν ὕπακρον ἐκεῖνον [τὸν φιλόσοφον][1] εἰσάγοις ἂν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν λάβοις;

D Ἀμφοτέρους ἔγωγ' ἄν, ἔφη.

Μή μοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρους λέγε, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον.

Οὐδεὶς ἄν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἀμφισβητήσειεν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον.

Τί δ'; ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ ποτέρῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέποις σαυτόν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ;

Τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἔγωγε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάνθ' οὕτως, ἕως ἄν τις δημιουργὸς ᾖ, οὐ χρήσιμός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος;

Φαίνεται, ἔφη.

E Οὐκοῦν νῦν ἄχρηστός τις ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὁ φιλόσοφος; εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεί[2] που δημιουργοί· ὡμολογήσαμεν δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς ἀχρήστους.

Ἠναγκάζετο ὁμολογεῖν.

Τί οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο; ἔρωμαί σε ἢ ἀγροικότερόν ἐστιν ἐρέσθαι;

Ἐροῦ ὅ τι βούλει.

Οὐδὲν δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ζητῶ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνομολογήσασθαι τὰ εἰρημένα. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδί. ὡμολογήσαμεν καλὸν εἶναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν [καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι],[3] τοὺς δὲ φιλοσόφους ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς ἀχρήστους· αὖθις δ' αὖ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἕως ἂν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ὦσιν, ἀχρήστους

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[1] *τὸν φιλόσοφον* secl. Cobet.

friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon the doctor?

For my part, I should have both, he replied.

Please do not say "both," I said, but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.

No one, he replied, would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.

And again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?

I should choose the pilot.

And so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher is not useful?

Apparently, he replied.

So now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.

He was obliged to agree to this.

Then what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?

Ask whatever you please.

Well, my aim, I said, is merely to recall our agreements upon what has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honourable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless,

[2] *δεί* Hermann: *δή* MSS.

[3] *καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι* secl. Schanz.

137 εἶναι, δημιουργοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ὡμολόγηται;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ὡμολογοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον, εἴπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον, πονηροὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἀχρήστους, ἕως ἂν ἐν ἀνθρώ-
B ποις τέχναι ὦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ φίλε, ἔχωσι, μηδ' ᾖ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν, περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακέναι, οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ ᾤμην καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακότας. ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον εἰσόμεθα, εἰ ἄρ' ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνῃ· τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται κο-
C λάζειν ὀρθῶς; πότερον οἵπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἄλλοι;

Οἵπερ βελτίστους.

Τί δέ; κύνας οὐχ οἳ βελτίστους ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν, οὗτοι καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπίστανται;

Ναί.

Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς;

Φαίνεταί μοι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τί δέ; πότερον ἥπερ βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς, ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς μοχθηρούς, ἢ ἑτέρα τις;

Ἡ αὐτή, ἔφη.

Ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπους τοῦθ' ὁμο-

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[1] *βάναυσος* expresses the peculiar contempt felt by Greek gentlemen for the work of artisans and even artists. Manual

and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed ?

Yes, to be sure, he replied.

Then we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts among mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one's life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else ; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid.[1] But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this : What men know how to punish horses rightly ? Is it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men ?

Those who make them into the best horses.

Or again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly ?

Yes.

Then it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly ?

It appears so to me, he replied.

Again, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?

The same, he said.

Then in the case of men also will you be prepared

labour was the business of slaves and persons who were unfit for military and political life.

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D λογεῖν, ἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ, ταύτην εἶναι καὶ τὴν κολάζουσαν ὀρθῶς καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ τοὺς μοχθηρούς;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς, καὶ ἥτις πολλούς, καὶ ἕνα;

Ναί.

Καὶ καθ' ἵππων δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οὕτως;

Φημί.

Τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥτις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀκολασταίνοντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ὀρθῶς κολάζει; οὐχ ἡ δικαστική;

Ναί.

Ἦ ἄλλην οὖν τινα καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἢ ταύτην;

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταύτην.

E Οὐκοῦν ἥπερ κολάζουσιν ὀρθῶς, ταύτῃ καὶ γιγνώσκουσι τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηρούς;

Ταύτῃ.

Ὅστις δὲ ἕνα γιγνώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται;

Ναί.

Καὶ ὅστις γε πολλοὺς ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ ἕνα;

Φημί.

Εἰ ἄρα ἵππος ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἵππους, κἂν αὐτὸν ἀγνοοῖ, ποιός τίς ἐστιν;

Φημί.

Καὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς <βοῦς>,[1] κἂν αὐτὸν ἀγνοοῖ, ποιός τίς ἐστιν;

Ναί, ἔφη.

Οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἰ κύων;

[1] βοῦς add. Bekker.

to agree that the art which makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?

Certainly, he said.

And that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?

Yes.

And so it is also with horses and everything else?

I agree.

Then what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities? Is it not judicature?

Yes.

And is it any other art than this that you call justice?

No, only this.

And that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?

It is.

And whoever knows one will know many also?

Yes.

And whoever does not know many will not know one?

I agree.

Then if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?

I think not.

And if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?

That is so, he said.

And so it would be, if one were a dog?

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Ὡμολόγει.

138 Τί δ'; ἐπειδὰν ἄνθρωπός τις ὢν ἀγνοῇ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἆρ' οὐχ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖ, πότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν;

Συνεχώρει.

Τὸ δ' ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν;

Μὴ σωφρονεῖν.

Τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν;

Φημί, ἔφη.

Τοῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα παρακελεύεται, σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

Ἔοικεν.

Τῇ αὐτῇ δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα,
B δικαιοσύνη αὕτη ἐστίν, ᾗ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους, σωφροσύνη;

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

Ταὐτὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη;

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ μὴν οὕτω γε καὶ αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται, ὅταν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.

Καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὐτή ἐστιν.

Συνεδόκει.

Τί δὲ ὅταν εἷς ἀνὴρ ὀρθῶς πόλιν διοικῇ, ὄνομά γε τούτῳ οὐ τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς;

He agreed.

Well now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?

He granted this.

And is "not knowing oneself" being temperate,[1] or not being temperate?

Not being temperate.

So "knowing oneself" is being temperate?

I agree, he said.

So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.

It seems so.

And it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?

Yes.

Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly is justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others' quality is temperance?

It seems so, he said.

Then justice and temperance are the same thing?

Apparently.

And further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.

That is true, he said.

Hence this is also statecraft.

He concurred.

Again, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?

[1] *Cf. Charmides* (Introduction and 164) for the connexion in thought and language between temperance and self-knowledge.

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Φημί.

Οὐκοῦν βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ διοικεῖ;

Οὕτως.

Καὶ αὗται ἄρ' αἱ αὐταὶ τέχναι εἰσὶν ἐκείναις;

Φαίνονται.

C Τί δὲ ὅταν εἷς ὢν ἀνὴρ οἰκίαν διοικῇ ὀρθῶς, τί ὄνομα τούτῳ ἐστίν; οὐκ οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης;

Ναί.

Πότερον οὖν καὶ οὗτος δικαιοσύνῃ εὖ ἂν τὴν οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ τέχνῃ;

Δικαιοσύνῃ.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικε, βασιλεύς, τύραννος, πολιτικός, οἰκονόμος, δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος. καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶ βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύη, σωφροσύνη.

Φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.

D Πότερον οὖν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, ὅταν μὲν ἰατρὸς περὶ τῶν καμνόντων τι λέγῃ, αἰσχρὸν μήθ' ἕπεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι μηδὲν περὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, καὶ ὁπόταν ἄλλος τις τῶν δημιουργῶν, ὡσαύτως· ὅταν δὲ δικαστὴς ἢ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν νῦν δὴ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μήθ' ἕπεσθαι δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν;

Πῶς δ' οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τοσούτων πραγμάτων μηδὲν ἔχειν συμβάλλεσθαι;

E Πότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, ἔφην, πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον, καὶ ταύτης μὲν τὰ δευτερεῖα ἔχοντα πάντων τὸν φιλόσοφον,

I agree.

And he governs by a kingly and despotic art?

That is so.

And these arts are the same as the former?

Apparently.

Again, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?

Yes.

Then would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?

By justice.

Hence they are all the same, it seems,—king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art,—the kingly, the despotic, the statesman's, the master's, the house-manager's, and justice and temperance.

It is so, apparently, he said.

Then, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?

It must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance!

Are we then to say, I asked, that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of

138 καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν τούτων τις ᾖ, ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία;

Συνεχώρει δή μοι.

Ἔπειτά γε δήπου ἐάν τε οἱ φίλοι αὐτῷ διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἐάν τε ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν, αἰσχρὸν ἐν τούτοις, ὦ ἑταῖρε, 139 δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι;

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.

Εἰπόντος δ' ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐσίγησεν, ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκείνως εἶναι· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπῄνεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα.

this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?

He granted me that it must be so.

Secondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine or judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?

I agree.

Hence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.

On my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.

THEAGES

INTRODUCTION TO THE *THEAGES*

THE purpose of this short dialogue is to set forth the nature of the potent influence which the society of Socrates was observed to have on his young companions. The pronouncement which he makes (128 D–130 E) on the divine agency by which he is directed in his guidance of others is a confession intended, apparently, as a serious confirmation of Alcibiades' after-dinner sketch of him, in the *Symposium*, as the magically beguiling satyr, the great enchanter of young men. In the present scene he is approached by Demodocus, an elderly man who has held high offices in the state, and who has now come to Athens from his rural retreat in order to place his son Theages with some suitable professor of that higher knowledge, or " wisdom," which the young man is anxious to learn. Socrates puts some questions to Theages on the nature of the wisdom that he seeks to acquire, and obtains the statement in reply that what he desires is to govern free citizens with their consent, as Themistocles, Pericles, Cimon, and other Athenian statesmen have done before (126 A); but as soon as he is asked who is to teach him this sort of wisdom, he admits that statesmen themselves are useless as instructors in their art, and asks Socrates to be his teacher (127 A). Demodocus warmly supports his son's request; he will

sacrifice everything for so great a boon : but Socrates denies his fitness for the task. Theages, however, protests that several of his young friends have gained great advantage by the instruction they have had from Socrates. This draws from Socrates a remarkable account of the spiritual voice which, from his earliest years, has forbidden certain actions proposed either by himself or by those who have consulted him (128 D–129 D) ; and he indicates, by the story of Aristeides (*cf. Laches*, 179 foll.), that his influence is not a matter of particular lessons or definite instruction, but the mysterious effect of close association, and especially of actual contact, with his person (130). The good or ill success of the pupil thus depends entirely on the decision of an inscrutable will which presides over both the master and his mission ; and Theages hopes that, if it should not be propitious in his case, he may be able to conciliate it by some religious rite (131).

By thus declining to give any rational basis or meaning to his daily occupation, and referring its entire governance to that obscure supernatural sphere which he was willing to assume but not to discuss (*cf. Phaedrus*, 229, etc.), Socrates may be deemed less than faithful here to his general pursuit of accurate definition in the principles of ordinary affairs ; and the turn which he gives to the talk when it touches himself certainly shows him, for the nonce, an obscurantist. But apart from the exaggerations of his ignorance and incompetence which were habitual to his modesty, it should be observed that there is nothing in this account of his reliance on a spiritual sign that does not agree with what we find recorded of him elsewhere. In the *Apology* he gives

a prohibition of the divine voice as the reason of his abstention from politics (31 C, D), and again, its silence as an indication that his defence in court was rightly conceived and conducted: hence the result—his death—must be for his good (40 A-C). There is mere irrational mystery in two instances which Plato gives of this strange intervention: the sign forbade Socrates to start on a walk until he had purified himself (*Phaedrus*, 242 B); and just as he was getting up from his seat in the dressing-room of a gymnasium it forbade him, and he had to sit down again (*Euthyd.* 272 E). "He forewarned many of his associates to do this or not to do that," says Xenophon (*Mem.* I. i. 4), "on the prognostication of the spiritual sign." There is nothing new, therefore, in his reference of all responsibility for his teaching and its results to the divine warning; though nowhere else in the Platonic writings do we find him dwelling on the matter at such length, and it is only in Xenophon that the intervention extends, as it does here, outside his own conduct to that of his companions. There is, it is true, a passage of the *Theaetetus* (150 D), occurring shortly before a mention of the "voice" as his guide in his dealings with young men (151 A), where he tells how those who associate with him, "if Heaven is kind to them, make amazing progress, as it seems to themselves and to others": but if we read the whole passage, and note the fine strength of its reasoning and expression, the awkward inconsequence of the *Theages* suggests that an imitator has tried to enlarge the mystical element in the Platonic Socrates at the expense of the intellectual process of his "midwifery."

Some part of the inferiority so apparent in the *Theages* might be explained by assuming that it is a work of Plato's immaturity: but it is hard to believe that he could at any time have made Socrates indulge in the relation of stories about his friends (128 foll.) which tend to prove, not his main point—that it depends on the spiritual sign whether they are to benefit or not from his society—but rather the great importance to them of associating with him and heeding his prophetic warnings. There seems also to be no connexion in his preceding remark (128 B)—that he knows nothing but the one little subject of love-matters (*cf. Sympos.* 177 E, etc.); and his account of the divine aid that he receives and gives is sadly lacking in the usual Socratic humour. On the whole it must be concluded that the *Theages* was composed, probably in the second century B.C., by a careful student of Plato's writings who wished to emphasize the mystical side of Socrates; that it found a place at the Academy and in the Alexandrian Library among other such exercises; and that by the time of Thrasyllus, who made the first complete collection of Plato's writings early in the first century A.D., it was generally regarded as an early sketch by Plato, and so was included in the canon with his genuine dialogues.

Theages is mentioned in the *Republic* (496 B) as "our comrade," whose delicate health restrained him, like a bridle, from politics, and kept him in the path of philosophy: in the *Apology* (33 E) we find that he has died before the trial of Socrates (399 B.C.).

ΘΕΑΓΗΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΣΟΦΙΑΣ· ΜΑΙΕΥΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΔΗΜΟΔΟΚΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΑΓΗΣ

St. I p. 121 ΔΗ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐδεόμην ἄττα σοι ἰδιολογήσασθαι, εἰ σχολή· κἂν εἰ ἀσχολία δὲ μὴ πάνυ τις μεγάλη, ὅμως ἐμοῦ ἕνεκεν ποίησαι σχολήν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως τυγχάνω σχολάζων, καὶ δὴ σοῦ γε ἕνεκα καὶ πάνυ. ἀλλ' εἴ τι βούλει λέγειν, ἔξεστιν.

ΔΗ. Βούλει οὖν δεῦρο εἰς τὴν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ἐλευθερίου στοὰν ἐκποδὼν ἀποχωρήσωμεν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

Β ΔΗ. Ἴωμεν δή. ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντα τὰ φυτὰ κινδυνεύει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα καὶ τὰ ζῷα τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ῥᾷστον ἡμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεται, ὅσοι τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦμεν, τὸ παρασκευάσασθαι πάντα τὰ πρὸ τοῦ φυτεύειν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φυτεῦσαι. ἐπειδὰν δὲ τὸ φυτευθὲν βιῷ, μετὰ τοῦτο θεραπεία τοῦ φύντος καὶ πολλὴ καὶ χαλεπὴ καὶ δύσκολος

THEAGES

[OR ON WISDOM : " OBSTETRIC "]

CHARACTERS

DEMODOCUS, SOCRATES, THEAGES

DEM. Socrates, I was wanting to have some private talk with you, if you had time to spare ; even if there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time, do spare some, nevertheless, for me.

SOC. Why, in any case I happen to have time to spare, and for you, moreover, I have plenty. Well, you are free to say whatever you wish.

DEM. Then do you mind if we step aside here from the street into the portico of Zeus the Liberator [1] ?

SOC. As you think best.

DEM. Let us go, then. Socrates, it would seem that all growths follow the same course, both those that grow from the earth, and the animals, including man. In regard to the plants, as you know, we who cultivate the earth find it the easiest part of our work to make all our preparations that are needed before planting, and to do the planting itself ; but when the plant begins to grow, thenceforward we have a great deal of difficult and vexatious business

[1] This portico or colonnade was near that of the King Archon, close to the Agora.

121 C γίγνεται. οὕτω δὲ ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐγὼ πραγμάτων τεκμαίρομαι καὶ ἐς τἆλλα. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἡ τοῦ υἱέος τουτουΐ, εἴτε φυτείαν εἴτε παιδοποιίαν δεῖ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν, πάντων ῥᾴστη γέγονεν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ δύσκολός τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν φόβῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ δεδιότι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πολλὰ ἂν εἴη λέγειν, ἡ δὲ νῦν παροῦσα ἐπιθυμία τούτῳ πάνυ με φοβεῖ· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀγεννής, σφαλερὰ δέ· ἐπιθυμεῖ γὰρ δὴ οὗτος ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς φησι, σοφὸς D γενέσθαι. δοκῶ γάρ μοι, τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τινὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτῶν, εἰς τὸ ἄστυ καταβαίνοντες, λόγους τινὰς ἀπομνημονεύοντες διαταράττουσιν αὐτόν· οὓς ἐζήλωκε καὶ πάλαι μοι πράγματα παρέχει, ἀξιῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναί με ἑαυτοῦ καὶ χρήματα τελέσαι τινὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν, ὅστις αὐτὸν σοφὸν ποιήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν χρημάτων καὶ ἔλαττον μέλει, ἡγοῦμαι δὲ τοῦτον οὐκ εἰς μικρὸν 122 κίνδυνον ἰέναι, οἱ σπεύδει. τέως μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν κατεῖχον παραμυθούμενος· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκέτι οἷός τέ εἰμι, ἡγοῦμαι κράτιστον εἶναι πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις ἄνευ ἐμοῦ συγγενόμενός τῳ διαφθαρῇ. νῦν οὖν ἦκω ἐπ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἵνα τῳ τούτων τῶν σοφιστῶν δοκούντων εἶναι συστήσω τουτονί. σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν εἰς καλὸν παρεφάνης, ᾧ ἂν ἐγὼ μάλιστ' ἐβουλόμην περὶ τῶν τοιούτων μέλλων πράξειν συμβουλεύσασθαι. ἀλλ' εἴ τι ἔχεις συμ- B βουλεύειν ἐξ ὧν ἐμοῦ ἀκήκοας, ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή.

in tending the new growth. Such, it seems, is also the case in regard to men : I take my own concerns as evidence for judging of the rest. For indeed I have found the planting, or the procreation—whichever one ought to call it—of this son of mine the easiest thing in the world ; but his upbringing has been vexatious and a constant source of alarm, so great are my fears for him. Among the many instances that I could mention, the desire which occupies him at the moment is a thing that especially alarms me : for it is not an ill-bred desire, but a dangerous one, since here we have him, Socrates, as he says, desiring to become wise. My opinion is that some of his fellow-townsmen, about his own age, who pay visits to the city, excite him with accounts of certain discussions they have heard there ; and in his envy of these he has long been pestering me with the demand that I should take due thought for his needs, and pay fees to some sophist or other who will make him wise. Now I do not mind so much about the fees, but I believe he is running into no slight danger where he is hastening. I did for a time restrain him with good advice ; but since I am no longer able to do so, I believe my best course is to comply with his request, in order that he may not resort, perchance, behind my back to somebody who will corrupt him. So I have come now on this very business of placing this youth with one of these sophists, or purveyors of wisdom, as they are held to be. It is a happy chance, therefore, that has thrown you in our way, as I should be particularly glad, with this plan of action in my mind, to ask your advice. Come, if you have any advice to give on what you have heard from me, you not only may, but should, give it.

122

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Δημόδοκε, καὶ λέγεταί γε συμβουλὴ ἱερὸν χρῆμα εἶναι. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ἄλλη ἡτισοῦν ἐστὶν ἱερά, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη, περὶ ἧς σὺ νῦν συμβουλεύῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ὅτου θειοτέρου ἂν ἄνθρωπος βουλεύσαιτο ἢ περὶ παιδείας καὶ
C αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ οἰκείων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ συνομολογήσωμεν, τί ποτε οἰόμεθα τοῦτ' εἶναι, περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα· μὴ γὰρ πολλάκις ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλο, κἄπειτα πόρρω που τῆς συνουσίας αἰσθώμεθα γελοῖοι ὄντες, ἐγώ τε ὁ συμβουλεύων καὶ σὺ ὁ συμβουλευόμενος, μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγούμενοι.

ΔΗ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγω γε ὀρθῶς, οὐ μέντοι παντάπασί γε, σμικρὸν γάρ τι μετατίθεμαι. ἐννοῶ γάρ, μὴ καὶ ὁ
D μειρακίσκος οὗτος οὐ τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ, οὗ ἡμεῖς αὐτὸν οἰόμεθα ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρου, εἶτ' αὖ ἡμεῖς ἔτι ἀτοπώτεροι ὦμεν περὶ ἄλλου του βουλευόμενοι. ὀρθότατον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τούτου ἄρχεσθαι, διαπυνθανομένους ὅ τι καὶ ἔστιν οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ.

ΔΗ. Κινδυνεύει γοῦν οὕτω βέλτιστον εἶναι ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δή μοι, τί καλὸν ὄνομα τῷ νεανίσκῳ; τί αὐτὸν προσαγορεύωμεν;

ΔΗ. Θεάγης ὄνομα τούτῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

E ΣΩ. Καλόν γε, ὦ Δημόδοκε, τῷ υἱεῖ τὸ ὄνομα ἔθου καὶ ἱεροπρεπές. εἰπὲ δὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θέαγες,

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[1] *i.e.* something above and apart from the adviser's personal interests, and looking only to what is best.

SOC. Well, you know, Demodocus, they do say that advice is a holy thing.[1] And so, if ever it is to be accounted holy, it must be in this instance, in which you now seek it. For there is no more divine matter on which a mortal could take counsel than the education either of himself or of his relations. Now, first of all, let you and me come to an agreement as to what we suppose that this thing can be, on which we are taking counsel; for it may happen that I conceive it to be one thing, and you another, and then when we have proceeded some little way in our conference, we may perceive how ridiculous we are, I the adviser and you the advised, in having no common ground in our notions.

DEM. Why, I think you are right there, Socrates, and we should do as you suggest.

SOC. Yes, I am right, but yet not entirely, because I have a slight change to make. For it occurs to me that this youngster may not be desiring the thing that we suppose him to desire, but something else, and there again we may be still more absurdly taking counsel on some other thing. Hence our properest course, it seems to me, is to begin with the youth himself, and inquire of him what it actually is that he desires.

DEM. It does rather look, in fact, as though our best way would be thus, as you suggest.

SOC. Then tell me, what is the young person's goodly name: how are we to address him?

DEM. Theages is his name, Socrates.

SOC. Goodly is the name, Demodocus, and holy-sounding,[2] that you have bestowed on your son. Tell me, then, Theages, do you say you desire to become

[2] "Theages" means "god-guided."

122 ἐπιθυμεῖν φῆς σοφὸς γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξιοῖς σου τὸν πατέρα τόνδε ἐξευρεῖν ἀνδρός τινος συνουσίαν τοιούτου, ὅστις σε σοφὸν ποιήσει;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Σοφοὺς δὲ καλεῖς πότερον τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἐπιστήμονες ὦσιν, ἢ τοὺς μή;

ΘΕ. Τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἐδιδάξατό σε ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν ἅπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἄλλοι πεπαίδευνται, οἱ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν πατέρων υἱεῖς, οἷον γράμματά τε καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν;

123 ΘΕ. Ἐμέ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι οὖν οἴει τινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐλλείπειν, ἧς προσήκει ὑπὲρ σοῦ τὸν πατέρα ἐπιμεληθῆναι;

ΘΕ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τίς ἐστιν αὕτη; εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν, ἵνα σοι χαρισώμεθα.

ΘΕ. Οἶδε καὶ οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πολλάκις ἐγὼ αὐτῷ εἴρηκα· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεπίτηδες πρὸς σὲ λέγει, ὡς δὴ οὐκ εἰδὼς οὗ ἐγὼ ἐπιθυμῶ. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἕτερα καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ μάχεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει με οὐδενὶ συστῆσαι.

B ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔμπροσθέν σοι ἦν πρὸς τοῦτον ῥηθέντα ὥσπερ ἄνευ μαρτύρων λεγόμενα· νυνὶ δὲ ἐμὲ ποίησαι μάρτυρα, καὶ ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κάτειπε, τίς ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖς. φέρε γάρ, εἰ ἐπεθύμεις ταύτης, ἣ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ πλοῖα κυβερνῶσι, καὶ ἐγώ σε ἐτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν· ὦ Θέαγες, τίνος ἐνδεὴς ὢν σοφίας μέμφῃ τῷ πατρί, ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλει σε συνιστάναι παρ' ὧν ἂν σὺ σοφὸς

wise, and do you require your father here to find out a school of some man who is qualified to make you wise?

THE. Yes.

SOC. And which sort of man do you call wise, those who have knowledge of such and such a thing, whatever it may be, or those who have not?

THE. Those who have knowledge, I say.

SOC. Well now, has not your father taught and educated you in the subjects which form the education of everyone else here—all the sons of noble and honourable fathers—in letters, I mean, and harping and wrestling and the other sorts of contest?

THE. Yes, he has.

SOC. And you think you are still lacking in some knowledge which it behoves your father to provide for you?

THE. I do.

SOC. What knowledge is it? Tell us on our side, that we may oblige you.

THE. He knows it, as well as I, Socrates, since I have often told him; only he says this to you of set purpose, making as if he did not know what I desire. For he assails me too with other statements of the same sort, and refuses to place me with any instructor.

SOC. Well, what you said to him before was spoken, as it were, without witnesses; but now you shall take me as a witness, and declare before me what is this wisdom that you desire. Come now; suppose you desired the wisdom whereby men steer a ship, and I happened to put this further question to you: Theages, what wisdom is it that you lack, when you blame your father for refusing to place you with people who would enable you to become wise?

123 γένοιο; τί ἄν μοι ἀπεκρίνω; τίνα αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἆρ' οὐ κυβερνητικήν;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

C ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἐπιθυμῶν ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι σοφός, ἦ τὰ ἅρματα κυβερνῶσιν, εἶτ' ἐμέμφου τῷ πατρί, ἐμοῦ αὖ ἐρωτῶντος τίς ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία, τίν' ἂν ἀπεκρίνω αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἆρ' οὐχὶ ἡνιοχικήν;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἧς δὲ δὴ νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιθυμῶν, πότερον ἀνώνυμός τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἔχει ὄνομα;

ΘΕ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αὐτὴν μὲν οἶσθα, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ὄνομα, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα;

ΘΕ. Καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἔστιν; εἰπέ.

D ΘΕ. Τί δὲ ἄλλο, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτῇ ὄνομά τις φαίη ἂν εἶναι ἀλλ' ἢ σοφίαν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ἡνιοχεία σοφία ἐστίν; ἢ ἀμαθία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;

ΘΕ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ σοφία;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἧι τί χρώμεθα; οὐχ ἧι ἵππων ἐπιστάμεθα ζεύγους ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ κυβερνητικὴ σοφία ἐστίν;

ΘΕ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὐχ αὕτη, ἧι πλοίων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἧς δὲ δὴ σὺ ἐπιθυμεῖς, ἡ σοφία τίς ἐστιν;

E ἧι τίνος ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;

What answer would you have given me? What wisdom would you name? The steersman's art, would you not?

THE. Yes.

SOC. And if a desire to be wise in the wisdom whereby they steer chariots led you to blame your father, and I asked what wisdom this was, what would you name in reply? The charioteer's art, would you not?

THE. Yes.

SOC. And is that which you happen to be desiring now a nameless one, or has it a name?

THE. I should say it has a name.

SOC. Now do you know *it*, though not its name, or do you know its name as well?

THE. I know its name as well.

SOC. Then what is it? Tell me.

THE. What other name, Socrates, can one give it but wisdom?

SOC. And the driver's art too is wisdom? Or do you think it is ignorance?

THE. I do not.

SOC. You call it wisdom?

THE. Yes.

SOC. What use do we make of it? Is it not the art whereby we know how to govern a team of horses?

THE. Yes.

SOC. And the steersman's art too is wisdom?

THE. I think so.

SOC. Is not this the art whereby we know how to govern ships?

THE. Yes, it is.

SOC. And the wisdom that you so desire, what is it? That whereby we know how to govern whom?

123 ΘΕ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ΣΩ. Μῶν ἢ τῶν καμνόντων;

ΘΕ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἰατρικὴ γὰρ αὕτη ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν ᾀδόντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Μουσικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε;

ΘΕ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Γυμναστικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν τί ποιούντων; προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σοὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν.

124 ΘΕ. Ἥι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ κάμνοντες;

ΘΕ. Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτων λέγω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Ἆρά γε μανθάνω ἣν λέγεις τέχνην; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οὐχ ἢ τῶν θεριζόντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν καὶ τρυγώντων καὶ τῶν φυτευόντων καὶ σπειρόντων καὶ ἁλοώντων· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ γεωργικὴ ἢ τούτων ἄρχομεν· ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

B ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε οἶμαι ἢ τῶν πριζόντων καὶ τρυπώντων καὶ ξεόντων καὶ τορνευόντων συμπάντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν, οὐ ταύτην λέγεις· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ τεκτονική;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

THE. To govern men, I imagine.

SOC. Sick men, do you mean?

THE. Oh, no.

SOC. For that is medicine, is it not?

THE. Yes.

SOC. Well, that whereby we know how to govern the singers in a chorus?

THE. No.

SOC. For that is music?

THE. To be sure.

SOC. Well, that whereby we know how to govern men in gymnastic training?

THE. No.

SOC. For that is gymnastics?

THE. Yes.

SOC. Well, to govern people who do what? Endeavour your best to speak, as I have done for you in what preceded.

THE. To govern the people in the city, I imagine.

SOC. And are the sick people also in the city?

THE. Yes, but I mean not these only, but all the rest who are in the city besides.

SOC. Do I understand what art it is that you mean? For you strike me as meaning, not that whereby we know how to govern reapers and harvesters and planters and sowers and threshers, for it is the farmer's art whereby we govern these, is it not?

THE. Yes.

SOC. Nor, I suppose, do you mean that whereby we know how to govern sawyers and borers and planers and turners, as a class together; for is not that carpentry?

THE. Yes.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ἦ τούτων τε πάντων καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἁπάντων καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, ταύτην ἴσως λέγεις τὴν σοφίαν.

ΘΕ. Ταύτην πάλαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν.

C ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, Αἴγισθος ὁ Ἀγαμέμνονα ἀποκτείνας ἐν Ἄργει ἆρα τούτων ἦρχεν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, τῶν τε δημιουργῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν συμπάντων, ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν;

ΘΕ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; Πηλεὺς ὁ Αἰακοῦ ἐν Φθίᾳ οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἦρχεν;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Περίανδρον δὲ τὸν Κυψέλου ἄρχοντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ ἤδη ἀκήκοας γενέσθαι;

ΘΕ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄρχοντα ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει;

D ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Περδίκκου, τὸν νεωστὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγῇ τούτων ἄρχειν;

ΘΕ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἱππίαν δὲ τὸν Πεισιστράτου ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἄρξαντα τίνων οἴει ἄρξαι; οὐ τούτων;

ΘΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Εἴποις ἂν οὖν μοι τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Βάκις τε καὶ Σίβυλλα καὶ ὁ ἡμεδαπὸς Ἀμφίλυτος;

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[1] In Aristophanes and Plato we find mention of only one "Sibyl": later the name, like Bacis (an old Boeotian

SOC. But perhaps it is that whereby we govern, not only all these, but farmers themselves also, and carpenters, and all craftsmen and ordinary people, whether men or women: that, perhaps, is the wisdom you mean.

THE. That, Socrates, is what I have been intending to mean all the time.

SOC. Then can you tell me whether Aegisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, governed all these people that you mean—craftsmen and ordinary people, both men and women, or some other persons?

THE. No, just those.

SOC. Well now, did not Peleus, son of Aeacus, govern these same people in Phthia?

THE. Yes.

SOC. And have you ever heard of Periander, son of Cypselus, and how he governed at Corinth?

THE. I have.

SOC. Did he not govern these same people in his city?

THE. Yes.

SOC. Or again, do you not consider that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, who governed recently in Macedonia, governed these same people?

THE. I do.

SOC. And who do you think were governed by Hippias, son of Peisistratus, who governed in this city? Were they not these people?

THE. To be sure they were.

SOC. Now, can you tell me what appellation is given to Bacis and Sibyl and our native Amphilytus?[1]

prophet), was applied to several oracular persons in different places. Amphilytus seems to have come from Acarnania to Athens in the time of Peisistratus.

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ΘΕ. Τίνα γὰρ ἄλλην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλήν γε χρησμῳδοί;

E ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούσδε μοι οὕτω πειρῶ ἀποκρίνασθαι, τίν' ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Ἱππίας καὶ Περίανδρος διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν[1] ἀρχήν;

ΘΕ. Οἶμαι μὲν τύραννοι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅστις ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συμπάντων ἄρχειν, τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς τούτοις ἐπιθυμεῖ, τυραννικῆς, καὶ τύραννος εἶναι;

ΘΕ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖν σὺ φῄς;

ΘΕ. Ἔοικέ γε ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον.

125 ΣΩ. Ὦ μιαρέ, τυραννεῖν ἄρα ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμῶν πάλαι ἐμέμφου τῷ πατρί, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔπεμπεν εἰς [διδασκάλου][2] τυραννοδιδασκάλου τινός; καὶ σύ, ὦ Δημόδοκε, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ πάλαι εἰδὼς οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ οὗτος, καὶ ἔχων ὅθι πέμψας αὐτὸν δημιουργὸν ἂν ἐποίησας τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἔπειτα φθονεῖς τε αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις πέμπειν; ἀλλὰ νῦν, ὁρᾷς; ἐπειδὴ ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κατείρηκέ σου, κοινῇ βουλευώμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐς τίνος[3] ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν καὶ διὰ τὴν τίνος συνουσίαν σοφὸς ἂν γένοιτο τύραννος;

B ΔΗ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, βουλευώμεθα δῆτα, ὡς δοκεῖ γέ μοι βουλῆς δεῖν περὶ τούτου οὐ φαύλης.

ΣΩ. Ἔασον, ὦ 'γαθέ. διαπυθώμεθα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἱκανῶς.

ΔΗ. Πυνθάνου δή.

THE. Why, soothsayers, of course, Socrates.

SOC. That is correct. But try to answer me in that way regarding those others—Hippias and Periander: what appellation is given them on account of their government?

THE. Despots, I suppose; it must be that.

SOC. And when a man desires to govern the whole of the people in his city, he desires the same government as those did—despotism, and to be a despot?

THE. Apparently.

SOC. And it is this that you say you desire?

THE. It seems so, from what I have said.

SOC. You scoundrel! So you were desiring to be a despot over us, all the time that you were blaming your father for not sending you to some seminary of despots! And you, Demodocus, are you not ashamed of having known all the time what he is desiring, and though you could have sent him where you would have made him an expert in the wisdom which he desires, actually grudging it to him and refusing to send him? But now, look here, as he has declared against you in my presence, shall you and I consult together on the question of whose school we shall send him to, and whose classes will help him to become a wise despot?

DEM. Yes, in faith, Socrates, let us certainly consult, as I feel this is a matter on which no slight counsel is needed.

SOC. By and by, my good sir. Let us first cross-examine him thoroughly.

DEM. Examine him then.

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[1] αὐτῶν Baiter: αὐτὴν MSS.
[2] διδασκάλου secl. Schleiermacher.
[3] ἐς τίνος Bekker (ἐς τίνα corr. Coisl.): ἐστιν οἱ, ἔστιν οἳ MSS.

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ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἄν, εἰ Εὐριπίδῃ τι προσχρησαίμεθα, ὦ Θέαγες; Εὐριπίδης γάρ πού φησι

σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ·

εἰ οὖν ἔροιτό τις τὸν Εὐριπίδην· ὦ Εὐριπίδη, τῶν τί
C σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ φῂς σοφοὺς εἶναί τοὺς τυράννους; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἰπόντα

σοφοὶ γεωργοὶ τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ,

ἠρόμεθα τῶν τί σοφῶν, τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο; ἆρ' ἂν ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν τὰ γεωργικά;

ΘΕ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; εἰ εἶπε

σοφοὶ μάγειροι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ,

εἰ ἠρόμεθα τῶν τί σοφῶν, τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο; οὐχ ὅτι τῶν τὰ μαγειρικά[1];

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ

σοφοὶ παλαισταὶ τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ

εἶπεν, εἰ ἠρόμεθα τῶν τί σοφῶν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν τῶν
D παλαίειν ἔφη;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶπε

σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ,

ἡμῶν ἐρωτώντων, τῶν τί σοφῶν λέγεις, ὦ Εὐριπίδη; τί ἂν φαίη; ποῖα ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα;

ΘΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλει ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;

[1] τῶν τὰ μαγειρικά Hirschig: τῶν μαγείρων, τῶν μαγειρικῶν MSS.

[1] This line, also quoted and attributed to Euripides in the

SOC. Well now, what if we called in Euripides to our aid, Theages? For you know Euripides says:

Despots are wise by converse with the wise.[1]

Now, if someone should ask Euripides: Euripides, in what are these men wise, by whose converse you say that despots are wise? I mean, suppose he had said:

Farmers are wise by converse with the wise,

and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? Surely none other than,—In farming.

THE. That, and none other.

SOC. Or again, if he had said:

Piemen are wise by converse with the wise,

and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? He would have said,—In the pie-making business,—would he not?

THE. Yes.

SOC. Or again, if he had said:

Wrestlers are wise by converse with the wise,

and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—would he not reply,—In wrestling?

THE. Yes.

SOC. But as he said:

Despots are wise by converse with the wise,

and we ask him,—In what do you mean that the latter are wise, Euripides?—what will he reply? What sort of subjects will he mention here?

THE. Why, upon my word, I for my part do not know.

SOC. Well, do you mind if I tell you?

[1] *Republic* (568 A), appears to belong really to Sophocles' lost tragedy *The Locrian Ajax*.

125 ΘΕ. Εἰ σὺ βούλει.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἅπερ ἔφη Ἀνακρέων τὴν Καλλικρίτην ἐπίστασθαι· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τὸ ᾆσμα;

ΘΕ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τοιαύτης τινὸς καὶ σὺ συνουσίας
E ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀνδρός, ὅστις τυγχάνει ὁμότεχνος ὢν Καλλικρίτῃ τῇ Κυάνης καὶ ἐπίσταται τυραννικά, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην ἔφη ὁ ποιητής, ἵνα καὶ σὺ ἡμῖν τύραννος γένῃ καὶ τῇ πόλει;

ΘΕ. Πάλαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκώπτεις καὶ παίζεις πρός με.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐ ταύτης ᾗς τῆς σοφίας ἐπιθυμεῖν, ᾗ πάντων ἂν τῶν πολιτῶν ἄρχοις; τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ τύραννος ἂν εἴης;

ΘΕ. Εὐξαίμην μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἔγωγε τύραννος
126 γενέσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πλείστων· καὶ σύ γ' ἄν, οἶμαί, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι· ἔτι δέ γε ἴσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί δή ἐστί ποτε οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖς; οὐ τῶν πολιτῶν ᾗς ἄρχειν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

ΘΕ. Οὐ βίᾳ γε οὐδ' ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀλλ' ἑκόντων, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλλόγιμοι ἄνδρες.

ΣΩ. Ἆρά γε λέγεις ὥσπερ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ ὅσοι τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν;

ΘΕ. Νὴ Δία τούτους λέγω.

B ΣΩ. Τί οὖν εἰ τὰ ἱππικὰ ἐτύγχανες ἐπιθυμῶν σοφὸς γενέσθαι; παρὰ τίνας ἂν ἀφικόμενος ᾠήθης

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[1] Nothing is known of this poem.

THE. If you do not mind.

SOC. They are the same subjects that Anacreon said Callicrite understood; or do you not know the ode?[1]

THE. I do.

SOC. Well then, do you desire to partake in some instruction of that sort from any man who is a fellow-craftsman of Callicrite, daughter of Cyane, and knows all about despotism as she did, according to the poet, in order that you may become a despot over us and our city?

THE. You are joking all this time, Socrates, and making fun of me.

SOC. Why, do you not say that you desire that wisdom which will enable you to govern all the citizens? And in doing that, will you be anything else but a despot?

THE. I should indeed pray, I imagine, that I might become a despot, if possible, over all men, and failing that, over as many as might be; so would you, I imagine, and everybody else besides: nay, even more, I daresay, that I might become a god; but I did not say I desired that.

SOC. Well, what on earth then is it that you do desire? Do you not say you desire to govern the citizens?

THE. Yes, but not by force, or as despots do, but with their consent, as is done by all the other men of importance in the state.

SOC. Do you mean, as by Themistocles and Pericles and Cimon, and by all those who have shown themselves able statesmen?

THE. Yes, in good earnest, I mean those people.

SOC. Then what if you chanced to desire to become wise in horsemanship? To whom would you have

126 δεινὸς ἔσεσθαι ἱππεύς; ἢ παρ' ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς ἱππικούς;

ΘΕ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοὺς αὖ τοὺς δεινοὺς ὄντας ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς εἰσί τε ἵπποι καὶ χρῶνται ἑκάστοτε καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ ἀλλοτρίοις πολλοῖς;

ΘΕ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ εἰ τὰ ἀκοντιστικὰ σοφὸς ἐβούλου γενέσθαι; οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἀκοντιστικοὺς ᾧου ἂν ἐλθὼν σοφὸς ἔσεσθαι τούτους, οἷς ἔστι τε ἀκόντια C καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀλλοτρίοις καὶ οἰκείοις ἑκάστοτε χρῶνται ἀκοντίοις;

ΘΕ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ τὰ πολιτικὰ βούλει σοφὸς γενέσθαι, οἴει παρ' ἄλλους τινὰς ἀφικόμενος σοφὸς ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς τούτους, τοὺς αὐτούς τε δεινοὺς ὄντας τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ χρωμένους ἑκάστοτε τῇ τε αὐτῶν πόλει καὶ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, καὶ Ἕλληνίσι προσομιλοῦντας πόλεσι καὶ βαρ-βάροις; ἢ δοκεῖς ἄλλοις τισὶ συγγενόμενος σοφὸς ἔσεσθαι ταῦτα, ἅπερ οὗτοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῖς τούτοις;

D ΘΕ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὓς σέ φασι λέγειν τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τούτων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ υἱεῖς οὐδὲν βελτίους εἰσὶν ἢ οἱ τῶν σκυτοτόμων· καί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθέστατα λέγειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ δύναμαι αἰσθέσθαι. ἀνόητος ἂν οὖν εἴην, εἰ οἰοίμην τινὰ τούτων ἐμοὶ μὲν ἂν παραδοῦναι τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ μηδὲν ὠφελῆσαι, εἴ τι οἷός τ' ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὠφελεῖν ἄλλον ὁντιναοῦν ἀνθρώπων.

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[1] *Cf. Alcib. I.* 118 E: *Protag.* 320 A, B.

had to resort before expecting to be a clever horseman? To whom else but the horse-masters?

THE. To none else, I am sure.

SOC. And moreover, you would go to the actual men who are clever at the business, and who have horses and constantly use them in great numbers, both their own and other people's?

THE. Obviously I should.

SOC. And what if you wished to become wise in javelin-throwing? Would you not expect to get this wisdom by having resorted to those javelin-masters who have javelins and who constantly use javelins, both other people's and their own, in great numbers?

THE. I think so.

SOC. Then pray tell me, since it is your wish to become wise in state-matters, do you expect to get your wisdom by resorting to any other persons than those statesmen, who not only have their own ability in state-matters, but have constant dealings with other cities besides their own, by their intercourse alike with Greek cities and with foreign peoples? Or do you think to get wisdom in their business by resorting to any other persons than these particular men?

THE. Well, Socrates, I have heard of the argument that you are said to put forward—that the sons of those statesmen are no better men than the sons of shoemakers[1]; and in my opinion your words are very true, from what I am able to gather. Hence I should be an utter fool if I supposed that any of these men would impart his wisdom to me when he never was of any use to his own son, as he would have been, if he were able to be of use in this matter to anyone at all in the world.

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ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἄν, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, εἴ σοι ἐπειδὴ γένοιτο υἱὸς τοιαῦτα πράγ-
Ε ματα παρέχοι, καὶ φαίη μὲν ἂν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι ζωγράφος, καὶ μέμφοιτο σοὶ τῷ πατρί, ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναλίσκειν εἰς αὐτὸν τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἀργύριον, τοὺς δὲ δημιουργοὺς αὐτοῦ τούτου, τοὺς ζωγράφους, ἀτιμάζοι τε καὶ μὴ βούλοιτο παρ' αὐτῶν μανθάνειν; ἢ τοὺς αὐλητάς, βουλόμενος αὐλητὴς γενέσθαι, ἢ τοὺς κιθαριστάς; ἔχοις ἂν αὐτῷ ὅ τι χρῷο καὶ ὅποι πέμποις ἄλλοσε μὴ ἐθέλοντα παρὰ τούτων μανθάνειν;

ΘΕ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

127 ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ποιῶν θαυμάζεις καὶ μέμφῃ εἰ ἀπορεῖ ὅ τί σοι χρήσηται καὶ ὅποι πέμψῃ[1]; ἐπεὶ Ἀθηναίων γε τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν τὰ πολιτικὰ ὅτῳ ἂν βούλῃ συστήσομέν σε, ὃς σοι προῖκα συνέσται· καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἀργύριον οὐκ ἀναλώσεις, ἅμα δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμήσεις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ συνών.

ΘΕ. Τί οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ καὶ σὺ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν εἶ ἀνδρῶν; εἰ γὰρ σύ μοι ἐθέλοις συνεῖναι, ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ οὐδένα ἄλλον ζητῶ.

Β ΣΩ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις, Θέαγες;

ΔΗ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μέντοι κακῶς λέγει, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐμοὶ χαριῇ· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι τούτου μεῖζον ἂν ἕρμαιον ἡγησαίμην, ἢ εἰ οὗτός τε ἀρέσκοιτο τῇ σῇ συνουσίᾳ καὶ σὺ ἐθέλοις τούτῳ συνεῖναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ αἰσχύνομαι λέγειν ὡς σφόδρα

[1] πέμψῃ Bekker: πέμποι MSS.

[1] *Cf.* the passage in the *Protagoras* (320 A, B) which shows that young men of good family were often placed with older

SOC. Then which way, most excellent sir, would you turn if, when you came to have a son, he should trouble you in the same manner, and tell you he desired to become a good painter, and should blame you, his father, for refusing to spend money on him for that very purpose, but at the same time should disregard the practitioners of that very thing, the painters, and decline to learn from them? Or the flute-players, when he wished to become a flute-player, or the harp-players? Would you know what to do with him, and where else you should send him if he refused to learn from these?

THE. Upon my word, I should not.

SOC. And do you now, when you are behaving in just the same way to your father, feel surprised and blame him for being at a loss what to do with you and where to send you? Why, we are ready to place you with any well-bred Athenian statesman you may choose, who will train you free of charge[1]; and so not only will you be at no expense of money, but will gain far greater commendation amongst the mass of men than if you studied with anyone else.

THE. But then, Socrates, are not you too one of our well-bred gentlemen? Indeed, if you will agree to instruct me, I am content and seek no other.

SOC. What do you mean by that, Theages?

DEM. Nay, Socrates, there is nothing amiss in what he says, and you will oblige me at the same time; for I should count it the greatest possible stroke of luck if he should welcome your instruction and you also should consent to instruct him. Nay, indeed, I am quite ashamed to say how keenly I wish

friends of standing and experience in order to prepare for public life. *Cf.* also *Meno* 94 D.

127 βούλομαι· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν δέομαι, σέ τ' ἐθέλειν τούτῳ συνεῖναι καὶ σὲ μὴ ζητεῖν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ συγγενέσθαι ἢ Σωκράτει· καί με πολλῶν C καὶ φοβερῶν ἀπαλλάξετε φροντίδων. ὡς νῦν πάνυ φοβοῦμαι ὑπὲρ τούτου, μή τινι ἄλλῳ ἐντύχῃ οἵῳ τοῦτον διαφθεῖραι.

ΘΕ. Μηκέτι νῦν, ὦ πάτερ, ὑπέρ γ' ἐμοῦ φοβοῦ, εἴπερ οἷός τ' εἶ πεῖσαι τοῦτον τὴν ἐμὴν συνουσίαν προσδέξασθαι.

ΔΗ. Πάνυ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ δ' ἂν ἤδη εἴη ὁ μετὰ τοῦτο λόγος· ἐγὼ γάρ σοι ἕτοιμός εἰμι, ὡς διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ὡς οἷόν τε οἰκειότατα παρέχειν, ὅτου ἂν D δέῃ, ἔμβραχυ, ἐὰν Θεάγη τουτονὶ ἀσπάζῃ τε καὶ εὐεργετῇς ὅ τι ἂν οἷός τε ᾖς.

ΣΩ. Ὦ Δημόδοκε, τὸ μὲν ἐσπουδακέναι σε οὐ θαυμάζω, εἴπερ οἴει ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μάλιστ' ἄν σοι τοῦτον ὠφεληθῆναι· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα ὑπὲρ ὅτου ἄν τις νοῦν ἔχων μᾶλλον σπουδάζοι ἢ ὑπὲρ υἱέος αὑτοῦ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται· ὁπόθεν δὲ ἔδοξέ σοι τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ ἂν μᾶλλον τὸν σὸν υἱὸν οἷός τ' εἴην[1] ὠφελῆσαι πρὸς τὸ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἢ σὺ αὐτός, καὶ ὁπόθεν οὗτος ᾠήθη ἐμὲ μᾶλλον ἢ σὲ αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν, τοῦτο πάνυ θαυμάζω. σὺ γὰρ E πρῶτον μὲν πρεσβύτερος εἶ ἐμοῦ, ἔπειτα πολλὰς ἤδη ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς μεγίστας Ἀθηναίοις ἦρξας, καὶ τιμᾷ ὑπὸ Ἀναγυρασίων τε τῶν δημοτῶν πολὺ μάλιστα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδενὸς ἧττον· ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἑορᾷ οὐδέτερος ὑμῶν. ἔπειτα εἰ ἄρα τῆς μὲν τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν συνουσίας Θεάγης ὅδε καταφρονεῖ, ἄλλους

[1] τ' εἴην Priscianus: τέ τ' ἦν, τε ἦν mss.

it; but I entreat you both—you, to consent to teach Theages, and you, to seek the teaching of no one else than Socrates; you will thus relieve me of a harassing load of anxiety. For just now I am sorely afraid of his falling in with some other person who is likely to corrupt him.

THE. Have no more fears for me now, father, so long as you are able to persuade him to receive me as his pupil.

DEM. Very rightly spoken. Socrates, from now onward we must address ourselves to you; for I am ready, in short, to place both myself and all that I hold dearest of what is mine in your hands—whatever you may require, absolutely—if you will open your arms to Theages here, and do him any service that you can.

SOC. Demodocus, your zeal is no wonder to me, if you suppose that I especially could be of use to your boy; for I know of nothing for which a sensible man could be more zealous than for his own son's utmost improvement. But how you came to form this opinion, that I would be better able to be of use to your son in his aim of becoming a good citizen than you would yourself, and how he came to suppose that I rather than yourself would be of use to him—this does fill me with wonder. For you, in the first place, are my elder, and further, you have held in your time many of the highest offices in Athens, and are respected by the people of Anagyrus [1] far above all your fellow-townsmen, and by the whole state as much as any man, whereas neither of you can notice anything like this about me. And moreover, if Theages here does despise the instruction of our statesmen, and is look-

[1] A deme or township of Attica.

127 δέ τινας ζητεῖ, οἳ παιδεύειν ἐπαγγέλλονται οἷοί τε εἶναι νέους ἀνθρώπους, ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πῶλος ὁ
128 Ἀκραγαντῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, οἳ οὕτω σοφοί εἰσιν, ὥστε εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἰόντες πείθουσι τῶν νέων τοὺς γενναιοτάτους τε καὶ πλουσιωτάτους οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν πολιτῶν ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται προῖκα συνεῖναι τούτους πείθουσιν ἀπολείποντας τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας αὐτοῖς συνεῖναι, προσκατατιθέντας ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ[1] μισθόν, καὶ χάριν πρὸς τούτοις εἰδέναι. τούτων τινὰς εἰκὸς ἦν προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν υἱόν σου καὶ αὐτὸν σέ, ἐμὲ δ'
B οὐκ εἰκός· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐπίσταμαι τῶν μακαρίων τε καὶ καλῶν μαθημάτων· ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἄν· ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγω δήπου ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ τυγχάνω, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλήν γε σμικροῦ τινὸς μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτικῶν. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ μάθημα παρ' ὁντινοῦν ποιοῦμαι δεινὸς εἶναι καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν.

ΘΕ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ πάτερ; ὁ[2] Σωκράτης οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ἐθέλειν ἐμοὶ συνδιατρίβειν· ἐπεὶ τό γ'
C ἐμὸν ἕτοιμον, ἐὰν οὗτος ἐθέλῃ· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγει. ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα τῶν ἐμῶν ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ ὀλίγῳ πρεσβυτέρων, οἳ πρὶν μὲν τούτῳ συνεῖναι οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι ἦσαν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ συνεγένοντο τούτῳ, ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὧν πρότερον χείρους.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν οἷον τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ παῖ Δημοδόκου;

ΘΕ. Ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε, ὅτι, ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ, καὶ

[1] πολὺ Beck: πολὺν mss.

ing for some other persons who profess to be able to educate young people, we have here Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Acragas, and many more, who are so wise that they go to our cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of our young men—who have the choice of learning from any citizen they choose, free of charge—they persuade them to abandon that instruction and learn from them, with a deposit, besides, of a large sum of money as their fee, and to feel thankful in addition. Some of these persons might naturally have been chosen both by your son and by yourself, in preference to me; for I have no knowledge of those fair and beatific subjects of study: I only wish that I had. But what I always say, you know, is that I am in the position of knowing practically nothing except one little subject, that of love-matters. In this subject, however, I claim to be skilled above anybody who has ever lived or is now living in the world.

THE. Do you see, father? Socrates does not seem to me to be at all willing now to spend his time on me; for there is readiness enough on my part, if he is willing. But he is only jesting in what he has just told us. For I know of some of my equals in age, and some a little older, who were of no account before they learnt from him, but after beginning to learn from him have in a very short time proved themselves superior to all whose inferiors they were before.

SOC. And do you know what the meaning of it is, son of Demodocus?

THE. Yes, on my soul, I do—that, if it be your

[2] ὁ Cobet: ὅτι MSS.

128 ἐγὼ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι, οἷοίπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι.

D ΣΩ. Οὔκ, ὦ 'γαθέ, ἀλλά σε λέληθεν, οἷον τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἐγὼ δέ σοι φράσω. ἔστι γάρ τι θεῖα μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεί μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι τῶν φίλων ἀνακοινῶται καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, ἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. Χαρμίδην γὰρ τουτονὶ γιγνώσκετε τὸν καλὸν γενόμενον, τὸν Γλαύκωνος·

E οὗτός ποτε ἐτύγχανεν ἐμοὶ ἀνακοινούμενος μέλλων ἀσκήσειν στάδιον εἰς Νεμέαν· καὶ εὐθὺς αὐτοῦ ἀρχομένου λέγειν, ὅτι μέλλοι ἀσκεῖν, ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή, καὶ ἐγὼ διεκώλυόν τε αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπον ὅτι λέγοντός σου μεταξὺ γέγονέ μοι ἡ φωνὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄσκει. ἴσως, ἔφη, σημαίνει σοι, ὅτι οὐ νικήσω· ἐγὼ δὲ κἂν μὴ μέλλω νικᾶν, γυμνασάμενός γε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ὠφεληθήσομαι· ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἤσκει· ἄξιον οὖν πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ, ἃ
129 αὐτῷ συνέβη ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως. εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, τὸν Τιμάρχου ἀδελφὸν Κλειτόμαχον ἔρεσθε, τί εἶπεν αὐτῷ Τίμαρχος ἡνίκ' ἀποθανούμενος ἦλει εὐθὺ τοῦ δημοσίου,[1] ἐκεῖνός τε καὶ Εὔαθλος ὁ σταδιοδρομῶν, ὃς Τίμαρχον ὑπεδέξατο φεύγοντα· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι εἶπεν αὐτῷ ταῦτα.

ΘΕ. Τί;

ΣΩ. Ὦ Κλειτόμαχε, ἔφη, ἐγὼ μέντοι ἔρχομαι ἀποθανούμενος νυνί, διότι Σωκράτει οὐκ ἤθελον

[1] δημοσίου Baiter: δαιμονίου MSS.

pleasure, I too shall be able to become such as those others are.

SOC. No, good sir, the meaning of it escapes you; but I will tell it you. There is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice occurs, the same thing happens: it prohibits, and does not allow him to act. And I will produce witnesses to convince you of these facts. You know our Charmides here, who has grown so handsome, the son of Glaucon: he once happened to be consulting me on his intention of training for the Nemean races, and he had no sooner begun to say that he intended to train than the voice occurred, and I tried to prevent him, saying—"Just as you were speaking my spirit-voice has occurred: no, you must not train." "Perhaps," said he, "it indicates to you that I shall not win; but even if I am not to win, at any rate the exercise I shall get in the meantime will do me good." So saying, he went and trained; and so you may as well inquire of him as to the results he got from his training. Or if you like, ask Cleitomachus, brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was going straight to the prison to meet his death, he and Euathlus the racing runner, who had harboured Timarchus as a fugitive; for he will tell you that the words he spoke to him were these:

THE. What?

SOC. "Cleitomachus," he said, "I tell you I am going to my death now, because I would not take

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πείθεσθαι. τί δὴ οὖν ποτὲ τοῦτο εἶπεν ὁ Τίμαρχος; ἐγὼ φράσω. ὅτε ἀνίστατο ἐκ τοῦ συμποσίου ὁ
B Τίμαρχος καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ Φιλημονίδου ἀποκτενοῦντες Νικίαν τὸν Ἡροσκαμάνδρου, ἠπιστάσθην μὲν αὐτὼ μόνω τὴν ἐπιβουλήν, ὁ δὲ Τίμαρχος ἀνιστάμενος πρὸς ἐμὲ εἶπε, τί λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; ὑμεῖς μὲν πίνετε, ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποι ἐξαναστῆναι· ἥξω δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ἐὰν τύχω. καί μοι ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, μηδαμῶς, ἔφην, ἀναστῇς· γέγονε γάρ μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον
C τὸ δαιμόνιον· καὶ ὃς ἐπέσχε. καὶ διαλιπὼν χρόνον αὖθις ὥρμᾶτο ἰέναι, καὶ ἔφη, εἶμι δή, Σώκρατες· αὖθις ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή· αὖθις οὖν αὐτὸν ἠνάγκασα ἐπισχεῖν. τὸ τρίτον, βουλόμενός με λαθεῖν, ἀνέστη οὐκέτι εἰπών μοι οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ λαθών, ἐπιτηρήσας ἄλλοσε τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· καὶ οὕτως ᾤχετ' ἀπιὼν καὶ διεπράξατο ἐξ ὧν ἤει ἀποθανούμενος. ὅθεν δὴ τοῦτ' εἶπε πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὅπερ νῦν ὑμῖν ἐγώ, ὅτι ἴοι ἀποθανούμενος διὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι.
D ἔτι τοίνυν περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ πολλῶν ἀκούσεσθον, ἃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον περὶ τῆς διαφθορᾶς τοῦ στρατοπέδου. καὶ τὰ μὲν παρεληλυθότα τῶν εἰδότων ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι· πεῖραν δ' ἔξεστι νυνὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ σημείου, εἰ ἄρα τι λέγει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐξορμῇ Σαννίωνος τοῦ καλοῦ ἐγένετο μοι τὸ σημεῖον, οἴχεται δὲ νῦν μετὰ Θρασύλλου στρατευσόμενος εὐθὺ Ἐφέσου καὶ Ἰωνίας. ἐγὼ οὖν οἶομαι ἐκεῖνον

[1] The disastrous Sicilian expedition of 415–413 B.C. *Cf.* Thuc. vi. and vii.

[2] 409 B.C., when Thrasyllus succeeded in recovering Colophon for Athens. He was one of the commanders put

Socrates' advice." Now, why on earth did Timarchus say that? I will tell you. When Timarchus and Philemon, son of Philemonides, got up from the wine-party to kill Nicias, son of Heroscamandrus, those two alone had knowledge of the plot; and Timarchus, as he got up, said to me: "What say you, Socrates? Go on drinking, all of you; I have to get up and go somewhere, but I will join you a little later, if I get the chance." Then occurred that voice of mine, and I said to him: "No, no, do not get up; for my accustomed spiritual sign has occurred to me." So he stopped. Then after an interval of time he again started to go, and said: "Well, I am going, Socrates." Again the voice occurred, and so again I constrained him to stop. The third time, wishing to give me the slip, he got up without saying another word to me; he gave me the slip by watching until my attention was turned elsewhere. Thus it was that he went right off and committed the deed which was the cause of his going then to his death. And hence it was that he spoke those words to his brother which I quoted to you just now, that he was going to his death because he had not taken my advice. And moreover, in regard to the Sicilian business,[1] many will tell you what I said about the destruction of the army. As to bygones, you may hear from those who know: but there is an opportunity now of testing the worth of what the sign says. For as the handsome Sannio was setting out on campaign, the sign occurred to me, and he has gone now with Thrasyllus on an expedition bound for Ephesus and Ionia.[2] I accord-

to death by the Athenians after the battle of Arginusae, 406 B.C.

129 ἢ ἀποθανεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοῦ τι τούτῳ γ' ἐλᾶν,[1] καὶ
περί γε τῆς στρατιᾶς τῆς ἄλλης πάνυ φοβοῦμαι.
E Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα εἴρηκά σοι, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις αὕτη
τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν
μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιατριβόντων τὸ ἄπαν δύναται.
πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐναντιοῦται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις
ὠφεληθῆναι μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίβουσιν, ὥστε οὐχ οἷόν
τέ μοι τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν· πολλοῖς δὲ συνεῖναι
μὲν οὐ διακωλύει, ὠφελοῦνται δὲ οὐδὲν συνόντες.
οἷς δ' ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου
δύναμις, οὗτοί εἰσιν ὧν καὶ σὺ ᾔσθησαι· ταχὺ γὰρ
παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν. καὶ τούτων αὖ τῶν ἐπι-
διδόντων οἱ μὲν καὶ βέβαιον ἔχουσι καὶ παρα-
130 μόνιμον τὴν ὠφέλειαν· πολλοὶ δέ, ὅσον ἂν μετ'
ἐμοῦ χρόνον ὦσι, θαυμάσιον ἐπιδιδόασιν, ἐπειδὰν
δέ μου ἀπόσχωνται, πάλιν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν
ὁτουοῦν. τοῦτό ποτε ἔπαθεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσι-
μάχου υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀριστείδου. διατρίβων γὰρ μετ'
ἐμοῦ πάμπολυ ἐπεδεδώκει ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· ἔπειτα
αὐτῷ στρατεία τις ἐγένετο καὶ ᾤχετο ἐκπλέων·
ἥκων δὲ κατελάμβανε μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίβοντα
Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μελησίου υἱὸν τοῦ Θουκυδίδου.
ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης τῇ προτεραίᾳ μοι δι' ἀπεχθείας
B ἐν λόγοις τισὶν ἐγεγόνει. ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Ἀρι-
στείδης, ἐπειδὴ ἠσπάσατό τε καὶ τἆλλα διελέχθη,
Θουκυδίδην δέ, ἔφη, ἀκούω, ὦ Σώκρατες, σεμνύ-
νεσθαι ἄττα πρὸς σὲ καὶ χαλεπαίνειν ὡς τι ὄντα.

[1] γ' ἐλᾶν Hermann: γελᾶν, ἐλᾶν MSS.

[1] *Cf. Theaet.* 151 A, from which this passage is derived. The Aristeides and Thucydides mentioned here were the grandsons respectively of Aristeides, the Athenian statesman of the time of the Persian wars, and of Thucydides, the

ingly expect him to be either killed or brought very near it, and I have great fears for our force as a whole.

Now I have told you all this, because this spiritual power that attends me also exerts itself to the full in my intercourse with those who spend their time with me. To many, indeed, it is adverse, and it is not possible for these to get any good by conversing with me, and I am therefore unable to spend my time in conversing with them. And there are many with whom it does not prohibit my intercourse, yet the intercourse does them no good. But those who are assisted in their intercourse by that spiritual power are the persons whom you have noticed; for they make rapid progress there and then. And of these, again, who make progress some find the benefit both solid and enduring; while there are many who, for as long a time as they are with me, make wonderful progress, but when they are parted from me relapse, and are no different from anybody else. This once befell Aristeides,[1] son of Lysimachus, son of Aristeides. For by conversing with me he had made immense progress in a little time; and then he had to go on an expedition, and he went and sailed away. On his return he found that Thucydides, son of Melesias, son of Thucydides, had been conversing with me. Now Thucydides, the day before, had quarrelled with me over some arguments we had had. So when Aristeides saw me, after greeting me and talking of other affairs, he said: "But Thucydides, I hear, Socrates, is somewhat on his dignity with you, and is annoyed

aristocratic opponent of Pericles. Their fathers Lysimachus and Melesias appear in the *Laches*.

130 Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὕτως. Τί δέ; οὐκ οἶδεν, ἔφη, πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι, οἷον ἦν τὸ ἀνδράποδον; Οὐκ ἔοικέ γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, νὴ τοὺς θεούς. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ αὐτός γε, ἔφη, καταγελάστως ἔχω, ὦ C Σώκρατες. Τί μάλιστα; ἔφην ἐγώ. Ὅτι, ἔφη, πρὶν μὲν ἐκπλεῖν, ὁτῳοῦν ἀνθρώπῳ οἷός τ' ἦν διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὥστε καὶ ἐδίωκον τὰς συνουσίας τῶν χαριεστάτων ἀνθρώπων· νυνὶ δὲ τοὐναντίον φεύγω, ἄν τινα καὶ αἰσθάνωμαι πεπαιδευμένον· οὕτως αἰσχύνομαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ φαυλότητι. Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐξαίφνης σε προὔλιπεν αὕτη ἡ δύναμις ἢ κατὰ σμικρόν; Κατὰ σμικρόν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡνίκα δέ σοι παρεγένετο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πότερον D μαθόντι παρ' ἐμοῦ τι παρεγένετο, ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ; Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπιστον μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀληθὲς δέ· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον μὲν παρὰ σοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε, ὡς αὐτὸς οἶσθα· ἐπεδίδουν δέ, ὁπότε σοι συνείην, κἂν εἰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μόνον οἰκίᾳ εἴην, μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ οἰκήματι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁπότε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι· καὶ ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁπότε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι ὢν λέγοντός σου βλέποιμι πρὸς σέ, μᾶλλον ἢ E ὁπότε ἄλλοσε ὁρῴην· πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πλεῖστον ἐπεδίδουν, ὁπότε παρ' αὐτόν σε καθοίμην ἐχόμενός σου καὶ ἁπτόμενος. νῦν δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πᾶσα ἐκείνη ἡ ἕξις ἐξερρύηκεν.

Ἔστιν οὖν, ὦ Θέαγες, τοιαύτη ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία· ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ, πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχύ, εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ὅρα οὖν μή σοι

as though he were somebody. "Yes, that is so," I replied. "Well, but does he not know," he said, "what a sad slave he was, before he associated with you?" "It seems not," I replied, "upon my soul." "But indeed I myself also," he said, "am in a ridiculous position, Socrates." "How exactly?" I asked. "Because," he replied, "before I sailed away, I was able to discuss things with anybody, and show myself inferior to none in argument, so that I even sought out the debates of the most accomplished people: but now, on the contrary, I shun them, wherever I notice there is anyone of education, so ashamed I am of my own ineptitude." "Tell me," I said, "did this power forsake you of a sudden, or little by little?" "Little by little," he replied. "And when it was present with you," I asked, "was it present through your having learnt something from me, or in some other way?" "I will tell you, Socrates," he said, "what is incredible, upon my soul, yet true. For I never yet learnt anything from you, as you know yourself: but I made progress, whenever I was with you, if I was merely in the same house, without being in the same room, but more progress, when I was in the same room. And it seemed to me to be much more when I was in the same room and looked at you as you were speaking, than when I turned my eyes elsewhere: but my progress was far the greatest and most marked whenever I sat beside you and held and touched you. Now, however," he said, "that condition has all oozed away."

Such then, Theages, is the intercourse you would have with me: if God so wills, you will make very great and rapid progress, but otherwise, you will

130 ἀσφαλέστερον ἢ παρ' ἐκείνων τινὶ παιδεύεσθαι, οἳ ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοί εἰσι τῆς ὠφελίας ἣν ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ἐμοὶ ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ τοῦτο πρᾶξαι.

131 ΘΕ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμᾶς οὑτωσὶ ποιῆσαι, ἀποπειραθῆναι τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου συνόντας ἀλλήλοις. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν παρείκῃ ἡμῖν, ταῦτα βέλτιστα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη παραχρῆμα βουλευσόμεθα ὅ τι δράσομεν, εἴτε ἄλλῳ συνεσόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον τὸ σοὶ γιγνόμενον πειρασόμεθα παραμυθεῖσθαι εὐχαῖσι τε καὶ θυσίαις καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ ἂν οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγῶνται.

ΔΗ. Μηκέτι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντείπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῷ μειρακίῳ· εὖ γὰρ λέγει Θεάγης.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι οὕτω ποιεῖν, οὕτω ποιῶμεν.

not. Consider, therefore, if it is not safer for you to be educated by one of those persons who have command themselves of the benefit which they bestow on mankind, rather than follow the course on which you may chance with me.

THE. Well then, I decide, Socrates, that our plan shall be to make trial of that spiritual sign by associating with each other. Thus, if it leaves us free, that will be best of all; if it does not, it will be time then for us to consider, at the moment, what we shall do—whether we shall associate with someone else, or try to conciliate the divine sign itself that occurs to you with prayers and sacrifices and anything else that the seers may indicate.

DEM. In view of this, Socrates, say no more in opposition to the lad; for Theages is right in what he says.

SOC. Well, if you consider that this is what we ought to do, let us do it.

MINOS

INTRODUCTION TO THE *MINOS*

THIS Dialogue may be classed with the *Hipparchus* as a fairly able and plausible imitation of Plato's early work, but it is destitute of those graceful or lively touches of characterization which distinguish his first memorials of Socrates, while the sequence of thought is awkward and none too clear. Socrates asks his nameless companion for a definition of Law, and shows how the various answers he receives are unsound or inadequate. He then himself suggests (315) that it must be true opinion, or discovery of reality.[1] His companion thereupon shows at some length how greatly laws differ among different communities. Socrates recalls him to the point that there must be something constant and the same in all that can be referred to as law, and cites medicine, agriculture, gardening, and cookery as giving instances of what he is seeking (316). His requirement of knowledge of what is right in every kind of artist or administrator leads him on to a consideration of lawgiving as a distributive skill[2] which pervades all arts and functions (317–318), and he proceeds, with a somewhat laboured solemnity, to set forth

[1] Contrast the discussion in *Meno*, 97-8, where right opinion is clearly distinguished from knowledge.

[2] See note on 317 D for this absurd forcing of the primitive notion of "distribution" or "apportionment" from the word *νόμος*.

the merits of Minos, king of Cnossos in Crete, as a lawgiver (319–320): but, just as we are hoping to gain from this long exposition a little more light for our inquiry about the meaning of law, we are abruptly told that our ignorance is shameful, and the discussion is thus clumsily broken off.

ΜΙΝΩΣ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΜΟΥ

[ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ

St. II. p. 313

ΣΩ. Ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν;

ΕΤ. Ποῖον[1] καὶ ἐρωτᾷς τῶν νόμων;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἔστιν ὅ τι διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι; σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε. ἐρωτῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνηρόμην, τί ἐστι χρυσός, εἴ με ὡσαύτως ἀνήρου, ὁποῖον καὶ λέγω χρυσόν, οἶομαί σε οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐρέσθαι. οὐδὲν γάρ που διαφέρει οὔτε χρυσὸς
B χρυσοῦ οὔτε λίθος λίθου κατά γε τὸ λίθος εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ χρυσός· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ νόμος που νόμου οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντες εἰσὶ ταὐτόν. νόμος γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ὁμοίως, οὐχ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἧττον· τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ ἐρωτῶ, τὸ πᾶν τί ἐστι νόμος. εἰ οὖν σοι πρόχειρον, εἰπέ.

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἴη ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα;

[1] *ποῖον* Hermann: *ὁποῖον* MSS.

[1] *νομιζόμενα* in ordinary speech meant "accepted by custom": "loyally" here attempts to preserve the connexion

MINOS OR ON LAW

[POLITICAL]

CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, COMPANION

SOC. Tell me, what is law?

COM. To what kind of law does your question refer?

SOC. What! Is there any difference between law and law, in this particular point of being law? For just consider what is the actual question I am putting to you. It is as though I had asked, what is gold: if you had asked me in the same manner, to what kind of gold I refer, I think your question would have been incorrect. For I presume there is no difference between gold and gold, or between stone and stone, in point of being gold or stone; and so neither does law differ at all from law, I suppose, but they are all the same thing. For each of them is law alike, not one more so, and another less. That is the particular point of my question—what is law as a whole? So if you are ready, tell me.

COM. Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted?[1]

[1] with *νόμος* ("law" in this context, though sometimes "custom," as below, 315 D).

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ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, ἢ ὄψις τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα; ἢ ἄλλο
C μὲν λόγος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ὄψις, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἀκοή, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ νόμος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα; οὕτως ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;

ΕΤ. Ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα νόμος ἐστὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα.

ΕΤ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δῆτ' ἂν εἴη νόμος; ἐπισκεψώμεθα αὐτὸ ὧδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο,
314 ἐπειδὴ ὄψει φατὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾶται; ἀπεκρινάμεθ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δ' αὖ ἤρετο ἡμᾶς, τί δέ; ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἀκοῇ; ἀπεκρινάμεθ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται; πότερον
B αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἢ δηλώσει, ὥσπερ τὰ μανθανόμενα μανθάνεται δηλούσῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἢ εὑρέσει τινί, ὥσπερ τὰ εὑρισκόμενα εὑρίσκεται, οἷον τὰ μὲν ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἰατρικῇ, ἃ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ διανοοῦνται, ὡς φασιν οἱ μάντεις, μαντικῇ· ἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστι τῶν πραγμάτων· ἦ γάρ;

ΕΤ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν τούτων ὑπολάβοιμεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον εἶναι;

soc. And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech something distinct from the things spoken, sight something distinct from the things seen, and hearing something distinct from the things heard; and so law is something distinct from things loyally accepted? Is this so, or what is your view?

com. I find it now to be something distinct.

soc. Then law is not things loyally accepted.

com. I think not.

soc. Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now: Since you say it is by sight that things seen are seen, what is this sight whereby they are seen? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows objects by means of the eyes. And if he had asked us again: Well then, since it is by hearing that things heard are heard, what is hearing? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows us sounds by means of the ears. In the same way then, suppose he should also ask us: Since it is by law that loyally accepted things are so accepted, what is this law whereby they are so accepted? Is it some sensation or showing, as when things learnt are learnt by knowledge showing them, or some discovery, as when things discovered are discovered—for instance, the causes of health and sickness by medicine, or the designs of the gods, as the prophets say, by prophecy; for art is surely our discovery of things, is it not?

com. Certainly.

soc. Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?

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ΕΤ. Τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι;

C ὥστε κινδυνεύει, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.

ΕΤ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἴσως καλῶς λέγεις· τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα. λέγεις τινὰς σοφούς;

ΕΤ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ σοφοὶ εἰσὶ σοφίᾳ σοφοί;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι;

ΕΤ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;

D ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἀνομίᾳ ἄνομοι;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι;

ΕΤ. Ἄδικοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;

ΕΤ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν σῴζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὡς περὶ καλοῦ ἄρα τινὸς ὄντος δεῖ τοῦ νόμου διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.

ΕΤ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

COM. Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law? So that apparently the whole thing, law, as you put it in your question, is a city's resolution.

SOC. State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.

COM. I do.

SOC. And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?

COM. I do.

SOC. And the wise are wise by wisdom?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And again, the just are just by justice?

COM. Certainly.

SOC. And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And the law-abiding are just?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And the lawless are unjust?

COM. Unjust.

SOC. And justice and law are most noble?

COM. That is so.

SOC. And injustice and lawlessness most base?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?

COM. Yes.

SOC. Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.

COM. Undeniably.

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ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δόγμα ἔφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον;

E ΕΤ. Ἔφαμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστι τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;

ΕΤ. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.

ΕΤ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς, ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως.

ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμόττοι ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.

ΕΤ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἆρα οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστίν;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

315 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις;

ΕΤ. Ἔστι γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ νόμος ἄρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις.

ΕΤ. Πῶς οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ὁ νόμος τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις, οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα γε ἡμῖν ἐξηύρηται;

ΣΩ. Βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ νόμος εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις· οἱ δ' ἄρα μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ

SOC. And we said that law is a city's resolution ?

COM. So we did.

SOC. Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil ?

COM. Yes, to be sure.

SOC. And, you know, law was not evil.

COM. No, indeed.

SOC. So it is not right to reply, in such downright fashion, that law is a city's resolution.

COM. I agree that it is not.

SOC. An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.

COM. No, to be sure.

SOC. But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion ; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion ?

COM. Yes.

SOC. But what is good opinion ? Is it not true opinion ?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And true opinion is discovery of reality ?

COM. Yes, it is.

SOC. So law tends to be discovery of reality.

COM. Then how is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not use always the same laws on the same matters, if we have thus got realities discovered ?

SOC. Law tends none the less to be discovery of reality : but men, who do not use always the same

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B νόμοις χρώμενοι ἄνθρωποι, ὡς δοκοῦμεν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δύνανται ἐξευρίσκειν ὃ βούλεται ὁ νόμος, τὸ ὄν. ἐπεὶ φέρε ἴδωμεν, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε κατάδηλον γένηται, εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμεθα ἢ ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις, καὶ εἰ ἅπαντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλοις.

ΕΤ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν γνῶναι, ὅτι οὔτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ἄλλοι τε ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἡμῖν μὲν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους θύειν ἀλλ' ἀνόσιον,

C Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ θύουσιν ὡς ὅσιον ὂν καὶ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἔνιοι αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὑτῶν υἱεῖς τῷ Κρόνῳ, ὡς ἴσως καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας. καὶ μὴ ὅτι βάρβαροι ἄνθρωποι ἡμῶν ἄλλοις νόμοις χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Λυκαίᾳ οὗτοι καὶ οἱ τοῦ Ἀθάμαντος ἔκγονοι οἷας θυσίας θύουσιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες· ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἶσθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούων, οἷοις νόμοις ἐχρώμεθα πρὸ τοῦ περὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας, ἱερεῖά τε προσφάττοντες πρὸ τῆς

D ἐκφορᾶς τοῦ νεκροῦ καὶ ἐγχυτριστρίας μεταπεμπόμενοι· οἱ δ' αὖ ἐκείνων ἔτι πρότεροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔθαπτον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας· ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιοῦμεν. μυρία δ' ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν· πολλὴ γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ὡς οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομίζομεν οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἄνθρωποι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν τοι θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ σὺ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν. ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν σύ τε κατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἃ σοι δοκεῖ μακρῷ

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[1] Or Lycoa, a town in the Arcadian district Maenalia.

[2] *Cf.* Herod. vii. 197. At Alus in Achaea Xerxes was told of human sacrifices offered to purge the guilt of Athamas in plotting the death of his son Phrixus.

laws, as we observe, are not always able to discover what the law is intent on—reality. For come now, let us see if from this point onward we can get it clear whether we use always the same laws or different ones at different times, and whether we all use the same, or some of us use some, and others others.

COM. Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy, whereas the Carthaginians perform it as a thing they account holy and legal, and that too when some of them sacrifice even their own sons to Cronos, as I daresay you yourself have heard. And not merely is it foreign peoples who use different laws from ours, but our neighbours in Lycaea [1] and the descendants of Athamas [2]—you know their sacrifices, Greeks though they be. And as to ourselves too, you know, of course, from what you have heard yourself, the kind of laws we formerly used in regard to our dead, when we slaughtered sacred victims before the funeral procession, and engaged urn-women to collect the bones from the ashes. Then again, a yet earlier generation used to bury the dead where they were, in the house : but we do none of these things. One might give thousands of other instances ; for there is ample means of proving that neither we copy ourselves nor mankind each other always in laws and customs.

SOC. And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches, and I speak likewise, we

315 E λόγῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐγώ, οὐδὲν μή ποτε συμβῶμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα, τάχ' ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν βούλει, πυνθανόμενός τι παρ' ἐμοῦ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ σκόπει· εἰ δ' αὖ βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος.

ET. Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, σὺ πότερα νομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἄδικα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄδικα δίκαια, ἢ τὰ μὲν δίκαια δίκαια, τὰ δὲ ἄδικα ἄδικα;

ET. Ἐγὼ μὲν τά τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικα.

316 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται;

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;

ET. ‹Καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις›.[1]

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀεὶ δήπου;

ET. Ἀεί.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα, ἢ τοὐναντίον;

ET. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ;

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἔοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται
B καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ καλὰ αἰσχρά.

ET. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὡς κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν, τὰ ὄντα

[1] καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις add. vulg.

shall never come to any agreement, in my opinion: but if we study the matter jointly, we may perhaps concur. Well now, if you like, hold a joint inquiry with me by asking me questions; or if you prefer, by answering them.

COM. Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.

SOC. Come then, do you consider [1] just things to be unjust and unjust things just, or just things to be just and unjust things unjust?

COM. I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust.

SOC. And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And among the Persians also?

COM. Among the Persians also.

SOC. Always, I presume?

COM. Always.

SOC. Are things that weigh more considered heavier here, and things that weigh less lighter, or the contrary?

COM. No, those that weigh more are considered heavier, and those that weigh less lighter.

SOC. And is it so in Carthage also, and in Lycaea?

COM. Yes.

SOC. Noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble, and base things base; not base things noble or noble things base.

COM. That is so.

SOC. And thus, as a universal rule, realities, and

[1] The word *νομίζειν* here and in what follows is intended to retain some of the sense of *νόμος* as "accepted" law and custom which it had in what precedes; see note, 313 B.

316 νομίζεται εἶναι, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

ΕΤ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ὃς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει.

ΕΤ. Οὕτω μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ταὐτὰ φαίνεται νόμιμα καὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις·

C ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐννοήσω, ὅτι οὐδὲν παυόμεθα ἄνω κάτω μετατιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ταῦτα μεταπεττευόμενα ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ὧδε μετ' ἐμοῦ αὐτὰ ἄθρει. ἤδη ποτὲ ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων;

ΕΤ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν, τίνος τέχνης τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σύγγραμμα;

ΕΤ. Οἶδα, ὅτι ἰατρικῆς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἰατροὺς καλεῖς τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων;

ΕΤ. Φημί.

D ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν νομίζουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλα;

ΕΤ. Ταὐτὰ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οἱ Ἕλληνες μόνοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι, ταὐτὰ νομίζουσιν;

ΕΤ. Ταὐτὰ δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ τοὺς εἰδότας αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς συννομίζειν καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους.

not unrealities, are accepted as real, both among us and among all other men.

COM. I agree.

SOC. Then whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.

COM. In your present way of putting it, Socrates, the same things appear to be accepted as lawful both by us and by the rest of the world, always: but when I reflect that we are continually changing our laws in all sorts of ways, I cannot bring myself to assent.

SOC. Perhaps it is because you do not reflect that when we change our pieces at draughts they are the same pieces. But look at it, as I do, in this way. Have you in your time come across a treatise on healing the sick?

COM. I have.

SOC. Then do you know to what art such a treatise belongs?

COM. I do: medicine.

SOC. And you give the name of doctors to those who have knowledge of these matters?

COM. Yes.

SOC. Then do those who have knowledge accept the same views on the same things, or do they accept different views?

COM. The same, in my opinion.

SOC. Do Greeks only accept the same views as Greeks on what they know, or do foreigners also agree on these matters, both among themselves and with Greeks?

COM. It is quite inevitable, I should say, that those who know should agree in accepting the same views, whether Greeks or foreigners.

316 ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε ἀπεκρίνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεί;

ΕΤ. Ναὶ καὶ ἀεί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ συγγράφουσι περὶ Ε ὑγιείας, ἅπερ καὶ νομίζουσιν εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἰατρικὰ ἄρα καὶ ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν.

ΕΤ. Ἰατρικὰ μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσίν;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίνων οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ κήπων ἐργασίας συγγράμματα καὶ νόμιμα;

ΕΤ. Κηπουρῶν.

ΣΩ. Κηπουρικοὶ ἄρα νόμοι ἡμῖν εἰσὶν οὗτοι.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν;

ΕΤ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἐπίστανται δ' οἱ κηπουροί.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίνων δὲ τὰ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμα;

ΕΤ. Μαγείρων.

ΣΩ. Μαγειρικοὶ ἄρα νόμοι εἰσίν;

ΕΤ. Μαγειρικοί.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄψου σκευασίας ἄρχειν;

317 ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπίστανται δ', ὥς φασιν, οἱ μάγειροι;

ΕΤ. Ἐπίστανται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τίνων δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως

SOC. Well answered. And do they so always?

COM. Yes, it is so always.

SOC. And do doctors on their part, in their treatises on health, write what they accept as real?

COM. Yes.

SOC. Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and medical laws.

COM. Medical, to be sure.

SOC. And are agricultural treatises likewise agricultural laws?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about garden-work?

COM. Gardeners'.

SOC. So these are our gardening laws.

COM. Yes.

SOC. Of people who know how to control gardens?

COM. Certainly.

SOC. And it is the gardeners who know.

COM. Yes.

SOC. And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?

COM. Cooks'.

SOC. Then there are laws of cookery?

COM. Of cookery.

SOC. Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And it is the cooks, they say, who know?

COM. Yes, it is they who know.

SOC. Very well; and now, whose are the treatises

317 συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν; ἆρ' οὐ τῶν ἐπισταμένων πόλεων ἄρχειν;

ΕΤ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἐπίστανται δὲ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἢ οἱ πολιτικοί τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοί;

ΕΤ. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πολιτικὰ ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματά ἐστιν, οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσι, βασιλέων τε καὶ
B ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν συγγράμματα.

ΕΤ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οἵ γε ἐπιστάμενοι οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα συγγράψουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν;

ΕΤ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μεταθήσονταί ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα νόμιμα;

ΕΤ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν οὖν ὁρῶμέν τινας ὁπουοῦν τοῦτο ποιοῦντας, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας;

ΕΤ. Ἀνεπιστήμονας.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ὀρθὸν ᾖ, νόμιμον αὐτὸ φήσομεν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἰατρικὸν ἢ τὸ μαγειρικὸν ἢ τὸ κηπουρικόν;

ΕΤ. Ναί.

C ΣΩ. Ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ ὀρθὸν ᾖ, οὐκέτι φήσομεν τοῦτο νόμιμον εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Οὐκέτι.

ΣΩ. Ἄνομον ἄρα γίγνεται.

ΕΤ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι τοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ὅλως περὶ πόλεως

and accepted rules about the government of a state? Of the people who know how to control states, are they not?

COM. I agree.

SOC. And is it anyone else than statesmen and royal persons[1] who know?

COM. It is they, to be sure.

SOC. Then what people call "laws" are treatises of state,—writings of kings and good men.

COM. That is true.

SOC. And must it not be that those who know will not write differently at different times on the same matters?

COM. They will not.

SOC. Nor will they ever change one set of accepted rules for another in respect of the same matters.

COM. No, indeed.

SOC. So if we see some persons anywhere doing this, shall we say that those who do so have knowledge, or have none?

COM. That they have no knowledge.

SOC. And again, whatever is right, we shall say is lawful for each person, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And whatever is not right we shall decline to call lawful?

COM. We shall decline.

SOC. Then it becomes unlawful.

COM. It must.

SOC. And again, in writings about what is just and unjust, and generally about the government of a

[1] *Cf. Euthyd.* 291 c, *Politicus* 266-7, where Plato identifies the statesman's and the king's art.

317 διακοσμήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς χρὴ πόλιν διοικεῖν, τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὔ, ὃ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ἄνομον.

ET. Ναί.

D ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν.

ET. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐν αὐτῷ διαθεώμεθα.[1] τίς ἐπιστήμων διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα;

ET. Γεωργός.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος δὲ τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει;

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ γεωργὸς ἄρα νομεὺς ἀγαθὸς τούτων, καὶ οἱ τούτου νόμοι καὶ διανομαὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρθαί εἰσιν;

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ κρουμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἀγαθὸς νομεύς, καὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι, καὶ οἱ τίνος νόμοι ὀρθοί εἰσιν;

E ET. Οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ καὶ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ νομικώτατος ἄρα ἐν τούτοις, οὗτος αὐλητικώτατος.

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα διανεῖμαι ἄριστος; οὐχ ὅσπερ τὴν ἀξίαν;

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Αἱ τούτου ἄρα διανομαὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι, καὶ ὅστις περὶ ταῦτα νομικώτατος, καὶ νομεὺς ἄριστος.

[1] διαθεώμεθα Hermann: διαθώμεθα, θεασώμεθα MSS.

state and the proper way of governing it, that which is right is the king's law, but not so that which is not right, though it seems to be law to those who do not know; for it is unlawful.

COM. Yes.

SOC. Then we rightly admitted that law is discovery of reality.

COM. So it appears.

SOC. Now let us observe this further point about it. Who has knowledge of distributing[1] seed over land?

COM. A farmer.

SOC. And does he distribute the suitable seed to each sort of land?

COM. Yes.

SOC. Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are right in this matter?

COM. Yes.

SOC. And who is a good apportioner of notes struck for a tune, skilled in distributing suitable notes, and who is it whose laws are right here?

COM. The flute-player and the harp-player.

SOC. Then he who is the best lawyer in these matters is the best flute-player.

COM. Yes.

SOC. And who is most skilled in distributing food to human bodies? Is it not he who assigns suitable food?

COM. Yes.

SOC. Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.

[1] The words *διανέμειν* and *νομεύς* in this passage introduce the primitive meaning of *νόμος* — "distribution" or "apportionment" of each person's status, property, rights, etc.

317

ET. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὗτος;

ET. Παιδοτρίβης.

318 ΣΩ. Οὗτος τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος;

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ τὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀγέλην κράτιστος νέμειν; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;

ET. Ποιμήν.

ΣΩ. Οἱ τοῦ ποιμένος ἄρα νόμοι ἄριστοι τοῖς προβάτοις.

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ τοῦ βουκόλου τοῖς βουσίν.

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ τοῦ τίνος νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι.

ET. Φημὶ δή.

B ΣΩ. Καλῶς τοίνυν λέγεις. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, τίς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης; ἴσως οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ βούλει σε ὑπομνήσω;

ET. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ὁ Μαρσύας λέγεται καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ Ὄλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ;

ET. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ καὶ τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι, καὶ μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντας· καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν μόνα λοιπά, ὡς θεῖα ὄντα.

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[1] Here *νόμος* is connected with a special use of *νέμειν*—"find appropriate pasture for"—derived from its original meaning of "apportion."

COM. Certainly.

SOC. Who is he?

COM. A trainer.

SOC. He is the best man to pasture [1] the human herd of the body? [2]

COM. Yes.

SOC. And who is the best man to pasture a flock of sheep? What is his name?

COM. A shepherd.

SOC. Then the shepherd's laws are best for sheep.

COM. Yes.

SOC. And the herdsman's for oxen.

COM. Yes.

SOC. And whose laws are best for the souls of men? The king's, are they not? Say if you agree.

COM. I do.

SOC. Then you are quite right. Now can you tell me who, in former times, has proved himself a good lawgiver in regard to the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you cannot think of him: would you like me to remind you?

COM. Do by all means.

SOC. Then is it Marsyas, by tradition, and his beloved Olympus, the Phrygian?

COM. That is true.

SOC. And their flute-tunes also are most divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods; [3] and to this day they only remain, as being divine.

[2] The awkward imagery of this sentence obviously cannot have come from Plato's mind or hand.

[3] *Cf. Sympos.* 215 c (from which this allusion to Marsyas is feebly imitated) δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους, where "in need of the gods" seems to be a mystic phrase for "ready for divine possession" (ἐνθουσιασμός).

318
C ET. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ λέγεται τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλέων ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης γεγονέναι, οὗ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὡς θεῖα ὄντα;

ET. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθα, τίνες παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;

ET. Ἆρα Λακεδαιμονίους λέγεις καὶ Λυκοῦργον τὸν νομοθέτην;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε οὐδέπω ἴσως ἔτη τριακόσια ἢ ὀλίγῳ τούτων πλείω. ἀλλὰ τούτων τῶν νομίμων
D τὰ βέλτιστα πόθεν ἦκει; οἶσθα;

ET. Φασί γ' ἐκ Κρήτης.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτοι παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν, τίνες τούτων ἀγαθοὶ βασιλεῖς ἦσαν; Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες, ὧν οἵδε εἰσὶν οἱ νόμοι.

ET. Ῥαδάμανθύν γέ φασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαιον ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ Μίνων ἄγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄδικον.

ΣΩ. Ἀττικόν, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγεις μῦθον καὶ τραγικόν.

E ET. Τί δέ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω;

ΣΩ. Οὔκουν ὑπό γε Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου· καίτοι γε πιθανώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ὧν σὺ ἀκούων ταῦτα λέγεις.

ET. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν οὗτοι περὶ Μίνω λέγουσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δή σοι ἐρῶ, ἵνα μὴ καὶ σὺ ὥσπερ οἱ

COM. That is so.

SOC. And who by tradition has shown himself a good lawgiver among the ancient kings, so that to this day his ordinances remain, as being divine?

COM. I cannot think.

SOC. Do you not know which of the Greeks use the most ancient laws?

COM. Do you mean the Spartans, and Lycurgus the lawgiver?

SOC. Why, that is a matter, I daresay, of less than three hundred years ago, or but a little more. But whence is it that the best of those ordinances come? Do you know?

COM. From Crete, so they say.

SOC. Then the people there use the most ancient laws in Greece?

COM. Yes.

SOC. Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws were theirs.

COM. Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.

SOC. Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy.

COM. What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?

SOC. Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.

COM. Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?

SOC. I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot

318 πολλοὶ ἀσεβῇς. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅ τι τούτου ἀσεβέστερόν ἐστιν οὐδ' ὅ τι χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς τοὺς θείους ἀνθρώπους· ἀλλὰ πάνυ πολλὴν χρὴ προμήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἀεί, ὅταν μέλλῃς 319 ἄνδρα ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴπῃς. τούτου καὶ ἕνεκα χρὴ μανθάνειν διαγιγνώσκειν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας. νεμεσᾷ γὰρ ὁ θεός, ὅταν τις ψέγῃ τὸν ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον ἢ ἐπαινῇ τὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως ἔχοντα· ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ ἀγαθός. μὴ γάρ τι οἷον λίθους μὲν εἶναι ἱεροὺς καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὄρνεα καὶ ὄφεις, ἀνθρώπους δὲ μή· ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων ἱερώτατόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀγαθός, καὶ μιαρώτατον ὁ πονηρός.

Ἤδη οὖν καὶ περὶ Μίνω, ὡς αὐτὸν Ὅμηρός τε Β καὶ Ἡσίοδος ἐγκωμιάζουσι, τούτου ἕνεκα φράσω, ἵνα μὴ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου εἰς ἥρω Διὸς υἱὸν λόγῳ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς. Ὅμηρος γὰρ περὶ Κρήτης λέγων, ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἐν αὐτῇ εἰσὶ καὶ ἐνενήκοντα πόλεις, τῇσι δέ, φησίν,

ἔνι Κνωσὸς μεγάλη πόλις, ἔνθα τε Μίνως
ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής.

C ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο Ὁμήρου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Μίνων διὰ βραχέων εἰρημένον, οἷον οὐδ' εἰς ἕνα τῶν ἡρώων ἐποίησεν Ὅμηρος. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς σοφιστής ἐστι καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὕτη παγκάλη ἐστί, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι δηλοῖ, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. λέγει γὰρ τὸν Μίνων συγγίγνεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔτει τῷ Διὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ φοιτᾶν παιδευθησόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ σοφιστοῦ ὄντος τοῦ Διός. ὅτι οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας οὐκ ἔστιν

[1] Minos and Rhadamanthus were sons of Zeus by Europa.

conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to blame or praise a man, so as not to speak incorrectly. For this reason you must learn to distinguish honest and dishonest men: for God feels resentment when one blames a man who is like himself, or praises a man who is the opposite; and the former is the good man. For you must not suppose that while stocks and stones and birds and snakes are sacred, men are not; nay, the good man is the most sacred of all these things, and the wicked man is the most defiled.

So if I now proceed to relate how Minos is eulogized by Homer and Hesiod, my purpose is to prevent you, a man sprung from a man, from making a mistake in regard to a hero who was the son of Zeus.[1] For Homer,[2] in telling of Crete that there were in it many men and "ninety cities," says:

> And amongst them is the mighty city of Cnossos, where Minos was king, having colloquy[3] with mighty Zeus in the ninth year.

Now here in Homer we have a eulogy of Minos, briefly expressed, such as the poet never composed for a single one of the heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that sophistry is a highly honourable art, he makes plain in many other places, and particularly here. For he says that Minos consorted and discoursed with Zeus in the ninth year, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. And the fact that Homer assigned this privilege of having been educated by Zeus to no one

[2] *Od.* xix. 179.

[3] δαριστής means "one who has familiar converse" (δαρος).

319 ὅτῳ ἀπένειμεν Ὅμηρος τῶν ἡρώων, ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ἄλλῳ ἢ Μίνῳ, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἔπαινος
D θαυμαστός. καὶ Ὀδυσσείας ἐν Νεκυίᾳ δικάζοντα χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα πεποίηκε τὸν Μίνων, οὐ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν· Ῥαδάμανθυν δὲ οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα δικάζοντα πεποίηκεν οὔτε συγγιγνόμενον τῷ Διὶ οὐδαμοῦ· διὰ ταῦτά φημ' ἐγὼ Μίνων ἁπάντων μάλιστα ὑπὸ Ὁμήρου ἐγκεκωμιάσθαι. τὸ γὰρ Διὸς ὄντα παῖδα μόνον ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ ἔχει ὑπερβολὴν ἐπαίνου.

Τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἔπος τὸ

ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής,

E συνουσιαστὴν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι τὸν Μίνων. οἱ γὰρ ὄαροι λόγοι εἰσί, καὶ ὀαριστὴς συνουσιαστής ἐστιν ἐν λόγοις. ἐφοίτα οὖν δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον ὁ Μίνως, τὰ μὲν μαθησόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀποδειξόμενος, ἃ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐννεετηρίδι ἐμεμαθήκει παρὰ τοῦ Διός. εἰσὶ δὲ οἳ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν ὀαριστὴν συμπότην καὶ συμπαιστὴν εἶναι τοῦ Διός· ἀλλὰ τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμηρίῳ χρῷτο, ὅτι
320 οὐδὲν λέγουσιν οἱ οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνοντες. πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, οὐκ ἔστιν οἵτινες ἀπέχονται συμποσίων καὶ ταύτης τῆς παιδιᾶς, οὗ ἔστιν οἶνος, ἄλλοι ἢ Κρῆτες καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δεύτεροι, μαθόντες παρὰ Κρητῶν. ἐν Κρήτῃ δὲ εἷς οὑτός ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων νόμων, οὓς Μίνως ἔθηκε, μὴ συμπίνειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς μέθην. καίτοι δῆλον ὅτι, ἃ ἐνόμιζε καλὰ εἶναι, ταῦτα νόμιμα ἔθηκε καὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις. οὐ γάρ που, ὥσπερ γε φαῦλος ἄνθρωπος,
B ὁ Μίνως ἐνόμιζε μὲν ἕτερα, ἐποίει δὲ ἄλλα παρ' ἃ

among the heroes but Minos makes this a marvellous piece of praise. And in the Ghost-raising in the *Odyssey* [1] he has described Minos as judging with a golden sceptre in his hand, but not Rhadamanthus : Rhadamanthus he has neither described here as judging nor anywhere as consorting with Zeus ; wherefore I say that Minos above all persons has been eulogized by Homer. For to have been the son of Zeus, and to have been the only one who was educated by Zeus, is praise unsurpassable.

For the meaning of the verse—" was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year "—is that Minos was a disciple of Zeus. For colloquies are discourses, and he who has colloquy is a disciple by means of discourse. So every ninth year Minos repaired to the cave of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show his knowledge of others that he had learnt from Zeus in the preceding nine years. Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus : but one may take the following as a proof that they who suppose so are babblers. For of all the many nations of men, both Greek and foreign, the only people who refrain from drinking-bouts and the jesting that occurs where there is wine, are the Cretans, and after them the Spartans, who learnt it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of their laws which Minos ordained that they are not to drink with each other to intoxication. And yet it is evident that the things he thought honourable were what he ordained as lawful for his people as well. For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, think one thing and do

[1] *Od.* xi. 569.

320 ἐνόμιζεν· ἀλλ' ἦν αὕτη ἡ συνουσία, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διὰ λόγων ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ εἰς ἀρετήν. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τούτους ἔθηκε τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις, δι' οὓς ἥ τε Κρήτη τὸν πάντα χρόνον εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ Λακεδαίμων, ἀφ' οὗ ἤρξατο τούτοις χρῆσθαι, ἅτε θείοις οὖσι.

Ῥαδάμανθυς δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ἦν ἀνήρ· ἐπεπαίδευτο γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ Μίνω· ἐπεπαίδευτο μέντοι οὐχ C ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην, ἀλλ' ὑπηρεσίαν τῇ βασιλικῇ, ὅσον ἐπιστατεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις· ὅθεν καὶ δικαστὴς ἀγαθὸς ἐλέχθη εἶναι. νομοφύλακι γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ὁ Μίνως κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην Κρήτην τῷ Τάλῳ. ὁ γὰρ Τάλως τρὶς περιῄει τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ κατὰ τὰς κώμας, φυλάττων τοὺς νόμους ἐν αὐταῖς, ἐν χαλκοῖς γραμματείοις ἔχων γεγραμμένους τοὺς νόμους, ὅθεν χαλκοῦς ἐκλήθη. εἴρηκε δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος ἀδελφὰ D τούτων εἰς τὸν Μίνων. μνησθεὶς γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος φησίν

> ὃς βασιλεύτατος γένετο θνητῶν βασιλήων,
> καὶ πλείστων ἤνασσε περικτιόνων ἀνθρώπων,
> Ζηνὸς ἔχων σκῆπτρον· τῷ καὶ πολέων βασίλευε.

καὶ οὗτος λέγει τὸ τοῦ Διὸς σκῆπτρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὴν παιδείαν τὴν τοῦ Διός, ᾗ εὔθυνε τὴν Κρήτην.

ΕΤ. Διὰ τί οὖν ποτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη ἡ φήμη κατεσκέδασται τοῦ Μίνω ὡς ἀπαιδεύτου E τινὸς καὶ χαλεποῦ ὄντος;

ΣΩ. Δι' ὃ καὶ σύ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς,

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[1] Talos, the brazen man who was given to Minos by Zeus, is described by Apoll. Rhod. iv. 1639 foll., and Apollodorus i. 9. 26 (where see Sir J. G. Frazer's note in this series).

another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education in virtue. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws, which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine.

Rhadamanthus was a good man indeed, for he had been educated by Minos; he had, however, been educated, not in the whole of the kingly art, but in one subsidiary to the kingly, enough for presiding in law courts; so that he was spoken of as a good judge. For Minos used him as guardian of the law in the city, and Talos[1] as the same for the rest of Crete. For Talos thrice a year made a round of the villages, guarding the laws in them, by holding their laws inscribed on brazen tablets, which gave him his name of "brazen." And what Hesiod[2] also has said of Minos is akin to this. For after mentioning him by name he remarks—

> Who was most kingly of mortal kings, and lorded it over more neighbouring folk than any, holding the sceptre of Zeus: therewith it was that he ruled the cities as king.

And by the sceptre of Zeus he means nothing else than the education that he had of Zeus, whereby he directed Crete.

COM. Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated and harsh-tempered person?

SOC. Because of something that will make both you,

[1] The passage quoted does not occur in our text of Hesiod, nor is it quoted by any other writer. The metre of the first line would be improved if we could read *βασιλευτότατος*, from the *βασιλευτός* used by Aristotle, *Pol.* iii. 17. 1.

320 εὐλαβήσει καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ἀνήρ, ὅτῳ μέλει τοῦ εὐδόκιμον εἶναι, μηδέποτε ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ποιητικῷ μηδενί. οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν, ἐφ' ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῶσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἢ εὐλογοῦντες ἢ κατηγοροῦντες. ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως, πολεμήσας τῇδε τῇ πόλει, ἐν ᾗ ἄλλη τε πολλὴ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ποιηταὶ παντοδαποὶ τῆς τε ἄλλης ποιήσεως καὶ τραγῳδίας. ἡ δὲ
321 τραγῳδία ἐστὶ παλαιὸν ἐνθάδε, οὐχ ὡς οἴονται ἀπὸ Θέσπιδος ἀρξαμένη οὐδ' ἀπὸ Φρυνίχου, ἀλλ' εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι, πάνυ παλαιὸν αὐτὸ εὑρήσεις ὂν τῇδε τῆς πόλεως εὕρημα. ἔστι δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως δημοτερπέστατόν τε καὶ ψυχαγωγικώτατον ἡ τραγῳδία· ἐν ᾗ δὴ καὶ ἐντείνοντες[1] ἡμεῖς τὸν Μίνων τιμωρούμεθα ἀνθ' ὧν ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασε τοὺς δασμοὺς τελεῖν ἐκείνους. τοῦτο οὖν ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως, ἀπεχθόμενος ἡμῖν, ὅθεν δή, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, κακοδοξότερος γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἀγαθὸς ἦν
B καὶ νόμιμος, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, νομεὺς ἀγαθός, τοῦτο μέγιστον σημεῖον, ὅτι ἀκίνητοι αὐτοῦ οἱ νόμοι εἰσίν, ἅτε τοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως ἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

ΕΤ. Δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσί σοι παλαιοτάτοις Κρῆτες οἱ Μίνω καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθυος πολῖται νόμοις χρῆσθαι;

[1] This is the meaning most probably intended, from an imperfect understanding of ἐντείνειν ("put some story into verse, or accompany it with music") in Plato, *Phaedo* 60 D; *Protag.* 326 B. Minos was represented as a harsh despot in Euripides' *Cretans*, and probably also in other lost plays.

[2] The legend was that Minos defeated the Athenians in

if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarrelling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy. Now tragedy is a thing of ancient standing here; it did not begin, as people suppose, from Thespis or from Phrynichus, but if you will reflect, you will find it is a very ancient invention of our city. Tragedy is the most popularly delightful and soul-enthralling branch of poetry: in it, accordingly, we get Minos on the rack of verse,[1] and thus avenge ourselves for that tribute which he compelled us to pay.[2] This, then, was the mistake that Minos made—his quarrel with us—and hence it is that, as you said in your question, he has fallen more and more into evil repute. For that he was a good and law-abiding person, as we stated in what went before—a good *apportioner*—is most convincingly shown by the fact that his laws are unshaken, since they were made by one who discovered aright the truth of reality in regard to the management of a state.

COM. In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.

SOC. Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?

war and compelled them to send a regular tribute of seven youths and seven maidens to be devoured by the Minotaur in the Cretan labyrinth.

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ET. Φαίνονται.

ΣΩ. Οὗτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄριστοι νομοθέται
C γεγόνασι, νομῆς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔφη ποιμένα λαῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν στρατηγόν.

ET. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου· εἴ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο, ὁ τῷ σώματι ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς τί ἐστι ταῦτα ἃ διανέμων ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, εἴποιμεν ἂν καλῶς τε καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι τροφήν τε καὶ πόνους, τῇ μὲν αὔξων, τοῖς δὲ γυμνάζων καὶ συνιστὰς [τὸ σῶμα][1] αὐτό.

ET. Ὀρθῶς γε.

D ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τί δὲ δή ποτε ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν ‹ἃ›[2] ὁ ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς διανέμων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βελτίω αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, τί ἂν ἀποκρινάμενοι οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθεῖμεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας αὐτῶν;

ET. Οὐκέτι τοῦτ' ἔχω εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἑκατέρου, τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς φαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας, ἐν οἷς αὐταῖς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φλαῦρον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐσκέφθαι.

[1] τὸ σῶμα seclusi. [2] ἃ om. mss.

COM. I do.

SOC. So these have shown themselves the best lawgivers among men of ancient times—apportioners and shepherds of men; just as Homer called the good general a "shepherd of the folk."

COM. Quite so, indeed.

SOC. Come then, in good friendship's name: if someone should ask us what it is that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to it when he makes it better, we should say, if we were to make a correct and brief answer, that it was food and labour; the former to strengthen, and the latter to exercise and brace it.

COM. And we should be right.

SOC. And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better? —what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?

COM. This time I am unable to say.

SOC. But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and the rest.

EPINOMIS

INTRODUCTION TO THE *EPINOMIS*

THE name of this short dialogue denotes that it was intended to serve as an appendix to Plato's *Laws*. It is improbable, however, that Plato would have appended this scanty and unsatisfactory chapter to that comprehensive treatise, instead of correcting and expanding the latter in many places where it would apparently have benefited by the author's revision. And when we consider the *Epinomis* in detail, we very soon become aware of contact with an inferior mind, which feebly strays and stumbles among the last physical and metaphysical speculations of Plato. The *Epinomis* appears to have been grouped with the *Laws* and the *Minos*, to form a set of three, by Aristophanes of Byzantium, the librarian at Alexandria, about 200 B.C. Already a number of dialogues had been attributed to Plato which by that time were commonly rejected as spurious: many forgeries were doubtless produced to meet the book-collecting zeal of the Ptolemies in the third century B.C., and the *Epinomis*, like the *Minos*, contrived to pass muster. Its inclusion here with the Platonic writings may be justified, partly as providing a curious illustration of such forgery, and of the superficial acquaintance with Plato's genius and manner which must account for the mistake made by the Alexandrian scholars in accepting it as genuine; but it also has some undoubted merits of its own—in its treatment of astronomical and mathematical theories and its earnest, if rather vague, manner of exposition—which deserve the attention of Platonic students.

The primary object of the work is to supplement the passage at the end of the *Laws* (xii. 966-7), where the training of the Nocturnal Council is briefly sketched. The speakers are the same—the Athenian stranger, Megillus the Spartan, and Cleinias the Cretan—and they are continuing the conversation that they had the day before, as described at the beginning of the *Laws* (i. 625), on a walk from Cnossos to the temple of Zeus beneath Mount Ida in Crete. As before, the Athenian does most of the speaking. He expounds his scheme of education, consisting of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy: the last of these is to be a kind of theology, involving a study of the cosmic soul or life-principle, and of the various degrees of divine beings (973-983); the writer here seems to have had his eye on the *Timaeus*. We proceed to consider the special kind of mathematics recommended in *Laws*, vii. 818-820, under the heads of arithmetic and geometry as applied to astronomy (990-992).

Through the verbose and ill-connected exposition of the Athenian one impression emerges clearly enough—that the author is intent on urging the importance of astronomy as the means to true wisdom. We need only read with attention the concluding pages of the *Laws* to realize how much more profound and ample is the wisdom which Plato inculcates, and how far below even his last composition, betraying, as it does, some decline in his powers of reasoning and expression, is the hardy attempt of this zealous but small-minded imitator.

(*Note.*—The following version owes many improvements to the translation and commentary of J. Harward, Clarendon Press, 1928.)

ΕΠΙΝΟΜΙΣ

[Η ΝΥΚΤΕΡΙΝΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ Η ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΛΕΙΝΙΑΣ ΚΡΗΣ, ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΣ ΞΕΝΟΣ, ΜΕΓΙΛΛΟΣ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΣ

St. II. p. 973

ΚΛ. Πρὸς μὲν τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἥκομεν ἅπαντες ὀρθῶς, ὦ ξένε, τρεῖς ὄντες, ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ Μέγιλλος ὅδε, τὸ τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπισκεψόμενοι τίνι ποτὲ χρὴ λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν, ὃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἕξιν φαμέν, ὅταν διανοηθῇ, κάλλιστ' ἔχειν ποιεῖν πρὸς φρόνησιν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ σχεῖν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα, ὡς φαμεν, ἅπαντα διεξήλθομεν ὅσα ἦν
B περὶ νόμων θέσιν· ὃ δὲ μέγιστον εὑρεῖν τε καὶ εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε μαθὼν θνητὸς ἄνθρωπος σοφὸς ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο οὔτε εἴπομεν οὔτε ηὕρομεν. νῦν δὲ πειρώμεθα τοῦτο μὴ καταλιπεῖν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἂν πράξαιμεν οὗ χάριν ἅπαντες ὡρμήσαμεν, ὡς φανερὰ ποιήσοντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους.

ΑΘ. Ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, καλῶς μὲν λέγεις, ἄτοπον

[1] *i.e.* describing the special training of the members of the Nocturnal Council of the *Laws*, xii. 961 ff.: this Council of the projected Cretan colony, corresponding to the Athenian

EPINOMIS

[OR NOCTURNAL COUNCIL[1]; OR PHILOSOPHER]

CHARACTERS

CLEINIAS OF CRETE, ATHENIAN VISITOR, MEGILLUS OF SPARTA

CL. True to our agreement, good sir, we have come all three—you and I and Megillus here—to consider the question of wisdom, and in what terms we ought to describe that which we say produces, when comprehended, the most excellent disposition of the human being for as much wisdom as is possible for man. For we claim that we have described all the other matters connected with law-giving; but the most important thing for us to discover and state—what it is that mortal man should learn in order to be wise—this we have neither stated nor discovered. Let us, however, now try to make good this defect: else we shall practically leave incomplete the quest on which we all set out, with the purpose of making our subject clear from beginning to end.

ATH. My dear Cleinias, you are quite right, yet I

[1] Areopagus, was to consist of high magistrates and retired officials, and hold its meetings at night. The characters and the scene (Crete) are the same as those of the *Laws*.

973 μὴν ἀκούσεσθαί σε λόγον οἶμαι, καί τινα τρόπον
οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ. πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ προστυχεῖς τῷ βίῳ
C γιγνόμενοι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον φέρουσιν, ὡς οὐκ
ἔσται μακάριον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος οὐδ' εὖ-
δαιμον. ἔπου δὴ καὶ σύνιδε, ἄν σοι δοκῶ κἀγὼ
μετ' αὐτῶν καλῶς τοῦ τοιούτου πέρι λέγειν. οὔ
φημι εἶναι δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις μακαρίοις τε καὶ
εὐδαίμοσι γενέσθαι πλὴν ὀλίγων· μέχριπερ ἂν
ζῶμεν τοῦτο διορίζομαι· καλὴ δὲ ἐλπὶς τελευτή-
σαντι τυχεῖν ἁπάντων, ὧν ἕνεκά τις προθυμοῖτ'
ἂν ζῶν τε ὡς κάλλιστ' ἂν ζῇν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ
τελευτήσας τελευτῆς τοιαύτης τυχεῖν. λέγω δ'
D οὐδὲν σοφόν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἅπαντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ
βάρβαροι γιγνώσκομέν τινα τρόπον, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
τὸ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν ἅπαντι ζῴῳ· πρῶτον μὲν
τὸ μετασχεῖν τῆς τῶν κυουμένων ἕξεως, ἔπειτ' αὖ
τὸ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὸ τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι,
διὰ πόνων μυρίων ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι σύμπαντα, ὥς
974 φαμεν ἅπαντες. καὶ χρόνος βραχὺς ἄν τις εἴη
πρὸς λογισμὸν μή τι[1] τῶν μοχθηρῶν, ἀλλ' ὃ πᾶς
ἂν ὑπολάβοι μέτριον. οὗτος δὲ σχεδὸν ἀναπνοὴν
δοκεῖ ποιεῖν τινα κατὰ μέσον πῃ βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπι-
νον· ταχύ γε μὴν ἐπιλαβὸν γῆρας ὄντινοῦν ποιήσει'
ἂν μήποτ' ἐθελῆσαι πάλιν ἀναβιῶναι, λογισάμενον
τὸν βεβιωμένον ἑαυτῷ βίον, ὅστις μὴ τυγχάνει
παιδικῆς δόξης μεστὸς ὤν. τούτων δὴ τί ποτέ μοι
τεκμήριον; ὅτι πέφυκε ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον
B τῷ λόγῳ. ζητοῦμεν δὲ δή, τίνα τρόπον σοφοὶ
γενησόμεθα, ὡς οὔσης τινὸς ἑκάστοις ταύτης
τῆς δυνάμεως· ἡ δὲ φυγῇ φεύγει τότε, ὅταν τις

[1] τι cod. Voss.: τοι mss.

think you are about to hear a strange statement; and, in a sense, one that is not so strange either. For many on becoming acquainted with life have the same account to give—that the human race will not be blessed or happy. So follow me now and apprehend if you conceive me, as well as them, to be giving a proper account of this matter. I say it is impossible for men to be blessed and happy, except a few; that is, so long as we are living: I limit it to that. But one may rightly hope to attain after death all the things for whose sake one may strive both in life to live as nobly as one can and in death to find a noble end.[1] What I say is no subtle doctrine, but a thing that all of us, Greeks and foreigners alike, in some way perceive—that from the beginning existence is difficult for every live creature: first, partaking of the state of things conceived, then again, being born, and further, being reared and educated—all these processes involve a vast amount of toil, we all agree. And our time must be a short one, I do not say by a reckoning of our miseries, but of any supposition of what is tolerable. This seems in a way to give some breathing-space about the middle of human life: yet swiftly old age is upon us, and must make any of us loth ever to come to life again, when one reckons over the life one has lived—unless one happens to be a bundle of childish notions. And what can be my evidence for this? It is that such is the nature of the matter now under inquiry in our discussion. We are inquiring, you know, in what way we shall become wise, presuming that each of us has this power in some sort or other: but it evades and escapes us as soon as

[1] The translation does not attempt to reproduce the alliteration of the last four words of this sentence.

974 *πρός τινα φρόνησιν ἴῃ τῶν λεγομένων τεχνῶν ἢ φρονήσεων ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων ὡς οἰόμεθα ἐπιστημῶν, ὡς ἀξίας τούτων οὐδεμιᾶς οὔσης ἐπίκλησιν ῥηθῆναι τῆς περὶ ταῦτα σοφίας τἀνθρώπινα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς σφόδρα πεποιθυίας καὶ μαντευομένης, ὡς οὔσης αὐτῇ κατά τινα φύσιν ταύτης,*
C *τίς δ' ἔστι καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς, οὐ πάνυ δυναμένης ἐξευρίσκειν. ἆρ' οὐ τούτῳ σφόδρα προσέοιχ' ἡμῶν ἡ περὶ σοφίαν ἀπορία καὶ ζήτησις, πλείων τῆς ἐλπίδος ἑκάστῳ γιγνομένη τῶν ὅσοι ἐν ἡμῖν δυνατοὶ γίγνονται φρονίμως αὐτοὺς ἄλλους τε ἐξετάσαι συμφώνως διὰ λόγων πάντων καὶ πάντῃ λεγομένων; ταῦτ' οὐχ οὕτως ἢ ταύτῃ συμφήσομεν ἔχειν;*

ΚΛ. *Συμφήσομεν ἐπ' ἐλπίδι σοι ἴσως ταῦτ', ὦ*
D *ξένε, τῇ μετὰ σοῦ κατὰ χρόνον ἂν γενομένῃ, δοξάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εἰσαῦθις τὸ ἀληθέστατον.*

ΑΘ. *Τὰς ἄλλας τοίνυν, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαι μέν εἰσι λεγόμεναι, σοφὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀποτελοῦσι τὸν λαμβάνοντά τε αὐτὰς καὶ ἔχοντα, πρῶτον διεξιτέον, ὅπως ταύτας ἐκποδὼν θέμενοι πειρώμεθα ἐκείνας ὧν δεόμεθα παραθέσθαι τε καὶ παραθέμενοι μανθάνειν.*

Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ὧν πρῶτον δεῖ θνητῷ γένει,
E *ἴδωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ μὲν ἀναγκαιόταται σχεδὸν ἀληθῶς τε πρῶται, ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος, εἰ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔδοξέ τις εἶναί ποτε σοφός, οὔκουν νῦν γε οὔτε σοφὸς εἶναι δοξάζεται ὀνείδη τε ἴσχει*
975 *μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης. ἐροῦμεν δὴ αἵ τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ὅτι πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτάς, σχεδὸν ὅσοις ἀγὼν πρόκειται τοῦ δοκεῖν ὡς ἄριστον ἄνδρα συμβῆναι γενόμενον ἄν, φεύγει διὰ τὰς κτήσεις*

we attempt any knowledge of reputed arts or knowledges or any of the ordinary sciences, as we suppose them to be; for none of them seems worthy to be called by the title of the wisdom that pertains to these human affairs. Yet the soul firmly believes and divines that somehow in nature she has it, but what it is that she has, or when, or how, she is quite unable to discover. Is not this a fair picture of our puzzle about wisdom and the inquiry that we have to make—a greater one than any of us could expect who are found able to examine ourselves and others intelligently and consistently by every kind and manner of argument? Shall we not agree that this, or the like, is the case?

CL. We shall probably agree with you on that, my good sir, in the hope which in time your aid will surely give us of forming hereafter the truest opinion on these matters.

ATH. Then first we must go through the other sciences, which are reputed as such, but do not render him wise who acquires and possesses them; in order that, having put them out of the way, we may try to bring forward those that we require, and having brought them forward, to learn them.

First, therefore, let us observe that while the sciences which are first needs of the human race are about the most necessary and truly the first, yet he who acquires a knowledge of them, though in the beginning he may have been regarded as wise in some sort, is now not reputed wise at all, but rather incurs reproach by the knowledge he has got. Now we will mention what they are, and that almost everyone who makes it his goal to be thought likely to prove himself in the end as good a man as possible avoids them, in order to gain the acquirements of under-

975 τῆς φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεως. ἔστω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς ἀλληλοφαγίας τῶν ζῴων ἡμᾶς τῶν μέν, ὡς ὁ μῦθός ἐστι, τὸ παράπαν ἀποστήσασα, τῶν δὲ εἰς τὴν νόμιμον ἐδωδὴν καταστήσασα. ἴλεῳ δ' ἡμῖν οἱ προσθεν εἴησάν τε καὶ εἰσίν· οἵτινες μὲν γὰρ ὧν[1] ἐλέγομεν πρῶτοι χαιρέτωσαν· ἡ δ' οὖν
B ἀλφίτων τε καὶ ἀλεύρων ποίησις ἅμα καὶ τροφὴ καλὴ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθή, σοφὸν δὲ ἄνδρα τελέως οὐκ ἐθελήσει ποτὲ ἀπεργάσασθαι· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτό, ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως ἐπίκλησις, τῶν ποιουμένων αὐτῶν δυσχέρειαν ἀπεργάζοιτ' ἄν. σχεδὸν δ' οὐδὲ χώρας συμπάσης γεωργία· οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἀλλὰ φύσει κατὰ θεὸν πάντες φαινόμεθα γῆν μετακεχειρίσθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ τῶν οἰκήσεών γε συνυφὴ καὶ σύμπασα οἰκοδομία καὶ σκευῶν πάντων ἀπεργαστική, χαλ-
C κεία τε καὶ ἡ τῶν τεκτονικῶν καὶ πλαστικῶν καὶ πλεκτικῶν καὶ ἔτι συμπάντων ὀργάνων παρασκευή, δήμῳ τὸ πρόσφορον ἔχουσα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ λεγομένη. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ σύμπασα θηρευτική, πολλή περ καὶ τεχνικὴ γεγονυῖα, τό γε μεγαλοπρεπὲς σὺν τῷ σοφῷ οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μαντική γε οὐδ' ἑρμηνευτικὴ τὸ παράπαν· τὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ οἶδε μόνον, εἰ δ' ἀληθές, οὐκ ἔμαθεν.

"Οτε δὴ τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὁρῶμεν κτῆσιν διὰ
D τέχνης μὲν ἀπεργαζομένην, τούτων δὲ οὐδεμίαν οὐδένα σοφὸν ποιοῦσαν, τό γε μετὰ τοῦτο παιδιά τις ἂν λείποιτο, μιμητικὴ μὲν τὸ πλεῖστον, ἀλλ'

[1] ὧν Stallbaum: οὖν MSS.

[1] "Some" means "men," and "others" means "other animals."

[2] *i.e.* the first men who practised a selective eating of flesh.

standing and study. So first let us take that which removed us from the practice among animate beings of eating each other and, as the story goes, has made us refrain entirely from some, while it has settled us in the lawful eating of others.[1] May the men of old time be gracious to us, as they are : for we must take our leave of whatever men were the first of those we were just mentioning [2] ; but at any rate the making of barley-meal and flour, with the sustenance thereof, is fine and good indeed, yet it is never like to produce a perfectly wise man. For this very name of *making* must produce [3] an irksomeness in the actual things that are made. Nor can it well be husbandry of land in general : for it is not by art but by a natural gift from Heaven, it seems, that we all have the earth put into our hands. Nor again is it the fabrication of dwellings and building in general, nor the production of all sorts of appliances—smiths' work, and the supply of carpenters', moulders' and plaiters' work, and, in fine, all kinds of implements ; for this is of advantage to the public, but is not accounted for virtue. Nor again the whole practice of hunting, which although grown extensive and a matter of skilled art, gives no return of magnificence with its wisdom. Nor surely can it be divination or interpretation [4] as a whole ; for these only know what is said, but have not learnt whether it be true.

And now that we see that the acquisition of necessaries is achieved by means of art, but that no such art makes any man wise, there may be some diversion remaining after this—imitative for the most part, but

[3] The word " produce " is repeated here in a strained sense of " declare," " indicate," or the like. The very idea of " making " implies a certain annoyance incompatible with perfect wisdom.

[4] *i.e.* of omens, heavenly signs, etc.

975 *οὐδαμῇ σπουδαία. πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ὀργάνοις μιμοῦνται, πολλοῖς δ' αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων οὐ πάντως εὐσχήμοσι μιμήμασι, τά τε κατὰ λόγους καὶ μοῦσαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ὅσων γραφικὴ μήτηρ, πολλῶν καὶ παντοίων ποικιλμάτων ἀποτελουμένων ἐν πολλοῖς ὑγροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς γένεσιν· ὧν σοφὸν οὐδένα εἰς οὐδὲν σπουδῇ τῇ μεγίστῃ δημιουργοῦντα ἡ μιμητικὴ παρέχεται.*

E *Πάντων δ' ἐξειργασμένων τὸ λοιπὸν βοήθεια γίγνοιτ' ἂν μυρία μυρίοις, ἡ μὲν μεγίστη τε καὶ εἰς πλεῖστα πολεμικὴ κληθεῖσα, στρατηγικὴ τέχνη, εὐδοκιμωτάτη πρὸς χρείαν, εὐτυχίας πλείστης*
δεομένη, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ σοφίᾳ
976 *δεδομένη. ἣν δὲ καλοῦσι μὲν ἰατρικήν, βοήθεια δέ που καὶ αὕτη σχεδὸν ὅσων ὧραι ψύχει καὶ καύματι ἀκαίρῳ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λῃζονται τὴν τῶν ζῴων φύσιν. εὐδόκιμον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς σοφίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην· ἄμετρα γὰρ δόξαις φορεῖται τοπαζόμενα. βοηθοὺς δέ που καὶ τοὺς κυβερνήτας ἅμα καὶ τοὺς ναύτας ἐροῦμεν, καὶ τούτων ἄνδρα σοφὸν μηδένα τις ἡμᾶς παραμυθούμενος ἐξ ἁπάντων διαγγελλέτω· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείη τις*
B *πνεύματος ὀργὴν οὐδὲ φιλίαν, ὃ προσφιλὲς ἁπάσῃ κυβερνητικῇ. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὁπόσοι βοηθοὶ δίκαις ἐν τῇ τοῦ λέγειν ῥώμῃ φασὶ γίγνεσθαι, μνήμῃ καὶ τριβῇ δόξης ἤθεσι προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν, ἀληθείας δὲ τῶν ὄντως δικαίων ἐκτὸς παρεσφαλμένοι.*

Λοιπὴ δ' ἔτι πρὸς δόξαν σοφίας ἐστί τις ἄτοπος δύναμις, ἣν φύσιν ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ἢ σοφίαν ὀνομάσειαν, τότε ὅταν τινά τις συννοῇ ῥᾳδίως μὲν

in no way serious. For they imitate with many instruments, and with many imitative acts, not altogether seemly, of their very bodies, in performances of speech and of every Muse, and in those whereof painting is mother, and whereby many and most various designs are elaborated in many sorts, moist and dry ; and though a man ply his craft in these with the greatest zeal, in nothing is he rendered wise by such imitation.

And when all these have been performed, there may yet remain assistance, in countless forms and countless cases : the greatest and most useful is called warfare, the art of generalship ; most glorified in time of need, requiring most good fortune, but in nature assigned rather to valour than to wisdom. And that which they call medicine is likewise, of course, an assistance in almost every case towards things of which animal nature is deprived by seasons of untimely cold and heat and all such visitations. But none of these aids is of high repute for the truest wisdom : for they are borne along by opinion, as inaccurate matter of conjecture. We may, I suppose, speak of pilots and sailors also as giving assistance : yet you shall not report, to appease us, a single wise man from amongst them all ; for none of them can know the wrath or amity of the wind, a desirable thing for all piloting. Nor again all those who say they can give assistance in law-suits by their powers of speech, men who by memory and skill in opinion pay attention to human character, but are far astray from the truth of what is really just.

There still remains, as a claimant to the name of wisdom, a certain strange power, which most people would call a natural gift rather than wisdom, appear-

976 ὅ τί περ ἂν μανθάνῃ μανθάνοντα, μάλα δὲ πολλὰ
C καὶ ἀσφαλῶς μνημονεύοντα, ὅταν τε τὸ πρόσφορον
ἑκάστῳ διαμνημονεύῃ τις, ὅ τι γιγνόμενον ἂν
πρέποι, τοῦτο δὲ ταχὺ δρᾷ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντα οἱ
μὲν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ σοφίαν, οἱ δὲ ἀγχίνοιαν θήσουσι
φύσεως· σοφὸν δὲ ὄντως οὐδενὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς τῶν
ἐμφρόνων ἐθελήσει ποτὲ καλεῖν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ φανῆναί γέ τινα ἐπιστήμην, ἣν
ἔχων σοφὸς γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ σοφὸς ὄντως ὢν καὶ
μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος. ἴδωμεν δή. χαλεπῷ μὲν
γὰρ λόγῳ παντάπασιν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ἑτέραν πάρεξ
D τῶν εἰρημένων εὑρεῖν, ἣ σοφία μὲν λέγοιτ' ἂν
ὄντως τε καὶ εἰκότως, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν οὔτε βάναυσος
οὔτ' ἠλίθιος ἔσται, σοφὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθός δι' αὐτὴν
πολίτης [τε] καὶ ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως
[ἔσται][1] πόλεως ἅμα καὶ ἐμμελής. κατίδωμεν δὴ
ταύτην πρώτην, τίς ποτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης
φύσεως ἐπιστήμη μία διεξελθοῦσα ἢ μὴ παρα-
γενομένη τῶν νῦν παρουσῶν ἀνοητότατον ἂν καὶ
ἀφρονέστατον παράσχοιτο ζῷον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
E οὐ δὴ τοῦτό γε πάνυ χαλεπὸν τὸ κατιδεῖν. μία γὰρ
ὡς εἰπεῖν πρὸς μίαν ἡ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δοῦσα παντὶ
τῷ θνητῷ γένει τοῦτ' ἂν δράσειεν· θεὸν δ' αὐτὸν
μᾶλλον ἢ τινα τύχην ἡγοῦμαι δόντα ἡμῖν σῴζειν
ἡμᾶς. ὃν δὲ θεὸν ἡγοῦμαι, φράζειν χρή, καίπερ
ἄτοπον ὄντα, καί πως οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ· πῶς γὰρ τὸ
977 ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ
μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αἴτιον ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ
γεγονέναι; τίνα δὴ καὶ σεμνύνων ποτὲ λέγω θεόν,

[1] τε et ἔσται secl. Stallbaum.

[1] Literally, "in tune," and hence "fitting in gracefully," "behaving with good taste," etc.

ing when one perceives someone learning this or that lesson with ease, and remembering a great many things securely ; or when a man recalls what is suitable to each case, as what should properly be done, and does it quickly. Some people will describe all this as nature, others as wisdom, and others as a natural readiness of mind : but no sensible person will ever call a man really wise for any of these gifts.

But surely there must be found some science, the possession of which will cause the wisdom of him who is really wise and not wise merely in men's opinion. Well, let us see : for in this laborious discussion we are trying our hardest to find some other science, apart from those we have mentioned, which can really and reasonably be termed wisdom ; such an acquirement as will not make one either a drudge or a witling, but will enable one to be a wise and good citizen, —just ruler and just subject—of his city, and also decorous.[1] So let us look for this one first, and see what single science it is of those that we now have which, by removing itself or being absent from human nature, must render mankind the most thoughtless and senseless of creatures. Well, there is no great difficulty in making that out. For if there is one more than another, so to speak, which will do this, it is the science which gave number to the whole race of mortals ; and I believe God rather than some chance gave it to us, and so preserves us. And I must explain who it is that I believe to be God, though he be a strange one, and somehow not strange either: for why should we not believe the cause of all the good things that are ours to have been the cause also of what is far the greatest, understanding ? And who is it that I magnify with the name of God, Megillus

ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία; σχεδὸν Οὐρανόν, ὃν καὶ δικαιότατον, ὡς σύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἅμα καὶ θεοί, τιμᾶν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι διαφερόντως αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν· δοῦναι δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως αὐτόν φαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ δώσειν, ἐάν τις θέλῃ συν-
B ακολουθεῖν. ἐὰν γὰρ ἴῃ τις ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ὀρθὴν τὴν τοῦδε, εἴτε κόσμον εἴτε Ὄλυμπον εἴτε Οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τῳ λέγειν, λεγέτω μέν, ἀκολουθείτω δέ, ὅπῃ ποικίλλων αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ στρέφων ἄστρα πάσας διεξόδους ὥρας τε καὶ τροφὴν πᾶσι παρέχεται. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὲ οὖν φρόνησιν, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, σὺν ἀριθμῷ παντί, καὶ τἆλλ' ἀγαθά· τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον, ἐάν τις τὴν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ δόσιν δεξάμενος ἐπεξέλθῃ πᾶσαν τὴν περίοδον.

Ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν ἐπανελθόντες πως τοῖς λόγοις
C ἀναμνησθῶμεν, ὅτι καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς ἐνοήσαμεν, ὡς, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐξέλοιμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τι φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ποτὲ ψυχὴ τούτου τοῦ ζῴου πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν λάβοι σχεδόν, ὅτου λόγος ἀπείη· ζῷον δέ, ὅ τι μὴ γιγνώσκοι δύο καὶ τρία μηδὲ περιττὸν μηδὲ ἄρτιον, ἀγνοοῖ δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀριθμόν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διδόναι λόγον ἔχοι περὶ ὧν αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας [ἔχοι][1] μόνον εἴη κεκτημένον· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετήν,
D ἀνδρείαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει· στερόμενος δὲ ἀληθοῦς λόγου σοφὸς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ὅτῳ δὲ σοφία μὴ προσείη, πάσης ἀρετῆς

[1] ἔχοι om. vulg.

[1] Apparently a metaphor from astronomy, meaning "the prescribed or proper course of study"; *cf.* Plato, *Rep.* 407 E. Or the word may refer to the actual scheme of the celestial order.

and Cleinias? It must be Heaven, which has full claim, no less than all other spirits and gods also, to our honour, and especially to our prayers. That it has been the cause of all the other good things we have, we shall all admit; that it really gave us number also, we assert, and that it will add to this gift, if we will but follow its lead. For if one enters on the right theory about it, whether one be pleased to call it World-order or Olympus or Heaven—let one call it this or that, but follow where, in bespangling itself and turning the stars that it contains in all their courses, it produces the seasons and food for all. And thence, accordingly, we have understanding in general, we may say, together with all number, and all other good things: but the greatest of these is when, after receiving its gift of numbers, one explores the whole circuit.[1]

Moreover, let us turn back some little way in our discussion and recall how entirely right we were in conceiving that if we should deprive human nature of number we should never attain to any understanding. For then the soul of that creature which could not *tell*[2] things would never any more be able, one may say, to attain virtue in entirety; and the creature that did not know two and three, or odd or even, and was completely ignorant of number, could never clearly *tell* of things about which it had only acquired sensations and memories. From the attainment of ordinary virtue—courage and temperance—it is certainly not debarred: but if a man is deprived of true *telling* he can never become wise, and he who has not the acquirement of wisdom

[2] There is a curious play here on the two meanings of λόγος—"reckoning," and "description." (*Cf.* the like English meanings of "tale" or "account.")

977 τὸ μέγιστον μέρος, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τελέως ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος εὐδαίμων ποτὲ γένοιτο. οὕτως ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ὑποτίθεσθαι· διότι δὲ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη, λόγος ἔτι πλείων πάντων γίγνοιτ' ἂν τῶν εἰρημένων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ νῦν ὀρθῶς ῥηθήσεται, ὅτι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν λεγόμενα, ἃ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν ἐῶντες εἶναι πάσας τὰς τέχνας, οὐδὲ
E τούτων ἓν οὐδὲν μένει, πάντα δ' ἀπολείπεται τὸ παράπαν, ὅταν ἀριθμητικήν τις ἀνέλῃ.

Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως[1] τις βραχέων ἕνεκα ἀριθμοῦ δεῖσθαι τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, εἰς τὰς τέχνας ἀποβλέψας· καίτοι μέγα μὲν καὶ τοῦτο· εἰ δέ τις ἴδοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τὸ θνητόν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ θεοσεβὲς γνωρισθήσεται καὶ ὁ[2] ἀριθμὸς ὄντως,
978 οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πᾶς ἄν τις γνοίη σύμπαντα ἀριθμόν, ὅσης ἡμῖν δυνάμεως αἴτιος ἂν εἴη συγγιγνόμενος· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ κατὰ μουσικὴν πᾶσαν διαριθμουμένων κινήσεώς τε καὶ φθόγγων δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ· καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ἀγαθῶν ὡς πάντων αἴτιον· ὅτι δὲ κακῶν οὐδενός, εὖ τοῦτο γνωστέον, ὃ καὶ τάχα γένοιτ' ἄν. ἀλλ' ἡ σχεδὸν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄτακτος ἀ-
σχήμων τε καὶ ἄρρυθμος ἀνάρμοστός τε φορά, καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα κακοῦ κεκοινώνηκέ τινος, ἐπι-
B λέλειπται παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ δεῖ τοῦθ' οὕτω διανοεῖσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα τελευτήσειν· καὶ τό γε δὴ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς ποτε μὴ γιγνώσκων,

[1] ἴσως Theo: ἱκανῶς mss.
[2] ὁ Theo: om. mss.

—the greatest part of virtue as a whole—can no more achieve the perfect goodness which may make him happy. Thus it is absolutely necessary to postulate number; but to show why this is necessary would need a still fuller argument than any that has been advanced. Yet here is one that will be particularly correct—that of the attributes of the other arts, which we granted them just now in going through the list of all the arts, not a single one can remain, but all of them are utterly discarded, when once you remove numeration.

And one may judge, perhaps, that the human race needs number for but slight uses, by glancing at the arts—and yet even that is a great matter—but if one could see the divinity of birth, and its mortality, in which awe of the divine will be taught, and number in its reality,[1] still it is not anybody who could tell how great is the power we should owe to the accompaniment of number as a whole—for it is clear that everything in music needs a distinct numeration of movement and notes—and above all, how it is the cause of all good things; and that it is the cause of no evil thing that may haply befall is a point that must be well understood. Nay, the motion that we may call unreasoned and unordered, lacking grace and rhythm and harmony, and everything that has a share of some evil, is deficient in number altogether; and in this light must the matter be regarded by him who means to end his life in happiness. And no one who does not know the just, the good, the honourable and all the rest of such qualities will ever, by

[1] *i.e.* our birth and death are alike under divine influence, and this means that they are governed by number—a Pythagorean argument.

ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐπιλαβόμενος, διαριθμήσεται πρὸς τὸ ἑαυτόν τε καὶ ἕτερον πεῖσαι τὸ παράπαν.

Ἴωμεν δὴ σκεψόμενοι πρὸς τοῦτ' αὐτό, πῶς ἐμάθομεν ἀριθμεῖν. φέρε· τὸ γὰρ ἓν δὴ καὶ δύο γέγονε πόθεν ἡμῖν ὥστ' ἐννοῆσαι, φύσιν ταύτην C ἔχουσιν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς πρὸς τὸ δυνατοὺς ἐννοεῖν εἶναι; πολλοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις αὖ τῶν ζῴων οὐδ' εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ἡ φύσις παραγέγονεν, ὥστε μαθεῖν δυνατοῖς εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀριθμεῖν, παρὰ δ' ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἐνῴκισεν ὁ θεός, ὥστε ἱκανοῖς εἶναι δεικνύμενον συννοεῖν, ἔπειτ' ἔδειξε καὶ δείκνυσιν· ὧν τί κάλλιον ἓν ἑνὸς ἄν τις θεάσαιτο πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας γένος, εἶτα εἰς τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς ἔλθοι μέρος ἔχων ὄψιν, ὅθεν ἕτερον πᾶν αὐτῷ D φαίνοιτ' ἄν; καὶ ἐλίττων δὴ ταῦτα αὐτὰ [ὄντα μὴ παύηται] πολλὰς μὲν νύκτας, πολλὰς δὲ ἡμέρας [ἃς][1] οὐρανός, οὐδέποτε παύεται διδάσκων ἀνθρώπους ἕν τε καὶ δύο, πρὶν ἂν καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος ἱκανῶς μάθῃ ἀριθμεῖν· ὡς γὰρ καὶ τρία καὶ τέτταρα καὶ πολλά, ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐπινοήσειεν ἂν ὁρῶν ταῦτα. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἓν ἐποίησε τὴν σελήνην ὁ θεὸς ἀπεργασάμενος, ἣ τοτὲ μὲν μείζων φαινομένη, τοτὲ δ' ἐλάττων, διεξῆλθεν ἄλλην ἀεὶ E φαίνουσα ἡμέραν, μέχρι πεντεκαίδεκα ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν· αὕτη δ' ἔστι περίοδος, εἰ βούλεταί τις τὸν κύκλον ἕνα ὅλον εἰς ἓν τιθέναι, ὥστε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ τὸ δυσμαθέστατον ἂν μαθεῖν ζῷον, οἷς παρέδωκε φύσιν ὁ θεὸς τοῦ δυνατοῖς εἶναι μανθάνειν.

[1] ὄντα μὴ παύηται et ἃς secl. Ast.

[1] The meaning obviously required—"shape" or "phase"—cannot be extracted from ἡμέραν, which is probably a copyist's error for ἰδέαν.

grasping true opinion, number them off so as fully to persuade both himself and his neighbour.

Now let us go on to inquire into the actual question of how we learnt to count in numbers. Tell me, whence have we got the conception of one and two, a natural gift that we have from the All to enable us to conceive of such things? Then again, many other living creatures are not endowed by nature even to the mere point of being enabled by the Father to learn to count; whereas in us, in the first place, God implanted this very faculty, so that we might be equal to comprehending a thing shown to us, and in the second place, he showed, and shows. Among such things, what one more singularly beautiful can a man behold than the world of day? Then he comes to the province of night with his vision; and there he will find quite another sight before him. And so the heaven, revolving these very objects for many nights and many days, never ceases to teach men one and two, until even the most unintelligent have learnt sufficiently to number; for that there are also three and four and many, each of us must further conceive on seeing those objects. And among them God made one thing that he wrought, the moon, which shows herself at one time larger, at another smaller, and runs her course, showing ever a new shape,[1] until fifteen days and nights are passed: this is her circuit, if one chooses to sum her orbit, as one and entire, in one[2]; so that, we may say, even the least intelligent creature must learn it, among those on whom God has bestowed the natural gift of being

[2] This seems to mean that the fifteen days from the new moon to the full moon give the basis for summing her whole thirty days' course—fifteen to the full, and fifteen back.

978 καὶ μέχρι μὲν τούτων τε καὶ ἐν τούτοις σύμπαν τὸ
δυνατὸν τῶν ζῴων μάλα ἀριθμητικὸν γέγονε, τὸ
979 καθ' ἓν αὐτὸ σκοποῦν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα
ἀριθμὸν ἀεὶ λογίζεσθαι, δοκῶ μὲν μείζονος ἕνεκα,
καὶ τούτου δὲ σελήνην, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐξανο-
μένην καὶ φθίνουσαν ἐμποιήσας, μῆνας πρὸς τὸν
ἐνιαυτὸν συνεστήσατο, καὶ πάντα ἀριθμὸν πρὸς
ἀριθμὸν ἤρξατο συνορᾶν εὐδαίμονι τύχῃ. διὰ δὲ
ταῦθ' ἡμῖν καρποί τε καὶ ἐγκύμων ἡ γῆ γέγονεν,
ὥστ' εἶναι τροφὴν πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀνέμων τε καὶ
ὑετῶν γιγνομένων οὐκ ἐξαισίων οὐδὲ ἀμέτρων· ἀλλ'
B εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦτα γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ φλαῦρον, οὐ
τὴν θείαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην αἰτιᾶσθαι χρὴ
φύσιν, οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ διανέμουσαν τὸν αὑτῶν βίον.
ἡμῖν δ' οὖν ζητοῦσι περὶ νόμων σχεδὸν ἔδοξε τὰ
μὲν ἄλλα ῥᾴδιά τ' εἶναι γνῶναι τὰ βέλτιστα ἀνθρώ-
ποις, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ἱκανὸς γίγνεσθαι καὶ συνεῖναι
τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ ποιεῖν, εἰ γνοίη, τί ποτ' ἔστιν ὃ
συμφέρειν εἰκὸς καὶ τί τὸ μὴ συμφέρον· ἔδοξε δὴ
καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα πάντα
C οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπὰ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τίνα τρόπον χρὴ
γίγνεσθαι χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους παγχάλεπον. καὶ
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα αὖ πάντα κτᾶσθαι χρηστά, τὸ λεγόμενόν
[τε],[1] καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ οὐ χαλεπόν, οὐσίαν τε ὅσην
δεῖ καὶ μὴ δεῖ, καὶ σῶμα οἷόν τε δεῖ καὶ μή· καὶ
ψυχὴν ὅτι μὲν ἀγαθὴν δεῖ, συγχωρεῖ πᾶς παντί, τὸ
δ' ὄντινα τρόπον ἀγαθήν, ὅτι μὲν αὖ δικαίαν καὶ
σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν, καὶ ταῦτα, ὅτι δὲ σοφήν,

[1] τε om. Bekker.

able to learn. Within these limits, and in this sphere, every creature so enabled has been made fully apt for numeration,—when it considers any unit by itself. But as to reckoning number, as they all do in their relations to each other, I think that God, not only for a greater reason, but to this end installed, as we mentioned, the waxing and waning of the moon, and combined the months to make up the year, and they all began to comprehend number in relation to number by a happy fortune. Hence it is that we have fruits and the teeming of the earth, so that there may be food for all creatures, with no inordinate or immoderate occurrences of winds and rains : but if in spite of this something does occur in an evil way, we ought not to charge it upon the divine but upon the human nature, for not disposing our own lives aright.

Now in our inquiry about laws, you know we decided that all other things that are best for men are easy to discover, and that everyone may become competent both to understand and to perform what he is told, if he discovers what is that which is likely to profit him, and what is not profitable : well, we decided, and we are still of the same mind, that all other studies are not very difficult, but that this of learning in what way we should become good men is one of the utmost difficulty. Everything else, again, that is good, as they say, is both possible and not difficult to acquire, and the amount of property that is wanted or not wanted, and the state of body that is wanted or not : everyone agrees that a good soul is wanted, and agrees, moreover, as to the manner of its goodness, that here again it must be just and temperate and brave ; but whereas everyone

979 φησὶ μὲν πᾶς δεῖν, ἤντινα δὲ σοφίαν, ὡς ἄρτι
D διεληλύθαμεν, οὐδεὶς οὐδενὶ τὸ παράπαν ἔτι συνομολογεῖ τῶν πολλῶν. νῦν οὖν δὴ παρὰ πάσας τὰς πρόσθεν σοφίας οὐ φαύλην τινὰ ἀνευρίσκομεν εἰς αὐτά γε ταῦτα, τὸ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι τόν γε μεμαθηκότα ἅπερ καὶ διεληλύθαμεν· εἰ δ' ἔστι σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτ' ἐπιστήμων καὶ ἀγαθός, τούτου δὴ πέρι λόγον δεῖ λαβεῖν.

ΚΛ. Ὦ ξένε, ὡς εἰκότως εἶπες, ὅτι περὶ μεγάλων μεγάλα ἐπιχειρεῖς φράζειν.

E ΑΘ. Οὐ γὰρ σμικρά, ὦ Κλεινία· τὸ δὲ χαλεπώτερον, ὅτι παντάπασι καὶ πάντως ἀληθῆ.

ΚΛ. Σφόδρα γε, ὦ ξένε· ἀλλ' ὅμως μὴ ἀποκάμῃς λέγων ὃ φῄς.

ΑΘ. Ναί, μηδὲ σφὼ τοίνυν ἀκούοντε.

ΚΛ. Ταῦτ' ἔσται· καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν ἐγώ σοι φράζω.

980 ΑΘ. Καλῶς. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὴ ῥητέον ἀνάγκῃ[1] πρῶτον, ὡς φαίνεται, μάλιστα μὲν ἄν, εἰ δυνάμεθα ἑνὶ λαβεῖν ὀνόματι, τίς ἐστιν ἣν οἰόμεθα σοφίαν εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' εἰ σφόδρα ἀδυνατοῦμεν, τὸ δεύτερον, τίνες εἰσί ποτε καὶ ὁπόσαι τινές, ἅς τις λαβὼν σοφὸς ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον μῦθον.

ΚΛ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΑΘ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀνεμέσητον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τὸ κάλλιον τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἄμεινον ἀπεικάζοντι λέγειν, οἷον παιδιᾷ καλῇ

[1] ἀνάγκῃ Schneider: ἀνάγκη MSS.

says it must be wise, no one any longer agrees at all with anyone else, in most cases—we have just now explained—as to what its wisdom should be. So now we are discovering, besides all those former kinds, a wisdom of no mean worth for this very purpose of showing how he is wise who has learnt the things that we have set forth. But whether he is wise who has knowledge of these things and is good at them, is what we must now examine.

CL. Good sir, how properly you said that you are undertaking to speak great things on great subjects![1]

ATH. Yes, for they are not small, Cleinias: but what is more difficult is to make sure that they are entirely and in every sense true.

CL. Very much so, good sir: but still, do not weary of the task of stating your views.

ATH. I will not, and therefore you two must not weary either of listening to me.

CL. Agreed: I give you my word for us both.

ATH. Thank you. To begin with, then, we must necessarily state first, it would seem—best of all, in a single word, if we are able so to put it—what is that which we suppose to be wisdom; but if we are utterly unable to do this, we must say in the second place what and how many kinds of it there are that a man must have acquired, if he is to be wise according to our story.

CL. Pray speak on.

ATH. And as to the next step, it will be no offence in the lawgiver that he speaks finer and higher things than have been previously said about the gods in his portrayal, making as it were a noble sport and

[1] This remark, however, does not appear to have been made.

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B χρωμένῳ καὶ τιμῶντι θεούς, ὕμνοις τε καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ γεραίροντι διάγειν τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον.

ΚΛ. Ἦ καλῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις. εἰ γάρ σοι τοῦτο τέλος εἴη τῶν νόμων, θεοὺς προσπαίσαντι καθαρώτερόν τε διαγαγόντι τὸν βίον τῆς ἅμα τελευτῆς ἀρίστης τε καὶ καλλίστης τυχεῖν.

ΑΘ. Πῶς οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, λέγομεν; ἢ δοκεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμνοῦντες σφόδρα τιμῶμεν, εὐχόμενοι τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιέναι λέγειν ἡμῖν; οὕτως ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

C ΚΛ. Θαυμαστῶς μὲν οὖν οὕτως. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε, πιστεύσας τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχου τε καὶ λέγε τὸν ἐπιόντα σοι λόγον τῶν καλῶν περὶ τοὺς θεούς τε καὶ τὰς θεάς.

ΑΘ. Ἔσται ταῦτα, ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἡμῖν ὑφηγῆται. συνεύχου μόνον.

ΚΛ. Λέγοις ἂν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο.

ΑΘ. Θεογονίαν τοίνυν καὶ ζῳογονίαν ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, πρῶτόν μοι, κακῶς ἀπεικασάντων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, βέλτιον ἀπεικάσαι κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον, ἀναλαβόντα ὃν πρὸς τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς ἐπι-
D κεχείρηκα λέγων,[1] φράζων ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ ἐπιμελούμενοι πάντων, σμικρῶν καὶ μειζόνων, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀπαραμύθητοι τῶν περὶ τὰ δίκαιά εἰσι πράγματα— εἰ δὴ μέμνησθέ γε, ὦ Κλεινία· ἐλάβετε μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὑπομνήματα· καὶ γὰρ ἦν τὰ ῥηθέντα τότε καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ· τόδε δὲ αὐτῶν ἦν τὸ μέγιστον, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη ψυχὴ σώματος ἅπασα παντός·

[1] λέγων Euseb.: λόγους mss.

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[1] *i.e.* the statement made in *Laws* x., on the existence of the gods, and the reverence due to them.

honouring the gods, with high tribute of his hymns and happiness throughout the period of his own life.

CL. Well spoken, indeed, good sir. Yes, may you have this consummation of your laws, after making fine sport in praising the gods and having passed a purer life, to find thereby the best and fairest end!

ATH. Then how, Cleinias, do we mean it? Should we honour the gods, think you, to the utmost with our hymns, praying that we may be moved to speak the fairest and best things about them? Do you mean it so, or how?

CL. Nay, absolutely so. Now, my excellent friend, pray to the gods with confidence, and utter the fine specimen of a speech that you are moved to make about the gods and goddesses.

ATH. It shall be done, if the god himself will be our guide. Do but join in my prayer.

CL. Speak what follows next.

ATH. It is necessary, then, it seems, that I should first portray in better terms, according to our previous statement, the generation of gods and of living creatures, which has been ill portrayed by those before us; I must resume the statement which I have attempted in speaking against the impious,[1] declaring that there are gods who have a care for all things, small and greater, and who are well-nigh inexorable in maintaining the claims of justice: that is, if you remember, Cleinias; for you did take memoranda[2] besides, and indeed what then was spoken was very true. And the most important part of it was that every soul was senior to each body[3]: do you

[1] There is no hint of this in the *Laws*.
[2] *Cf. Laws*, x. 893-896.

980 ἆρα μέμνησθε; ἢ πάντως που τοῦτό γε; ὃ γὰρ
ἄμεινον καὶ παλαιότερον καὶ θεοειδέστερον, πιθανὸν
E ὅτι τοῦ νέου† καὶ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτιμοτέρου, παν-
ταχῇ τε ἄρχον ἀρχομένου πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἄγον
ἀγομένου πάντῃ. λάβωμεν δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὡς ψυχὴ
πρεσβύτερόν ἐστι σώματος· εἰ δ' ἔχει τοῦτο οὕτω,
981 τό γε πρῶτον ἡμῖν τοῦ πρώτου τῆς γενέσεως
πιθανώτερον ἂν εἴη σχεδὸν ὑπηργμένον· καὶ θῶμεν
δὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς εὐσχημονέστερον ἔχειν,
καὶ τῶν μεγίστων σοφίας περὶ θεῶν γενέσεως
ὀρθότατα ἐπιβαίνειν ἡμᾶς.

ΚΛ. Ἔστω ταῦτα εἰς δύναμιν λεγόμενα.

ΑΘ. Φέρε δή, ζῷόν γε ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι
κατὰ φύσιν φῶμεν τοῦτό γε, ὅταν μία συνελθοῦσα
σύστασις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀποτέκῃ μίαν μορφήν;

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς.

B ΑΘ. Ζῷον μὲν δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖται δικαιό-
τατα;

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Στερεὰ δὲ σώματα λέγεσθαι χρὴ κατὰ τὸν
εἰκότα λόγον πέντε, ἐξ ὧν κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστά τις
ἂν πλάττοι, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο γένος ἅπαν ἔχει μορφὴν
μίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὅ τί τ' ἄλλο γίγνοιτ'
ἂν καὶ χρῶμα οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτ' ἔχον, πλὴν
τὸ θειότατον ὄντως ψυχῆς γένος. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ
σχεδὸν ᾧ μόνῳ πλάττειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν προσήκει,
C σώματι δέ, ὃ λέγομεν, πλάττεσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι

[1] νέου in the text is a corruption of a word not yet recovered.

[2] *i.e.* the elements fire, water, air, earth, and ether. Plato (*Tim.* 40 A, 81 E) does not allow ether as one of the elements: our author includes it, because he wishes to make it the source of δαίμονες, or spirits that come midway between gods and men in the scale of existence; *cf.* 984 B, E.

[3] *i.e.* the generality of things that have come to be have

remember? Or in any case, surely, this must be so? For that which is better and more ancient and more godlike is credibly so in comparison with the . . .,[1] the junior, and the less honoured; and everywhere, a thing governing is senior to a thing governed, and the driver every way senior to the driven. So much, then, let us conclude—that soul is senior to body; and if this is the case, our first of first things in creation may be taken as a more credible foundation. So let us take it that our beginning of the beginning is more appropriate, and that we are most correctly entering upon the principal parts of wisdom relating to the generation of the gods.

CL. Let this be so, in the best statement that we can give.

ATH. Come then, shall we say that a living creature is most truly described by its nature, as a case of one combination of soul and body so uniting as to beget one shape?

CL. Correct.

ATH. And such a thing is most justly called a living creature?

CL. Yes.

ATH. On the most likely account there are to be reckoned five solid bodies,[1] from which one might fashion things fairest and best; but all the rest of creation has a single shape,[2] for there is nothing that could come to be without a body and never possessing any colour at all, except only that really most divine creature, the soul. And this alone, one may say, has the business of fashioning and manufacturing, whereas the body, as we call it, has that

assumed a unity of shape resulting from the afore-mentioned combination of soul and body.

981 καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι· τῷ δέ—λέγωμεν πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ ῥητέον—ἀοράτῳ τε εἶναι καὶ γιγνώσκοντι νοητῷ τε, μνήμης μεταλαβόντι λογισμοῦ τε ἐν περιτταῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίαις ἅμα μεταβολαῖς. πέντε οὖν ὄντων τῶν σωμάτων πῦρ χρὴ φάναι καὶ ὕδωρ εἶναι καὶ τρίτον ἀέρα, τέταρτον δὲ γῆν, πέμπτον δὲ αἰθέρα· τούτων δ' ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ἕκαστον ζῷον πολὺ καὶ παντοδαπὸν ἀποτελεῖσθαι. μαθεῖν δὲ καθ' ἓν ὧδ' D ἔστι χρεών. γήινον μὲν τιθῶμεν τὸ πρῶτον ἡμῖν ἕν, πάντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους, πάντα δὲ ὅσα πολύποδα καὶ ἄποδα, καὶ ὅσα πορεύσιμα καὶ ὅσα μόνιμα, διειλημμένα ῥίζαις· τὸ δὲ ἓν αὐτοῦ τόδε νομίζειν δεῖ, ὡς πάντα μὲν ἐξ ἁπάντων ταῦτ' ἔστι τῶν γενῶν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ τούτου γῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς στερεμνίας φύσεως. ἄλλο δὲ χρὴ ζῴου γένος θεῖναι δεύτερον γιγνόμενον ἅμα καὶ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι. τὸ γὰρ πλεῖστον πυρὸς ἔχει, ἔχει μὴν γῆς τε καὶ E ἀέρος, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἁπάντων τῶν ἄλλων βραχέα μέρη, διὸ δὴ ζῷά τε ἐξ αὐτῶν παντοδαπὰ γίγνεσθαι χρὴ φάναι καὶ ὁρώμενα, νομίσαι δὲ δὴ δεῖ πάλιν τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν ζῴων γένη, ὃ δὴ πᾶν χρὴ φάναι θεῖον γένος ἄστρων γεγονέναι, σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δὲ εὐδαιμονεστάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης. δυοῖν δὲ αὐτοῖς μοιρῶν τὴν ἑτέραν χρὴ δόξῃ μεταδιδόναι σχεδόν· ἢ γὰρ ἀνώλεθρόν τε 982 καὶ ἀθάνατον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ θεῖον τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἁπάσης ἀνάγκης, ἤ τινα μακραίωνα βίον ἔχειν ἱκανὸν ἑκάστῳ ζωῆς, ἧς οὐδέν τι πλείονος ἂν προσδεῖσθαί ποτε.

Νοήσωμεν οὖν πρῶτον, ὃ λέγομεν, δύο τὰ τοιαῦτα

[1] Here the author agrees with Plato, *Tim.* 39 E ff.; *Laws*, X. 889 B.

of being fashioned and created and seen. But the other—let us repeat it, for not once only be it said—has the properties of being unseen, of knowing and being thought, and of being endowed with memory and reckoning by alternations of odd and even.

The bodies, then, being five, we must name them as fire, water, and thirdly air, earth fourth, and ether fifth ; and by predominance of these are each of the many varieties of creatures perfected. We should learn this by single instances in the following way. Let us take first the earthy as one sort—all men, all things that have many feet or none, and those that move along and that stay still, held in place by roots ; but we must conceive its unity thus,—though all these things are the outcome of all kinds, yet for the most part it is of earth and of solid substance. And another kind of creature we must regard as second in birth as well as one that can be seen : for its greatest part is of fire, though it has some earth and air, and has slight portions of all the others also, wherefore we must say that all sorts of creatures are born of them, things that are seen, and these again we must conceive to be the heavenly kinds of creatures, which altogether, we must agree, have been born as the divine race of stars, endowed with the fairest body as also with the happiest and best soul.[1] One or other of two lots we may very well, in our opinion, assign to them : for each of them is either imperishable and immortal, and by all necessity wholly divine, or has a certain longevity sufficient for the life of each, such that nothing could ever require a longer one.

Let us therefore first observe that, as we state it,

982 εἶναι ζῷα, πάλιν γὰρ λέγωμεν, ὁρατὰ μὲν ἀμφότερα, τὸ μὲν ἐκ πυρός, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, ὅλον, τὸ δ' ἐκ γῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν γήινον ἐν ἀταξίᾳ, τὸ δ' ἐκ πυρὸς ἐν τάξει πάσῃ κινούμενον· τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀταξίᾳ κινούμενον ἄφρον χρὴ νομίζειν, ὅπερ ὡς τὸ B πολὺ δρᾷ τὸ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ἐν τάξει τε καὶ οὐρανῷ πόρον ἔχον μέγα τεκμήριον χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ φρόνιμον εἶναι· κατὰ ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὡσαύτως πορευόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον τεκμήριον ἱκανὸν τοῦ φρονίμως ζῆν εἴη παρεχόμενον. ἡ ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνάγκη νοῦν κεκτημένης ἁπασῶν ἀναγκῶν πολὺ μεγίστη γίγνοιτ' ἄν· ἄρχουσα γὰρ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρχομένη νομοθετεῖ. τὸ δὲ ἀμετάστροφον, ὅταν C ψυχὴ τὸ ἄριστον κατὰ τὸν ἄριστον βουλεύσηται νοῦν, τὸ τέλεον ἐκβαίνει τῷ ὄντι κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀδάμας ἂν αὐτοῦ κρεῖττον οὐδὲ ἀμεταστροφώτερον ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ὄντως τρεῖς Μοῖραι κατέχουσαι φυλάττουσι τέλεον εἶναι τὸ βελτίστῃ βουλῇ βεβουλευμένον ἑκάστοις θεῶν. τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἐχρῆν τεκμήριον εἶναι τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν ἄστρα τε καὶ σύμπασαν ταύτην τὴν διαπορείαν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεὶ πράττει διὰ τὸ βεβουλευμένα πάλαι πράττειν θαυμαστόν τινα χρόνον ὅσον, ἀλλ' D οὐ μεταβουλευόμενον ἄνω καὶ κάτω, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερα, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλα πρᾶττον, πλανᾶσθαί τε καὶ μετακυκλεῖσθαι. τοῦθ' ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως πράττει,[1] ψυχὴν οὐκ ἔχειν· οὕτω τοῖς ἄφροσι συνεφέσπετο τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον

[1] *πράττει* Stephanus: *πράττειν* mss.

[1] "Necessity" is used here in the old poetic sense of a compelling or overruling power; *cf.* the mention of the Fates below, and *Laws*, 818 A.

such creatures are of two sorts—for let us state it again—both visible, the one of fire, as would appear, entirely, and the other of earth ; and the earthy moves in disorder, whereas that of fire has its motion in perfect order. Now that which has motion in disorder we should regard as unintelligent, acting like the animal creatures about us for the most part ; but that which has an orderly and heavenly progress must be taken as strongly evincing its intelligence. For in passing on and acting and being acted upon always in the same respects and manner it must provide sufficient evidence of its intelligent life. The necessity [1] of a soul that has acquired mind will prove itself by far the greatest of all necessities ; for it makes laws as ruler, not as ruled ; and this inalterable state, when the soul has taken the best counsel in accord with the best mind, comes out as the perfect thing in truth and in accord with mind, and not even adamant could ever prove stronger than it or more inalterable ; but in fact the three Fates have taken hold, and keep watch that what has been decided by each of the gods with the best counsel shall be perfect. And men ought to have found proof of the stars and the whole of that travelling system being possessed of mind in the fact that they always do the same things because they do what has been decided long ago for an incalculable time, not deciding differently this way and that, and doing sometimes one thing, sometimes another, in wanderings and changes of circuit. Most of us have thought just the opposite—that because they do the same things in the same way they have no soul : the multitude followed the lead of the unintelligent so far as to suppose that, whereas humanity was intelligent and

982 ἔμφρον καὶ ζῶν ὡς κινούμενον ὑπολαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἄφρον ὡς μένον ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς φοραῖς· ἐξῆν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ γε ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω καὶ βελτίω καὶ
E φίλα τιθεμένῳ λαμβάνειν, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἔμφρον δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ διὰ ταὐτὰ πράττον ἀεί· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν, ἰδεῖν μὲν καλλίστην, πορείαν δὲ καὶ χορείαν πάντων χορῶν καλλίστην καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτην χορεύοντα πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ δέον ἀποτελεῖν. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε δικαίως ἔμψυχα αὐτὰ
983 λέγομεν, πρῶτον τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν διανοηθῶμεν. οὐ γάρ, ὡς σμικρὰ φαντάζεται, τηλικαῦτα ὄντως ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀμήχανον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὸν ὄγκον, πιστεῦσαι δ' ἄξιον· ἀποδείξεσι γὰρ ἱκαναῖς λαμβάνεται· τὸν γὰρ ἥλιον ὅλον τῆς γῆς ὅλης μείζω διανοηθῆναι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς, καὶ πάντα δὴ τὰ φερόμενα ἄστρα θαυμαστόν τι μέγεθος ἔχει. λάβωμεν δή, τίς τρόπος ἂν εἴη τοσοῦτον περιφέρειν ὄγκον τινὰ φύσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ὅσον καὶ
B νῦν περιφέρεται. θεὸν δή φημι τὸν αἴτιον ἔσεσθαι, καὶ οὔποθ' ἑτέρως εἶναι δυνατόν· ἔμψυχον μὲν γὰρ οὔποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ἑτέρᾳ πλὴν διὰ θεόν, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀπεφηνάμεθα· ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο οἷός τέ ἐστι θεός, ἅπασα αὐτῷ ῥᾳστώνη γέγονε τοῦ πρῶτον μὲν ζῷον γεγονέναι πᾶν σῶμα καὶ ὄγκον σύμπαντα, ἔπειτα, ᾗπερ ἂν διανοηθῇ βέλτιστα, ταύτῃ φέρειν. νῦν δὴ περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων ἕνα λόγον λέγοιμεν ἀληθῆ· οὐκ ἔστι γῆν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἅπαντάς τε
C ἀστέρας ὄγκους τε ἐκ τούτων σύμπαντας, μὴ ψυχῆς πρὸς ἑκάστῳ γενομένης ἢ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις, εἶτα εἰς ἀκρίβειαν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτω πορεύεσθαι

[1] *Cf.* Plato, *Tim.* 40 c.

living because it moved about, divinity was unintelligent because it abode in the same courses. But if man had sided with the fairer and better and friendly part, he might have concluded that he ought to regard as intelligent—and for this very reason—that which acts always in the same respects, in the same way, and from the same causes ; and that this is the nature of the stars, fairest to see, and passing along, dancing [1] the fairest and most magnificent of all dances in the world, they perform their service to all living creatures. And now, to see how justly we speak of their living spirit, let us first consider their great size. For they are not actually those small things that they appear to be, but each of them is immense in its bulk ; we should do well to believe this, because there are ample proofs of such a conclusion. For we can rightly consider the whole of the sun as larger than the whole of the earth, and all the travelling stars are of amazing size. Let us conclude then how it can possibly be that any natural force revolves this great mass always in the same time as that in which it is now being revolved. God, then, I say, will be the cause, and never in any other way is it possible. For never can a thing get living spirit by any other means than by the act of God, as we have explained ; and since God is able to do this, he has found it a perfectly easy matter, firstly that any body and a whole mass should be made a living creature, and secondly to move it in the course he considers best. So now I trust we may make one true statement about all these things : it cannot be that earth and heaven and all the stars and all the masses they comprise, without soul attached to each or resident in each, should pass along as they do, so

983 κατὰ μῆνάς τε καὶ ἡμέρας, καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ γιγνόμενα σύμπασιν ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ γίγνεσθαι.

Δεῖ δέ, ὅσῳ φλαυρότερόν ἐστ' ἄνθρωπος, μή τοι ληροῦντά γε, σαφῶς δέ τι λέγοντα φαίνεσθαι. ῥύμας μὲν οὖν εἴ τις αἰτίας τινὰς ἐρεῖ σωμάτων ἢ φύσεις ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲν σαφὲς ἐρεῖ· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένον σφόδρ' ἀναλαβεῖν χρή, πότερον D ἔχει λόγον ὁ λόγος ἢ πάντως ὑστερεῖ, τὸ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ὄντα εἶναι δύο, τὸ μὲν ψυχήν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα, καὶ πολλὰ ἑκατέρου, πάντα δὲ ἀλλήλων ἄλλα καὶ ἑκάτερα ἑκατέρων, καὶ τρίτον ἄλλο οὐδὲν κοινὸν οὐδενί, διαφέρειν δὲ ψυχὴν σώματος. ἔμφρον μέν που, τὸ δὲ ἄφρον θήσομεν, ἄρχον δέ, τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τὸ δὲ ἀναίτιον πάσης πάθης· ὥστε τά γε δὴ κατ' οὐρανὸν ὑπ' E ἄλλου του φάναι γεγονέναι, καὶ μὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος οὕτως εἶναι γεννήματα, πολλὴ μωρία τε καὶ ἀλογία. εἰ δ' οὖν δεῖ νικᾶν τοὺς περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων λόγους καὶ πιστῶς θεῖα φαίνεσθαι γεγονέναι τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα, δυοῖν τοι θάτερα θετέον αὐτά· ἢ γὰρ θεοὺς αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ὑμνητέον 984 ὀρθότατα, ἢ θεῶν εἰκόνας ὡς ἀγάλματα ὑπολαβεῖν γεγονέναι, θεῶν αὐτῶν ἐργασαμένων· οὐ γὰρ ἀνοήτων γε οὐδὲ βραχέος ἀξίων, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἰρήκαμεν, τούτων ἡμῖν θάτερα θετέα, τὰ δὲ τεθέντα

[1] Soul and body, in their respective spheres, cover or account for the whole of existent things, of whatever kind, from the astral to the inanimate.

exactly to year and month and day, and that all the good things that happen should happen for us all.

And according as man is a meaner creature, he should show himself, not a babbler, but a speaker of clear sense. If, then, anyone shall speak of certain onrushes or natural forces of bodies or the like as causes, he will say nothing clear : but we must certainly recall what we have said, and see whether our statement is reasonable or is utterly at fault—namely, in the first place, that existence is of two kinds, the one soul, and the other body, and that many things are in either, though all are different from each other and those of the one kind from those of the other,[1] and that there is no other third thing common to any of them ; and that soul excels body. Intelligent, of course, we shall hold it to be, and the other unintelligent ; the one governs, the other is governed ; and the one is cause of all things, while the other is incapable of causing any of its experiences : so that to assert that the heavenly bodies have come into existence through anything else, and are not the offspring, as we have said, of soul and body, is great folly and unreason. However, if our statements on all such existences are to prevail, and the whole order of them is to be convincingly shown to be divine by their origin, we must certainly class them as one or the other of two things : either we must in all correctness glorify them as actual gods, or suppose them to be likenesses produced, as so many images, of the gods, creations of the gods themselves. For they are the work of no mindless or inconsiderable beings but, as we have said, we must class them as one or other of these things ; and, if classed as the latter, we must

984 τιμητέον πάντων ἀγαλμάτων διαφερόντως· οὐ γὰρ μήποτε φανῇ καλλίω καὶ κοινότερα συμπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀγάλματα, οὐδ' ἐν διαφέρουσι τόποις ἱδρυμένα, καθαριότητι καὶ σεμνότητι καὶ
B συμπάσῃ ζωῇ διαφέροντα, ἢ ταύτῃ, ὡς πάντῃ ταύτῃ γεγένηται. νῦν οὖν δὴ περὶ θεῶν ἐγχειρῶμεν τό γε τοσοῦτον, τὰ δύο κατιδόντες ζῷα ὁρατὰ ἡμῖν, ἃ φαμεν ἀθάνατον, τὸ δὲ γήινον ἅπαν θνητὸν γεγονέναι, τὰ τρία τὰ μέσα τῶν πέντε τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων σαφέστατα κατὰ δόξαν τὴν ἐπιεικῆ γεγονότα πειραθῆναι λέγειν. αἰθέρα μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τὸ πῦρ θῶμεν, ψυχὴν δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ τιθῶμεν πλάττειν
C ζῷα δύναμιν ἔχοντα, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν, τὸ πολὺ μὲν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα συνδέσμου χάριν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν· μετὰ δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα ἐξ ἀέρος πλάττειν τὴν ψυχὴν γένος ἕτερον ζῴων, καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐξ ὕδατος· πάντα δὲ δημιουργήσασαν ταῦτα ψυχὴν ζῴων εἰκὸς ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἐμπλῆσαι, χρησαμένην πᾶσι τοῖς γένεσι κατὰ δύναμιν, πάντων μὲν μετόχων τοῦ ζῆν γεγονότων· δεύτερα δὲ καὶ τρίτα καὶ τέταρτα καὶ
D πέμπτα, ἀπὸ θεῶν τῶν φανερῶν ἀρξάμενα γενέσεως, εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀποτελευτᾶν.

Θεοὺς μὲν δή, Δία τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, ὅπῃ τις ἐθέλει, ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τιθέσθω νόμον καὶ πάγιον ἐχέτω τοῦτον τὸν λόγον· θεοὺς δὲ δὴ τοὺς ὁρατούς, μεγίστους καὶ τιμιω-

[1] *i.e.* fire, ether, air, water, earth; *cf.* 981 c.

[2] First come the stars, or "manifest gods"; then the creatures of ether, air and water (the second, third or fourth kinds); and fifth and last, the creatures of earth or mankind.

[3] *i.e.* the law governing the order or scale of animate creatures which has been described. The writer, like Plato

honour them far above all images: for never will fairer or more commonly owned images be found among all mankind, none established in more eminent places, none more eminent in purity, majesty, and life altogether, than in the way in which their existence is altogether fashioned. Well then, for the present let us attempt so much in treating of the gods, as to try—after observing the two living creatures visible to us, of which we call one immortal, and the other, the earthy, all a mortal creation—to tell of the three middle things of the five,[1] which come most evidently, according to the probable opinion, between those two. For let us consider ether as coming next after fire, and let us hold that soul fashions from it live creatures with their faculties,—as in the creatures of the other kinds,—belonging for the most part to that one substance, but in the lesser parts derived from the other elements for the sake of combination. After ether, there is fashioned by soul another kind of creature from air, and the third kind from water; and by having produced all these it is likely that soul filled the whole heaven with creatures, having made use of all the kinds so far as it could, and all the creatures having been made participators in life; but the second, third, fourth, and fifth kinds, starting from the birth of the manifest gods, end finally in us men.[2]

Now the gods—Zeus and Hera and all the rest—each man must regard in what light he pleases, though according to the same law,[3] and must take this account as reliable. But as our visible gods, greatest

(*Tim.* 40 D-41 A), avoids any definite statement about the traditional deities: like Plato again (*Tim.* 41 A-42 E), he is more concerned with the "visible gods," or stars.

984 τάτους καὶ ὀξύτατον ὁρῶντας πάντῃ, τοὺς πρώτους
τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν λεκτέον καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τούτων
αἰσθανόμεθα γεγονότα, μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ ὑπὸ
E τούτοις ἑξῆς δαίμονας, ἀέριον δὲ γένος, ἔχον ἕδραν
τρίτην καὶ μέσην, τῆς ἑρμηνείας αἴτιον, εὐχαῖς
τιμᾶν μάλα χρεὼν χάριν τῆς εὐφήμου διαπορείας.
τῶν δὲ δύο τούτων ζῴων, τοῦ τ' ἐξ αἰθέρος ἐφεξῆς
τε ἀέρος, οὐ[1] διορώμενον ὅλον αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον
εἶναι· παρὸν δὴ πλησίον οὐ κατάδηλον ἡμῖν γί-
985 γνεσθαι· μετέχοντα δὲ φρονήσεως θαυμαστῆς, ἅτε
γένους ὄντα εὐμαθοῦς τε καὶ μνήμονος, γιγνώσκειν
μὲν σύμπασαν τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτὰ διάνοιαν λέγωμεν,
καὶ τόν τε καλὸν ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἅμα θαυμαστῶς
ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ τὸν σφόδρα κακὸν μισεῖν, ἅτε
λύπης μετέχοντα ἤδη· θεὸν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν τέλος
ἔχοντα τῆς θείας μοίρας ἔξω τούτων εἶναι, λύπης
τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, τοῦ δὲ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν
κατὰ πάντα μετειληφέναι· καὶ συμπλήρους δὴ ζῴων
B οὐρανοῦ γεγονότος, ἑρμηνεύεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους
τε καὶ τοὺς ἀκροτάτους θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ
πάντα, διὰ τὸ φέρεσθαι τὰ μέσα τῶν ζῴων ἐπί τε
γῆν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἑλαφρᾷ φερόμενα
ῥύμῃ. τὸ δὲ ὕδατος πέμπτον ὂν ἡμίθεον μὲν
ἀπεικάσειεν ἄν τις ὀρθῶς ἀπεικάζων ἐξ αὐτοῦ
γεγονέναι, καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ὁρώμενον,

[1] οὐ vulg.: ὃν mss.

[1] The daemons or divine spirits had their existence and activity "betwixt mortal and immortal," and they served as *interpreters* and *conveyers* of men's prayers and offerings to the gods, and of the god's behests and requitals to men (Plato, *Sympos.* 202 D). Good mortals might become daemons after death (Eurip. *Alc.* 1003; Plato, *Cratyl.* 398 B; Lucian, *De morte Peregr.* 36), and as such they were charged

and most honourable and having keenest vision every way, we must count first the order of the stars and all else that we perceive existing with them; and after these, and next below these, the divine spirits,[1] and air-borne race, holding the third and middle situation, source of interpretation, which we must specially honour with prayers for the sake of an auspicious journey across.[2] We must say of each of these two creatures—that which is of ether and, next to it, that of air—that it is not entirely plain to sight: when it is near by, it is not made manifest to us; but partaking of extraordinary intelligence, as belonging to an order which is quick to learn and strong in memory, we may say that they understand the whole of our thoughts, and show extraordinary kindness to anyone of us who is a good man and true, and hate him who is utterly evil, since they can have a feeling of pain. For we know that God, who has the privilege of the divine portion, is remote from these affections of pain and pleasure, but has a share of intelligence and knowledge in every sphere; and the heaven being filled full of live creatures, they interpret all men and all things both to one another and to the most exalted gods, because the middle creatures move both to earth and to the whole of heaven with a lightly rushing motion. The kind which is of water,[3] the fifth, we shall be right in representing as a semi-divine product of that element, and it is

with the guidance and care of mankind (Plato, *Laws* 713 D; Plutarch, *De genio Socr.* 588 C).

[2] The "journey across" seems to refer to one part of the "conveying" that daemons performed — conducting the souls of deceased human beings from earth to the abode of the gods.

[3] The nymphs.

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ἄλλοτε δὲ ἀποκρυφθὲν ἄδηλον γιγνόμενον, θαῦμα
κατ' ἀμυδρὰν ὄψιν παρεχόμενον. τούτων δὴ τῶν
C πέντε ὄντως ὄντων ζῴων, ὅπῃ τινὲς ἐνέτυχον ἡμῶν,
ἢ καθ' ὕπνον ἐν ὀνειροπολίᾳ προστυχόντες, ἢ κατὰ
φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας λεχθέν τισιν ἐν ἀκοαῖς
ὑγιαίνουσιν ἢ καὶ κάμνουσιν, ἢ καὶ τελευτῇ βίου
προστυχέσι γενομένοις, ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ δόξας
παραγενομένας, ὅθεν ἱερὰ πολλὰ πολλῶν γέγονε,
τὰ δὲ γενήσεται, τούτων πάντων νομοθέτης, ὅστις
νοῦν κέκτηται καὶ τὸν βραχύτατον, οὔποτε μὴ
τολμήσῃ καινοτομῶν ἐπὶ θεοσέβειαν, ἤτις μὴ
D σαφὲς ἔχει τι, τρέψαι πόλιν ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ μὴν οὐδ'
ὧν ὁ πάτριος νόμος εἴρηκε περὶ θυσιῶν ἀποκωλύσει,
μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν εἰδώς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὃν δυνατὸν
εἰδέναι τῇ θνητῇ φύσει τῶν τοιούτων πέρι. τοὺς
δὲ ὄντως ἡμῖν φανεροὺς ὄντας θεοὺς ἆρ' οὐχ αὐτὸς
λόγος ἔχει κακίστους εἶναι τοὺς μὴ τολμῶντας
λέγειν ἡμῖν καὶ φανεροὺς ποιεῖν ἀνοργιάστους τε
ὄντας ἑτέρους θεοὺς καὶ τιμὰς μὴ δεχομένους τὰς
προσηκούσας αὐτοῖς; νῦν δὲ δὴ συμβαίνει γι-
E γνόμενον ἅμα τὸ τοιοῦτον· οἷον γὰρ εἴ ποτέ τις
ἡμῶν ἥλιον ἢ σελήνην ἑωρακὼς ἦν γιγνομένους
ἐφορῶντάς τε ἡμᾶς πάντας, καὶ μὴ ἔφραξεν
ἀδύνατος ὢν πῃ φράζειν, τιμῆς τε ἀμοίρους ὄντας
ἅμα καὶ μὴ προθυμοῖτο τό γε αὐτοῦ μέρος,
εἰς ἔντιμον χώραν καταφανεῖς ἄγων αὐτούς,
ἑορτάς τε αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι ποιεῖν καὶ θυσίας,
ἀπολαμβανόμενόν τε χρόνον ἑκάστοις μειζόνων καὶ
ἐλαττόνων πολλάκις ἐνιαυτῶν ὥρας διανέμειν, ἆρ'

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[1] The astral gods.

at one time seen, but at another is concealed through becoming obscure, presenting a marvel in the dimness of vision. So these five being really existent creatures, wherever any of us came upon them, either happening upon them in the dream-world of sleep, or by something spoken to persons listening in health, or equally in sickness, through ominous utterances and prophecies, or again when they have met them at the end of life—opinions that occur to us both in private and in public, whence many sanctities of many beings have arisen, and others shall arise—in regard to all these the lawgiver who possesses even the slightest degree of mind will never dare by innovations to turn his city to a divine worship which is lacking in certainty. Nor indeed will he hinder men from what ancestral custom has ordained regarding sacrifices, when he knows nothing at all of the matter, just as it is not possible for mortal nature tc know about such things. But of the gods who are really manifest to us [1] the same argument must surely hold—that those men are most evil who have not courage to tell us of them and make manifest that these are likewise gods, but without any frenzied rites, or any tribute of the honours that are their due. But as things are, we have a strange conjunction of proceedings: for suppose that one of us had seen the sun or moon being born and observing all of us, and uttered no word through some impotence of speech, and should not also at the same time be zealous, so far as in him lay, when they lacked their share of honour, to bring them in all evidence to an honoured place, and cause festivals and sacrifices to be offered to them, and apportion to each a reserved space of time for the greater or lesser length of its

986 οὐκ ἂν κακὸς ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι λεγόμενος ἐν δίκῃ συνεδόκει λέγεσθαί ποτ' ἄν;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ, ὦ ξένε; κάκιστος μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν, ὦ Κλεινία φίλε, περὶ ἐμὲ νῦν γιγνόμενον ἴσθι φανερῶς.

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ἴστε ὀκτὼ δυνάμεις τῶν περὶ ὅλον οὐρανὸν γεγονυίας ἀδελφὰς ἀλλήλων, ὧν καθεώρακα ἐγώ· καὶ οὐδὲν μέγα διαπέπραγμαι. ῥᾴδιον γὰρ καὶ
B ἑτέρῳ· τούτων δ' εἰσὶ τρεῖς αὗται, μία μὲν ἡλίου, μία δὲ σελήνης, μία δὲ τῶν [πλανητῶν][1] ἄστρων, ὧν ἐμνήσθημεν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν· πέντε δὲ ἕτεραι. ταύτας δὴ πάσας καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἐν ταύταισιν εἴτε αὐτοὺς ἰόντας εἴτε φερομένους ἐν ὀχήμασι πορεύεσθαι ταύτῃ, μηδεὶς ἄλλως ποτὲ νομίσῃ πάντων ἡμῶν, ὡς οἱ μὲν θεοί εἰσιν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὔ, μηδ' ὡς οἱ μὲν γνήσιοι, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοί τινες, οἵους οὐδὲ θέμις εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδενί, πάντες δὲ δὴ πάντας λέγωμέν τε καὶ φῶμεν ἀδελφούς τ'
C εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἀδελφαῖς μοίραις, καὶ τιμὰς ἀποδιδῶμεν μὴ τῷ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, τῷ δὲ μῆνα, τοῖς δὲ μήτε τινὰ μοῖραν τάττωμεν μήτε τινὰ χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ διεξέρχεται τὸν αὑτοῦ πόλον, συναποτελῶν κόσμον, ὃν ἔταξε λόγος ὁ πάντων θειότατος ὁρατόν· ὃν ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων πρῶτον μὲν ἐθαύμασεν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἔρωτα ἔσχε τοῦ καταμαθεῖν ὁπόσα θνητῇ φύσει

[1] πλανητῶν secl. Burnet.

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[1] "Year" is used here for "circuit."

[2] *Cf.* Plato, *Tim.* 38 ff, where God is said to have made, besides the fixed stars, the sun, the moon, and the five planets—Venus, Mercury, Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars—for the generation of time.

year,[1] as may happen : would it not be agreed both by himself and by another who observed it that he would justly be described as an evil man ?

CL. To be sure he would, my good sir ; nay, most evil.

ATH. Well then, this, my dear Cleinias, is what, you may take it, is evidently happening to me now.

CL. How do you mean ?

ATH. Let me tell you, there are eight powers of those contained in the whole heaven which are cognate to each other : these I have observed, and it is no great achievement ; for it is easy enough for anybody. Three of them are that of the sun, for one, that of the moon for another, and a third that of the stars which we mentioned a little while ago ; and there are five others besides.[2] Now in regard to all these and those beings who either have their own motion in these, or are borne in vehicles so as to make their progress thus, let none of us all ever idly suppose that some of them are gods, while others are not, or that some are legitimate, while others are of a certain kind which it is not permissible to any of us even to express ; but let us all declare and say that they are all cognate and have cognate lots, and let us render them due honour, and not, while giving to one a year, to another a month, to others appoint neither a certain lot nor a certain time in which each travels through its particular orbit, completing the system which the divinest reason of all[3] appointed to be visible. At this first the man who is blest marvels, and then he feels a passion for understanding so much as is possible for mortal nature, believing that thus he

[3] *i.e.* the supreme deity of Plato's *Timaeus*.

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δυνατά, ἡγούμενος ἄρισθ' οὕτως εὐτυχέστατά τε
D διάξειν τὸν βίον τελευτήσας τε εἰς τόπους ἥξειν
προσήκοντας ἀρετῇ, καὶ μεμνημένος ἀληθῶς τε
καὶ ὄντως, μεταλαβὼν φρονήσεως εἷς ὢν μιᾶς,
τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον θεωρὸς τῶν καλλίστων
γενόμενος, ὅσα κατ' ὄψιν, διατελεῖ. νῦν δὴ τὸ
μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν λοιπὸν λέγειν ὅσοι τ' εἰσί, καὶ
E τίνες· οὐ γὰρ μήποτε φανῶμεν ψευδεῖς. βεβαίως
δὴ διισχυρίζομαι τό γε τοσοῦτον. λέγω γὰρ
πάλιν ὀκτὼ μὲν εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ τρεῖς μὲν
εἰρῆσθαι, πέντε δ' ἔτι λοιπάς. ἡ τετάρτη δὲ φορὰ
καὶ διέξοδος ἅμα καὶ πέμπτη τάχει μὲν ἡλίῳ
σχεδὸν ἴση, καὶ οὔτε βραδυτέρα οὔτε θάττων τό
γ' ἐπίπαν. δεῖ[1] τούτων τριῶν ὄντων τὸν νοῦν
ἱκανὸν ἔχοντα ἡγεῖσθαι. λέγωμεν δὴ ταύτας ἡλίου
τ' εἶναι καὶ ἑωσφόρου, καὶ τρίτου, ὡς μὲν ὀνόματι
φράζειν οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι, τούτου
δ' αἴτιος ὁ πρῶτος ταῦτα κατιδὼν βάρβαρος ὤν·
παλαιὸς γὰρ δὴ τρόπος ἔθρεψε τοὺς πρώτους
987 ταῦτα ἐννοήσαντας διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῆς θερινῆς
ὥρας, ἣν Αἴγυπτός τε Συρία δ' ἱκανῶς κέκτηται,
φανεροὺς μὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀστέρας ἀεὶ σύμπαντας
καθορῶντας, ἅτε νεφῶν καὶ ὑδάτων ἀπόπροσθεν
ἀεὶ τοῦ κόσμου κεκτημένους· ὅθεν καὶ πανταχόσε
καὶ δεῦρ' ἐξήκει, βεβασανισμένα χρόνῳ μυριετεῖ τε
καὶ ἀπείρῳ. διὸ θαρροῦντα χρὴ ταῦτα εἰς νόμους
θέσθαι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ τίμια τὰ θεῖα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τίμια,
B σαφῶς οὐκ ἐμφρόνων· ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἔσχηκε,

[1] δεῖ Burnet: ἀεὶ MSS.

[1] *i.e.* sun, moon, and fixed stars.
[2] Venus (or Lucifer); *cf.* Plato, *Tim.* 38 D.
[3] Mercury.

will best and most happily pass through life, and at the end of his days will arrive at regions meet for virtue ; and having been truly and really initiated, and, himself one, partaken of wisdom that is one, he will continue for the rest of time to be a spectator of what is fairest, so far as sight can go. And now after this it remains for us to say how many and who these beings are : for we shall never be found to be deceivers. So much, at least, I asseverate with certainty : I say, once more, that there are eight of them, and that while three [1] of the eight have been told, five yet remain. The fourth [2] motion and transit together with the fifth,[3] are almost equal to the sun in speed, and on the whole are neither slower nor swifter. Of these three, the one who has sufficient mind must be leader. So let us speak of them as powers of the sun and of Lucifer, and of a third,[3] which we cannot express in a name because it is not known ; and he is to blame for this who first observed these things, since he was a foreigner : for it was an ancient custom that nurtured those who first remarked these things owing to the fairness of the summer season which Egypt and Syria amply possess, so that they constantly beheld the whole mass of stars, one may say, revealed to their sight, since they had got them continually without obstruction of clouds and rains in the sky ; whence they have spread abroad in every direction and in ours likewise, after the testing of thousands of years, nay, of an infinite time. And therefore we should not hesitate to include them in the scope of our laws ; for to say that some divine things should have no honour, while others should have it, is clearly a sign of witlessness ; and as to their having got no names, the cause of it

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τήν γε αἰτίαν χρὴ λέγεσθαι ταύτην. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπωνυμίαν εἰλήφασι θεῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἑωσφόρος ἕσπερός τε ὢν αὐτὸς Ἀφροδίτης εἶναι σχεδὸν ἔχει λόγον καὶ μάλα Συρίῳ νομοθέτῃ πρέπον, ὁ δ' ὁμόδρομος ἡλίῳ τε ἅμα καὶ τούτῳ σχεδὸν Ἑρμοῦ· τρεῖς δ' ἔτι φορὰς λέγωμεν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πορευομένων μετὰ σελήνης τε καὶ ἡλίου. ἕνα δὲ τὸν ὄγδοον χρὴ λέγειν, ὃν μάλιστά τις ἂν[1] κόσμον προσαγορεύοι, ὃς ἐναντίος ἐκείνοις σύμπασι πορεύεται, ‹οὐκ›[2] ἄγων τοὺς ἄλλους, ὥς γε ἀνθρώποις φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὀλίγα τούτων εἰδόσιν. ὅσα δὲ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν, C ἀνάγκη λέγειν καὶ λέγομεν· ἡ γὰρ ὄντως οὖσα σοφία ταύτῃ πῃ φαίνεται τῷ καὶ σμικρὰ συννοίας ὀρθῆς θείας τε μετειληφότι. λοιποὶ δὴ τρεῖς ἀστέρες, ὧν εἷς μὲν βραδυτῆτι διαφέρων αὐτῶν ἐστί, Κρόνου δ' αὐτόν τινες ἐπωνυμίαν φθέγγονται· τὸν δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον βραδυτῆτι λέγειν χρὴ Διός· Ἄρεως δὲ ὁ μετὰ τοῦτον, πάντων δὲ οὗτος ἐρυθρώτατον ἔχει χρῶμα. χαλεπὸν δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων κατανοῆσαί D τινα φράζοντός τινος, ἀλλὰ μαθόντα, ὡς λέγομεν, ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ.

Τόδε γε μὴν διανοηθῆναι χρὴ πάντ' ἄνδρα Ἕλληνα, ὡς τόπον ἔχομεν τὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐν τοῖς σχεδὸν ἄριστον· τὸ δ' ἐπαινετὸν

[1] ἂν Burnet: ἄνω MSS.
[2] οὐκ add. Burnet.

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[1] Lucifer, or Hesperus, is for its beauty connected with Aphrodite (and so got the further name of Venus).

[2] The cult of Aphrodite flourished among all the eastern peoples.

[3] Venus.

[4] Hermes being the god of escort or attendance (whence this "power" came to be known as Mercury).

should be stated as we have done. For indeed they have received titles of gods: thus, that Lucifer, or Hesperus (which is the same), should belong to Aphrodite,[1] we may take as reasonable, and quite befitting a Syrian lawgiver[2]; and that that which follows the same course as the sun and this[3] together may well belong to Hermes.[4] Let us also note three motions of bodies[5] travelling to the right with the moon and the sun. One must be mentioned, the eighth,[6] which we may especially address as the world-order, and which travels in opposition to the whole company of the others, not impelling them, as might appear to mankind who may have scant knowledge of these matters. But we are bound to state, and do state, so much as adequate knowledge tells us. For real wisdom shows herself in some such way as this to him who has got even a little share of right and divine meditation. And now there remain three stars, of which one is distinguished from the others by its slowness, and some speak of it under the title of Saturn; the next after it in slowness is to be cited as Jupiter; and the next after this, as Mars, which has the ruddiest hue of all. Nothing in all this is hard to understand when someone expresses it; but it is through learning, as we declare, that one must believe it.

But there is one point which every Greek should bear in mind—that of all Greeks we have a situation which is about the most favourable to human excellence.[7] The praiseworthy thing in it that we have to

[5] Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.

[6] Here, after the sun, moon, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, we return to the sphere of the fixed stars (mentioned as the "third power" in 986 B).

[7] *Cf.* Plato, *Tim.* 24 C.

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αὐτοῦ χρὴ λέγειν ὅτι μέσος ἂν εἴη χειμώνων τε καὶ τῆς θερινῆς φύσεως, ἡ δ' ὑστεροῦσα ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ θερινὸν φύσις τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, ὕστερον αὖ[1] παραδέδωκε τὸ τούτων τῶν θεῶν τοῦ κόσμου κατανόημα. λάβωμεν δὲ ὡς
E ὅ τί περ ἂν Ἕλληνες βαρβάρων παραλάβωσι, κάλλιον τοῦτο εἰς τέλος ἀπεργάζονται· καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ταὐτὸν δεῖ διανοηθῆναι τοῦτο, ὡς χαλεπὸν μὲν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐξευρίσκειν, πολλὴ δ' ἐλπὶς ἅμα καὶ
988 καλὴ κάλλιον καὶ δικαιότερον ὄντως τῆς ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλθούσης φήμης τε ἅμα καὶ θεραπείας πάντων τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐπιμελήσεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας, παιδείαις τε καὶ ἐκ Δελφῶν μαντείαις χρωμένους καὶ πάσῃ τῇ κατὰ νόμους θεραπείᾳ. τόδε δὲ μηδεὶς ποτε φοβηθῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὡς οὐ χρὴ περὶ τὰ θεῖά ποτε πραγματεύεσθαι θνητοὺς ὄντας, πᾶν δὲ τούτῳ διανοηθῆναι τοὐναντίον, ὡς οὔτε ἄφρον ἐστί ποτε τὸ θεῖον οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ που
B τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι διδάσκοντος αὐτοῦ συνακολουθήσει καὶ μαθήσεται τὰ διδασκόμενα· ὅτι δὲ διδάσκει τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, μανθάνομεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀριθμόν τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν, οἶδε δήπου· πάντων γὰρ ἀφρονέστατον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦν· τὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ ἂν ὄντως αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἀγνοοῖ, χαλεπαῖνον τῷ δυναμένῳ μανθάνειν, ἀλλ' οὐ συγχαῖρον ἄνευ φθόνου διὰ θεὸν ἀγαθῷ γενομένῳ. λόγον δὴ καὶ πολὺν καὶ καλὸν ἔχει, τότε
C μέν, ὅτε περὶ θεῶν ἦν ἀνθρώποις διανοήματα πρῶτα, ὥς τ' ἐγένοντο οἷοί τ' ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ὅθεν[2]

[1] αὖ Ast: αὐτοῖς mss. [2] ὅθεν Hermann: ὁ μὲν mss.

[1] Syria and Egypt; *cf.* 987 A.

mention is that it may be taken as midway between a wintry and a summery climate; and our climate, being inferior in its summer to that in the region over there,[1] as we said, has been so much later in imparting the cognizance of the order of these deities. And let us take it that whatever Greeks acquire from foreigners is finally turned by them into something nobler; and moreover the same thing must be borne in mind regarding our present statements—that although it is hard to discover everything of this kind beyond dispute, there is hope, both strong and noble, that a really nobler and juster respect than is in the combined repute and worship which came from foreigners will be paid to all these gods by the Greeks, who have the benefit of their various education, their prophecies from Delphi, and the whole system of worship under their laws. And let none of the Greeks ever be apprehensive that being mortals we should never be concerned with divine affairs[2]; they should rather be of the quite opposite opinion, that the divine is never either unintelligent or in any ignorance of human nature, but knows that if it teaches us we shall follow its guidance and learn what is taught us. That it so teaches us, and that we learn number and numeration, it knows of course: for it would be most utterly unintelligent if it were ignorant of this; since it would truly, as the saying is, be ignorant of itself, vexed with that which was able to learn, instead of whole-heartedly rejoicing with one who became good by God's help. And indeed there is much good reason to suppose that formerly, when men had their first conceptions of how the gods came to exist and with what qualities,

[2] *Cf.* Plato, *Laws*, vii. 821 A.

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καὶ οἵας μετεχειρίζοντο πράξεις, μὴ κατὰ νοῦν τοῖς σώφροσι λέγεσθαι μηδὲ φίλως, μηδ' ὡς οἱ δεύτεροι, ἐν οἷς πρεσβύτατα μὲν τὰ πυρὸς ἐλέγετο καὶ ὕδατος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων, ὕστερα δὲ τὰ τῆς θαυμαστῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ φορὰ κρείττων καὶ τιμιωτέρα, ἣν τὸ σῶμα εἴληχε φέρειν αὐτό τε ἑαυτὸ θερμότητι καὶ ψύξεσι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀλλ'
D οὐ ψυχὴ σῶμά τε καὶ ἑαυτήν· νῦν δ' ὅτε λέγομεν ψυχὴν μέν, ἅπερ ἐν σώματι γένηται, θαῦμα οὐδὲν κινεῖν τε καὶ περιφέρειν τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτήν, οὐδ' ἡμῖν ἀπιστεῖ ψυχὴ κατὰ λόγον οὐδένα ὡς βάρος οὐδὲν περιφέρειν δυναμένη. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων, ψυχῆς οὔσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ πάντων μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τοιούτων, τῶν δὲ αὖ φλαύρων τοιούτων ἄλλων, τῆς μὲν φορᾶς πάσης
E καὶ κινήσεως ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι θαῦμα οὐδέν, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίαν, νενικηκέναι δεῖ καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.

Ταῦτα ἡμῖν εἴρηται πάντα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνοσίων τιμωρὸν [δὲ][1] δίκην· περὶ δὲ δὴ τὸ δοκιμαζόμενον οὐχ οἷόν τε ἡμῖν ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τόν γε ἀγαθὸν
989 σοφὸν ἡμᾶς ἡγεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ταύτην, ἣν ζητοῦμεν πάλαι, ἴδωμεν ἄν ποτ' ἄρα ἐπινοήσωμεν ἢ κατὰ παιδείαν ἢ κατὰ τέχνην, ἥντινα τοῦ γιγνώσκειν ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες τῶν δικαίων, ἀγνώμονες ἂν

[1] δὲ mss.: δὴ Stallbaum.

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[1] These later people, instead of attributing the highest power to the divine stars, attributed it to the ordinary physical forces; *cf.* Plato, *Laws*, x. 888 ff.

and whence, and to what kind of actions they proceeded, they were spoken of in a manner not approved or welcomed by the prudent, nor were even the views of those who came later, among whom the greatest dignity was given to fire and water and the other bodies, while the wonderful soul was accounted inferior; and higher and more honoured with them was a motion assigned to the body for moving itself by heat and chills and everything of that kind, instead of that which the soul had for moving both the body and itself.[1] But now that we account it no marvel that the soul, once it is in the body, should stir and revolve this and itself, neither does our soul on any reckoning mistrust her power of revolving any weight. And therefore, since we now claim that, as the soul is cause of the whole, and all good things are causes of like things, while on the other hand evil things are causes of other things like them, it is no marvel that soul should be cause of all motion and stirring—that the motion and stirring towards the good are the function of the best soul, and those to the opposite are the opposite [2]—it must be that good things have conquered and conquer things that are not their like.

All this we have stated in accordance with justice, which wreaks vengeance on the impious: but now, as regards the matter under examination, it is not possible for us to disbelieve that we must deem the good man to be wise; and let us see if we may perhaps be able to perceive this wisdom which we have all this while been seeking in either education or some art, which if we fail to perceive among those that are just, our condition will be that of ignorant persons. We can

[1] The evil soul is just hinted at; *cf.* Plato, *Laws*, x. 896-897.

989 εἶμεν ὄντες τοιοῦτοι. δοκοῦμεν δή μοι, καὶ λεκτέον· ἄνω γὰρ καὶ κάτω ζητῶν, ᾗ μοι καταφανὴς γέγονε, πειράσομαι δήλην ὑμῖν αὐτὴν ἀποτελεῖν. τὸ δὴ μέγιστον ἀρετῆς οὐ καλῶς πραττόμενον ἡμῖν γέγονεν αἴτιον, ὡς ἄρτι σημαίνειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων μοι σφόδρα δοκεῖ. μεῖζον
B μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτὲ πείσῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας εἶναι τῷ θνητῷ γένει· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ταῖς ἀρίσταις φύσεσιν οὐ γέγονε, λεκτέον. ἄρισται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ χαλεπώτατα μὲν ἂν γενόμεναι, μέγιστον δὲ ὄφελος, ἂν γίγνωνται· τά τε γὰρ τῆς βραδείας τε καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως μετρίως ἀποδεχομένη ψυχὴ καὶ πρᾴως εὔκολος ἂν εἴη, τήν τε ἀνδρείαν ἀγαμένη, καὶ πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν εὐπειθής, καὶ τό γε μέγιστον, ἐν ταύταις
C ταῖς φύσεσι δυναμένη μανθάνειν καὶ μνήμων οὖσα, εὖ μάλα χαίρειν τούτοις αὐτοῖς δύναιτ' ἂν φιλομαθὴς ὥστ' εἶναι. ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε ῥᾴδια φύεσθαι, γενόμενά τε, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας τυχόντα, ἧς δεῖ, τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ χείρους κατέχειν ὀρθότατα δύναιτ' ἂν τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν περὶ θεοὺς ἕκαστα, ὡς δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ, περὶ θυσίας τε καὶ καθαρμοὺς τῶν περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, οὐ σχήμασι τεχνά-
D ζοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντας ἀρετήν, ὃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι συμπάντων πάσῃ τῇ πόλει. τοῦτο δὴ οὖν τὸ μέρος εἶναί φαμεν φύσει κυριώτατον

[1] *Cf.* Plato, *Politicus*, 307 B ff., where the danger of an extreme development of such qualities as temperance, calmness, slowness, and of their opposites in the citizens of a state is expounded.

succeed, it seems to me, and I must say how : for I have sought this wisdom high and low, and so far as it has been revealed to me I will try to render it plain to you. Now the fact that the greatest part of virtue is not properly practised is the cause of our condition : this is just now indicated—it seems clear to me—by what has been said. For let no one ever persuade us that there is a greater part of virtue, for the race of mortals, than piety ; and I must say it is owing to the greatest stupidity that this has not appeared in the best natures. And the best are they which can only become so with the greatest difficulty, but the benefit is greatest if they do become so : for a soul that admits of slowness and the opposite inclination moderately and gently will be good-tempered [1] ; and if it admires courage, and is easily persuaded to temperance, and, most important of all, in natures of this sort, has the strength to learn and a good memory, it will be able to rejoice most fully in these very things, so as to be a lover of learning. For these things are not easily engendered, but when once they are begotten, and receive due nourishment and education, they will be able to restrain the multitude of men, their inferiors, in the most correct way by their every thought, every action, and every word about the gods, in due manner and due season, as regards both sacrifices and purifications in matters concerning gods and men alike, so that men contrive no life of pretence, but truly honour virtue, which indeed is the most important matter of all for the whole state. That section [2] of us, then, we say is naturally the most

[2] *i.e.* those who possess the natures mentioned in 989 B.

989 καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάσκοι τις· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν διδάξειεν, εἰ μὴ θεὸς ὑφηγοῖτο· εἰ δ' οὖν διδάσκοι, κατὰ τρόπον δὲ μὴ δρῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον, κρεῖττον μὴ μανθάνειν· ὅμως δ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀνάγκη μαθεῖν ταῦτα καὶ ἐμὲ λέγειν τὴν τοιαύτην τε καὶ ἀρίστην
E φύσιν. πειρώμεθα δὴ τῷ τε λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν ἅ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οἷα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μανθάνειν, κατὰ δύναμιν τήν τ' ἐμὴν τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὴν τῶν δυναμένων
990 εἰσακοῦσαι, θεοσεβείας ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τις τίνα μαθήσεται. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον ἀκούσαντι· τὸ δ' ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς γε, ὅ τις οὐκ ἄν ποτε δόξειε δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀστρονομίαν, ἀγνοεῖ τε, ὅτι σοφώτατον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀστρονόμον εἶναι, μὴ τὸν καθ' Ἡσίοδον ἀστρονομοῦντα καὶ πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους, οἷον δυσμάς τε καὶ ἀνατολὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων τὰς ἑπτὰ περιόδους, διεξιούσης τὸν αὑτῶν κύκλον ἑκάστης οὕτως ὡς οὐκ
B ἂν ῥᾳδίως ποτέ πᾶσα φύσις ἱκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρῆσαι, μὴ θαυμαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως. ὃ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν ἐροῦμέν τε, ὥς φαμεν, ὅπῃ δεῖ τε καὶ ὅπως χρεὼν μανθάνειν· πρῶτον δ' ἡμῖν τόδε λεγέσθω.

Σελήνη μὲν περίοδον τὴν αὑτῆς τάχιστα διέξεισιν, ἄγουσα μῆνα καὶ πανσέληνον πρώτην· δεύτερον δὲ κατανοεῖν δεῖ τὸν ἥλιον, τροπὰς ἄγοντα διὰ πάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ περιόδου, καὶ τούτῳ τοὺς συνδρόμους· ἵνα δὲ μὴ πολλάκις ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐ-

[1] *i.e.* of the sun, the moon, and the five planets; *cf.* 987 B. With the astronomy and mathematics of the rest of the *Epinomis cf.* Plato, *Laws*, vii. 818-820.

sovereign, and supremely able to learn the best and noblest lessons that it may be taught : but it cannot get this teaching either, unless God gives his guidance. If, however, it should be so taught, but should fail to get the proper instruction, it were better for it not to learn. Nevertheless it follows of necessity from our present statements, that I also state that the nature which is of this kind—the best—should learn these things. Let us try, then, to set forth in our statement what things these are, and of what kind, and how one should learn them, so far as our ability permits both me the speaker and those who are able to hear in what manner one will learn the proper reverence of the gods. It is, indeed, a rather strange thing to hear ; but the name that we, at any rate, give it—one that people would never suppose, from inexperience in the matter—is astronomy ; people are ignorant that he who is truly an astronomer must be wisest, not he who is an astronomer in the sense understood by Hesiod and all the rest of such writers, the sort of man who has studied settings and risings ; but the man who has studied the seven [1] out of the eight orbits, each travelling over its own circuit in such a manner as could not ever be easily observed by any ordinary nature, that did not partake of a marvellous nature. As to this, we have now told it, and shall tell, as we propose, by what means and in what manner it ought to be learnt ; and first let us make the following statement.

The moon travels through its orbit very swiftly, bringing the month and the full-moon first ; and in the second place we must remark the sun, bringing his solstices as he travels the whole of his orbit, and with him his satellites. But to avoid repeating again and again the same things on the same subjects in

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C τῶν διαλεγώμεθα, τὰς ἄλλας ὅσας ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν διεξήλθομεν ὁδοὺς τούτων οὐ ῥᾴδιον συννοεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταῦτα παρασκευάζοντας φύσεις, οἵας δυνατὸν εἶναι, χρεὼν πολλὰ προδιδάσκοντα καὶ ἐθίζοντα ἀεὶ[1] διαπονήσασθαι παῖδα ὄντα καὶ νεανίσκον. διὸ μαθημάτων δέον ἂν εἴη· τὸ δὲ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ σώματα ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ ὅλης τῆς τοῦ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου γενέσεώς τε καὶ δυνάμεως, ὅσην παρέχεται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. ταῦτα

D δὲ μαθόντι τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν ὃ καλοῦσι μὲν σφόδρα γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν, τῶν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοις φύσει ἀριθμῶν ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπιπέδων μοῖραν γεγονυῖά ἐστι διαφανής· ὃ δὴ θαῦμα οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ γεγονὸς θεῖον φανερὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ δυναμένῳ συννοεῖν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τοὺς τρὶς[2] ηὐξημένους καὶ τῇ στερεᾷ φύσει ὁμοίους, τοὺς δὲ ἀνομοίους αὖ γεγονότας ἑτέρᾳ τέχνῃ ὁμοιοῖ, ταύτῃ ἣν δὴ στερεομετρίαν

E ἐκάλεσαν οἱ προστυχεῖς αὐτῇ γεγονότες· ὃ δὲ θεῖόν τ' ἐστὶ καὶ θαυμαστὸν τοῖς ἐγκαθορῶσί τε καὶ διανοουμένοις, ὡς περὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἀεὶ στρεφομένης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ καθ' ἑκάστην ἀναλογίαν εἶδος καὶ γένος

991 ἀποτυποῦται πᾶσα ἡ φύσις. ἡ μὲν δὴ πρώτη

[1] ἀεὶ Burnet: δεῖ MSS. [2] τρὶς Bekker: τρεῖς MSS.

[1] Which means literally "measuring the earth"; this developed into the *arithmetical* calculation of squares, cubes, roots, etc. *Cf.* the account Plato gives (*Theaet.* 147 D ff.) of "quadrangular" and "equilateral" numbers, showing how the terms of geometry had to be used for arithmetic. As there was no *number* equal (or "like") to the "square" root of 2, recourse was had to the *geometrical* symbol of the

our discussion, the other courses of these bodies that we have previously set forth are not easily understood: we must prepare our faculties, such as they may possibly be, for these matters; and so one must continually strive hard to teach the pupil many things beforehand, and habituate him in childhood and youth. And therefore there will be need of studies: the most important and first is, in fact, of numbers in themselves; not of those which are corporeal, but of the whole origin of the odd and the even, and the greatness of their influence on the nature of reality. When he has learnt these things, there comes next after these what they call by the very ridiculous name of *geometry*,[1] when it proves to be a manifest likening[2] of numbers not like one another by nature by reference to the province of planes; and this will be clearly seen by him who is able to understand it to be a marvel not of human, but of divine origin. And then, after that, the numbers thrice increased and like to the solid nature, and those again which have been made unlike, he likens by another art, namely, that which its adepts called *stereometry*; and a divine and marvellous thing it is to those who envisage it and reflect how the whole of nature moulds off species and class, as power and its opposite[3] continually turn upon the double according to each analogy. Thus the first

diagonal of a square whose side is 1; and similarly "cubic" roots were reckoned with the aid of *stereometry*.

[2] "Likening" here means "comparing in an exact manner," so as to obtain a ratio or proportion between numbers not directly commensurable; *cf.* Plato, *Laws*, viii. 820.

[3] "Power" is multiplication, its "opposite" is extension: 1 point doubled gives the beginning of a line; multiplying 2 by 2 gives 4 as a square surface, and by 2 again, 8 as the cube. So (see below) we proceed "from 1 to 8."

991 τοῦ διπλασίου κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἓν πρὸς δύο κατὰ λόγον φερομένη, διπλάσιον δὲ ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν οὖσα· ἡ δ' εἰς τὸ στερεόν τε καὶ ἅπτὸν πάλιν αὖ διπλάσιον, ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἰς ὀκτὼ διαπορευθεῖσα· ἡ δὲ διπλασίου μὲν εἰς μέσον, ἴσως δὲ τοῦ ἐλάττονος πλέον ἔλαττόν τε τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ δ' ἕτερον τῷ αὐτῷ μέρει τῶν ἄκρων αὐτῶν ὑπερέχον τε καὶ ὑπερεχόμενον· ἐν μέσῳ δὲ τοῦ ἓξ πρὸς τὰ
B δώδεκα συνέβη τό τε ἡμιόλιον καὶ ἐπίτριτον· τούτων αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐπ' ἀμφότερα στρεφομένη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σύμφωνον χρείαν καὶ σύμμετρον ἀπενείματο παιδιᾶς ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας χάριν, εὐδαίμονι χορείᾳ Μουσῶν δεδομένη.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γιγνέσθω τε καὶ ἐχέτω σύμπαντα· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τέλος, εἰς θείαν γένεσιν ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὁρατῶν καλλίστην τε καὶ θειοτάτην φύσιν ἰτέον, ὅσην ἀνθρώποις θεὸς ἔδωκε κατιδεῖν, ἣν οὔποτε ἄνευ τῶν νῦν διειρημένων μὴ
C κατιδὼν ἐπεύξηταί τις ῥᾳστώνῃ παραλαβεῖν. πρὸς τούτοις δὲ τὸ καθ' ἓν τῷ κατ' εἴδη προσακτέον ἐν ἑκάσταις ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἐρωτῶντά τε καὶ ἐλέγχοντα τὰ μὴ καλῶς ῥηθέντα· πάντως γὰρ καλλίστη καὶ πρώτη βάσανος ἀνθρώποις ὀρθῶς γίγνεται, ὅσαι δὲ οὐκ οὖσαι προσποιοῦνται, ματαιότατος πόνος ἁπάντων. ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ χρόνου ἡμῖν ληπτέον, ὡς ἀκριβῶς ἀποτελεῖ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν γιγνόμενα, ἵν' ὁ πιστεύσας, ὡς

[1] As between 3 and 6, 4 is greater than 3 by $\frac{1}{3}$ of 3, and less than 6 by $\frac{1}{3}$ of 6.

analogy is of the double, passing by numerical scale in the proportion of one to two, and that which is according to power is double ; that which passes to the solid and tangible is likewise again double, having proceeded from one to eight ; but that passing to a mean of the double, as much more than the less as it is less than the greater, while the other mean [1] exceeds and is exceeded by the same portion of the extremes themselves—between six and twelve comes the whole-and-a-half ($9 = 6 + 3$) and whole-and-a-third ($8 = 6 + 2$)—turning between these very two, to one side or the other, this analogy assigned to men an accordant and proportioned use for the purpose of rhythm and harmony in their pastimes, and has been bestowed by the blessed dance of the Muses.

In this way then let all these things come to pass, and so let them be. But as to their crowning point, we must go to divine generation and therewith the fairest and divinest nature of visible things, so far as God has granted the vision of it to men ; a vision that none of us may ever boast of having received at his ease without the conditions here laid down. And besides these requirements, one must refer the particular thing to its generic form in our various discussions, questioning and disproving what has been wrongly stated ; for it [2] is rightly found to be altogether the finest and first of tests for the use of men, while any that pretend to be tests, without being so, are the vainest of all labours. And further, we must mark the exactness of the time, how exactly it completes all the processes of the heavens ; for here he who is convinced of the truth of the statement

[2] *i.e.* Plato's method of dialectic ; see General Introduction.

991 D ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς γέγονεν, ὅτι πρεσβύτερόν τ' ἐστὶν ἅμα καὶ θειότερον ψυχὴ σώματος, ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν παγκάλως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι τὸ θεῶν εἶναι πάντα πλέα καὶ μηδέποτε λήθῃ μηδὲ ἀμελείᾳ τῶν κρειττόνων ἡμᾶς παρωλιγωρῆσθαι. νοητέον δ' ἐστὶ περὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τόδε, ὡς, ἐὰν μέν τις ἕκαστα τούτων ὀρθῶς λαμβάνῃ, μέγ' ὄφελος γίγνεται τῷ παραλαμβάνοντι κατὰ τρόπον, εἰ δὲ μή, θεὸν ἄμεινον ἀεὶ καλεῖν· ὁ δὲ τρόπος ὅδε· E ἀνάγκη γὰρ τό γε τοσοῦτον φράζειν· πᾶν διάγραμμα ἀριθμοῦ τε σύστημα καὶ ἁρμονίας σύστασιν ἅπασαν τῆς τε τῶν ἄστρων περιφορᾶς τὴν ὁμολογίαν οὖσαν μίαν ἁπάντων ἀναφανῆναι δεῖ τῷ κατὰ τρόπον μανθάνοντι, ἀναφανήσεται δέ, ἄν, ὃ λέγομεν, ὀρθῶς τις εἰς ἓν βλέπων μανθάνῃ· 992 δεσμὸς γὰρ πεφυκὼς πάντων τούτων εἷς ἀναφανήσεται διανοουμένοις· εἰ δ' ἄλλως πως ταῦτα μεταχειριεῖταί τις, τύχην δεῖ καλεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ γε τούτων μήποτέ τις ἐν πόλεσιν εὐδαίμων γένηται φύσις, ἀλλ' οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, αὕτη ἡ[1] τροφή, ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα, εἴτε χαλεπὰ εἴτε ῥᾴδια, ταύτῃ πορευτέον· ἀμελῆσαι δὲ οὐ θεμιτόν ἐστι θεῶν, καταφανοῦς γενομένης τῆς πάντων αὐτῶν κατὰ τρόπον λεγομένης φήμης B εὐτυχοῦς. τὸν δὲ σύμπαντα ταῦτα οὕτως εἰληφότα, τοῦτον λέγω τὸν ἀληθέστατα σοφώτατον· ὃν καὶ διισχυρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπουδάζων ἅμα, ὅτε θανάτῳ τις τῶν τοιούτων τὴν αὑτοῦ μοῖραν

[1] ἡ Theo: om. mss.

[1] *i.e.* we must become aware of a single, unifying scheme of proportion running through geometrical figures and proportions ("diagrams"), arithmetical proportions ("systems

which has been made—that the soul is at once older and more divine than the body—will hold it a most admirable and satisfactory saying that all things are full of gods, and that we have never been disregarded in the least by any forgetfulness or neglect in these our superiors. And our view about all such matters must be that, if one conceives of each of them aright, it turns out a great boon to him who receives it in a proper way ; but failing this, he had better always call on God. The way is this—for it is necessary to explain it thus far : every diagram, and system of number, and every combination of harmony, and the agreement of the revolution of the stars must be made manifest as one through all [1] to him who learns in the proper way, and will be made manifest if, as we say, a man learns aright by keeping his gaze on unity ; for it will be manifest to us, as we reflect, that there is one bond naturally uniting all these things : but if one goes about it in some other way, one must call on Fortune, as we also put it. For never, without these lessons, will any nature be happy in our cities : no, this is the way, this the nurture, these the studies, whether they be difficult or easy, this is the path to pursue : to neglect the gods is not permissible, when the happiness that is properly referred to the fame of them all has been made manifest. And the man who has acquired all these things in this manner is he whom I account the most truly wisest : of him I also assert, both in jest and in earnest, that when one of his like completes his allotted span with

of number "), harmonic proportions (" combinations of harmony ")—corresponding to square, line and cube referred to in 991 A—and the rotations of the stars.

992 ἀναπλήσει, σχεδὸν ἐάνπερ ἔτ' ἀποθανὼν ᾖ, μήτε μεθέξειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε καθάπερ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς τε μοίρας μετειληφότα μόνον καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα, εὐδαίμονά τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ σοφώτατον ἅμα καὶ μακάριον, εἴτε τις ἐν ἠπείροις εἴτ' ἐν νήσοις μακάριος ὢν ζῇ, κἀκεῖνον μεθέξειν C τῆς τοιαύτης ἀεὶ τύχης, κεἴτε δημοσίᾳ τις ἐπιτηδεύσας ταῦτα εἴτε ἰδίᾳ διαβιῷ, τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως αὐτὸν πράξειν παρὰ θεῶν. ὃ δὲ κατ' ἀρχάς τε ἐλέγομεν, καὶ νῦν αὐτὸς[1] πάρεστι λόγος ἀληθὴς ὄντως, ὡς οὐ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις τελέως μακαρίοις τε καὶ εὐδαίμοσι γενέσθαι πλὴν ὀλίγων, ἔστι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς εἰρημένα· ὁπόσοι γὰρ θεῖοι καὶ σώφρονες ἅμα τῆς ἄλλης τε μετέχοντες ἀρετῆς φύσει, πρὸς D δὲ τούτοις ὅσα μαθήματος ἔχεται μακαρίου πάντα εἰληφότες, ἃ δ' ἔστιν εἰρήκαμεν, τούτοισι μόνοις τὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου σύμπαντα ἱκανῶς εἴληχέ τε καὶ ἔχει. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω διαπονήσασιν ἰδίᾳ λέγομεν καὶ δημοσίᾳ κατὰ νόμον τίθεμεν, εἰς πρεσβύτου τέλος ἀφικομένοις τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς παραδίδοσθαι δεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους τούτοις συνεπομένους εὐφημεῖν πάντας θεοὺς ἅμα καὶ πάσας, καὶ τὸν νυκτερινὸν σύλλογον ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν ἱκανῶς γνόντας τε καὶ δοκιμάσαντας E ἡμᾶς ὀρθότατα πάντας παρακαλεῖν.

[1] αὐτὸς Bekker: αὐτὸς MSS.

death, let me say if he still exists, though dead, he will not partake any more of the many sensations then as he does now, but having alone partaken of a single lot and having grown from many into one, will be happy and at the same time most wise and blessed, whether one has a blessed life in continents or in islands; and that such a man will partake always of the like fortune, and whether his life be spent in a public or in a private practice of these studies he will get the same treatment, in just the same manner, from the gods. And what we said at the beginning stands now also unchanged as a really true statement, that it is not possible for men to be completely blessed and happy, except a few—this has been correctly spoken. For as many as are divine and temperate also, and partakers of the rest of virtue in their nature, and have acquired besides all that pertains to blessed study—and all this we have explained—are the only persons by whom all the spiritual gifts are fully obtained and held. Those then who have thus worked through all these tasks we speak of privately, and publicly establish by law, as the men to whom, when they have attained the powers of seniority, the highest offices should be entrusted, while the rest should follow their lead, giving reverent praise to all gods and goddesses; and ordain that we most rightly incite all the Nocturnal Council to this wisdom, as we have now sufficiently distinguished and approved it.

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